Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in 1984 for a gang-related stabbing petitioned for relief under Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95), and proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. The People introduced statements Defendant made to a psychologist in 2013 during a parole risk assessment interview. Defendant argued that admitting his prior statements was an error because those statements are (1) inadmissible under a judicially crafted “use immunity” doctrine, and (2) involuntary under the due process clause.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief under Penal Code section 1172.6. The court held Defendant’s statement to the psychologist was not involuntary under due process. A finding that Defendant’s statement was involuntary means it would have been inadmissible at the parole hearing itself because involuntary statements are, by definition, coerced and utterly unreliable. Yet Defendant is not asserting that his 2013 interview statement should not have been considered at the parole hearing. At the bottom, Defendant seems to be urging us to construe the due process clause as a sort of “super use immunity” that would preclude the use of his prior statement even to impeach. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "P. v. Duran" on Justia Law

G.I. Industries, doing business as Waste Management (WM), provided solid waste management for the City of Thousand Oaks (City). The City was considering entering into a new exclusive solid waste franchise agreement with Arakelian Enterprises, Inc. doing business as Athens Services (Athens). A supplemental item was posted giving notice of the staff’s recommendation that the City find the agreement to be exempt from CEQA. Prior to the commencement of litigation under the Brown Act, WM sent the City a “cure and correct” letter. WM petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate directing the City to vacate both its approval of the franchise agreement and its finding that the project is exempt from CEQA. Athens was joined as the real party in interest. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The court agreed with WM that the CEQA exemption is an item of business separate from the approval of the franchise agreement. The court also concluded that the Brown Act does not apply.   The Second Appellate District reversed the finding that the trial court erred when it entered judgment. Section 54954.2 of the Brown Act, requires this CEQA finding of exemption to be listed on the agency’s agenda for its public meeting. The purpose of section 54960.1, subdivision (b) is to give the local agency notice of an alleged violation of the Brown Act so that it can avoid litigation by curing the violation. Here, the City council voted that the project is exempt, without the public notice required by the Brown Act. WM’s cure and correct letter adequately stated that point. View "G.I. Industries v. City of Thousand Oaks" on Justia Law

In 2005, fifteen-year-old Davion Keel and eighteen-year-old Ariel Bolton held Barry Knight at gunpoint and robbed him of twenty dollars on the streets of San Bernardino. One of them shot and killed Knight when he resisted the robbery and tried to flee. Keel and Bolton were both prosecuted in adult criminal court and convicted of first degree murder in connection with Knight’s death. More than a decade later, Keel petitioned to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on legislative changes to California's murder laws. The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Keel was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Knight’s murder because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery and he acted with reckless indifference to human life. Keel appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he was a major participant in the underlying robbery who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In the alternative, he contended the court applied an incorrect legal standard when it adjudicated his petition for resentencing. The Court of Appeal agreed with Keel’s first argument, which rendered it unnecessary to reach his second argument. Because there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination, the Court reversed the order denying Keel’s resentencing petition and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to grant Keel’s resentencing petition and vacate his murder conviction. Further, the Court concluded Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, and Senate Bill 1391 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) would apply retroactively to Keel once his petition for resentencing was granted and his murder conviction was vacated. Therefore, on remand, the Court instructed the trial court to transfer the matter to the juvenile court for resentencing in accordance with those measures. View "California v. Keel" on Justia Law

Defendant joined in an “eight against one” gang assault resulting in the victim’s death. While his cohorts used a baseball bat, a shovel, and a knife, Defendant pummeled the victim with his fists and feet. The trial court found that this participation in the gang assault resulting in death is an implied malice murder.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s petition for resentencing on his 2001 second-degree murder conviction. The court explained that it suffices that Defendant knew was aiding in a violent attack, knew dangerous weapons were being used against the victim and intended to stop the victim from escaping or defending himself by helping the perpetrators to surround and hit him. The court also rejected Defendant’s assertion that second-degree implied malice murder cannot be shown unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was a substantial factor in aiding and abetting the actual perpetrators of the murder. The court also rejected Defendant’s claim that SB 775 invalidated the theory of aiding and abetting a second-degree implied malice murder. View "P. v. Schell" on Justia Law

In September 2019, the Department filed a dependency petition after taking six-year-old A.H. and her younger half-siblings into emergency protective custody and placing them in foster care. The petition alleged that the children’s mother had allowed A.H. to have unsupervised contact with an older relative suspected of having sexually molested the child. A.H.’s alleged father, J.H., had failed to provide care, support, or supervision for more than a year and it was indicated that his whereabouts were unknown, although the Department did have an address.The court of appeal reversed an order terminating J.H.'s parental rights. From the outset of the dependency proceedings through the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing, the Department’s efforts to locate J.H. and provide him notice requirements fell far short of the statutory requirements and left him in the dark about his parental status, how to assert his parental rights and how to participate in the proceedings. While its efforts may have improved later in the case, the Department never rectified its earlier failures by advising J.H. of his right to request counsel and his need to elevate his status to "presumed parent" to assert his parental rights. The Department violated his right to due process. View "In re A.H." on Justia Law

In 2001, Gerardo Vizcarra was convicted of the second degree murder of Richard Holcomb. Vizcarra and three confederates beat, kicked, and stabbed Holcomb to death after he bumped a mutual companion’s young child into a wall while playing with him. In 2019, Vizcarra filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction and to be resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6 based on changes to California’s murder laws effectuated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.). The trial court denied the petition for resentencing, finding Vizcarra was not entitled to relief because he remained liable for Holcomb’s murder under a still-valid theory of liability: he directly aided and abetted an implied malice murder. Vizcarra appealed the order denying his petition for resentencing, arguing direct aiding and abetting of implied malice murder was not a legally-valid theory of murder liability. Further, he argued he was entitled to resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and affirmed the order denying Vizcarra’s petition for resentencing. View "California v. Vizcarra" on Justia Law

The State of California appealed after a juvenile court declared defendant-respondent T.O. a ward of the court and placed him in a secure local facility for committing a sexual offense against his seven-year-old cousin. The State contended the juvenile court erred in refusing to impose mandatory sex offender registration pursuant to Penal Code section 290.008 because the court improperly relied on a strict interpretation of section 290.008 without adequately considering the illogical or consequences and harmonizing the statutory scheme. Based on the legislative intent in enacting changes to the juvenile delinquency provisions and the plain language of section 290.008, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re T.O." on Justia Law

Victor Tellez asked the Court of Appeal to vacate his conviction based on a plea of guilty to committing a lewd and lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years. He contended his appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him before the plea that he could be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually violent predator after service of the prison term. Finding that Tellez did not state a prima facie case for habeas relief, the Court denied his petition. View "In re Tellez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted in 1990 of special-circumstance felony murder for a crime committed when he was 25 years old. Current law entitles anyone who commits a special-circumstance murder at age 16 or 17 is entitled to both a Youth Offender Parole Hearing and a Franking Hearing. However, those who commit a special-circumstance murder at 18 or older are ineligible for both.Defendant challenged California law on Equal Protection grounds. The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant, finding there is no rational basis to support the Legislature’s distinction between young adult offenders who committed a special-circumstance murder and were sentenced to life without parole and other young adult offenders who committed different serious or violent crimes and received parole-eligible indeterminate life terms, including those that could be the functional equivalent of a life without parole sentence. Thus, the court determined that Defendant was eligible for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing as well as a Franklin Hearing. View "P. v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law