Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this coordinated proceeding appealed postdismissal orders denying their motions for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In 2017, plaintiffs filed petitions against defendant Department of Water Resources (DWR) challenging the California WaterFix (WaterFix), a proposal to improve the State’s water supply infrastructure by constructing two 35-mile-long tunnels that would convey fresh water from the Sacramento River to pumping stations in the southern Sacramento–San Joaquin Delta (Delta). The lawsuits sought to compel DWR to rescind the WaterFix approvals, decertify the environmental impact report (EIR), and suspend activities related to the project until DWR complied with applicable laws. In 2019, while the coordination proceeding was pending, California’s newly elected Governor announced that he did not support WaterFix’s dual tunnel proposal and directed DWR to instead pursue a single tunnel conveyance. Shortly thereafter, DWR decertified the EIR and rescinded the project approvals. Consequently, all pending actions, including the validation suit, were dismissed. After the cases were dismissed, plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, asserting that they were “successful” parties under the catalyst theory because the litigation motivated DWR to voluntarily provide the relief sought in their petitions and answers. On appeal, plaintiffs argued: (1) the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining there was no causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained; and (2) the trial court’s finding of no causation is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard and therefore failed to consider all relevant evidence in the record. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for redetermination of the issue. View "Dept. of Water Resources Environmental Impact Cases" on Justia Law

On appeal, the district attorney argued that The Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County (“ADDA”) lacks standing to seek mandamus relief on behalf of its members and that he does not have a ministerial duty to comply with the legal duties ADDA alleges he violated, that the trial court’s preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of separation of powers and that the balance of the harms does not support preliminary injunctive relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s order. The court concluded that ADDA has associational standing to seek relief on behalf of its members. The court concluded the voters and the Legislature created a duty, enforceable in mandamus, that requires prosecutors to plead prior serious or violent felony convictions to ensure the alternative sentencing scheme created by the three strikes law applies to repeat offenders. This duty does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by materially infringing on a prosecutor’s charging discretion; to the contrary, the duty affirms the voters’ and the Legislature’s authority to prescribe more severe punishment for certain recidivists. Further, neither the voters nor the Legislature can create a duty enforceable in mandamus to require a prosecutor to prove allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions, an inherently discretionary act. Nor is mandamus available to compel a prosecutor to exercise his or her discretion in a particular way when moving to dismiss allegations of prior strikes or sentence enhancements under section 1385. View "The Association of Deputy District Attorneys etc. v. Gascon" on Justia Law

United Water Conservation District (“District”) manages the groundwater resources in Ventura County. City of San Buenaventura (“City)” pumps groundwater from the District’s territory and sells it to residential and commercial customers.   The District collects a fee from the city by applying a fixed ratio of rates for nonagricultural users, such as the City, who pump groundwater for municipal and industrial (M&I) uses. The District charged such users three times more than agricultural (also known as “Ag”) users in accordance with Water Code section 75594.   The City filed its complaint for determination of invalidity and declaratory relief and petition for writ of mandate. The City alleged section 75594 is facially unconstitutional because the groundwater extraction rates charged for the water year 2019-2020 were not allocated to the City and other M&I users in a manner that bears a reasonable relationship to the City’s burdens on or benefits from the District’s activities.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment and held that the groundwater extraction charge is invalid as to nonagricultural users and must be set aside and section 75594 violates the California Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. The threshold issue concerned the applicable standard of review. The court held that District’s rates for the 2019-2020 Water Year do not comply with proposition 26. The court reasoned that the constitutional requirement of a ‘fair or reasonable relationship’ is not resolved by application of a rigid judicial standard nor by application of a deferential standard of substantial evidence. View "City of San Buenaventura v. United Water Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Three men ("Defendants") were involved in a fistfight. During the fracas, one of the Defendants ("the Shooter") retrieved a gun. The Shooter missed his intended target, but several passing vehicles, including a young child. All three Defendants were charged with attempted premeditated murder and shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. All charges contained a gang enhancement under Sec. 186.22. The jury convicted all Defendants of two counts of attempted murder and several counts of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle. The jury also found the gang enhancements to be true.In a May 2, 2022 opinion, the Second Appellate District reversed all Defendants' gang enhancements, remanding for further proceedings. The court held that Senate Bill 333 provides a new framework for determining the applicability of the enhancement. The court affirmed the Shooter's convictions for attempted premeditated murder but reversed the other Defendant's convictions for the same. The court held that the evolving standard of aiding and abetting liability requires a retrial on these charges. The court also affirmed the non-shooting Defendant's convictions for shooting at an occupied motor vehicle.The Second Appellate District released a modified opinion replacing the court's May 22, 2022 opinion. In its modified opinion, court removed certain directives to the trial court regarding the restructuring of Defendants' sentences. View "P. v. Perez" on Justia Law

In 2017 the Police Protective League (“PPL”)—an employee organization that represents peace officers employed by the City—filed an action against the City and its Chief of Police (collectively “the City”), seeking a declaration section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2), was “legally valid [and] enforceable.” PPL also sought an order enjoining the City from accepting an allegation of misconduct against” peace officers represented by the Police Protective League “without the complainant being required to read and sign” the required advisory.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling in favor of The Los Angeles Police Protective League. The court held that it must follow Stanistreet because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled section 148.6 or an analogous statute is unconstitutional. The court reasoned that Section 148.6 is not an impermissible content-or viewpoint-based speech restriction. Further, the City’s constitutional challenge is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stanistreet. The Supreme Court in Stanistreet did not reject the exact argument the City now makes for why section 148.6 is an impermissible content- and viewpoint-based speech restriction. But the California Supreme Court’s analysis of why the three R.A.V. exceptions apply to section 148.6 applies to the City’s arguments. Additionally, the court held that the advisory and signature requirements of Section 148.6 do not chill protected speech and the City forfeited its argument that Section 148.6 violates the First Amendment by prohibiting anonymous complaints. View "L.A. Police Protective League v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

Petitioner Ruben Elias was awaiting trial on charges arising from several alleged incidents of domestic violence that occurred in March and April 2020, during the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic. In early March 2020, the Governor of California declared a state of emergency in California, and the President declared a national emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on health recommendations, the Chief Justice of the State of California issued statewide emergency orders suspending in-person jury trials and, among other things, extending statutory deadlines for trials in criminal proceedings. The Presiding Judge of the San Diego Superior Court issued a general order in April 2020 closing courtrooms and extending the time period provided in Penal Code section 1382 for holding criminal trials. Elias was arraigned on May 13, 2020 and the court held him to answer the charges against him on May 27, 2020. He was arraigned on the information in June 2020, and on an amended information in August 2020. His trial was initially set in October 2020, but it was continued several times until June 2021 based on the COVID-19 general orders and instances when Elias was in medical isolation. After the trial court granted two additional trial continuances on June 24 and July 6, 2021, and denied his motion to dismiss on August 9, 2021, Elias filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contending the court violated his right to a speedy trial pursuant to section 1382 and the federal Constitution. "Given the unique and unprecedented circumstances caused by the global public health emergency, courts must exercise their inherent power to manage and prioritize their cases to work through the backlog. The record before us shows the court did just that." Construing the petition as a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition requesting dismissal of the case for violation of Elias’ speedy trial right, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause to grant the continuances or in denying Elias’s motion to dismiss. It, therefore, denied his petition for relief. View "Elias v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Michael Watkins, Jr., and a codefendant were charged with second degree robbery and two counts of identity theft based on purchases they allegedly made at a Best Buy store in Los Angeles County. At Watkins’s preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence that the victims’ wallets had been stolen from parked cars in Orange County, and that later that day, two men had used the victims’ credit cards at a Best Buy in West Covina to purchase laptop computers; a detective had identified Watkins as one of those men based on a still shot taken from Best Buy’s surveillance video. A magistrate refused to hold Watkins to answer, finding there was insufficient evidence to establish that Watkins had taken the wallets from the vehicles or committed any other relevant act in Orange County that would support venue in Orange County Superior Court. The State moved to reinstate the complaint, asserting the magistrate had erroneously dismissed the complaint as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion, and the State appealed that ruling. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: the State presented no evidence that Watkins was in any way involved in taking the wallets from the vehicles; venue in Orange County was therefore inappropriate. View "California v. Watkins" on Justia Law

This putative class action against California and San Diego County officials challenged California Governor Gavin Newsom’s emergency orders and related public health directives restricting business operations during the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, owners of affected restaurants and gyms (Owners), primarily contended the orders were procedurally invalid because they were adopted without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, Owners contended that the business restrictions were substantively invalid because they effected a taking without compensation, violating the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rejecting these claims, the superior court sustained demurrers to the third amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. While the Court of Appeal sympathized with the position some Owners find themselves in and the significant financial losses they alleged, the unambiguous terms of the Emergency Services Act and controlling United States Supreme Court regulatory takings caselaw required that the judgment be affirmed. View "640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant Jeremy Nance was found not guilty by reason of insanity of sexual battery and committed to Atascadero State Hospital. Defendant’s term of commitment has been extended several times under Penal Code section 1026.5. He appealed the trial court’s denial of his application for outpatient treatment pursuant to section 1026.2. After hearing defendant’s evidence, the trial court granted the State's motion for a “directed verdict,” finding defendant “could be a danger to the health and safety of others due to a mental defect, disease, or disorder if under supervision and treatment in the community.” On appeal to the Court of Appeal, defendant contended the court erred by weighing the evidence on a motion for directed verdict. Because the trial court was the fact finder, and therefore entitled to weigh the evidence, the appellate court affirmed the denial of defendant’s application. View "California v. Nance" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Rodrigo Fuentes, Jr. was convicted by jury of two crimes: (1) fleeing a police officer while driving with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property (wanton disregard while fleeing); and (2) resisting a police officer. He raised an issue of first impression by contending that the latter crime was a lesser included offense of the former. The Court of Appeal held that resisting a police officer was not a lesser included offense of wanton disregard while fleeing. The Court rejected his other contentions (except for a custody calculation issue the parties agreed on) and affirmed. View "California v. Fuentes" on Justia Law