Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiffs in this case, John Sanderson and George Taylor, sued Douglas Burdick, an Illinois resident, for defamation and other intentional torts, based on an allegedly defamatory posting made by Burdick on his personal Facebook page while he was in Illinois. The respondent court denied Burdick’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, and Burdick challenged that ruling by petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that posting defamatory statements about a person on a Facebook page, while knowing that person resides in the forum state, is insufficient in itself to create the minimum contacts necessary to support specific personal jurisdiction in a lawsuit arising out of that posting. Instead, it is necessary that the nonresident defendant not only intentionally post the statements on the Facebook page, but that the defendant expressly aim or specifically direct his or her intentional conduct at the forum, rather than at a plaintiff who lives there. View "Burdick v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mackey and Bey were charged with the murder of journalist Chauncey Bailey and the murders of Wills and Roberson. Mackey was also charged as a felon in possession of a firearm; Bey was charged with shooting at an unoccupied vehicle in a separate incident before the murders. In a joint trial Mackey was convicted of the first degree murders of Bailey and Wills, and Bey was convicted of three first degree murders, with special circumstance findings of multiple murders on each conviction for both. Mackey was sentenced to two life terms without possibility of parole, and Bey was given three life terms without parole. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that denial of a motion for change of venue did not result in an unfair trial and refusal to sever Mackey’s case was not an abuse of discretion. Because California case law allowed warrantless placement of a GPS device by law enforcement when the device was placed, the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has since held such conduct requires a warrant did not dictate exclusion of GPS tracking evidence in this case. The court rejected claims pf instructional errors and related ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "People v. Mackey" on Justia Law

In 1993, a jury convicted Young of the second degree murder of his former girlfriend in 1991. He was sentenced to a term of 15 years to life. Now 53 years old, he has been denied parole by the Board five times. The court of appeal previously held that the Board’s 2009 denial violated his due process rights and that stated reasons for denial were not supported by evidence rationally indicative of current dangerousness. The Board failed to conduct a new suitability hearing as ordered, but in 2012, held another hearing and denied parole, committing the same errors previously pointed out: it did not duly consider Young’s insights into why he committed the murder or the prolonged stresses he experienced prior to it; mischaracterized his insights and stresses; and failed to consider his post-conviction conduct. The heinous nature of the crime itself is not sufficient to deny parole. The Board violated his due process rights to a decision based on the evidence, not conjecture, and on consideration of all relevant suitability factors. The court ordered the Board to vacate its denial and immediately grant parole, subject to review by the Governor. View "In re Young" on Justia Law

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed the grant of a writ of ordinary mandate compelling it to set aside its calculation of the period of postconviction suspension of licensee Charles James Piper, arguing the trial court misconstrued the statutes governing the interplay of suspensions due to administrative actions by the DMV and criminal actions in drunk driving (DUI) cases. After Piper was arrested for DUI, he was issued an administrative per se suspension notice, alleging his blood alcohol reading exceeded .08 percent. After a hearing, DMV suspended his driver’s license for four months. After 51 days, Piper applied for and received a restricted license that allowed him to drive to and from work and his mandatory first DUI offender class. DMV thereafter reinstated his full, unrestricted, driving privileges. However, one day before the reinstatement, Piper was convicted of DUI based on the same incident. DMV again suspended his license. He could again apply for a restricted license, but his license could not be reinstated until six months after his conviction. Piper sought a writ of mandate compelling the DMV to credit him for the first suspension, so that the total suspension would not exceed the longer of the two suspension periods. DMV credited Piper with only the 51 days his license was suspended before he asked for and received a restricted license based on his first (administrative) suspension. Piper received a restricted license after his second (postconviction) suspension, which again allowed him to drive to and from DUI classes and work. Based on these facts, the trial court found Piper was “treated in an arbitrary and capricious fashion simply because of the unusually lengthy time lapse between his arrest and administrative suspension pursuant to [] 13353.2, and his eventual conviction and resultant suspension pursuant to [] 13352.” The court issued a writ of mandate compelling DMV to reinstate Piper’s driving privileges.The DMV appealed. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court's conclusion and its judgment granting the writ. Section 13352.4 (relied upon by the trial court), which allowed for postconviction restricted licenses in lieu of suspensions, defined when the postconviction suspension restriction begins and provided that it “shall remain in effect until the final day of the original suspension imposed” under section 13352 “and may include credit for any suspension period served under subdivision (c) of Section 13353.3.” But by its terms, the reference to “the final day of the original suspension imposed” merely marked the end of the period of restriction, and did not mean that a restricted license is a type of suspended license. Piper conceded he was given 51 days credit towards his postconviction suspension for the preconviction period during which his license was suspended, before he asked for and received a restricted license. He was entitled to no additional credit. Based on the statutory scheme, the Court of Appeal saw no mandatory duty that DMV failed to carry out. Accordingly, Piper was not entitled to writ relief. View "Piper v. Dept. Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Arturo Hernandez was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and five other charges and sentenced to 61 years to life in prison for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old. On appeal, he argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because: (1) his attorney did not move to suppress his confession; and (2) his attorney did not object to his sentence as violating the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. After review, the Court of Appeal found no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to move to suppress the confession because such a motion would have had no merit. The Court did conclude, however, that under recent decisions from the United States and California Supreme Courts, defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing consistent with those decisions. View "California v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Viktors Rekte received a citation by mail for a violation of the Vehicle Code for failing to stop at a red light, based on a photograph taken pursuant to the Automated Traffic Enforcement System (ATES). At trial, the court overruled in limine objections to the admission of the photographic evidence on foundational grounds. Thereafter, defendant presented expert testimony to rebut the presumption of the reliability of the photographic evidence due to noncompliance with the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD or "Manual"). The trial court found defendant guilty of the offense. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the presumptions established by Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553, affecting the burden of producing evidence, were rebutted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and subsequently certified the matter for transfer to this court. The Court of Appeal reversed: "defendant undermined the presumptions created by Evidence Code sections 1552 and 1553. He produced expert testimony and evidence that the printed representation of computer generated information (Evid. Code, 1552) and the video or digital images admitted into evidence (Evid. Code, 1553) were inaccurate and unreliable. An inadequate yellow light interval renders a safe stop impossible, and constitutes an emergency justifying the entry into an intersection when the signal turns red. [. . .] The burden of producing evidence shifted to the city once the presumption was rebutted, but the expert’s testimony and opinions were not refuted. Because the digital images were previewed by Redflex before being forwarded to the Riverside Police Department, and because digital images are susceptible to manipulation, it was incumbent upon the City to introduce evidence that the printed representations were accurate." View "California v. Rekte" on Justia Law

The State petitioned for a writ of mandate to order the Superior Court of Orange County to vacate its ruling reducing the felony charges against Alireza Jalalipour to misdemeanors. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause, then held that, unless the State consented to a reduction of the charged offense, the establishment of the defendant’s guilt, whether by plea or trial, must precede a court’s reduction of a wobbler to a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3). The Court also held that, in the absence of the State's consent, the court’s reduction of the charged felonies to misdemeanors, and then allowing defendant to plead guilty to the misdemeanors, constituted an unlawful judicial plea bargain. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal granted the State's petition. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition challenging the superior court’s order that it acted outside of its jurisdiction. This petition arose over the court's decision that though the real party in interest, inmate Michael Williams, posed an unreasonable risk of danger, Williams' petition to recall his sentence was held in abeyance to give him an opportunity to take programs in prison in order to demonstrate that he no longer posed a danger to public safety. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the superior court acted without statutory authority, and accordingly, granted the State's petition and directed the superior court to deny Williams' petition for resentencing. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition challenging the superior court’s order that it acted outside of its jurisdiction. This petition arose over the court's decision that though the real party in interest, inmate Ricky Burton, posed an unreasonable risk of danger, Burton's' petition to continue sentencing for two years to give him an opportunity to demonstrate that he no longer posed a danger to public safety. The Court of Appeal agreed with the State that the superior court acted without statutory authority, and accordingly, granted the State's petition and directed the superior court to deny Burton's petition for resentencing. View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff controls the Fig Garden Village outdoor shopping center, which has approximately 60 retailers. Plaintiff has a policy of prohibiting solicitation of donations on the shopping center property; it allows other forms of expressive activity, such as gathering petition signatures, in a designated public forum area only. Solicitors for Nu Creation solicited donations on sidewalk areas adjacent to the entrances of stores within the shopping center. Plaintiff explained its policy regarding solicitation and asked the solicitors to leave, but they refused. Officers would not arrest them without a court order. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and a temporary restraining order. The trial court granted the ex parte application and issued a TRO. After a hearing, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which did not prohibit all solicitation on plaintiff’s property, but restricted it to a designated public forum area marked on a map attached to the preliminary injunction. The court of appeal affirmed, agreeing that the store entrances and aprons are not a public forum. View "Donahue Schriber Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach" on Justia Law