Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Curtis Slaton was convicted by jury of murder. The prosecution’s theory in the case was that defendant committed the murder because he affiliated with a gang that wore blue and the victim wore red—a color associated with a rival gang. The trial court allowed the prosecution to present limited gang evidence to advance this theory, including screenshots from a music video that, among other things, show defendant affiliating with a known gang member, displaying a symbol of the gang, and holding up a blue bandana. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court wrongly admitted these screenshots for three reasons: (1) this evidence was inadmissible to show his potential motive for the charged murder; (2) they were highly inflammatory and carried minimal relevance; and (3) a new statute governing the admission of music videos and other forms of creative expression—which became effective after the trial here— applied retroactively and requires reversal. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Slaton" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. During jury selection, the State exercised a challenge for cause against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda. On appeal, Aranda argued the State's challenge for cause during jury selection was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this was a presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, and the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection to the challenge. The Court of Appeal determined that argument failed because section 231.7 applied only to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. View "California v. Aranda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Anthony Narro molested two of his stepdaughters and one of his stepdaughter’s friends for a period of over 10 years. He was convicted of numerous sexual offenses and sentenced to 195 years to life. On appeal he argued: (1) the judgment should have been reversed because CALCRIM No. 1191B violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution by allowing jurors to rely on currently charged crimes to find he had the propensity to commit other currently charged crimes; and (2) the trial court erred by awarding restitution in the amount of $9,461.34 as noneconomic damages pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4(f)(3)(F) in order for a victim’s mother to replace the furniture where the molestations had occurred because the furniture invoked painful memories. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment. View "California v. Narro" on Justia Law

Defendant Fermin Perez-Robles, a massage therapist, was convicted by jury on 16 counts of sexual penetration and sexual battery involving six clients and sentenced to 15 years in prison. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on 10 counts, including those for sexual battery by restraint; (2) the jury was not properly instructed on lesser included offenses on four counts; (3) the jury was improperly instructed on using other charged sex offenses as propensity evidence; (4) the prosecutor misstated the law during closing argument; and (5) the imposition of the upper term sentence on one count had to be reversed and remanded based on recent changes to Penal Code section 1170. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence was insufficient to support one count (count 4); although there was sufficient evidence of restraint, the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses on two counts (counts 14 & 20); and the imposition of the upper term sentence on count 11 had to be vacated and remanded for resentencing. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Perez-Robles" on Justia Law

In 2001, petitioner Ronnie Harrell was charged with five felonies, including attempted murder, each with a firearm enhancement and a gang enhancement; a prior prison term enhancement and a strike prior were also alleged. He was allowed to enter into a plea bargain, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to robbery, with a firearm enhancement, and admitted a strike prior. He was sentenced to 28 years in prison — the term prescribed by the plea bargain. In 2023, Harrell filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91. Harrell was honorably discharged from the United States Army in 1981, and he claimed to suffer from several service-related disorders. The trial court denied the petition, relying on case law holding that a person serving a stipulated sentence was categorically ineligible for relief under section 1170.91. It rejected Harrell’s argument that recent amendments to section 1170.91 had abrogated that case law. To this, the Court of Appeal found was error: the amendments deleted language from section 1170.91 that courts had previously relied on in holding that persons serving a stipulated sentence were ineligible. They also added new language allowing a trial court to reduce a conviction or a sentence “regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea . . . .” View "California v. Harrell" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rhonda Jenkins appealed an order recommitting her as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972. Jenkins contended substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that she represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others because of her severe mental disorder. After careful review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed: the mental health experts who evaluated Jenkins expressed concern that she was not ready to leave the hospital due to her mental illness and level of functioning, and that she had unrealistic expectations about the challenges she would face. "They nevertheless failed to identify any history of dangerous behavior beyond her commitment offense in 1999 or explain how their concerns translate into difficulty controlling her dangerous behavior." Because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenkins then-represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others, the Court reversed the trial court’s order recommitting her for an additional year. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and gang and firearm enhancements and sentenced to a total term of 22 years. Appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court granted the petition, vacated Appellant’s conviction, and resentenced him to the midterm of three years on the target offense of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The court awarded Appellant the same number of custody credits he was awarded at his initial sentencing and reimposed the same fines, fees, and direct victim restitution. Appellant contends the court erred in several respects. He primarily argued that he should have received additional custody credits for the time he served on his original sentence. Respondent Attorney General concedes Appellant is correct.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s order in part, specifically to the calculation of Appellant’s custody credits and their application to his restitution and parole revocation fines. The court explained that where a defendant has served any portion of his sentence under a commitment based upon a judgment which judgment is subsequently declared invalid or which is modified during the term of imprisonment, such time shall be credited upon any subsequent sentence he may receive upon a new commitment for the same criminal act or acts.” In the specific context of a resentencing under section 1172.6, a person resentenced “shall be given credit for time served.” The court held that the trial court did not fulfill this obligation, rendering Appellant’s sentence unauthorized. View "P. v. Rojas" on Justia Law

San Francisco Officer Gunn testified that he observed a Buick parked in a “known high-crime area” and ran a license plate check, which came back as belonging to an Acura. Finley, who is Black, stepped out of the vehicle with his wife. Finley stated that they had recently purchased the vehicle and provided title and registration information, establishing the car was not stolen. After obtaining Finley’s driver’s license, Gunn learned that Finley was on federal probation with a search clause. Gunn searched the vehicle and retrieved a backpack, containing a loaded handgun without a serial number.Finley alleged a violation of the Racial Justice Act (Penal Code 745(a)(1)). The prosecution noted that the Supreme Court has stated that an area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in determining the reasonableness of investigative detention and that it is “common practice” for an officer to run a query of a person’s name. The trial court concluded that Finley did not establish a prima facie violation of the Racial Justice Act under the totality of the circumstances, noting that the officer was courteous.The court of appeal ordered a rehearing. The trial court’s review of Finley’s motion went beyond the confines of determining whether it stated a prima facie case. The focus at this stage of the proceedings should be on Finley’s allegations and supporting evidence, not evidence supporting the prosecution’s argument. View "Finley v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Karl Doron appealed after his guilty plea to nine counts of robbery, two counts of attempted robbery, and allegations he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the robberies. Before entering into his plea, Doron unsuccessfully requested pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The court sentenced Doron to a prison sentence of 10 years four months in accordance with his plea. In his initial appellate briefing, Doron contended the trial court abused its discretion by ruling he had not made a prima facie showing he was entitled to mental health diversion. After the State filed its respondent’s brief, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to revise the eligibility test for pretrial diversion (Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023), and the parties submitted supplemental briefing on the issue. Doron then contended under the amended statute, which applied retroactively to his case, the trial court was required to find his mental disorder was a substantial factor in the commission of his crimes absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. He maintained there was no substantial evidence to rebut this presumption, and thus he was both eligible and suitable for pretrial mental health diversion. Doron alternatively asked the Court of Appeal remand his matter for an evidentiary hearing governed by section 1001.36’s new principles. The State conceded, and the Court of Appeal agreed, that amended section 1001.36 applied retroactively to Doron’s nonfinal judgment. The State argued, however, the proper remedy was not for the Court to engage in factfinding so as to decide whether Doron met the criteria for diversion, but to remand the matter for a new prima facie evidentiary hearing consistent with section 1001.36’s amendments. To this the Court concurred, and remanded the case with directions that the trial court consider Doron’s request for mental health diversion under amended section 1001.36. View "California v. Doron" on Justia Law

Castaneda-Prado was convicted of five counts of committing a lewd act on a child under age 14, with allegations that the charges involved multiple victims and substantial sexual conduct. Castaneda-Prado was sentenced to 125 years to life; five consecutive prison terms of 25 years to life. Castaneda-Prado argued the court erred by excluding evidence that one of the children believed that, by accusing Castaneda-Prado of sexual molestation, she was helping her mother obtain a “U visa,” which can provide legal status for victims of certain crimes who assist in the investigation of those crimes.The court of appeal reversed his convictions. The exclusion of this evidence violated Castaneda-Prado’s right to confront a witness against him under the federal and state constitutions. On the record cannot be considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury’s guilty verdicts turned almost entirely on the credibility of the girls. There was no physical evidence of the alleged sexual offenses. The court noted that it was irrelevant whether a U visa was possible or whether the mother actually sought a visa; what mattered was the girl’s belief. In addition, the prosecutor highlighted the absence of any proven basis to question the motives of either witness. View "People v. Castaneda-Prado" on Justia Law