Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An individual and a hotel who incurred a one percent surcharge on their electricity bills, collected by Southern California Edison (SCE) and remitted to the City of Santa Barbara, filed a class action challenging its validity. The city did not seek voter approval of the surcharge, which is collected pursuant to an ordinance and franchise agreement with the city. The California Constitution, as amended by Proposition 218, prohibits local governments from imposing new or increased taxes without first obtaining voter consent. (Cal. Const., art. XIII C, 2.) The court of appeal reversed the trial court. The surcharge is an illegal tax masquerading as a franchise fee. Distinguishable precedent cited by the city concerned traditional franchise fees collected for grants of rights of way rather than, as here, a surcharge collected for general revenue purposes. View "Jacks v. City of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Defendant Theodore Soria appeals after a jury found him guilty of rape of an unconscious person and rape of an intoxicated person. Defendant admitted habitual criminal prior serious felony and strike conviction allegations. Defendant was sentenced to a total aggregate term of 11 years. In sentencing defendant, the trial court imposed sentence on count two, but stayed execution of that sentence. On appeal, defendant argued conviction on one of the two counts should have been stricken because both counts were based on a single act. The State agreed that defendant could not be convicted of two counts, but argued the remedy was consolidation. Defendant also argued: (1) the DNA evidence was unreliable and should not have been admitted; (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the DNA evidence; (3) the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction on adoptive admissions; and (4) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to strike the prior strike conviction. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred by staying the sentence on one of the rape counts, and held that defendant’s convictions for rape of an intoxicated person and rape of an unconscious person should be consolidated into a single count. In unpublished portions of this opinion, the Court concluded that defendant forfeited his objection to the DNA evidence, and in any event that evidence was admissible and defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by not objecting to it. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in its instruction on adoptive admissions. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Soria" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Harris appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a blood test taken after he was arrested on suspicion of DUI. The superior court appellate division affirmed the order denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The appellate division did not address whether exigent circumstances supported the warrantless blood test because the People did not argue that exigent circumstances existed, and because the court concluded defendant consented to the test after the arresting officer advised defendant of the consequences of refusing to submit. The appellate division held that "Missouri v. McNeely," (569 U.S. ___ (2013)) did not foreclose consensual blood tests conducted under the implied consent law, and that defendant’s voluntarily and freely given consent satisfied the Fourth Amendment. After its review of the case, the Court of Appeal concluded that "McNeely" did not govern defendant’s case; that actual consent to a blood test satisfied the Fourth Amendment; that defendant’s submission to the blood test in this case was freely and voluntarily given and did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and that the record contained substantial evidence that defendant’s blood draw was conducted in a reasonable manner. "Defendant’s blood test was taken before the United States Supreme Court decided McNeely, and at a time when the California courts uniformly held that probable cause of DUI and the natural dissipation of alcohol or drugs in the bloodstream was sufficient to justify a warrantless blood test. Because the police obtained defendant’s blood sample without a warrant in reliance of binding precedent, excluding the evidence in this case would not achieve the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring future Fourth Amendment violations." Therefore, the Court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to suppress. View "California v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Leon Wilson Crockett filed a petition to recall his indeterminate life sentence. The statute, enacted as part of a November 2012 initiative measure, provided retrospective relief under narrow criteria from indeterminate life sentences imposed for recidivism. Defendant alleged that he was eligible for resentencing because his February 2009 commitment convictions (corporal injury to a cohabitant, false imprisonment by means of force or violence (as a lesser offense of kidnapping), and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury) were not “serious” or violent felonies, and neither his commitment convictions nor his other prior felony convictions came within any other disqualifying criteria. He asserted that the trial court as a result should resentence him to a determinate sentence of double the term otherwise applicable to his convictions. The original sentencing judge presided over the matter. The court appointed counsel and invited opposition from the prosecutor. The prosecutor “determined that the defendant is eligible for recall of sentence . . . and will therefore not object to the Court considering . . . re-sentencing.” However, the prosecutor contended defendant presented an unreasonable risk of danger to the safety of the public and asked that he not be resentenced. The trial court exercised its discretion to deny the petition on the ground that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Defendant appealed. On appeal, the State now sought to raise the threshold question of whether in fact defendant was eligible for resentencing. Procedurally, defendant argued he was entitled to have a jury determine the issue of unreasonable danger beyond a reasonable doubt, or have the court determine the issue either by that standard or by clear and convincing evidence. He also argued that whatever the burden of proof, the prosecution did not satisfy it. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant was eligible for resentencing, he was not entitled to a jury to determine the issue of unreasonable danger, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching its judgment. View "California v. Crockett" on Justia Law

Bob has been the pastor of Visalia’s Calvary Chapel Church for 35 years; he wrote a book, “A Common Miracle,” runs a website to teach the Bible, hosts a radio show, and volunteers as a police chaplain. Bob has been married since 1977 and has four children, including Alex, a stepson who Bob raised since Alex was three years old. In 2004-2005, Alex accused Bob of emotionally and physically abusing him and his brothers. Tim joined the Church in 2005 and began an online discussion about Bob. Alex added comments. In 2010, Alex created his own website/blog where he writes about Bob and Calvary Chapel. Tim contributes comments. The two referred to Bob’s drug dealing, drug smuggling, child abuse, stealing money from the church, and spiritual abuse. Denying a motion to dismiss Bob’s defamation suit as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, the trial court concluded that the alleged defamatory statements concerned an issue of public interest and that Bob was a limited purpose public figure, but that Bob had shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. The court of appeal affirmed, while holding that Bob is not a limited purpose public figure. View "Grenier v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Following a 2012 Los Angeles shooting Castaneda died; Barragan and Villanueva survived. Two surveillance cameras recorded the shooting. Police directed their attention to Art, who was then 13 years old. Art’s custodial interrogation was videotaped and subsequently transcribed. After viewing a videotape of the shooting, Art said “Could I have an attorney? Because that’s not me." Art, denied a request to see his mother, subsequently made incriminating statements. The court of appeal reversed denial of a motion to suppress, holding that the statement was an unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. A reasonable officer, in light of the circumstances known to the officer or that would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, including the juvenile’s age, would understand the statement by the juvenile to be a request for an attorney. The error was not harmless. View "In re Art T." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Dana Wilson of one count of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1) and three counts of making criminal threats (counts 2, 4, and 5). The jury further found that defendant personally used a deadly weapon in connection with count 2, and that he committed a secondary offense while released on bail as to count 4. The court sentenced defendant to two years in prison on count 1 and concurrent 16 month sentences on counts 2, 4, and 5. The court struck the weapon allegation on count 2 and the out-on-bail allegation on count 4. The only issue raised on appeal was whether defendant should have been convicted of and punished for two counts of making criminal threats (counts 4 & 5) based on a single 15 minute incident during which defendant continuously menaced the victim and (at least) twice threatened to kill the victim and his family. Defendant argued his behavior amounted to a single violation. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed defendant’s conviction on count 5, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged a City of Sacramento ordinance. Among other things, they argued the ordinance was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to them. A private property owner agreed that plaintiffs, 22 homeless individuals and two people providing services to the homeless, could camp on his lot in a light industrial area of the City. City police informed plaintiffs that their camping violated a City ordinance prohibiting extended camping on public or private property without a permit. When plaintiffs continued to camp on the lot, the police gave them citations on two occasions and removed their camping gear. Plaintiffs brought in other camping gear each time and continued their camping activities. The police ultimately arrested them. Plaintiffs sued the City, claiming the camping ordinance was unconstitutional and the City enforces the ordinance in a discriminatory manner. The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer with leave to amend. Rather than amend the complaint, the parties agreed judgment could be entered against plaintiffs and plaintiffs could appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal reversed a portion of the trial court’s order sustaining the City’s demurrer. Although plaintiffs failed to meet their appellate burden on most of their claims, they stated a cause of action for declaratory relief asserting an as-applied challenge based on equal protection. View "Allen v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Munoz violated probation by driving on a suspended license and possessing methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced him to three years in county jail followed by three years of mandatory supervision subject to terms and conditions including that he participate in psychological or psychiatric counseling/treatment if directed to do so by his probation officer, and that he sign any release of information necessary to allow the exchange of information between his probation officer, counselors, and therapists. On appeal, defendant argued the condition requiring submission to psychiatric counseling was invalid, and the condition requiring the release of confidential mental health information was overbroad. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant forfeited his claims by failing to object to imposition of either mandatory supervision condition. Furthermore, the Court concluded defense counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to these conditions. View "California v. Munoz" on Justia Law