Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the California constitution's prohibition against the impairment of contracts precluded the application of the defined benefit formulas and employee contribution provisions of the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act of 2013 to County of San Diego safety employees who were hired after the Act's effective date, but who were covered by preexisting collective bargaining agreements containing conflicting terms. After review, the Court concluded the application of the defined benefit formula provisions did not result in a constitutionally prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court did not reach the constitutional question as to the application of the employee contribution provisions as the Court concluded their application resulted in a statutorily prohibited impairment of the agreements. The Court affirmed the judgment as to the application of the defined benefit formula provisions and remanded the case back to the superior court for further proceedings as to the application of the employee contribution provisions. View "Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 1995, Wilson, White and Carr, all age 17, approached a Pomona bank, wearing masks and carrying handguns. One of them fired at the security guard who stood outside the bank. The guard fled and alerted police. Inside the bank, they told the customers to “hit the deck.” Theresa Hernandez, a bank employee, was shot and killed during the robbery. The three fled in a car driven by Smith. Another car occupied by Brown also waited nearby. White later admitted to his girlfriend that he had shot Hernandez during the robbery because he thought she was activating an alarm. Brown was arrested. Wilson, Carr and White turned themselves into the police a few days after the robbery. Wilson, sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, sought habeas relief in 2013, asserting, that under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama (2012) the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and that he is entitled to be resentenced based on the individual sentencing factors that the Miller Court directed trial courts to consider when sentencing a juvenile offender for a homicide conviction. The court of appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "In re: Wilson" on Justia Law

After defendant-respondent Hugo Camp entered into a plea agreement, the trial court imposed a stipulated split sentence of 28 months, with 14 months to be served in local custody and 14 months under mandatory supervision. In preparing for Camp's release from custody, the probation officer filed a report indicating that the officer had recently learned that Camp was ineligible for mandatory supervision because he was subject to an immigration hold and would be deported upon his release from custody. At a hearing to consider this issue, defense counsel requested that the court terminate the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence and permit him to be deported. The trial court agreed, terminated the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's sentence, and ordered Camp released to an immigration enforcement agent. On appeal, the State argued that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in terminating the mandatory supervision portion of Camp's split sentence. The State argued that the court's only options were to order Camp to serve the remainder of the 28-month sentence in custody, or permit him to withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order. View "California v. Camp" on Justia Law

A.L., a minor, was charged with felony second degree robbery of another minor, personally using a handgun. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing; testimony focused on the sequence of events and on A.L.’s relative culpability. During closing argument, the juvenile court noted that it “didn’t think there was any evidence” of the section 12022(b) enhancement, which requires personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon. The prosecutor indicated that A.L. had been mistakenly charged under section 12022(b) and should have been charged with the section 12022(a) enhancement, for vicarious liability when another principal is armed. She moved to amend the petition to conform to proof. A.L.’s attorney objected. The judge concluded that A.L. would not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the change, permitted the amendment, sustained the second degree robbery allegation, and found true the section 12022(a) enhancement. At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court adjudged A.L. a ward of the juvenile court with a maximum period of confinement of six years, including one year for the section 12022(a) enhancement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court violated A.L.’s due process rights by allowing amendment of his delinquency petition during closing arguments. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

In 2000, the California voters passed Proposition 36 for the purpose of placing nonviolent drug offenders into substance abuse treatment programs, rather than incarcerating them. In 2011, the Legislature enacted realignment legislation, including the Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 2011. Defendant Evan Taylor Armogeda appealed a trial court order requiring him to serve 60 days in jail for committing an NVDP violation of his supervision. Defendant argued the Act, which authorized the court’s order, improperly amended Proposition 36 and thereby violated the California Constitution. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court's order. View "California v. Armogeda" on Justia Law

California voters adopted Proposition 13 in 1978 to require, among other constitutionally implemented tax relief measures, that any “special taxes” for cities, counties, and special districts be approved by two-thirds of voters. In 1996, voters adopted Proposition 218 with one of its aims being “to tighten the two-thirds voter approval requirement for „special taxes‟ and assessments imposed by Proposition 13.” To this end, Proposition 218 added article XIII C to require that new taxes imposed by a local government be subject to two-thirds vote by the electorate. Article XIII C was amended by the voters in 2010 when they passed Proposition 26. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether Proposition 26 applied to a practice by the City of Redding of making an annual budget transfer from the Redding Electrical Utility to Redding's general fund. Because the Utility was municipally owned, it was not subject to a one percent ad valorem tax imposed on privately owned utilities in California. However, the amount transferred between the Utility's funds and the Redding general fund was designed to be equivalent to the ad valorem tax the Utility would have to pay if privately owned. Redding described the annual transfer as a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT). The PILOT was not set by ordinance, but was part of the Redding biennial budget. Plaintiffs in this case (Citizens for Fair REU Rates, Michael Schmitz, Shirlyn Pappas, and Fee Fighter LLC) challenged the PILOT on grounds it constituted a tax for which article XIII C required approval by two-thirds of voters. Redding argued the PILOT was not a tax, and if it was, it was grandfathered-in because it precedesd the adoption of Proposition 26. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the PILOT was a tax under Proposition 26 for which Redding needed to secure two-thirds voter approval unless it proved the amount collected was necessary to cover the reasonable costs to the city to provide electric service. The Court rejected Redding's assertion the PILOT is grandfathered-in by preceding Proposition 26's adoption: "[t]he PILOT does not escape the purview of Proposition 26 because it is a long-standing practice." Because the trial court concluded the PILOT was reasonable as a matter of law, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing in which Redding would have the opportunity to prove the PILOT did not exceed reasonable costs under article XIII C, section 1, subdivision (e)(2). View "Citizens for Fair REU Rates v. City of Redding" on Justia Law

Petitioner Farhad Fredericks made a California Public Records Act (CPRA) request to defendant and real party in interest, the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Department (the Department), for all "complaints and/or requests for assistance" made to the Department during a six-month period (180 days), pertaining to burglary and identity theft. In response to the request, the Department notified Fredericks that its investigation reports were exempt from disclosure under the CPRA, but it would provide him with redacted, summarized information in its relevant "Calls for Service" reports (e.g., deletion of names of victims), but only about incidents that had occurred during the 60 days before the date of the request. If he continued to seek the Incident History Reports for the same period, they would be provided in redacted form, conditioned on payment of costs for staff preparation costs, plus charged per page disclosed. In response, Fredericks filed a petition for writ of mandate with the trial court to challenge the Department's incomplete compliance with his request. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that the CPRA only requires the Department to provide information relating to current or "contemporaneous" police activity. In this original proceeding, the Court of Appeal addressed the interpretation of CPRA section 6254, subdivision (f)(2), about the temporal and substantive scope of disclosure that a local law enforcement agency must make under the CPRA: (1) Whether the Department adequately responded to the request by supplying its summary Calls for Service reports, in light of any applicable exemptions from disclosure of records or information; and (2) whether the Department was justified in denying Fredericks the requested access to information from "complaints and/or requests for assistance" that was more than 60 days old, that it categorized as "historical" in nature. After review, the Court concluded the trial court's narrow construction of the Department's disclosure duties under the CPRA is incorrect both as to the substantive and temporal limits placed upon them. Accordingly, the Court granted Fredericks' petition and directed the trial court to allow such appropriate further proceedings as will determine the reasonable and appropriate levels of disclosures and the allowable costs. View "Fredericks v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Robert Orlosky appealed his conviction of marijuana possession and cultivation. He argued the trial court erred in refusing his request to instruct the jury on the statutory collective cultivation defense, which permits qualified medical marijuana patients to join together to cultivate marijuana to meet their medical needs. The trial court rejected application of the collective cultivation defense on the basis that defendant and his roommate (who were growing marijuana together) had not formed a marijuana collective with some indicia of formality. The Attorney General acknowledged that an instruction on the collective cultivation defense was likely warranted (although maintaining the particular instruction drafted by defense counsel did not accurately apply to the facts of this case). The Court of Appeal concluded, after review of the facts of this case, that the court erred in refusing to instruct on the defense. The Court also found the error was prejudicial. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Orlosky" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Aaron Campbell met Silvester Leyva at a hookah bar where they exchanged telephone numbers and discussed buying and selling marijuana. A few days later, Campbell and defendant and appellant Xavier Fort, among others, went to Leyva’s house to obtain marijuana. Leyva and his friend, Samuel De La Torre, met Campbell in Leyva’s front yard. After De La Torre handed marijuana to Campbell, Campbell pulled a gun and began to back away toward two waiting vehicles. Fort, who was standing near the vehicles, fired his gun in the direction of the house. Leyva was killed by one of the bullets. A jury convicted defendants of first degree murder and found true a robbery special-circumstance allegation. The jury also convicted them of two counts of robbery based upon the taking of the marijuana. In one robbery count, Leyva was the victim; in the other, De La Torre was the victim. Regarding the murder charge, the jury was instructed on first degree felony murder only, with robbery as the underlying felony. On appeal, Fort argued that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses. The Court of Appeal agreed: there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that a lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. Therefore, the court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to lesser included offenses. Because the error was not harmless, Fort’s murder conviction was reversed. Because the instructional error may have led the jury to convict Fort of the robbery counts, the conviction on those counts was also reversed. In the nonpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected defendants’ argument that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions of the robbery of Leyva. View "California v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant pleaded no contest to unlawful exhibition of a firearm and grand theft. The trial court suspended imposition of sentencing and granted defendant formal probation for a period of 36 months. Among the terms of his probation, defendant was ordered to “obey all laws” and “not to use or possess any controlled substance, including marijuana, unless you [defendant] have a licensed prescription for the marijuana that is approved by the court.” Defendant was thereafter charged, in 2013, with misdemeanor unlawful possession of concentrated cannabis, and was alleged to have violated his probation based on that possession. Defendant moved in limine for the trial court to take judicial notice of an Attorney General’s opinion that concentrated cannabis is “marijuana” as that term is used in the Compassionate Use Act (CUA). The State moved to exclude evidence of the CUA, contending the reference to the term “marijuana” in the act precluded an interpretation that concentrated cannabis was also covered by the act because marijuana and concentrated cannabis are elsewhere separately defined and punished. The trial court reviewed the existing persuasive authority indicating that concentrated cannabis is covered by the CUA, rejected the authority as “unsound,” and ruled that “the [CUA] does not apply to concentrated cannabis” because the CUA does not define marijuana, refer to concentrated cannabis, or incorporate statutory definitions of either term. Defendant unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of that ruling. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court violated his due process rights by erroneously precluding him from presenting the affirmative defense that he was permitted to possess concentrated cannabis pursuant to the CUA, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that he violated the terms of his probation by possessing the concentrated cannabis because he had an adequate physician's recommendation. The Attorney General agreed, as did the Court of Appeal. The trial court's judgment that defendant violated the terms of his probation was reversed. View "California v. Mulcrevy" on Justia Law