Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Christopher Whitmore was convicted by jury of rape, false imprisonment and other crimes. After trial, Whitmore made a Marsden motion to replace his appointed counsel; he also moved for a new trial. Because of circumstances related to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, Whitmore was not physically present in the courtroom when the trial court heard those motions in late December 2020; instead, Whitmore reluctantly appeared via video for the hearing and at sentencing. The court denied Whitmore’s motions and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. On appeal, Whitmore contended the trial court erred in overruling his demand to be personally present in the courtroom for the hearing on his posttrial motions and at sentencing. He also contended the court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion, and that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for false imprisonment. In its original opinion, filed on April 29, 2022, the Court of Appeal found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment. Whitmore petitioned for rehearing, arguing that among other things: while his appeal was pending, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1170 (b) to make the middle term the presumptive sentence unless certain circumstances exist. Whitmore contended those amendments applied retroactively to him and required remand for resentencing. The Court granted rehearing, which vacated its previous opinion by operation of law. After considering the matter, the Court agreed with Whitmore that the recent amendments to section 1170(b) applied here. Accordingly, the Court vacated the imposed sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Whitmore" on Justia Law

After having his first degree murder conviction reduced to second degree murder based on instructional error, defendant-appellant Matthew Basler filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Basler was not present, the trial court denied the petition, ruling: (1) Basler was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 (a) because he was not convicted of felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, but was convicted of first degree premeditated murder; and (2) Basler could still be convicted of murder even after the changes made to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019. The court further found “as an independent factfinder” beyond a reasonable doubt that Basler committed first degree premeditated murder and that he harbored premeditated intent before killing the victim. On appeal, Basler contends the trial court erred by its ruling. The State conceded the trial court reversibly erred by failing to address the merits of Basler's petition as to his attempted murder conviction, and Senate Bill No. 775 required a remand for that determination. The Court of Appeal accepted that concession, and further concluded Basler had a constitutional right to be present at his section 1170.95 evidentiary hearing or competently waive his presence. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing on Basler's murder conviction. View "California v. Basler" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruman Abdul Richardson acted as the getaway driver for a robbery. During the robbery, one of his coparticipants shot the victim. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on a felony murder theory. The trial court denied petitioner’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. After review, the Court of Appeal held there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that petitioner was a major participant in the underlying robbery. Hence, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults who claimed they were molested by a priest when they were children, brought suit against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and related parties ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' claims were that the Defendants ratified the assaults and acted negligently in failing to supervise the priest who committed the assaults.In response, Defendants moved to strike the complaint, claiming that some of the acts that allegedly ratified the priest's conduct, as well as those serving as the basis for the allegations of negligence, constituted speech and litigation conduct that was protected under California's anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16). The district court rejected Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.The Second Appellate District affirmed. As to the ratification claims, the court held that Defendants mischaracterized Plaintifffs' complaint, "cherry-picking allegations of litigation conduct, and, without support, suggesting that they are the only allegations incorporated by reference into the sexual abuse cause of action."As to the negligence claims, Defendants too narrowly construed Plaintiffs' complaint, focusing only on what Defendants claim was protected speech. Any allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint that may have been "conclusory" when taken out of context, were supported by factual allegations earlier in the complaint. View "Ratcliff v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted carjacking. He requested and was denied, mental health diversion several times. After the last hearing and denial, Defendant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months in state prison. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court erred by requiring the consent of the prosecution before granting diversion. Defendant also contended that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to allow live testimony in the last diversion hearing by a psychiatrist that had examined Defendant.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Defendant that it was an error for the trial court to conclude that diversion required consent by the People. But found that the error was harmless because the trial court independently found that Defendant did not meet the criteria for diversion. And, the court acted within its discretion in considering the expert’s report, but not live testimony, in the pre-trial diversion hearing. View "P. v. Watts" on Justia Law

In a previous opinion in this matter involving defendant James Bunas, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and the underlying convictions and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a mental health diversion eligibility hearing under Penal Code section 1001.36 and to determine whether to place Bunas in mental health diversion. (Bunas I.) The Court further directed that, if the trial court determined Bunas was ineligible for diversion or exercised its discretion not to place Bunas on diversion, then the court was to reinstate Bunas’s convictions and resentence him. On remand, the trial court denied Bunas’s request for mental health diversion, but did not resentence. On appeal, Bunas argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mental health diversion; and (2) the trial court erred in failing to resentence him in accordance with the Court of Appeal’s prior decision. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Bunas mental health diversion, but it did err in failing to issue a new sentence. Judgment was affirmed in part, and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Bunas" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Zuniga pled no contest to felony hit and run resulting in death or serious bodily injury. In late 2018, the court placed him on formal probation for three years. The terms and conditions of probation included that Zuniga “pay restitution [to the victim] through the Probation Department in an amount and manner to be determined by the probation officer at a later date.” Effective January 1, 2021, two years into Zuniga’s probation term, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) which amended Penal Code section 1203.1(a) by reducing the maximum felony probation term to two years, with certain exceptions not applicable here. In November 2021, the parties agreed that Zuniga was entitled to have his term of probation shortened to two years under Assembly Bill No. 1950. Accordingly, the court terminated Zuniga’s probation nunc pro tunc to December 31, 2020. When the court terminated Zuniga’s probation, the probation officer still had not determined the amount of victim restitution, as contemplated in the original probation order. Zuniga then argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set the amount of victim restitution because his probation had terminated. After soliciting briefing on the issue, the trial court disagreed with Zuniga and ordered direct restitution to the victim in the amount of $313,518.74. Zuniga appealed the restitution order. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction and affirmed the order. View "California v. Zuniga" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Cristina Qualkinbush threw a pair of scissors at her 75-year-old mother and then spat on a police officer who detained her following the incident. After the trial court denied Qualkinbush’s motion for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36, she pled guilty to elder abuse and misdemeanor battery on a peace officer. The trial court placed her on formal probation for three years, subject to certain conditions, including residential mental health treatment. Qualkinbush appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in denying her motion for mental health diversion. She also contended, and the State conceded that the Court of Appeal: (1) order an amendment of the probation order to vacate certain fees or costs pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (AB 1869); and (2) order a correction of the probation search condition to accurately reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement. After briefing, the parties agreed that the offense of conviction fell under an exception to Penal Code section 1203.1 and required a three-year minimum probation term. The Court concluded the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for mental health diversion, and remanded for the court to consider the primary purposes of the mental health diversion statute. “If after conducting a hearing on the motion, the trial court again denies mental health diversion, the order granting formal probation shall be reinstated, as modified, to vacate the unpaid portion of the challenged fees and costs, and to correct the probation search conditions to delete authorization of searches of computers and recordable media.” View "California v. Qualkinbush" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jesse Sambrano sought to reverse his attempted murder convictions because his jury was given a kill zone instruction that was erroneous under California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). The State conceded the error but argued it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal concluded after a review of the trial court record: (1) the jury should not have been instructed on the kill zone theory at all; (2) the instruction’s description of the kill zone theory was erroneous; (3) the prosecutor relied almost exclusively on the kill zone theory in arguing that Sambrano had the necessary mental state for attempted murder; and (4) the prosecutor’s argument concerning the kill zone theory was likewise erroneous. From this, the Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would not have reached a verdict more favorable to Sambrano. "Accordingly, the convictions on the attempted murder counts must be reversed." the petition was granted and the attempted murder convictions were vacated. View "In re Sambrano" on Justia Law

During a traffic stop in September 2009, police searched defendant Manual Soto and found 29.9 grams of methamphetamine in his breast pocket. According to the officer who arrested him, defendant stated he was to receive $200 for delivering the drugs on behalf of another person. A probation report noted defendant had never attended school, was illiterate in English and spoke it poorly, and was subject to an immigration hold as a noncitizen. Defendant was charged with drug possession and transportation charges, in addition to driving without a license. Pursuant to a plea negotiation, defendant initialed and signed a waiver of rights and plea form, in which he indicated his understanding that, as a noncitizen, his plea “may cause my deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States and denial of citizenship or naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” He also initialed the following line on the form: “I read and understand the English language.” Defendant’s attorney signed an acknowledgement on the form stating, among other things, he had “explained the consequences of this plea” to his client. A Spanish interpreter signed an acknowledgement on the form stating she was duly sworn, had translated the form to defendant, and that defendant indicated he understood its contents. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his 2020 motion to vacate his 2010 drug trafficking conviction, claiming he would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Defendant contended his conviction was invalid due to prejudicial error. Applying its independent judgment, the Court of Appeal concluded, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonably probable defendant would have rejected the plea had he correctly understood its actual immigration consequences. Therefore, defendant established prejudice. The trial court's order denying the section 1473.7 motion was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. View "California v. Soto" on Justia Law