Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2021, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) sent a letter to the superior court recommending that it resentence Gabriel Mendoza because of errors in his original sentence. Mendoza was resentenced in 2022, after amendments to Penal Code section 1385 became effective. The trial court concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not always require dismissal of a firearm enhancement under section 12022.53(c), even when imposition of the 20-year sentence for that enhancement results in a sentence of over 20 years. On appeal, Mendoza argued that under section 1385(c)(2)(C) dismissal of the enhancement was mandatory, not discretionary. The Court of Appeal concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) did not mandate dismissal of an enhancement when the court finds that dismissal would endanger public safety. The Court also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the enhancement. View "California v Mendoza" on Justia Law

These original proceedings involve efforts by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC or the Commission) to discover whether the political activities of Southern California Gas Company (SCG) are funded by SCG’s shareholders, which is permissible, or ratepayers, which is not. The Commission propounded several discovery requests (called “Data Requests”) on SCG, and when SCG failed fully to comply, moved to compel further responses that ultimately resulted in an order to comply or face substantial penalties. SCG seeks a writ of mandate directing the Commission to rescind its order on the ground that the discovery requests infringe on SCG’s First Amendment rights.   The Second Appellate District granted the petition and held that SCG has shown that disclosure of the requested information will impact its First Amendment rights, and the Commission failed to show that its interest in determining whether SCG’s political efforts are impermissibly funded outweighs that impact. The court reasoned that because SCG demonstrated that a threat to its constitutional rights exists, the burden shifted to the Commission to demonstrate that the data requests serve and are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. However, the PAO’s discovery inquiries into all sources of funding for SCG’s lobbying activities go beyond ratepayer expenditures. Insofar as the requests seek information about shareholder expenditures, they exceed the PAO’s mandate to obtain the lowest possible costs for ratepayers and its authority to compel disclosure of information necessary for that task. The requests, therefore, are not carefully tailored to avoid unnecessary interference with SCG’s protected activities. View "So. Cal. Gas Co. v. P.U.C." on Justia Law

When Leonardo Fernandez arrived at the hospital with his son Marco, the child was 13 weeks old and already dead. Marco sustained 18 separate rib fractures and bruises spattered his body. Blunt forces had caused several skull fractures and contusions on his brain. An expert later testified that Marco died from a blow to the left side of his skull. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeals was whether the State demonstrated a rational ground for concluding that Fernandez intended to kill Marco, an element necessary to charge the torture-murder special circumstance. The Court concluded that showing was made and granted a writ of mandate to order the charge reinstated. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Fernandez)" on Justia Law

Appellant V.R. is the mother of now 11-year-old N.R. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to N.R. Mother argued that the order is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness or child detriment. Specifically, she argued that termination cannot be predicated on earlier, unchallenged findings of parental unfitness or child detriment as to N.R. because, after N.R. and her younger half-sister R.L. were removed from mother’s custody, the juvenile court returned R.L. to mother. According to mother, R.L.’s return to mother “rebutted” the earlier findings as a matter of law. If these earlier findings are disregarded, mother continues, no substantial evidence otherwise supports termination of her parental rights as to N.R.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the juvenile court’s order. The court explained that the record reflects manifest differences between N.R.’s and R.L.’s needs and mother’s ability to parent each child. Throughout the proceedings, the juvenile court carefully considered this evidence and the respective risks the children faced in mother’s care. The court, therefore, rejected mother’s argument that R.L.’s return to mother rebutted or otherwise limited the vitality of prior findings of mother’s unfitness to parent N.R. or the detriment to N.R. of remaining in, or being returned to, mother’s custody. Notwithstanding its order returning R.L. to mother’s custody, due process permitted the juvenile court to rely on such findings at the section 366.26 hearing. View "In re N.R." on Justia Law

Appellant Ventura29, LLC purchased property (the Property) in the City of San Buenaventura (City). Appellant filed a complaint against the City alleging that Appellant “is in the process of developing a multi-unit townhome project” on the Property. The first cause of action is for inverse condemnation. Appellant claims City’s modification of an approved grading plan for the Property “resulted in an unconstitutional taking for which [it] is entitled to just compensation.” The trial court entered a judgment of dismissal after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to Appellant’s second amended complaint (complaint). Appellant contends the complaint states causes of action for private nuisance, trespass, and negligence based on the City’s dumping of uncertified fill on the Property in 1977.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court concluded that these causes of action are barred by the statute of limitations. The court reasoned that Appellant’s “action on the case” theory is based on its claim that the primary injury to its property was not caused by the dumping of the uncertified fill. Instead, it was caused by the consequences of the dumping. Therefore, Appellant argued, the statute of limitations on the causes of action began to run when the City Engineer made the modification. The “action on the case” theory is of no assistance to Appellant. The theory, in effect, restates the first cause of action for inverse condemnation. Appellant forfeited its right to object to the modification of the grading plan because it had complied with the modification without exhausting its administrative remedies. View "Ventura29 v. City of San Buenaventura" on Justia Law

Defendant was 22 years old when he committed various sex crimes for which he was sentenced to serve multiple life in prison without parole and multiple life in prison with parole terms. These sentences were based on the One Strike law. On an unrelated occasion, he stole a car and was convicted for its theft. On appeal, Defendant made several claims mostly related to sentencing. Primarily, he suggested the youthful offender parole scheme—which excludes people sentenced under the One Strike law, and people sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as adults—violates equal protection. The People disputed any equal protection violation. Second, Defendant complained the court erred in pronouncing one of the life in prison with parole terms. The People concede, but the parties diverge on the appropriate remedy. Their disagreement centers on due process and notice. Third, Defendant contends the trial court should have stayed some of the One Strike sentences pursuant to section 654, which generally prohibits multiple punishments for a single act. The People disagree.   The Fifth Appellate district, in the published portion of the opinion, found against Defendant on three issues. In the unpublished portion, the court addressed his remaining contentions. Ultimately, the court reversed the car theft conviction for insufficient evidence, directed the court to stay certain other sentences, and remanded for resentencing. The court affirmed the judgment, including the life without parole terms. View "P. v. Bolanos" on Justia Law

In November 2018, appellant Ryan Kite was driving a truck while under the influence of alcohol. He pulled out of a parking lot into traffic without coming to a stop, causing motorcyclist D.P. to slam on his brakes and fall off his motorcycle. Kite drove away from the scene without stopping. D.P. got back on his motorcycle, called 911, caught up to Kite’s truck, and signaled for Kite to pull over. At first, Kite did not stop. Kite eventually did stop at an intersection, where his passenger exited the truck. When the police arrived, Kite’s eyes were watery and red, and he had a strong odor of alcohol. Kite failed a variety of field sobriety tests. The motorcyclist D.P. suffered a spinal compression fracture as a result of the accident.Kite was charged with three counts: (1) driving under the influence causing injury; (2) driving with measurable blood alcohol content causing injury; and (3) hit-and-run with injury. A jury convicted Kite as charged on all three counts. At sentencing, the trial court placed Kite on formal probation for five years for counts two and three, imposed but stayed a 365-day jail term pending completion of probation, and stayed the sentence for count one under Penal Code section 654. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court violated Penal Code section 1203.1 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950 by imposing a five-year term of probation. As amended, section 1203.1(a) generally limited felony probation to a maximum of two years. But the statute included several exceptions, including one for violent felonies or any offense that “includes specific probation lengths within its provisions.” For these offenses, the maximum length of probation was “the maximum possible term of the sentence.” The Court of Appeal held that the maximum term of imprisonment was that which could have been imposed, rather than the maximum probationary period allowable under another law specifying a specific probation length; the maximum possible probation length had to be calculated by reference to the aggregate prison term that could have been imposed for all counts of conviction. Based on this holding, the Court found Kite’s term of probation had to be reduced from five years to three years and eight months. View "California v. Kite" on Justia Law

Minor K.C. appealed the order imposing a condition of probation that prohibits unconsented sexual touching of another person. K.C. argues that probation condition 6A is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define “sexual touching.” He points out, for example, that lewd or lascivious conduct prohibits touching of a child with the intent to sexually arouse the perpetrator or the child, but the touching need not be done in a sexual manner.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the condition. The court explained that probation condition 6A provides fair warning of the conduct it prohibits. A reasonable person would interpret this provision to proscribe unconsented touching of another person that involves any sexual connotation, either due to the parts of the body involved or K.C.’s intent in touching the person. The term “unconsented” provides guidance and permits K.C. to avoid violating the condition in those instances where he has that person’s consent. That different penal statutes define and proscribe particular sexual crimes in different terms makes no difference; K.C. must avoid all unconsented sexual touching. The condition is sufficiently definite to preclude constitutional infirmity. View "In re K.C." on Justia Law

In 1981, defendant Richard Morgan was convicted of vehicular manslaughter caused by unlawful exhibition of speed and DUI, neither of which was listed as a qualifying prior for elevating a DUI to a felony under California Vehicle Code section 23550.5 (b). The sole question presented in this appeal was whether Morgan’s nonqualifying 1981 convictions could be treated together as if they were a qualifying prior conviction for violating Penal Code section 191.5 (a), even though the latter statute was not enacted until five years later. After deciding that they could be, the trial court sentenced Morgan’s current DUI convictions as felonies. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred by treating Morgan as if he had previously been convicted of violating a Penal Code provision that was not yet in existence at the time of his 1981 convictions. "Without legislative authorization, we cannot expand the statute by judicial fiat to authorize courts to cobble together the elements of older California convictions and treat them as if they were a violation of a Penal Code provision that was not enacted until years later." Accordingly, the Court vacated Morgan’s sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. View "California v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The California Public Employment Relations Board (Board) refused to file an unfair labor practice complaint on behalf of plaintiff Rebecca Wu, a substitute teacher representing herself in propria persona, against real party in interest Twin Rivers United Educators (Union), a teachers’ union. In her unfair practice charge filed with the Board, Wu alleged the Union breached its duty to represent her in her claim against Twin Rivers Unified School District (School District), wherein she claimed to be misclassified as a substitute teacher. The Board declined to file a complaint against the Union based on Wu’s charge because Wu, as a substitute teacher, was not entitled to union representation given that substitute teachers were excluded from representation by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the School District. Wu argued she had a constitutional right to union representation as a misclassified teacher and as a substitute teacher. She further argued she had a statutory right to representation by the Union that could not be circumvented by a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Wu that she had a constitutional or statutory right to representation by the Union as an alleged misclassified employee or as a substitute teacher. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Wu v. Public Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law