Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants were arrested and convicted of murder charges after law enforcement obtained a geofence warrant, leading to the discovery of evidence connecting them to the crime. Defendants filed motions to quash and suppress, which were denied. Defendants then entered guilty and no contest pleas and then appealed their conviction based on the geofence warrant.The Second Appellate District found that, while the geofence warrant satisfied the requirements of CalECPA, it was overbroad and violated the 4th Amendment. However, the court affirmed Defendants’ convictions nonetheless, finding that the officers relied on the geofence warrant in good faith. View "P. v. Meza" on Justia Law

The question presented for the Court of Appeal in this case was whether California could lawfully require anyone who seeks to vote in a presidential primary for a candidate of a particular political party to associate with that party as a condition of receiving a ballot with that candidate’s name on it. Plaintiffs contended that the answer was no, making Elections Code section 13102 unconstitutional. Defendants California Secretary of State and the State of California disputed this conclusion, asserting that the United States Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative on multiple occasions. Defendants pointed out, that when plaintiffs discuss a “right” to cast an expressive ballot simply for the sake of doing so, rather than to affect the outcome of an election, they have ceased talking about voting. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that elections have some “generalized expressive function.” California Court of Appeal concluded Plaintiffs’ inventive theories therefore did not supply a constitutional basis for evading binding legal precedent that foreclosed their arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling sustaining the defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. View "Boydston v. Padilla" on Justia Law

In May 2022, the juvenile court granted a motion to transfer defendant minor T.A. from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction. T.A. argued the Court of Appeal should remand so the juvenile court could reconsider its ruling in light of recent ameliorative changes to the law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The State conceded that the changes applied retroactively to a minor, like T.A., whose case was not final when they took effect. Nevertheless, the State argued, no remand was necessary here because there was no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have reached a different result under the amended law. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore affirmed. View "In re T.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs William Thompson and Simon Cole were professors at the University of California, Irvine, and taxpaying residents of Orange County. They filed a taxpayer lawsuit under California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a against Todd Spitzer, in his capacity as the Orange County District Attorney (OCDA), and the County of Orange (County; collectively, County defendants). Plaintiffs sought to enjoin County defendants from operating an allegedly unconstitutional DNA collection program (the OCDNA program) that authorized County prosecutors to obtain DNA samples from persons charged with misdemeanors. Specifically, County prosecutors offered to drop or reduce charges or punishments in exchange for alleged misdemeanants’ DNA, which the OCDA stored indefinitely in its own databank. Plaintiffs claimed the OCDNA program violates alleged misdemeanants’ rights to privacy, counsel, and due process and violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The trial court sustained County defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend, characterizing plaintiffs’ claims as facial challenges to the OCDNA program. It also noted that alleged misdemeanants were required to sign waivers to participate in the program, in which they waived their rights to privacy and counsel. These waivers, the court concluded, barred any facial challenges to the OCDNA program. Plaintiffs appealed this ruling. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer as to the claims based on the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process: these claims asserted both facial and as-applied challenges to the OCDNA program, and Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged the OCDNA program, as implemented by the OCDA, was unconstitutional. The Court determined Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that including a DNA provision as part of a plea deal or negotiated dismissal was facially unconstitutional. The Court also concluded plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to bring their claims. On remand, the trial court was instructed to enter a new order overruling the demurrer as to the claims for violations of the right to privacy, the right to counsel, and due process, and sustaining it as to the remaining claims. View "Thompson v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

In February 2001, Bounthanom Didyavong was convicted by jury of first degree murder for his role in the 1998 gang-related beating and shooting death of David D. In May 2019, following California’s adoption of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Didyavong petitioned the superior court for resentencing, alleging he was not the actual killer or a major participant who acted with a reckless disregard to human life, and he did not act with intent to kill. The superior court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial and directed the superior court to issue an order to show cause. On remand and following a hearing that complied with Penal Code section 1172.6, the superior court concluded that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Didyavong committed second degree implied malice murder. It denied the petition for resentencing. Didyavong appealed that determination, contending there was not substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion. The Court of Appeal agreed with Attorney General that section 1172.6 did not provide a mechanism to reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder. We further conclude there was substantial evidence to support the court’s denial of Didyavong’s petition. View "California v. Didyavong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Vondetrick Carr drove drunk with four children in his car. He ran three red lights; the third time, while going 70 miles an hour, he hit a pickup truck. One of the children was killed. As a result, in 2004, petitioner was convicted of, among other crimes, second degree murder. In 2021, petitioner petitioned to vacate the murder conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition because petitioner was not convicted either on a natural and probable consequences theory or under the felony murder rule. Petitioner appealed, contending the theory under which he was convicted — causing death unintentionally but with implied malice while driving drunk was an “other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” within the meaning of section 1172.6. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "Implied malice is not imputed malice. ... Petitioner’s contrary argument is an artificial concoction that takes the words 'natural consequences' and/or 'natural and probable consequences' out of their proper legal contexts and dumps them all together into a confused semantic stew." Petitioner argued that, by enacting section 1172.6 as it then stood, the California Legislature somehow embraced the view of the dissenting justices in California v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981) that an unintentional killing while driving drunk should be no more than vehicular manslaughter." The Court held the trial court correctly ruled petitioner was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. View "California v. Carr" on Justia Law

This case involves the City of Clovis’s (City) housing element and related zoning ordinances and whether they comply with specific statutory requirements designed to assure affordable housing opportunities to lower-income families in California. These requirements for a municipality’s housing element have statewide importance because the housing elements of all cities and counties must include compliant zoning that accommodates the municipality’s need for lower-income housing. Adequacy of Housing Element. Plaintiff, a Clovis resident, sued the City, alleging its housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period, including amendments and zoning changes adopted in March 2019, did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.The Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment issuing the peremptory writ of mandate to the extent the writ is based on the trial court’s finding the amended housing element does not satisfy the requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g) because it does not include the required analysis for sites within the P-F Zone. The court otherwise  affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the City to (1) adopt “a housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period that substantially complies with Government Code section 65754”; and (2) implement Program 4 “by zoning or rezoning an adequate number of sites, compliant with Government Code Section 65583.2(h), to accommodate the City’s unmet share of the RHNA from the 2008-2013 planning period, pursuant to Government Code section 65584.09.” View "Martinez v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

In 2015, Nijmeddin was sentenced to an indeterminate life term, consecutive to a determinate term, for murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of narcotics. In 2023, the Department of Corrections recommended that the court recall Nijmeddin’s sentence under the new compassionate release provisions, Penal Code 1172.2, that apply to defendants who have “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” creating a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”Nijmeddin has advanced incurable pancreatic cancer, biliary adenocarcinoma, and other medical conditions. Nijmeddin is foregoing chemotherapy treatment. Nijmeddin, 65 years old, has committed prison rules violations, including fighting and violent threats. Nijmeddin’s doctor testified Nijmeddin “is barely able to get out of" his wheelchair and estimated Nijmeddin has three-six months to live. Nijmeddin’s brother, an attorney, is willing to be Nijmeddin’s caregiver. The court observed, “Nijmeddin looks quite good. … the doctors may say that he is terminally ill, he is not on that far end.” The court characterized Nijmeddin as “able to use his mental capacity to commit offenses” and declined to recall Nijmeddin’s sentence, finding that he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.The Attorney General conceded that the court erred and that Nijmeddin is entitled to relief. The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to immediately enter an order recalling Nijmeddin’s sentence. View "Nijmeddin v. Superior Court of Monterey County" on Justia Law

In 1988, Kerins was convicted of sodomy with a person under 18, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) qualifying offense. In 1998, Kerins pleaded guilty to two counts of annoying or molesting a child under 18. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Before Kerins’s scheduled release date in 2006, two psychologists concluded Kerins met the SVP criteria, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(a). After his probable cause hearing there were multiple continuances, reevaluations, and substitutions of attorney. In November 2020. Kerins filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the People did not bring him to trial in a timely manner and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.The trial court denied the petition in November 2021, describing the delay as “considerable,” but finding that the “overwhelming reason” for the delay was that Kerins’s counsel sought “continuance after continuance.” The court further observed that Kerins did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2019 and that nothing indicated Kerins’s defense had been impaired. The court of appeal upheld the decision. The court’s findings about the reasons for the delays and concerning prejudice were supported by substantial evidence. Kerins offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his attorneys provided reasonable assistance. View "In re Kerins" on Justia Law