Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Juan A. was charged with one count of misdemeanor battery on school property; resisting an officer; disturbing the peace; and felony threatening a public officer or employee. At the time of the adjudication hearing, the prosecution's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor battery count was granted. At the end of the hearing, the court made true findings only on the resisting an officer charge and on the disturbing the peace charge. Juan A. was placed on formal probation, then appealed. On appeal, Juan argued there was not sufficient evidence to support the true findings on either of the remaining counts. After careful examination of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed with the Minor that the prosecution failed to prove the elements of either offense. Thus the court should not have made true findings on those charges.View "In re Juan A." on Justia Law

After being convicted of drug-related offenses, Lavina Wofford was sentenced under the Realignment Act to serve a portion of her prison sentence released into the community under the mandatory supervision of the probation department. Among the many conditions of her mandatory supervision, Wofford was required to obtain the superior court's consent before moving to another state. Apart from mandatory supervision requirements, a released offender who wants to transfer his or her supervision to another state must also obtain the approval of the California office that administers out-of-state transfer requests under the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision (the Compact or Interstate Compact). After she was released in the community under mandatory supervision, Wofford filed a motion requesting that she be permitted to submit an application to California's Interstate Compact office for a transfer of her supervision to another state. The court denied her request to apply to the Compact office, in part based on its conclusion that offenders serving mandatory supervision sentences are ineligible to apply for transfers under the Compact. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in ruling mandatory supervision releasees serving their sentences in the community under the Realignment Act were ineligible to apply for transfers under the Interstate Compact. Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandate was granted.View "Wofford v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Patrol Officer Tyhurst was driving on Highway 242 in Contra Costa County when he saw a car weaving and traveling about 90 miles per hour in a 65 miles-per-hour-zone. Tyhurst activated his emergency lights. The vehicle stopped. Tyhurst approached the driver and observed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and his speech was thick and slurred. Tyhurst could smell alcohol. The driver was unable to produce identification, Tyhurst directed him to get out of the car and conducted field sobriety tests. The driver’s performance was consistent with impairment. Tyhurst placed him under arrest, drove him to the area office, and advised the driver that state law required a person arrested for DUI to submit to a blood or breath test. He refused. Restrained by Tyhurst and others, his blood was drawn without his consent by a lab technician certified in phlebotomy. Tyhurst did not obtain a warrant for the blood draw, although there was a judge on call. The results showed a 0.19 percent blood-alcohol level, well above the .08 percent legal limit. The court denied a motion to suppress the blood sample and observations and statements stemming from the forcible blood draw. The driver entered a plea of no contest and admitted three prior convictions. The court placed appellant on probation for five years with the condition that he serve 365 days in county jail. The court of appeal affirmed.View "People v. Rossetti" on Justia Law

Defendant and his wife appealed from the trial court's order denying, in part, their anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, special motion to strike claims against them. The claims arose out of the wife's police reports and her filing of two civil harassment petitions under section 527.6 against plaintiff. Plaintiff cross-appealed the trial court's order granting, in part, defendants' special motion to strike. The court held that the trial court erred when it denied the special motion to strike as to the conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of action; the conduct underlying those causes of action is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and plaintiff cannot prevail on the merits where her malicious prosecution claim cannot be based on the filing of a petition under section 527.6 and the conduct underlying plaintiff's other tort claims is privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). On cross-appeal, the court held that the trial court did not err in granting the special motion to strike as to the abuse of process, libel, and slander causes of action because those claims arose from protected activity, and plaintiff cannot prevail on them as a matter of law as they are barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).View "Kenne v. Stennis" on Justia Law

Sean Mullendore appealed his convictions of felony throwing a substance at a vehicle (Veh. Code, 23110, subd. (b)), and misdemeanor assault and vandalism. He argued that the section 23110(b) conviction should have been reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included misdemeanor offense defined in Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (a). Furthermore, Mullendore argued his assault and vandalism convictions should have been reversed because the court: (1) declined his request to instruct the jury on the defense of accident; and (2) refused to admit his proffered evidence from an accident reconstruction expert. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mullendore with regard to his 23110(b) conviction, but found no reversible error and affirmed the misdemeanor convictions.View "California v. Mullendore" on Justia Law

In 1997, an Independence Day the apartment complex at which defendant, his common law wife Claudette Walters, and his infant daughter resided, held a party. Both defendant and his wife were drinking, and at some point got into an argument. Apparently, defendant was angry at Walters for agreeing to let a friend’s pit bull live in the apartment without consulting him first, as he was concerned about his daughter’s safety. Kutrina Farris, a neighbor, saw defendant and Walters argue in front of the building. Then, defendant took his daughter and left. Subsequently, he returned with a gun and continued his argument with Walters. Subsequently, Walters’ daughter, Dominique, told Farris that defendant pulled a gun on her mother. In response, Farris called the police. After summoning the police, Farris saw defendant walk out of his apartment with a shotgun and hide the gun in the nearby rose bushes. When the police arrived, defendant was belligerent and could not be interviewed due to being severely intoxicated. Defendant was arrested, transported to county jail, and placed in an isolated drunk room of the jail. Police officers recovered an unloaded sawed-off shotgun in the bushes near the apartment. A year later, defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a short-barreled shotgun. It was also found true that defendant had suffered three prior strike convictions, two for robbery and two for first degree residential burglary. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. In 2012, California passed Proposition 36, which enacted section 1170.126, which permitted persons currently serving an indeterminate life term under the “Three Strikes” law to file a petition in the sentencing court seeking to be resentenced to a determinate term as a second striker. In 2012, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.126. The State opposed the petition on the grounds that defendant was statutorily ineligible because he was armed with and used a firearm during the commission of the crime; that the prosecution did not have to plead and prove defendant was armed with and used a firearm; and that defendant posed a risk to public safety. The trial court granted defendant's petition, finding defendant eligible for resentencing under section 1170.126. The court also found by a preponderance of evidence that defendant did not pose a dangerous risk to public safety. The court resentenced defendant to the upper term of three years, doubled to six years due to the prior strike offenses, for felon in possession of a firearm as alleged in count 1; and a stayed six-year sentence on count 2 for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Defendant was awarded a total of 5,939 days in credits and ordered to report to parole. The State appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding defendant eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeal concluded that, where the record established the prosecution’s case was based on the theory a defendant convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon used or was armed with the firearm, a defendant is not entitled to resentencing relief under the Act. Furthermore, the Court held that a trial court may deny section 1170.126 resentencing relief under the armed-with-a-firearm exclusion even if the accusatory pleading did not allege he or she used or was armed with a firearm during the commission of that possessory offense.View "California v. Brimmer" on Justia Law

Defendant Armando Garcia appealed the denial of his petition for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (the Act). The court based the denial on its finding that defendant posed “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” if released, citing as grounds for its decision: (1) defendant’s “nonstop criminal history” that included violent felonies (two robberies); (2) two escapes from confinement; (3) an 18-year prison commitment shortly after which he exhibited a weapon; and (4) the relatively recent timing of his current offense (receiving stolen property) in 2007. Defendant argued on appeal that the Act was unconstitutionally vague because the term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” was not adequately defined. The Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court.View "California v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Anthony Blakely pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to assault with a deadly weapon and robbery. The jury convicted him of both counts. After the evidence was presented in the sanity phase of the trial, the court granted the State's motion for a directed verdict of sanity. Blakely appealed, contending the court erred in directing a verdict of sanity. The Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in removing the issue of Blakely's sanity from the jury. As set forth in "California v. Severance" (138 Cal.App.4th 305 (2006), the court properly directs a verdict of sanity when a defendant fails to proffer "substantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found the defendant was not sane." The evidence in this case was insufficient for the jury to make such a finding.View "California v. Blakely" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Consumer Affairs revoked defendant’s private investigator license. A month later, defendant presented his revoked license and his driver’s license to enter the Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility. Having held himself out as a private investigator, defendant interviewed inmate Jeffrey Merrill. Defendant was taken to the visiting area and interviewed Merrill for approximately 30 minutes. Defendant did not ask for permission to go onto the grounds of LSCF before he entered. Defendant also failed to disclose that he was an ex-convict. Deputy Collins was not aware of defendant’s ex-convict status before checking defendant in. A deputy at the facility testified that, had he known defendant was an ex-convict, he would have notified one of his superiors at the jail (at the LSCF Visiting Center entrance, a notice is posted that states that persons convicted of a felony are not authorized to visit without approval). The State charged defendant with unauthorized entry onto prison grounds by an ex-convict. A jury found defendant guilty as charged. Thereafter, defendant admitted the truth of the prior prison term allegation. Defendant was granted defendant five years' probation on the condition that he serve 365 days in custody. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing the trial court improperly instructed the jury that a jail officer must give informed consent for an ex-convict’s entry upon jail grounds to be authorized. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed.View "California v. Gjersvold" on Justia Law

In "Morrissey v. Brewer,"(408 U.S. 472 (1972)), the United States Supreme Court held that a parolee is entitled to certain procedural due process protections before parole may be revoked. Among these is the right to a prompt evidentiary hearing on whether probable cause exists to believe the parolee violated a condition of parole. In 2011, California began enacting legislation, "Realignment," that altered the state’s criminal justice system. Petitioner Wendy Williams argued that, in the wake of realignment, the State and the Orange County Superior Court have systematically denied her and other parolees the procedural protections to which they are entitled in revocation proceedings. Williams petitioned for a writ of mandate: (1) to order the Superior Court to arrange for her immediate release from custody and to dismiss the petition for revocation of her parole; and (2) to order the Superior Court and real parties in interest to provide her with reasonable due process prior to any further incarceration, including a Morrissey-compliant probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest. The Court of Appeal granted Williams’s petition in part, holding that, in parole revocation proceedings, a parolee is entitled to arraignment within 10 days of an arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest.View "Williams v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law