Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The National Center on Missing and Exploited Children reported a tip that username “mrwadleigh@sbcglobal.net” had uploaded 23 images of child pornography to an Adobe account, associated with an AT&T account. Detective DeRespini prepared a warrant application, identifying four images as child pornography and describing the images and why he believed the subjects were children. DeRespini did not attach the images. With a warrant, DeRespini learned the address of Wadleigh’s likely residence and that the Adobe and AT&T accounts were his. The search yielded 41 more images. DeRespini conducted social media searches and surveillance, confirmed Wadleigh’s residence and vehicle, and prepared a second warrant application to search Wadleigh’s person, vehicle, and residence; to search for and seize his electronic devices and stored digital media; and to conduct a forensic examination of seized items. DeRespini restated his experience and training and repeated the description of the original four images but did not include actual images. With the second warrant, officers seized items that contained additional child pornography.Wadleigh unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court of appeal affirmed. The warrant applications contained sufficient factual detail to establish probable cause. DeRespini misdescribed one of the images and testified that he was taught not to include images of suspected child pornography in warrant applications; the court noted that the preferable course is to include the actual images purporting to establish probable cause. View "People v. Wadleigh" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of a man during a street brawl. The jury in Defendant’s case also found a sentencing enhancement alleging that he personally used a knife to be not true. Defendant appealed for a third time, arguing, among other things, that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s ruling he could still be convicted of murder as the actual killer.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s summary denial of that petition and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing per section 1172.6. The court agreed that the court erred in finding that Defendant stabbed the victim to death after the jury found not true an allegation that Defendant personally used a knife. The court explained that it is appropriate to remand the matter for a new hearing to determine whether the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant is guilty under a permissible theory of murder. The court directed that in doing so, the court shall not make any finding or rely on any evidence which contradicts the jury’s finding that the personal use of a knife sentencing enhancement was not true. View "P. v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder; the jury rejected the special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred during the course of a robbery. In 2019, Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Defendant’s petition on the grounds that Defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he aided and abetted the murder and acted with malice. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s findings but argued he should have been resentenced without a hearing under the streamlined procedure described in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2), which applies when “there was a prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony.” He asserted that the jury’s rejection of the special circumstance constitutes such a finding, regardless of any other viable grounds for his conviction.
The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) does not mandate vacatur of a murder conviction and resentencing when there are viable bases for murder liability independent of a rejected special circumstances allegation. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(2) provides a mechanism to streamline the process of resentencing only if it is clear the petitioner is otherwise eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Marilyn Joy Zemek was convicted by jury of first degree murder (count 1); elder abuse (count 2); two counts of grand theft (counts 3 and 5); identity theft (count 4); and perjury (count 6). Regarding count 2, the jury found true that Zemek caused the death of the victim who was then over 65 years and under 70 years of age within the meaning of Penal Code section 368 (b)(3)(A). Also, concerning counts 3 and 5, the jury found true that Zemek committed two or more related felonies involving fraud with the taking of more than $100,000 within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.11 (a)(1). The court sentenced Zemek to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to life on count 1, plus a total determinate term of five years, comprised of eight-month terms (one-third the middle term) on each of counts 3, 4, and 5, and the middle term of three years on count 6. Zemek appealed, contending: (1) she was denied her right to a public trial; (2) the trial court erred by failing to sufficiently investigate and then dismiss a juror for misconduct; (3) insufficient evidence supports her murder conviction; (4) the trial court erred in denying her request for a pinpoint jury instruction; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting evidence of her prior thefts. The Court of Appeal concluded none of these arguments has merit, and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Zemek" on Justia Law

In 2010, the California Supreme Court upheld a superior court's dismissal of a felony case under Penal Code section 1382 because there was no available judge or courtroom to hear the case. The Supreme Court held, without qualification, that “the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly growing population and caseload” did not provide good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. More recently, Courts of Appeal in other parts of California have held that delay and docket congestion caused by the COVID-19 pandemic constitutes good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. In October 2022, about two years and seven months after the pandemic began, the Superior Court granted Jose Tapia’s motion to dismiss his felony case because there was no available judge or courtroom to try the case by the time the section 1382 deadline expired. In doing so, the Superior Court found that there was no good cause to extend section 1382’s deadline. The Riverside District Attorney sought writ review of that decision. Finding that the superior court did not err, the Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal. View "California v. Superior Ct. (Tapia)" on Justia Law

Defendant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition for resentencing based on Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Sen. Bill No. 483). In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to state prison for 49 years to life. He claims his current sentence is invalid due to recent legislative changes involving sentencing enhancements.   The Second Appellate District dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court explained that Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides: “The court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in the law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” The court must appoint counsel for the defendant and hold a resentencing hearing unless a hearing is waived. Section 1172.75 contains no provision for an individual defendant to file the type of petition Defendant has filed. The court wrote that Section 1172.75 simply does not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual defendant’s petition or motion.” Defendant has not shown that the DCR did not comply with its statutory duty. View "P. v. Newell" on Justia Law

Defendants B.G. and D.R. were making a purchase at a convenience store where they exchanged words with a man who was accompanied by his girlfriend and her two young children. A short time after leaving the store, B.G. stopped his vehicle in the street near where the man, girlfriend, and children were walking on the sidewalk while D.R. exited the vehicle and shot at the individuals multiple times. Defendants were convicted of premeditated attempted murder and related charges and were sentenced to terms of seven years to life plus 10 years (as to B.G) and seven years to life plus 49 years and eight months (as to D.R). Defendants challenged their convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle and permitting someone to discharge a firearm from a vehicle because Ross was not in the vehicle when the shooting occurred. Defendants argued that recent amendments to the sentencing law require we remand their cases for resentencing.   The Fifth Appellate District vacated the sentences and remanded for resentencing in accordance with section 1170, as amended by Senate Bill 567. The judgments are otherwise affirmed. The court explained that when a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, “the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. After reviewing the trial court’s comments and sentence in this case, the court was unable to conclude that the trial court would not exercise its discretion to impose different sentences. View "P. v. Gaines" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found that at a 2020 neighborhood party, 17-year-old D.L. shot and killed a six-year-old boy and shot an adult twice. Video footage showed D.L. running down a hill seconds after the shooting, stumbling, and then running. Officers recovered a handgun in a dirt-filled hole where D.L. had stumbled. DNA swabbed from the handgun was a match with D.L.’s DNA. D.L. admitted to several felonies prior to the incident, including assault, robbery, and theft in 2018, and burglary in 2019. D.L. appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm in San Francisco. (Pen. Code 25850(a)), arguing that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 “Bruen” holding section 25850 must be facially unconstitutional based on its relationship to California’s laws for obtaining a concealed-carry license.The court of appeal affirmed. Before Bruen, California required an applicant for a concealed carry license to show “good cause,” usually by establishing a specific need to carry a gun for self-defense. D.L. argued that the requirement was substantially similar to the “proper cause” requirement for a New York unrestricted firearm license, struck down in Bruen. California’s “good cause” requirement did not survive Bruen but is severable from the other requirements for obtaining a concealed carry license, saving California’s regulatory framework for gun possession and preserving D.L.’s conviction. View "In re D.L." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Seth Hilburn was charged with first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, first degree robbery, and carjacking, with allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of all three offenses. Before trial, Hilburn entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to the first degree robbery charge and the related firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a maximum sentence of 13 years in prison. At the sentencing hearing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors and imposed an eight year sentence, consisting of the middle term of four years for both the first degree robbery conviction and the admission of the firearm enhancement allegation. Hilburn appealed the sentence, asserting the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the middle, and not low terms, on the charges. Hilburn argued recent changes to the sentencing laws required the court to impose the low terms for the crimes he pleaded guilty to because the aggravating factors relied on by the court were not stipulated or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hilburn also argued the court abused its discretion by imposing the middle terms because the aggravating factors did not outweigh those in mitigation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment and sentence, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Hilburn" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law