Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Madou Toure drove his semi-truck into on-coming traffic before colliding head-on with an automobile carrying two occupants. Throughout the investigation of the incident by the California Highway Patrol (CHP), defendant was violent and combative, continuing his resistance even at the CHP station. Defendant refused to consent to blood alcohol testing after being admonished of the implied consent provisions of the Vehicle Code, so a nonconsensual warrantless blood draw was performed while defendant was restrained. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felony driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury, driving on a suspended license, and resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to four years in state prison and appealed. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) his four year state prison sentence was unauthorized in the absence of pleading or proof of prior drunk driving convictions; (2) his felony drunk driving convictions should have been reversed because the blood alcohol evidence was obtained without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or his consent, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; and (3) his convictions under both subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 23153 were improper. The State conceded that the court imposed the incorrect sentence for driving under the influence with injury. The Court of Appeal modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed. View "California v. Toure" on Justia Law

In March 1985, a juvenile court found true the allegation that Luis Ramon Aparicio committed battery with serious bodily injury after he dislocated a victim's nose by pushing the victim's head onto concrete. Aparicio was 15 years old at the time. In August 1986, Aparicio attacked a victim with a knife. In October 1988, Aparicio suffered his first strike conviction for robbery when he and three cohorts robbed two victims of their stereos. During the struggle, one of the assailants stabbed one of the victims. Aparicio was sentenced to 365 days in jail and three years of formal probation, but probation was ultimately revoked and he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June 1989, Aparicio suffered his second strike conviction after he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after trying to rob three victims with an ice pick. He received a two-year prison sentence. In 1992, Aparicio received a three-year prison term for possessing PCP and marijuana. In 1996, Aparicio was convicted of battery and resisting a police officer. He received probation, but probation was later revoked. In 1997, Aparicio was convicted of his commitment offense after burglarizing a car. During the reading of his guilty verdict, Aparicio attacked a marshal and attempted to remove his gun. He received a 27-years-to-life prison sentence under the Three Strikes Law. Aparicio received nine write-ups while incarcerated. In February 1998, he received administrative punishment after pinching a female prison employee on the buttocks and grabbing her thigh. In June 1998, he headbutted another inmate. In October 1998, he flooded his cell. In February 1999, he flooded his cell and threw urine at an officer. In December 2000, he obstructed a peace officer by refusing to accept a new cellmate. In 2001, 2005 and 2007, he engaged in mutual combat with other inmates. In November 2012, he stole desserts from the dining hall. A psychologist examined Aparicio, finding that he suffered from antisocial personality disorder and posed a low-moderate risk of committing a future violent offense. Nonetheless, she concluded that Aparicio did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. In November 2013, the trial court denied Aparicio's petition for recall of sentence after reviewing the petition, Aparicio's criminal history, prison history and mental health evaluation. Aparicio appealed. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed the order. Appellant subsequently sought rehearing arguing section Penal Code section 1170.18 (effective November 5, 2014) as part of Proposition 47 (the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act) changed the definition of "unreasonable risk of danger to public safety" as it applied to inmates petitioning for recall of their third-strike life sentence under section 1170.126. The Court of Appeal declined to address that new issue and affirmed the order without prejudice to appellant petitioning for relief from the superior court under section 1170.18. View "California v. Aparicio" on Justia Law

After members of the San Mateo County Sheriff’s Gang Task Force allegedly conducted a warrantless search of her home, Pierce filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (section 1983) against the Sheriff’s Department and individual members of the Gang Task Force (Does 1–12). The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal affirmed as to the Department, but reversed as to the individual Doe defendants, none of whom appeared, and who, apparently, were never served. Binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, on both the scope of liability under section 1983 and the import of the Eleventh Amendment makes clear that the meaning of the term “person” as used in section 1983 and the reach of the Eleventh Amendment are separate issues, that the Eleventh Amendment applies only in federal court and not in state court, and that, depending on state law, a county sheriff may not be subject to a suit for damages under section 1983 because he or she is not a “person” as that term is used in the statute, and not because he or she is “immune” from suit by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity. View "Pierce v. San Mateo Co. Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

Defendant Drake Noyan was sentenced to state prison for various drug-related charges pursuant to a negotiated plea. Noyan's appeal presented two issue for the Court of Appeal's review: (1) that the court abused its discretion in refusing to reinstate him on probation; and (2) that the differing applications of Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h) to Penal Code sections 4573 and 4573.5 violated equal protection by requiring him to serve his sentence in state prison instead of county jail. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected defendant's probation claim but agreed that section 4573.5 treated similarly situated classes of offenders differently, and there was no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The Court reformed the statute and modified the judgment accordingly. View "California v. Noyan" on Justia Law

Jacqueline W. and Garrett J. were the unwed biological parents of Baby Boy W. When Jacqueline knew Garrett was Baby Boy W.'s biological father, but she denied Garrett's requests that she sign a voluntary declaration of paternity that would have established Garrett as Baby Boy W.'s statutory presumed father. She then sought to have A.H. and M.H. (the Hs) adopt Baby Boy W. at birth, despite the fact that Garrett had repeatedly stated that he wanted to raise Baby Boy W. himself. Garrett filed a petition to establish his paternity, and Jacqueline and the Hs (collectively, appellants) filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The trial court found that Garrett established his paternity rights under "Adoption of Kelsey S.," 1 Cal. 4th 816. The trial court denied appellants' petition, and entered judgment in Garrett's favor, thereby halting the adoption. Appellants argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court misunderstood and misapplied Kelsey S., and (2) there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court's Kelsey S. findings. The Court of Appeal disagreed in both respects and affirm the judgment: "We understand that the consequences of our decision, i.e., halting the Hs' adoption of Baby Boy W., will undoubtedly be heartbreaking for the Hs, who have had custody of Baby Boy W. since the day after his birth. We also realize that removing Baby Boy W. from the Hs and placing him with Garrett and/or Jacqueline will require a period of adjustment for Baby Boy W. However, those emotional considerations, precipitated by Jacqueline's unilateral decision that adoption was in Baby Boy W.'s best interests, do not override Garrett's constitutional right to establish a parental relationship with Baby Boy W." View "Adoption of Baby Boy W." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Mason of three counts of first degree murder, and found true the special circumstances of robbery-murder and multiple murders as to each. The jury further convicted Mason of one count of attempted murder; two counts of attempted robbery; one count of burglary; five counts of false imprisonment by violence; one count of assault with a firearm; two counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling ; and four counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury also found true several gang and firearms-related sentencing enhancements. Mason admitted suffering two prior serious felony convictions and three "strike priors." The court ultimately sentenced Mason to nine consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The nine terms consist of one term for each count of murder, which were then tripled pursuant to the "Three Strikes" law. In addition, the court sentenced Mason to an indeterminate term of 337 years six months to life imprisonment, plus an additional 110 years. Mason appealed, arguing: (1) the court erred in admitting the prior testimony of one victim (Hana Jabbar) after finding her unavailable; (2)the court erroneously admitted the out-of-court statements of an informant, allegedly recounting statements made by Mason's accomplice, Terrill Bell, which the court found were statements against interest; (3) the evidence did not support Mason's multiple convictions for possession of the same firearm, on different days, because that crime is a single, continuous offense; and (4) the sentences of life imprisonment without parole should not have been tripled pursuant to the Three Strikes law. In the unpublished portions of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded Hana Jabbar's testimony was properly admitted and any error in admitting Marquis Veal's statements was harmless. However, the Court agreed the evidence did not support multiple convictions for firearm possession based on Mason's possession of the same gun on different days. The Court also agreed that the Three Strikes law did not provide for tripling sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In light of its conclusion, the Court reversed three of Mason's four convictions for firearm possession and modify the judgment to reflect a single life sentence without parole for each first degree murder conviction. In all other respects, the judgment as modified was affirmed.View "California v. Mason" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Ward was convicted of felon-addict in possession of a firearm in 2012 and was sentenced to two years in prison. Rather than parole, as a non-violent offender, he was placed under "community supervision" following his release. The period of post-release community service cannot exceed three years. However, if the offender has been on supervision for a continuous year with no other violations of the conditions of post-release supervision, the offender could be discharged from supervision within thirty days. "Defendant’s performance under community supervision was far from ideal." The violation report contained multiple violations, two of which had resulted in periods of “flash incarceration.” The recommendation was that Ward be returned to custody and serve 180 days in county jail. After hearing argument from both sides, the court concluded that “flash incarceration” was not a “custodial sanction” within the meaning of Penal Code section 3456, subdivision (a)(3), but was merely a “tool” employed to correct behavior. The court also expressed concerns about the procedure by which “flash incarceration” had been imposed. Pursuant to section 3454, subdivision (b), the county agency supervising offenders on community supervision may order “flash incarceration” without judicial authorization. Section 3453, subdivision (q) provided that a person placed on such supervision “shall waive any right to a court hearing prior to the imposition of a period of ‘flash incarceration’. . . .” The probation department apparently had a policy of requiring offenders to sign a so-called “waiver” at the time of a violation. The record contained one such waiver executed by Ward. The court eventually concluded that the waiver was invalid because Ward gave up substantial rights without legal advice and through the use of the form, which did not adequately (in the court’s view) explain his options and the consequences. It relied on this as another basis for finding Ward free from further supervision, as in the court’s view he had not served any valid term of incarceration. The State appealed the trial court's judgment. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded Ward had suffered lawful "custodial sanctions" within the meaning of Penal Code 3456 (a)(3), and he remained under supervision when the violation report at issue was filed. The Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order dismissing violation proceedings, and to continue such proceedings.View "California v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Arturo Hernandez was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and five other charges and sentenced to 61 years to life in prison for crimes he committed when he was 16 years old.He argued on appeal that his trial attorney was ineffective because: (1) his attorney did not move to suppress his confession; and (2) his attorney did not object to his sentence as violating the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Upon review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal found no ineffective assistance in counsel’s failure to move to suppress the confession because such a motion would have had no merit. However, that under recent decisions from the United States and California Supreme Courts, defendant’s sentence was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case for resentencing consistent with those decisions.View "California v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

In 1998, Michael Maas was convicted of grand theft of an automobile and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle. He was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. In a subsequent case, he was convicted of burglary and forgery of a fictitious check and sentenced to a consecutive term of 25 years to life. Maas petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, raising issues regarding the validity of his sentence and ineffective assistance from his counsel. He also argued the superior court denied him his statutory right under section 170.6 to challenge the judge assigned to his habeas corpus petition in that court. After its review of the matter, the Court of Appeal held that where petitioner collaterally attacks his criminal convictions and sentences by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus and the matter is assigned to a judge other than the original trial judge, petitioner may assert a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 to the judge assigned to the petition. A writ of mandate was issued directing the superior court to vacate its order denying Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, the superior court was ordered to reassign Maas's petition for writ of habeas corpus for decision by a different judge.View "Maas v. Super. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Mario Alberto Gonzalez was charged with: (1) five counts of violating Penal Code1 section 422 (criminal threats) (counts 1 through 5), all of which also specially alleged violations of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B) (that defendant had the specific intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang member); and (2) one count violating section 166, subdivision (a)(10) (disobeying the terms of an injunction) (count 6). The complaint also alleged that defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction for violating section 192, subdivision (a) (voluntary manslaughter), and section 245, subdivision (a)(2) (assault with a firearm), under section 667, subdivisions (a), (c), and (e)(1), and section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1). The complaint further alleged that defendant suffered three prior offenses with state prison sentences under section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant was arraigned the same day. He entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and denied all special allegations. An information charged defendant with all of the counts previously alleged in the complaint, as well as two additional counts for misdemeanor violations of section 415, subdivision (l) (challenging another to fight in a public place). These counts also contained special allegations for violations of section 186.22, subdivision (d) (specific intent to promote, further and assist in criminal conduct by gang members). Defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and denied all special allegations. He then filed a motion to set aside the information and dismiss all counts alleging violations of section 422 (criminal threats) and 415 (challenging another to fight in a public place). The State filed an opposition to defendant’s motion. The trial court held a hearing on the motion. Thereafter, the court granted defendant’s motion and dismissed counts 1 through 7 and the related allegations. That same day, defendant pled guilty to count 8, a violation of section 166, subdivision (a)(10) (disobeying the terms of an injunction). The State appealed he trial court's decision, arguing that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss counts 1 through 5 (criminal threats). Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the State. Therefore, it reversed the order setting aside those charges and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law