Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Laura Nunez's attorneys served Lunada with a notice under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Civil Code section 1750 et seq., alleging that her dietary supplement, Amberen, was being marketed falsely and misleadingly as a natural remedy for Menopausal symptom relief. Lunada subsequently filed a declaratory relief action against Nunez and her attorneys. Nunez and her attorneys moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The trial court granted the motion and Lunada appealed. The court held that the declaratory relief action seeking a declaration that Lunada had not violated the CLRA is subject to the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose out of protected activity under the statute. Consequently, the trial court properly granted the special motions to strike because Lunada's declaratory relief action had no probability of success. The court, under the reasoning of Filarsky v. Superior Court, held that a potential defendant in a CLRA damages action after receiving the statutory notice may not maintain a declaratory relief action to establish that there was no violation of the CLRA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order striking the complaint and the award of attorney fees to Nunez and her attorneys.View "Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez" on Justia Law

The District Attorney of Plumas County filed a criminal complaint charging defendant with a violation of section 5653, subdivision (a) of the Fish and Game Code in that he used vacuum and suction dredge equipment in a river, stream, or lake without a permit (Count I) and with a violation of section 5653, subdivision (d) in that he possessed a vacuum and suction dredge within an area closed to the use of that equipment and within 100 yards of waters closed to the use of that equipment (Count II). Defendant demurred to the complaint arguing that, in light of section 5653.1 as amended, the state had "indefinitely suspended the issuance of all permits for suction dredging, closing all waters of the state to" that use. The trial court overruled the demurrer. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal centered on whether the provisions under which defendant was charged were preempted by federal law because they "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment [and execution] of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." On the record presented, the Court was unable to make that determination and it remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the issue of federal preemption.View "California v. Rinehart" on Justia Law

Defendant Larry Jason Batchelor appealed his conviction after two separate trials of implied malice murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. As to the first trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter; and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant's exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly vouched for the State's case. As to the second trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied malice murder; (2) former section 224 violated principles of due process because it authorized disparate treatment for the prosecution and defense with respect to the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove implied malice; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to read or present to the jury section 188 and case law regarding implied malice; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on gross vehicular manslaughter and/or to inform the jury that defendant had been convicted of that offense in the first trial; (5) the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that if it did not convict defendant of murder he would be a free man and by appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jury; (6) he was denied due process by being sentenced by a judge who had not presided over either trial and who had failed to read the trial transcripts or the defense sentencing memoranda; and (7) the cumulative error doctrine required reversal. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in its instruction to defendant's second jury. The Court held that the jury was instructed in a manner to give that jury a false impression that defendant would have been left entirely unpunished for his actions if it did not convict him of murder. Moreover, the trial court's error was compounded by the prosecutor's argument to the jury. As a result of this error, the Court of Appeal reversed as to second degree murder. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects.View "California v. Batchelor" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Galardi appealed the trial court's order denying his special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute in a malicious prosecution action brought against him by Michael Zucchet. Galardi owned several strip clubs in Las Vegas and one in San Diego. In 2000, the San Diego City Council enacted a "no-touch" ordinance, which banned touching between exotic dancers and patrons in strip clubs. Galardi hired Lance Malone as a lobbyist to try to obtain repeal of the ordinance. Malone's lobbying activities included meeting with and making campaign contributions to members of the San Diego City Council, including Zucchet, who was elected to the city council in November 2002. In 2001, Malone made campaign contributions to city council member Ralph Inzunza, and Malone and Inzunza discussed a strategy to repeal the ordinance. Inzunza and Malone arranged to have an ostensibly corrupt police officer (who turned out to be an FBI informant) express public support for the plan. Inzunza advised Malone to contribute to Zucchet's campaign. Malone attempted to make a $6,750 contribution to Zucchet's campaign in 2001, but Zucchet returned the money because it was a political liability to be associated with Galardi's adult entertainment business. In 2002, Malone donated approximately $5,000 to Zucchet's campaign in checks that were not traceable to Galardi through one of Galardi's employees (and who also turned out to be an FBI informant). In 2003, the government executed a series of search warrants, raiding city hall. A federal grand jury indictment was filed, naming Inzunza, Zucchet, Galardi, Malone and others as defendants in numerous counts of fraud and other crimes, all arising from the scheme to repeal the no-touch ordinance. Galardi agreed to enter a guilty plea to a charge of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and agreed to cooperate with the government's prosecution of the other defendants. After an approximate 11-week trial, the jury acquitted Zucchet of 28 of the 37 counts against him. Zucchet filed this lawsuit against Galardi in October 2012, asserting a single cause of action for malicious prosecution. Zucchet alleged that: (1) Galardi falsely told the United States Attorney's Office that he had given $10,000 in cash to Malone to bribe three city council members, including Zucchet; and (2) Galardi falsely testified to that cash bribery during the criminal trial against Zucchet. Galardi filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that the complaint arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because it arose from statements he made during Zucchet's trial and to the United States Attorney's Office in preparation for that trial. The trial court granted the special motion to strike, concluding that Galardi had not rebutted the allegation that his conduct was illegal and therefore not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court also concluded that Zucchet had established a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. As permitted by the anti-SLAPP statute, Galardi filed a notice of appeal of the order denying his special motion to strike. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in denying the special motion to strike, reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Zucchet v. Galardi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether federal law preempted the effort by a district attorney to recover civil penalties under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) based on an employer’s alleged violation of workplace safety standards. Petitioners Solus Industrial Innovations, Emerson Power Transmission Corp., and Emerson Electric Co. (collectively Solus) argued the trial court erred by overruling their demurrer to two causes of action filed against them by Respondent, the Orange County District Attorney, alleging a right to recover such penalties. Solus argued that federal workplace safety law (Fed/OSHA) preempted any state law workplace safety enforcement mechanism which has not been specifically incorporated into the state workplace safety plan approved by the U.S. Secretary of Labor. The district attorney argued that once a state workplace safety plan has been approved by the Secretary of Labor, the state retains significant discretion to determine how it will enforce the safety standards incorporated therein, and thus the state may empower prosecutors to enforce those standards through whatever legal mechanism is available when such a case is referred to them. The trial court agreed with the district attorney and overruled Solus’s demurrer. But the court also certified this issue as presenting a controlling issue of law suitable for early appellate review under Code of Civil Procedure section 166.1. Solus then filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to review the trial court’s ruling. After the Court summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to show cause. In the course of its opinion, the Court of Appeal noted that the UCL was not even in effect when California’s plan was approved. The California Supreme Court then granted review, and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to reconsider the matter in light of former Civil Code section 3370.1 repealed by stats. 1977, ch. 299, sec. 3, p. 1204. Having done so, the Court of Appeal again concluded that the district attorney’s reliance on the UCL to address workplace safety violations was preempted. View "Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Bryan Watt of receiving stolen property and he was granted probation. He appealed, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, the jury was misinstructed and two of his probation terms were invalid. After review, the Court of Appeal disagree with Watt's first two contentions, agreed with the third, and, therefore, struck the probation terms at issue while affirming the remainder of the judgment. View "California v. Watt" on Justia Law

Defendant Rudy Francisco De La Rosa appealed an order committing him to the trial competency program at Napa State Hospital. He contended insufficient evidence supported the finding that he was not competent to stand trial. He also contended that after the court decided his placement at Napa State Hospital, the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to be heard. While defendant’s appeal was pending with the Court of Appeal, defense appellate counsel advised the Court that on April 2, 2013, the trial court terminated defendant’s commitment, finding that defendant had been restored to competency, and reinstated criminal proceedings. Defendant then entered a plea and the court granted probation. The State argued the issues on appeal were rendered moot due to defendant’s restoration to competency and the resumption of criminal proceedings during which defendant entered a plea and was granted probation. Defendant disagreed the issues were moot, arguing that State ignored post-"Lindsey" cases discussing the continuing stigma of a wrongful commitment. The Court of Appeal found that the issues on appeal were not moot, and that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial.View "California v. De La Rosa" on Justia Law

Los Alamitos Unified School District (the District) filed an action to validate its lease-leaseback agreement with a contractor performing improvements on the track and athletic field of the District's high school. Another contractor, Howard Contracting, Inc. (Howard), filed an answer, claiming the lease-leaseback agreement was unconstitutional, illegal, and invalid because the District did not obtain competitive bids for the project. The primary issue presented by this appeal was legal: did Education Code section 17406 exempt school districts from obtaining competitive bids when entering into what are known as "lease-leaseback" agreements to improve school property? After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the answer was yes. "More than 40 years ago, the California Attorney General concluded the language of the statute is plain, unambiguous, and explicit, and does not impose bid requirements on school districts. We agree, and nothing has occurred in the interim that would change our conclusion."View "Los Alamitos Unified etc. v. Howard Contracting" on Justia Law

The State alleged that defendant Ricardo Chaides had a prior felony conviction under Penal Code section 12025, subdivision (b)(3) and that this conviction constituted a strike for purposes of the three strikes law. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the strike prior allegation; it ruled that defendant’s prior conviction constituted only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). The State appealed. After review of the matter, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. "In ruling on the demurrer, it had to accept the allegations of the complaint as true; those allegations indicated that defendant had been convicted of an offense that would also constitute a felony violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). On remand, however, the evidence may show that Defendant’s offense of carrying a concealed firearm would constitute only a misdemeanor violation of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (a). In that event, defendant would be entitled to have the strike prior allegation found not true." View "California v. Chaides" on Justia Law

Defendant Larry Jason Batchelor appealed his conviction (from two separate trials) of implied malice murder (count 1) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (count 2).As to the first trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter, and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly vouched for the State's case. As to the second trial, defendant argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied malice murder; (2) the statute under which he was charged violated principles of due process because it authorizes disparate treatment for the prosecution and defense with respect to the admission of evidence of voluntary intoxication to prove implied malice; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to permit defense counsel to read or present to the jury section 188 and case law regarding implied malice; (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on gross vehicular manslaughter and/or to inform the jury that defendant had been convicted of that offense in the first trial; (5) the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that if it did not convict defendant of murder he would be a free man and by appealing to the passion and prejudice of the jury; (6) he was denied due process by being sentenced by a judge who had not presided over either trial and who had failed to read the trial transcripts or the defense sentencing memoranda; and (7) the cumulative error doctrine requires reversal. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by instructing defendant’s second jury in a manner that gave the jury the false impression that defendant would be left entirely unpunished for his actions if the jury did not convict him of murder. Moreover, the trial court’s error was compounded by the prosecutor’s argument to the jury: “And now is the time that you have to hold this person accountable. Now is the time that you have to send the message that you drink and drive and kill someone, you’re going to be held accountable. There is only one count in this case that you have to decide on. This is it. Hold him accountable for killing someone.” The Court reasoned: "[a]lthough perhaps the argument was technically correct, in that only one count remained for the jury to decide in the second trial, the argument certainly created the misleading impression that unless the jury found him guilty of the murder charge, he would not be held accountable at all for [the victim's] death." The Court concluded, therefore, the error required reversal. View "California v. Batchelor" on Justia Law