Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Renee Robinson was charged with both aggravated mayhem, in violation of Penal Code section 205, and mayhem, in violation of Penal Code section 203 (“simple mayhem”). Both charges were based on a single incident in which defendant poured scalding water over her husband’s head, resulting in serious burns to his face and various parts of his body, with residual scarring. She contended that she could not be convicted of both offenses based on the same act because simple mayhem was a lesser included offense of aggravated mayhem. Upon further review, the Court of Appeal concluded that section 203 was a necessarily included lesser offense of section 205. Accordingly, the Court reversed defendant’s conviction for violation of section 203, and remanded the case for the trial court for resentencing.View "California v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In January 2013, defendant Leonard Oehmigen filed a petition for the recall of his 1998 indeterminate life sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.126.2 Defendant alleged that he was eligible for resentencing because his 1998 commitment conviction (assault with force likely to inflict great bodily injury) was not a "serious" or violent felony, and neither his commitment conviction nor his other prior felony convictions came within other disqualifying criteria. Therefore, he argued, he was entitled to a determinate sentence of double the normal term applicable to his conviction. The trial court denied the recall petition in case No. 97F00832 without a hearing, relying on the prosecutor’s statement of the factual basis for defendant’s change of plea in January 1998, which neither defense counsel nor defendant had challenged. The trial court found that defendant was both armed with deadly weapons and intended to inflict great bodily injury during the commission of the commitment conviction, and thus his commitment conviction was ineligible for recall for resentencing. The court set the other petition (case No. 05F02375) for briefing and argument on various issues (for which reason it is not part of this appeal). The parties both argued this was an appealable order. On the merits, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s record of conviction demonstrated he was armed with a deadly weapon in the form of a car during the commission of his commitment offense, and therefore defendant was ineligible for resentencing.View "California v. Oehmigen" on Justia Law

Serban worked as a massage therapist at Voda Spa. Serban and Voda Spa disagree as to why he left that work, but the trial court found Serban had good cause to leave and that finding was not challenged. They also disputed whether Serban was an employee or independent contractor. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board found that he was an employee, not an independent contractor, and the trial court agreed with the Board that its decision was not subject to judicial review because both the California Constitution and the Unemployment Insurance Code bar actions whose purpose is to prevent the collection of state taxes. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the case does not challenge the imposition of a tax.View "W. Hollywood Cmty. Health & Fitness Ctr. v. CA Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Police saw Buza run from a burning police car, arrested him, and found evidence of arson. While he was in county jail, before any court appearance, Buza was asked to provide a DNA sample, required by Penal Code 296. He refused, even after being informed that refusal constituted a misdemeanor. He admitted at trial that he set fire to the car using an accelerant, to protest "corrupt government," and challenged section 296. He was convicted on all counts and ordered to provide a DNA sample before sentencing. After he refused, the court ordered use of “reasonable force.” He was sentenced to 16 months for arson and a concurrent six-month term for refusal to provide a sample. After remand by the California Supreme Court for consideration in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision, Maryland v. King, the court of appeal again reversed the section 296 conviction. Section 296, in requiring felony arrestees to submit a DNA sample for analysis and inclusion in state and federal databases, without independent suspicion, a warrant, or a judicial or grand jury determination of probable cause, unreasonably intrudes on the expectation of privacy and is invalid under article I of the California Constitution.View "People v. Buza" on Justia Law

In 2000, defendant-appellant Wenonah Parker was found guilty, but not guilty of various crimes by reason of insanity. Defendant was committed to Patton State Hospital (Patton). In 2011, the trial court granted defendant outpatient status. The outpatient agencies refused to accept defendant due to her behavior and mental condition. As a result, defendant remained hospitalized at Patton, in the inpatient program. In 2012, the trial court revoked the order granting defendant outpatient status. Defendant appealed, raising three issues: (1) the Department of Mental Health and the outpatient treatment agencies acted unlawfully by refusing to admit defendant; (2) the controlling statutes did not authorize revocation of outpatient status for a person who was not given the opportunity to participate in an outpatient program; and (3) collateral estoppel required defendant’s outpatient status to remain in place because there were not material changes to defendant’s condition. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.View "California v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff/Petitioner owned a 64-acre site in Jackson, California (comprised of five assessor parcel numbers), which included an 11-acre portion of (historical) arsenopyrite mine tailings, known as “Tim’s Corner” (the property is also known as the Argonaut Mine Tailings Site). In 1998, the Department of Toxic Substances Control, after testing, constructed a fence around plaintiff’s property and posted a lien for $245,306.64. In November 2007, the Department made an imminent or substantial endangerment determination concerning the property. Plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing to contest this determination; no hearing was provided, but the Department sent plaintiff a letter explaining the basis of this determination. Without notice to plaintiff, the Department secured two property inspection warrants, one in 2008 and another in 2010. In early February 2011, the Department advised plaintiff that it intended to update and increase its lien from $245,306.64 to $833,368.19. The Department also advised plaintiff, for the first time, of a right to a hearing concerning the placement of the lien on her property. On February 17, 2011, plaintiff, in a letter to the Department, requested a hearing on four issues, the propriety of the lien increase, the amount of the lien increase, the properties covered by the lien and additional information the Department obtained to justify the work performed. The Department did not provide a hearing as requested. Plaintiff then sued, seeking a writ of mandate to require the Department to hold the hearing. The Court of Appeal concluded that the procedure the Department used to deny plaintiff's appeal violated due process; its lien procedure failed to allow an affected landowner to dispute the amount of the lien, the extent of the property burdened by the lien and the characterization of the landowner as the responsible party.View "Van Horn v. Dept. Toxic Substances Control" on Justia Law

A rear-end collision forced one vehicle down an embankment, so that the driver sustained injuries for which she sought treatment. The other car, a Toyota with major damage, was on the street unattended, with the air bags deployed. Its driver had reportedly fled on foot, headed westbound on the north side of the Parkway. Minutes later Jones was observed walking westbound on the north side of the Parkway about 400 yards from the collision, in an area where pedestrian traffic is prohibited. Jones had leaves on his person as if he had come out of the bushes. He had an alcoholic odor, watery bloodshot eyes, and unsteady gait. Jones denied having been involved in an accident, but admitted that he was on probation, with a search and seizure condition. A search of Jones’s person revealed apparent residue from a deployed airbag on his clothing and a key that operated the locks of the Toyota in the collision. After a Miranda admonishment, Jones admitted that he had been the Toyota’s driver. Jones was arrested and transported to the station, but refused to provide a breath sample. Jones was taken to a medical center where a blood sample was drawn by a phlebotomist. Analysis determined that Jones had a blood alcohol content of 0.25 percent. The trial court denied his motion to suppress. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision in McNeely required a warrant or exigent circumstances for the blood drawView "People v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County after officers fired a tear gas canister into plaintiff's mobile home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the County. In this case, once the officers decided to arrest plaintiff's adult son, they were vested by the Department with discretion to determine the means by which the arrest should be carried out, including the possible use of tear gas as a way to determine whether plaintiff's son was in plaintiff's house. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the County was immune under Government Code section 820.2, which provides immunity for discretionary acts of County employees.View "Conway v. County of Tuolumne" on Justia Law

After defendants purchased the building where plaintiff was living in a rent-controlled apartment, defendants served plaintiff with a 60-day notice to quit. Plaintiff subsequently initiated unlawful detainer proceedings against defendants and then filed a complaint alleging several state claims. Plaintiff sought an order restoring him to his apartment, restitution, damages, and attorney fees. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their Code of Civil Procedure section 426.16 special motion to strike plaintiff's first amended complaint because their conduct was protected litigation activity. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's denial of his request for attorney fees in defending the motion. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint was not directed at protected activity. However, the court reversed the denial of attorney fees and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether defendants' motion was frivolous, whether plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and if so, the amount of such fees.View "Ben-Shahar v. Pickart" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Phoenix was convicted of crimes in Sacramento and Yolo Counties. He was originally sentenced to prison in the Sacramento County case. The Yolo County trial court resentenced defendant on the Sacramento case and consolidated the sentences as required by Penal Code sections 669 and 1170.1, and the California Rules of Court. Defendant’s sole contention on appeal was that the Yolo County trial court erred when it refused to calculate custody credits in the Sacramento case for the time he spent in custody before he was sentenced on the Yolo County case. The State argued Sacramento County should make the calculation. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case to Yolo County for recalculation of defendant’s credits on both the Sacramento County and Yolo County cases.View "California v. Phoenix" on Justia Law