Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Sacramento Kings have played at the Sleep Train Arena since 1988. In January 2013, the team’s then owners entered into a tentative agreement to sell the Sacramento Kings to a group of investors in Seattle, Washington. Seeking to keep the team in Sacramento, the City of Sacramento partnered with Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a new entertainment and sports center in downtown Sacramento at the site of a shopping mall with declining occupancy rates. In May 2013, the Board of Governors for the National Basketball Association (NBA) rejected an application to sell the team and move it to Seattle, and approved the sale of the team to Sacramento Basketball Holdings. The NBA’s board of governors also reserved the right to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another city if a new arena in Sacramento did not open by 2017. To meet the NBA’s deadline, the City and Sacramento Basketball Holdings developed a schedule that targeted October 2016 as the opening date for the downtown arena. To facilitate timely completion of the project, the Legislature added section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code, which modified (only for construction of the downtown arena in Sacramento) several deadlines for review of the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (sec. 21050 et seq.). Other than deadlines for review, section 21168.6.6 did not substantively modify CEQA as it applied to the downtown arena project. Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other individuals sued to challenge section 21168.6.6’s constitutionality as well as the project’s compliance with CEQA requirements. Saltonstall moved for a preliminary injunction on grounds of imminent harm to the public caused by the demolition of the shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena. The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. She appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing: (1) section 21168.6.6 represents an unconstitutional intrusion of the legislative branch on the core function of the courts; and (2) the preliminary injunction should have been granted because section 21168.6.6 “harms [the public] and the environment,” but not the respondents. The Court of Appeal rejected Saltonstall’s constitutional challenge on the merits because section 21168.6.6 did not materially impair a core function of the courts. Moreover, CEQA review did not implicate any constitutionally granted right.View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

In 2008, a trial court sentenced defendant Tyrea Hicks to 25 years to life in prison under the three strikes law for being a felon in possession of a firearm and a concurrent sentence of 25 years to life (that was later stayed by the Court of Appeal) for being a felon in possession of ammunition, after a jury had found defendant guilty of those crimes. In 2012, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 20121 (the Act). The trial court denied the petition, finding that the facts as recited in the appellate court opinion from defendant’s 2008 three strikes’ conviction, defendant was armed with a firearm when he committed the felon in possession of a firearm offense. Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing arguing it was error for the court to “restrict itself solely to a few limited facts” from the appellate opinion. He further argued that the arming enhancement had never been pled or proven with respect to the felon-in-possession charge and that he was not, in fact, armed, and pointed the court to evidence in the appellate court opinion that arguably showed he was not armed. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. Defendant appealed the denial of his resentencing petition contending: (1) it was an appealable order; (2) if not, his appeal should have been treated as a petition for writ of mandate; and (3) the trial court improperly denied the petition for resentencing based on the fact that he was armed with a firearm during the commission of his felon-in-possession offense because (a) the felon-in-possession offense is not one of the disqualifying offenses to which an arming may be attached; (b) no sentence was “imposed” for his arming; and (c) the court improperly relied on the statement of facts in the appellate opinion to support its factual finding that he was armed. In "Teal v. Superior Court" ___ Cal.4th ___ (2014), the California Supreme Court concluded decisions under the “Three Strikes Reform Act” were appealable orders. Otherwise, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "California v. Hicks" on Justia Law

In 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of grand theft of an automobile arising from an improper lien sale. The jury acquitted defendant of other charges arising from that sale, as well as the charge of operating a "chop shop." The trial court placed defendant on five years of formal probation, including 120 days in the county jail as a condition thereof. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on claim of right as a defense, and that counsel was ineffective in failing to request the instruction. Defendant also argued there was insufficient evidence of his criminal intent. The State conceded the evidence supported a claim of right instruction. The People also conceded error by the trial court in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on claim of right. The Court of Appeal agreed with the claim of right instruction, but rejected the State's concession that the trial court erred in failing on its own volition, to instruct the jury regarding that claim of right. The Court agreed that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request that pattern instruction CALCRIM No. 1863 be given and that this failure resulted in prejudice to defendant. Accordingly, although the Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction, it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "California v. Hussain" on Justia Law

Thompson filed a complaint, alleging that he operates a business and pays property taxes in Petaluma, seeking to enjoin the police from using taxpayer funds to order 30-day impoundment of vehicles pursuant to Vehicle Code 14602.6 when the driver has operated the vehicle without a valid driver’s license, but with consent of the vehicle’s owner. He alleged that section 14602.6’s notice provisions are insufficient to provide the owner with the factual grounds for the traffic stop or impound, the statutory basis for the driver’s license suspension or revocation, and the grounds for releasing the vehicle. The trial dismissed, finding that Thompson lacked standing because a taxpayer has no standing under section 526a in a matter that involves the city’s exercise of executive discretion. The court also rejected claims that the use of police officers to enforce sectionc14602.6 results in illegal government action or waste of taxpayer funds and that procedures implementing the statute violate procedural due process. The court of appeal remanded with directions to allow Thompson leave to amend his complaint. Assuming Thompson can allege facts showing the city’s actions violate the law, there is a reasonable possibility that the defects in his complaint can be cured by amendment.View "Thompson v. Petaluma Police Dep't" on Justia Law

In March 1985, a juvenile court found that Luis Ramon Aparicio committed battery with serious bodily injury after he dislocated the victim's nose by pushing the victim's head onto concrete. Aparicio was 15 years old at the time. In August 1986, Aparicio attacked a victim with a knife. In October 1988, Aparicio suffered his first strike conviction for robbery when he and three cohorts robbed two victims of their stereos. During the struggle, one of the assailants stabbed one of the victims. Aparicio was sentenced to 365 days in jail and three years of formal probation, but probation was ultimately revoked and he was sentenced to three years in prison. In June 1989, Aparicio suffered his second strike conviction after he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery after trying to rob three victims with an ice pick. While fleeing the scene, Aparicio's vehicle struck another vehicle and he was later found to be under the influence of a controlled substance. He received a two-year prison sentence. In 1992, Aparicio received a three-year prison term for possessing PCP and marijuana. In 1996, Aparicio was convicted of battery and resisting a police officer. He received probation, but probation was later revoked. In 1997, Aparicio was convicted of his commitment offense after burglarizing a car. During the reading of his guilty verdict, Aparicio attacked a marshal and attempted to remove his gun. He received a 27-years-to-life prison sentence under the Three Strikes Law. Aparicio received nine write-ups while incarcerated. In February 1998, he received administrative punishment after pinching a female prison employee on the buttocks and grabbing her thigh. In June 1998, he headbutted another inmate. In October 1998, he flooded his cell. In February 1999, he flooded his cell and threw urine at an officer. In December 2000, he obstructed a peace officer by refusing to accept a new cellmate. In 2001, 2005 and 2007, he engaged in mutual combat with other inmates. In November 2012, he stole desserts from the dining hall. A psychologist found that he suffered from antisocial personality disorder and posed a low-moderate risk of committing a future violent offense. Nonetheless, she concluded that Aparicio did not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety if released. In November 2013, the trial court denied Aparicio's petition for recall of sentence after reviewing the petition, Aparicio's criminal history, prison history and mental health evaluation. Aparicio timely appealed. In this case, the Court of Appeal held that the abuse of discretion standard applies when reviewing an appeal from a trial court's denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126 based on the trial court's finding that release of the petitioner would present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, and in this case, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The Court affirmed the trial court's order.View "California v. Aparicio" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Thomas Paulek appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). He sought a writ to direct defendant-respondent California Department of Water Resources (Department) to vacate its approval of the final environmental impact report (EIR) with respect to the Perris Dam Remediation Project. In its draft EIR, the Department proposed three activities: (1) remediating structural deficiencies in the Perris Dam, (2) replacing the facility’s outlet tower, and (3) creating a new “Emergency Outlet Extension.” In response to comments on the draft EIR, the emergency outlet extension was split off into a separate environmental review process, and the final EIR at issue considers only dam remediation and outlet tower replacement. Paulek argued on appeal that the lack of an emergency outlet extension constituted a significant environmental impact that the project as finally approved failed to mitigate, and that the separation of the emergency outlet extension into a different project constitutes impermissible segmentation. He further contended that the Department did not adequately respond to written comments submitted by “Friends of the Northern San Jacinto Valley,” an organization of which Paulek was the “Conservation Chair.” Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that Paulek had standing, and found no abuse of discretion in its denial of the petition on its merits.View "Paulek v. CA Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant G.H. appealed a trial court order correcting a previous order awarding defendant precommitment custody credits for time served against his three-year commitment to Patton State Hospital pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1368 et seq. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C), mandated the trial court to deduct defendant's precommitment custody credits from the maximum term of commitment; and (2) the denial of precommitment custody credits based upon the level of crime alleged violates a defendant's rights to due process and equal protection. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contentions and affirmed the judgment.View "California v. G.H." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Willie Brown, a “Three Strikes” prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence, appealed following the trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition to recall his sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, added by Proposition 36 (the Reform Act). On appeal, defendant argued: (1) a trial court has the authority to strike a disqualifying prior conviction allegation under Penal Code section 1385 and "California v. Superior Court" at a sentencing recall hearing brought under section 1170.126; and (2) because the trial court believed it did not have such authority, the matter should have been remanded. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant's contention, and affirmed.View "California v. Brown" on Justia Law

In case No. 12F03331, a jury found defendant Brenton James guilty of battery against a transportation worker, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, misdemeanor resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer, and misdemeanor willful harm or injury to a child. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true allegations defendant committed the battery while released from custody in case No. 12F00971 and had one prior strike conviction. Case No. 12F03331 was joined with case No. 12F00971 for sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 years 4 months in state prison. In case No. 12F03331, defendant was sentenced to six years for assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and a consecutive two years for the on-bail enhancement. Defendant’s sentence for assault against a transportation worker was stayed and he was sentenced to time served on the misdemeanor convictions. In case No. 12F00971, defendant was sentenced to one year for assault with a deadly weapon, one year four months for first degree burglary, both to run consecutive to defendant’s sentence in case No. 12F03331, and time served for misdemeanor battery. Defendant appealed the judgment, which implicated both cases; however, the issues raised on appeal only concerned case No. 12F03331. Defendant argued: (1) the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on battery on a person on public transportation as a lesser included offense of battery against a transportation worker; and (2) there was no substantial evidence to support defendant’s conviction for battery against a transportation worker because there is no evidence the victim of the battery was a "station agent." The Court of Appeal concluded after review of the record that there was no evidence, substantial or otherwise, to support a finding that the victim of the battery was a "station agent." The Court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to that charge, modified defendant’s conviction for battery against a transportation worker by reducing it to simple battery, and remanded the case for resentencing.View "California v. James" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a superior court’s order denying his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. In 2000, a jury convicted defendant of first degree burglary and second degree burglary along with several other counts, and found true that he had two prior strike convictions. In 2001, the trial court sentenced defendant as a third-striker to 25 years to life for the first degree burglary and a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the second degree burglary, for a total indeterminate sentence of 50 years to life. On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld defendant’s conviction and sentence but modified the judgment to reflect additional days of custody credits. In 2013, defendant filed a petition for recall of sentence, which the superior court denied, finding defendant ineligible for resentencing on either of the indeterminate life terms because one of them, for the first degree burglary, was imposed for a serious and/or violent felony. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "California v. Anthony" on Justia Law