Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Michelle Guiffreda appealed an order denying her petition for resentencing on a 2004 conviction for second-degree murder under California Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found there was insufficient evidence of malice aforethought to establish Guiffreda’s liability as a direct aider and abettor to murder. However, the court denied her petition based on a felony murder theory after finding beyond a reasonable doubt under current law that: (1) Guiffreda was a major participant in the underlying robbery which led to the victim’s death; and (2) she acted with reckless indifference to human life. Guiffreda contended on appeal that the record did not support the trial court’s major participant and reckless indifference findings. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal concurred there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Guiffreda acted with reckless indifference to human life. Consequently, the Court did not resolve whether she was a major participant. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court with directions to vacate her murder conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "California v. Guiffreda" on Justia Law

In 1990, a San Diego jury convicted petitioner Christopher Box of three counts of first degree murder, attempted premeditated murder, first degree robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, and residential burglary with associated weapons use enhancements. After the jury found special circumstances of multiple murder and murder during the commission of robbery and burglary, Box was sentenced to death in 1991. Box was African American, his codefendant was Hispanic, and the three murder victims were White. During jury selection, the prosecutor used two of her peremptory challenges to excuse both African Americans who were seated in the jury box. Defense counsel objected under California v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258 (1978). Although the court did not find a prima facie showing of racial bias as to either strike, it permitted the prosecutor to state her reasons for excusing the jurors on the record. Later the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to excuse an alternate juror, and the defense again raised a Wheeler challenge. The court again found no prima facie case, but permitted the prosecutor to offer reasons for the strike. The judge then denied the motion, finding the prosecutor had not engaged in “racial discrimination” because she would not have excluded a Black prosecutor or police officer from the jury. Ultimately one African American alternate juror was seated, but none of the 12 jurors who deliberated the verdicts was African American. On automatic appeal, the California Supreme Court rejected Box’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his Batson/Wheeler motion. In January 2022, shortly after the California Supreme Court decided California v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.5th 348 (2021, Jones II), Box filed a motion to compel the District Attorney to produce copies of the trial prosecutor’s jury selection notes to support his federal habeas claim of Batson error. The State objected to their production on grounds of work product privilege. The Court of Appeal found that where a prima facie case of racial bias under Batson/Wheeler has been made, a defendant is entitled to discover the prosecution’s jury selection notes under Penal Code section 1054.9. "Those notes are not categorically shielded from discovery by the absolute work product privilege. To the extent the People maintain that those notes reflect the prosecution’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research and theories about case strategy independent of conclusions or impressions about prospective jurors, they bear the burden to make that foundational proffer and seek appropriate redactions from the trial court." View "Box v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

Ross was charged with battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Ross pleaded guilty to the administrative charge of battering the counselor. At trial, several officers and an intercepted letter corroborated the victim’s testimony about the attack. The defense presented no evidence. During discussions about jury instructions, Ross declared, “Man, you are fired” and “I will represent myself.” Ross cursed at the court, which had him removed. Defense attorney Fallman stated that he tried to talk with Ross, who refused and declined to return to the courtroom. Fallman noted that Ross had fired his previous attorney and that he knew of no “provocation.” The court continued without Ross. During closing arguments, Fallman admitted Ross touched the officer willingly, in a harmful or offensive manner, but argued there was no preplanning or weapon. Fallman asked the jury to find Ross guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The jury convicted Ross, finding two prior strike allegations true. Finding six aggravating factors true and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Ross to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years under the Three Strike Law.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Ross’s argument that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding his guilt. There was no evidence that his claimed desire to maintain innocence to the exclusion of all other defense strategies was ever communicated to Fallman or the court. The court remanded for resentencing due to Senate Bill 567., which requires that when a statute specifies three potential terms of imprisonment, a court must presumptively impose the middle term. View "People v. Ross" on Justia Law

In May 2006, a then-25-year old defendant Matthew White, while drunk and speeding, struck a car stopped on the shoulder of the highway with its hazard lights on, killing the driver and injuring two passengers. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence causing injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or higher causing injury, with enhancements for causing and inflicting great bodily injury on multiple victims. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for second degree murder, and a consecutive determinate middle term of two years for driving under the influence with injury. In 2020, defendant requested and received a hearing pursuant to California v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) to make a record of information relevant to an eventual youthful offender parole hearing. He then filed a motion to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) based on amendments to Penal Code section 654 following the passage of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) the Franklin hearing rendered the judgment nonfinal and subject to Assembly Bill 518; (2) Assembly Bill 518 should have been applied retroactively to all convictions; and (3) failure to remand for resentencing would deprive him of equal protection under the law. Rejecting all these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. White" on Justia Law

M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. sought habeas relief ordering her release, arguing that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. A hearing was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. M.G. is hearing impaired; she requested two sign language interpreters: an ASL interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. On Tuesday, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued to Thursday, September 1. On August 31, M.G. petitioned the appeal court.After the court issued an order to show cause, counsel indicated M.G. had been released. Unable to grant the relief requested—release from confinement—the court denied her petition as moot, noting that temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, so a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. Welfare and Institutions Code 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person’s request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Lonnie Kocontes of murdering his ex-wife for financial gain. Kocontes conceded sufficient evidence supported his conviction; he challenged numerous procedural and evidentiary rulings. Although the trial court erred by admitting evidence, Kocontes was not prejudiced by its admission, and his constitutional rights were not infringed. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Kocontes" on Justia Law

The California Constitution directs that laws be made to exclude “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Former Code of Civil Procedure 203(a)), provided, “All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except” “Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.” In 2019, Senate Bill 310 eliminated the exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries. Section 203(a) now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors “Persons while they are incarcerated. … Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. … Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender … based on a felony conviction.”Plaintiffs alleged that the categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denied registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statutory disparity withstands rational basis scrutiny. Plausible reasons for the Legislature’s line-drawing include ensuring impartial juries by excluding those persons convicted of felonies deemed more likely to harbor anti-government bias. View "Doe v. Finke" on Justia Law

After defendant Ishmael Carter was housed for more than 14 years in a state hospital awaiting trial, the trial court found him to be a sexually violent predator and committed him to an indeterminate term. Defendant appealed that order, contending the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion; and (2) failed to obtain a valid waiver of defendant’s right to a jury trial. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Carter" on Justia Law