Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA, Civil Code, 1786) mandates certain disclosures for investigative consumer reports, which are often used by landlords to make decisions regarding consumers who apply for housing. ICRAA requires the adoption of “reasonable procedures” for providing consumer information “in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer," concerning the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of their information. Any investigative consumer reporting agency or user of information that fails to comply with the requirements is liable to the affected consumer for any actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. Courts of appeal disagreed about the constitutionality and enforceability of ICRAA.In 2018, the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of ICRAA. Bernuy had filed one of 27 consolidated actions seeking damages against BPMC for its commission of ICRAA violations in 2017. Bernuy’s action was designated a “bellwether” case for adjudicating certain issues. The court of appeal held that the California Supreme Court’s 2018 decision did not constitute a subsequent change in the law that relieved BPMC of liability for its ICRAA violations. However, certain plaintiffs’ ICRAA claims are time-barred under the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The limitations period was not tolled by the pendency of a putative class action. View "Bernuy v. Bridge Property Management Co." on Justia Law

Minor S.S. (minor) appealed an order transferring him from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, pursuant to former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1. Minor contended: (1) the juvenile court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) subsequent legislation applies retroactively and requires reversal because the juvenile court did not comply with new requirements for transfer hearings. The State conceded the second argument. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the new law applied retroactively and therefore reversal and remand was appropriate for an amenability hearing in compliance with the new law. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

At sentencing, counsel stated that her client, defendant Eric Cooks waived his right to appear at any future restitution hearing. The court noted the waiver orally and in its sentencing minute order. Cooks appealed, claiming he never validly waived his right to be present at a future restitution hearing. At the time of his appeal, a restitution hearing had not yet taken place. The Court of Appeal concluded that until a restitution hearing takes place in Cooks’s absence, any error from an invalid waiver was hypothetical and not concrete. Concluding the claim was not yet ripe for appellate review, his appeal was dismissed. View "California v. Cooks" on Justia Law

Over several months, Jackie Marquez stole about $100,000 from her brother-in-law Robert C., who was then about 80 years old. The prosecution elected to charge Marquez with eight felony counts of elder theft as a noncaretaker. A jury found Marquez guilty of all counts. The court imposed a five-year sentence. Marquez contended the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution needed to prove she was “not a caretaker.” To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: a defendant’s status as a noncaretaker was not an element of Penal Code section 368 (d); rather, the Court found it more properly characterized as a charging option for the prosecution. Here, the trial court instructed the jury that the prosecution needed to prove the required elements of the crime: (1) Marquez committed a theft; (2) the victim was an elder; (3) Marquez stole more than $950; and (4) Marquez knew, or reasonably should have known the victim was at least 65 years old. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Stephen Wilson was convicted by jury of the sexual abuse of a child age 10 or younger. Wilson told his adult son that the victim (C.F.) at age six “was a better kisser than every one of my wives except [one].” During a police interrogation, Wilson admitted that he “kissed [C.F.’s] vagina and her breast area” and “she kissed me in private areas too.” In her testimony, C.F. (now 17 years old) described nine years of sexual abuse. Wilson contended the judgment should be reversed because in closing argument the prosecutor told the jury it could “presume” from this evidence that he “committed the crimes here.” The Court of Appeal determined that in the context in which it was said, the jury could reasonably have understood “presume” only in the colloquial sense, and there was no prosecutorial error. And even if there were, the Court concluded it was not prejudicial. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant Jony Pantaleon was convicted by jury on 15 counts of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a children. In March 2022, after amendments to California’s determinate sentencing law went into effect, the trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 111 years in prison plus an indeterminate term of 115 years to life. The trial court also awarded defendant a total of 932 days of custody credit. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court’s imposition of upper term sentences was unauthorized because the State did not plead any aggravating factors as required by current law. Additionally, defendant argued, and the State conceded, the abstract of judgment and minute order had to be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded by the court at his sentencing. The Court of Appeal accepted this concession and ordered the abstract of judgment and minute order corrected to conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. Because the State was not required to plead aggravating factors relating to defendant’s prior convictions, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Pantaleon" on Justia Law

Defendant Yaroslav Viktorovic Shkrabak was convicted by jury of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, and the trial court doubled his sentence based on a prior strike conviction. Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to strike his prior strike conviction consistent with California v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) because the court failed to afford “great weight” to the influence his mental illness had on the current offense. In supplemental briefing, defendant also argued he was entitled to a recalculation of his custody credits to include time he spent in Napa State Hospital after the trial court found him incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the former argument, but agree with the latter, and will remand the case for a recalculation of defendant’s custody credits. View "California v. Shkrabak" on Justia Law

In November 2021, a jury convicted Rahsaan Butler of one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter and other offenses, and found true related allegations that he personally used a firearm and caused great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced him to the upper term for the conviction and the firearm enhancement. On appeal, Butler contended he was entitled to resentencing because: (1) the trial court erred by impermissibly relying on the same facts that formed the basis of the enhancements to sentence him to the upper term; and (2) he was entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which became effective while his appeal was pending. The State conceded the legislation applied retroactively to Butler’s nonfinal judgment but argued that remand was not necessary because sentencing Butler under the applicable law at the time was harmless. The Court of Appeal found there was a split of authority concerning the applicable harmlessness standard. The Court adopted the approach in California v. Lopez, 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (2022) and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Butler" on Justia Law

In 2018, the California Legislature passed a law titled the “Keep Groceries Affordable Act of 2018” (the Groceries Act). The Act sought prohibit charter cities, counties, and other local governments from imposing taxes, fees, or assessments on certain grocery items, including, most relevant here, on sodas and other sugar-sweetened drinks. The act also imposes a penalty—the loss of all revenue from sales and use taxes—for violations of its terms. But it imposes its penalty only on charter cities and only if the city’s “tax, fee, or other assessment is a valid exercise of [the] city’s authority under Section 5 of Article XI of the California Constitution with respect to the municipal affairs of that city.” A nonprofit health advocacy organization and a city council member appearing in her individual capacity filed suit to challenge the act’s penalty provision, arguing the provision wrongly served to penalize charter cities that lawfully exercised their constitutional rights under the home rule doctrine. The trial court ultimately agreed the Groceries Act’s penalty provision was unlawful and deemed it unenforceable. On appeal, the State of California, the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration, and the department’s director (collectively, the Department) challenged the trial court’s decision, arguing: (1) the Groceries Act’s penalty provision did not penalize a charter city only when its tax on groceries “is a valid exercise” of the city’s constitutional powers; and (2) even if the trial court properly construed the act’s penalty provision, the trial court should have severed certain words from the penalty provision rather than deem the provision unenforceable in its entirety. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Cultiva La Salud v. State of California" on Justia Law

Andre Myles was homeless when he broke into an unoccupied Oceanside house. During the 15 hours he was inside, he did not take anything of significant value. But he drank a juice box and ate ice cream belonging to the owner, and he charged the battery in the owner’s vehicle. Several months later, Myles tried to break into the house again. The only disputed issue at Myles’ trial for first degree residential burglary and attempted first degree residential burglary was whether he had the specific intent to commit theft when he entered or tried to enter the house. Myles claimed he did not have the required specific intent and presented evidence he suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to experience delusions, and at the time of each incident, these delusions caused him to believe the home belonged to him because it had been given to him by an “entity” named “Archangel Michael.” The trial court modified the pattern instruction on the definition of theft by larceny (CALCRIM No. 1800). The modified instruction also contained citations to appellate decisions involving burglary charges arising from alleged incidental use of utilities and consumption of food inside a victim’s home. The jury convicted Myles of both charges. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court committed prejudicial instructional error when it modified the definition of theft and provided the jury with citations to appellate decisions that included factual summaries of other burglary cases. Consequently, Myles’ convictions of burglary and attempted burglary were reversed and the case remanded for possible retrial. View "California v. Myles" on Justia Law