Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Wyatt Cannata appeals from the judgment following his conviction on one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, for which he was sentenced to twelve years. Cannata's first trial ended in a hung jury; his conviction came after a second trial. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in the second trial by ruling that if he elected to testify on his own behalf, his statements to a staff member at a psychiatric hospital could be used by the prosecutor for impeachment. According to defendant, this ruling improperly forced him to choose between testifying on his own behalf and maintaining the confidentiality of his privileged psychotherapy communications. Defendant also contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 1110 and 1120, which, he argues, omit a required element of the charged crimes, i.e., that the lewd or lascivious acts were committed “in a lewd or sexual manner.” After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the asserted psychotherapist privilege did not apply and therefore rejected this contention. With regard to the jury instruction, the Court concluded that the omission, if it was one, was harmless. Therefore Cannata's conviction was affirmed. View "California v. Cannata" on Justia Law

Three small political parties and several party members and candidates sought to invalidate California’s electoral system for statewide and legislative offices, contending the system, which consists of an open nonpartisan election followed by a runoff between the top-two candidates, deprives them of equal protection and associational and voting rights secured by the state and federal Constitutions. According to plaintiffs, because “minor” party candidates are typically eliminated in the primary election, they are denied the constitutional right to participate in the general election upon a showing of substantial public support. Plaintiffs also contend their associational rights are violated by the effective limitation of their participation to the primary election, when voter participation is typically less than half that of the general election; that the electoral system denies them equal protection because they are no longer able to regularly participate in the general election, as they were under the prior electoral system; and that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, without permitting them a hearing on the evidentiary support for their claims. The court of appeal affirmed The dismissal. View "Rubin v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In 1996 Ritzhoff was injured while working as a banquet server. He sustained permanent injuries to his ankle and injured his hand and back. His treating psychiatrist initially evaluated Ritzhoff in 2001 and noted that Ritzhoff demonstrated diminished cognitive functioning, had severe depression, suicidal ideation, severe anxiety, and total neuroticism. The doctor found Ritzhoff temporarily totally disabled on a psychiatric basis and in need of emotional treatment. His employer made temporary disability payments until 2006. Ritzhoff admitted working from time-to-time since his injury. At a third hearing in 2013, Ritzhoff refused to respond to cross-examination. The workers’ compensation judge found Ritzhoff totally permanently disabled on a psychiatric basis, originating in the orthopedic injury. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed. The court of appeal annulled the determination. That the decision was supported by substantial evidence is beside the point. The appeals board exceeded its powers when it adopted a decision as its own that was flawed by a denial of due process with respect to cross-examination. View "Ogden Entm't Servs. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Victor Espudo Ramirez, Jr., and his brother Armando Ramirez of first degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. The jury found true a gang special circumstance allegation on the murder count, and also found true a gang enhancement and firearm enhancement on that count. Defendants argued on appeal of their convictions that the trial court erroneously prevented the jury from considering their self-defense claim by instructing the jury categorically that “[a] person does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.” (CALCRIM No. 3472.) The prosecutor argued repeatedly based on the plain terms of this instruction that even if the jury believed defendants sought to provoke only a fistfight, their bare intent “to use force” as stated in the instruction meant they forfeited a claim of imperfect self-defense. After review, the Court of Appeal held that the instruction misstated the law. The trial court sentenced defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a term of 25 years to life for the firearm use. Based on the instructional error, we reverse the judgment. View "California v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Several attorneys from the public defender’s office represented Espinoza in lengthy pretrial proceedings as he repeatedly moved for dismissal of counsel. In the week before trial, the court denied additional motions to dismiss counsel. The case went to trial. During jury selection, the court granted Espinoza’s “Faretta” motion, denied his motion for a one-day continuance, and dismissed the public defender. Espinoza proceeded with the trial in pro per, but on the second day of the evidentiary phase, failed to appear. After trying unsuccessfully to locate Espinoza, the court proceeded in his absence without appointing defense counsel. The jury found Espinoza guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon; possession of morphine; possession of marijuana; possession of ammunition by a felon; and possession of diazepam without a prescription, but acquitted him on charges of making criminal threats and attempting to dissuade a witness by use or threat of force. The court of appeal reversed. The court erred by proceeding with trial in the absence of Espinoza and defense counsel because Espinoza did not knowingly waive several fundamental trial rights. The error was structural, requiring automatic reversal. The court erred also erred in denying a continuance after granting the Faretta motion. View "People v. Espinoza" on Justia Law

Defendant Steven Zinda chased David Valdez into a field and murdered him with an axe. After drinking with some friends at a house in Rio Linda, Valdez decided to leave around 2:00 a.m. He was intoxicated and did not make it very far before driving his Honda Passport into a ditch near defendant's house. Valdez stayed with his vehicle while two friends left in a truck to get some tow chains. Meanwhile, defendant's house was being burglarized. Defendant stayed the night at a friend's house, but had reason to believe certain neighborhood gang members wanted to steal from him, so he set his alarm for 3:00 a.m. and stopped by his house to check on it before his early morning work shift. He arrived to find the burglary in progress. One burglar fled to a waiting car and drove away. Defendant went into his house, grabbed an axe from inside, and came back out. He then saw Valdez waiting for his friends on the side of the road. Assuming Valdez was one of the burglars, defendant walked out to him with the axe and yelled at him. Valdez ran. Defendant took this to be an admission of guilt and gave chase. Defendant was convicted by jury of second degree murder and found to have personally used a deadly weapon during the commission of the crime. He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate prison term of 15 years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of one year. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court: (1) erred by not instructing the jury, sua sponte, on (a) justifiable homicide in making an arrest, and (b) mistake of fact; (2) erroneously instructed the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter; and (3) erroneously excluded "evidence that [Valdez] claimed a gang affiliation, and photographs which either suggested a gang affiliation or gave a more accurate and neutral portrait of the victim near the time of his death." Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Zinda," on Justia Law

Defendant Jorge Armando Juarez Perez pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine for sale and possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. The court placed him on probation and ordered him to spend 180 days in jail with credit for 157 days, including conduct credits. Defendant subsequently filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court denied defendant's motion without stating any reasons. Defendant appealed that denial. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed: based on the record in this matter, including the superior court's failure to state any reason for denying defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court abused its discretion. "We remand the matter for further proceedings. This is not to say defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, but when the evidence is one-sided and the court's ruling is contrary to that evidence, an order denying relief should alert the reviewing court as to the reason(s) for such a ruling. A denial without any statement of a reason provides no reasonable basis for the denial." View "California v. Perez" on Justia Law

Mother "T.A." appealed a judgment finding that R.M. was the presumed father of her biological daughter. T.A. conceived the child through artificial insemination procedures, and R.M. was not the biological father. The trial court declared R.M. to be the child's presumed father by applying the parentage presumption in Family Code 7611(d). Mother claimed she chose to be a single parent of the child and raised numerous constitutional and other legal challenges to the manner in which the presumed parent statutory scheme was applied in her case. Based on the fundamental constitutional right to parent one's child without interference, she requested that the Court of Appeal establish a rule that a decision to form a single parent family should be afforded the same constitutional protection as a two parent familial arrangement. She also asserted the standards associated with the presumed parent statute did not adequately protect the constitutional rights of a single parent "by choice." After review, the Court of Appeal held that application of the presumed parent statutory scheme in this case did not constitute an unconstitutional interference with T.A.'s fundamental right to parent her child. Furthermore, the Court held the evidentiary record supported that R.M. was the child's presumed parent and that the presumption was not rebutted. View "R.M. v. T.A." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Juanita Vidana guilty of one count of grand theft by larceny and one count of grand theft by embezzlement. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant 36 months of formal probation. She was ordered to serve 240 days in jail: 30 straight days, and the remainder to be served on weekends. In addition to the usual fines and fees, defendant was ordered to pay $58,273.02 in victim restitution. Defendant appealed her sentence, arguing: (1) the two counts, larceny and embezzlement, were not separate offenses, but two ways of committing a single offense: theft; (2) the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to reduce the charges to misdemeanors; and (4) the court abused its discretion in setting the amount of restitution at $58,273.02. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with her first contention and struck her conviction under count 2 (grand theft). In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court rejected her remaining contentions and affirmed the remainder of the judgment. View "California v. Vidana" on Justia Law

In 1994, at age 14, Ruelas admitted committing felony assault with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor annoying or molesting a child. Three years later, while Ruelas was still a minor, the juvenile court found true allegations that he had committed three felonies: robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and vehicle theft, and committed Ruelas to the California Youth Authority for a maximum term of eight years two months, including four months imposed as a result of Ruelas’s prior admission of annoying or molesting a child. Upon his release, Ruelas was required to register as a sex offender because of his Penal Code 647.6 adjudication. In 2012, Ruelas unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate arguing that his equal protection guarantees were violated by the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The court of appeal reversed. Requiring registration for those adjudicated of violating section 647.6 as juveniles only if they are committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice because they have committed another nonsex crime violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. View "Ruelas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law