Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Woody McMurray appealed a trial court’s denial of a recommendation made by the Secretary (Secretary) of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) under former Penal Code section 1170(d)(1) that the trial court consider recalling defendant’s sentence and resentencing him in light of changes made to section 12022.53. Defendant contended the trial court’s denial of resentencing without notice or the appointment of counsel violated his constitutional rights and was reversible error. While defendant’s appeal was pending, Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, sections 1-7) came into effect on January 1, 2022, and moved the recall and resentencing provisions of former section 1170(d)(1) to new section 1170.03. Assembly Bill 1540 also clarified the Legislature’s intent regarding procedural requirements and the provision’s application to “ameliorative laws . . . that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion, regardless of the date of the offense of conviction.” In addition, where requests for recall and resentencing are made, Assembly Bill 1540 added a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing. To the change in the law, Defendant argued: (1) Assembly Bill 1540 constituted a clarification of existing law and applied to cases involving the interpretation of former section 1170(d)(1); and (2) Assembly Bill 1540 applies retroactively to his case. The State argued Assembly Bill 1540 was not retroactive, but acknowledged, however, that in the interest of judicial economy, that the Court of Appeal may reverse the trial court’s order and remand for new proceedings under section 1170.03. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that Assembly Bill 1540 applied to his case because it is a clarification of former section 1170(d)(1), so it reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "P. v. McMurray" on Justia Law

The ex-girlfriend of defendant Johnathan Kiger testified that he got drunk and started an argument with her. During the argument, he slapped her, pushed her head against a car, dragged her by the leg, and finally strangled her into unconsciousness. There was evidence that defendant had committed three prior assaults: one on the same girlfriend and two on previous girlfriends. The assaults on the previous girlfriends had resulted in a conviction in 2009 for domestic battery and in 2016 for attempted domestic battery. At a bench trial, defendant was found guilty of domestic battery with a prior, and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, each with a domestic violence great bodily injury enhancement. One “strike” prior, and one prior serious felony conviction enhancement, were found true. Defendant was sentenced to a total of 16 years in prison, along with the fines, fees, and ancillary orders. On appeal, defendant contended there was insufficient evidence of domestic battery with a prior because his only sufficiently recent prior conviction was for an attempt, not for a completed crime. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal found the trial court erred by finding defendant guilty of domestic battery with a prior when his only relevant prior conviction was for attempted domestic battery. In the unpublished portion, the Court rejected defendant’s other contentions. Accordingly, the judgment was modified and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Kiger" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Kelley, III and the victim, L.S., were dated and lived together for two years and had a child together. When the relationship ended, L.S. obtained a domestic violence restraining order against defendant. He violated the order repeatedly. In one of several consolidated cases, defendant was charged with felony stalking. He pled guilty and the charges in the other consolidated cases were dismissed. The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years in state prison, imposed fines and fees, and issued a criminal protective order. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing certain fines and fees despite his inability to pay, and this violated his right to due process under California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019); and (2) the criminal protective order was unconstitutionally vague because its stay-away provision did not specify that he not do so “knowingly.” In a supplemental briefing, defendant argued (3) he was entitled to resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., Senate Bill 567). In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded it did not have to modify the criminal protective order because the requirement that defendant not “knowingly” come within 400 yards of L.S. was implicit in the order. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court agreed with both parties that Senate Bill 567 applied retroactively to defendant’s case, and that the matter had to be remanded for resentencing in compliance with the Bill. Because the case was remanded for resentencing, defendant’s claims concerning the trial court’s imposition of fines and fees and Dueñas were deemed moot and were not addressed. View "California v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Holiman was found in possession of illegal drugs and a handgun during a traffic stop initiated after he made a right-hand turn at a stop sign, while the arresting officer’s patrol car was stopped directly behind him. Holiman did signal the turn, but the basis for the traffic stop was that he did not turn on his signal blinker early enough: for the 100 feet he drove before coming to a stop. The arresting officer cited him for violation of Vehicle Code section 22108. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, following which he pled guilty to two felony drug charges.The court of appeal reversed. The warrantless seizure of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked objectively reasonable suspicion. Holiman’s turn did not violate the Vehicle Code, and no reasonable police officer could think that it did. The statute refers to “the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” The prosecution presented no evidence that the turn could have affected any vehicle, including the officer’s patrol car. View "People v. Holiman" on Justia Law

In 2014, a jury found petitioner Larry Bailey guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and leaving the scene of an accident and found true various enhancements. Petitioner was sentenced to 28 years in prison. In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, which amended the California Constitution to grant early parole consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. It also authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of early parole consideration. In 2017 and 2018, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) considered petitioner for Proposition 57 parole. In each of the parole consideration proceedings, the Board allowed petitioner to submit a written statement explaining why he should be granted parole. The Board, through written decisions by a deputy commissioner, both times denied petitioner parole. Petitioner requested administrative review of each of the parole decisions; both decisions were upheld. Petitioner thereafter filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus; the trial court denied petitioner’s claims challenging the evidentiary sufficiency of the parole denials, but granted petitioner habeas relief after finding he was entitled to “a live parole hearing at which [he] could attend.” The trial court interpreted Penal Code section 3041.5 “ ‘as providing for a hearing for all inmates eligible for parole consideration, at the very least to comply with federal and state due process concerns as well as equal protection.’ ” The trial court further ordered the Department to, within 60 days of the finality of the decision, promulgate new parole regulations to reflect the right to an in-person hearing under Proposition 57. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Proposition 57 neither required nor impliedly incorporated an in-person hearing requirement, and the Department acted within its delegated authority under Penal Code section 32(b) when it adopted the parole regulations at issue in this appeal. The Court further concluded the absence of an in-person hearing did not violate equal protection principles, nor did it violate a prisoner’s right to procedural due process. View "In re Bailey" on Justia Law

In 1984, Friend robbed an Oakland bar and fatally stabbed Pierucci. Convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a special circumstance, Friend was sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and denied Friend’s state habeas corpus petition.Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, requires that capital habeas corpus petitions generally be presented to the sentencing court and that a successive habeas corpus petition be dismissed unless the court finds that the petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty. A petitioner may appeal the denial of a successive petition only if the sentencing court or the court of appeal grants a certificate of appealability (COA). The sentencing court denied Friend’s second habeas petition and his request for a COA. The court of appeal denied a COA. The California Supreme Court remanded with directions to analyze whether Friend made a substantial showing that the claims in his second habeas corpus petition are not successive.On remand, the court of appeal again denied relief. Friend essentially acknowledged that all the claims in his second petition were either known or could and should have been discovered earlier and he failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of some claims from the initial petition reflects incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Friend failed to show a substantial claim that he is either actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence. View "In re Friend" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted petitioner Jason Harper of felony murder, and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance allegation for his participation in the robbery of a store, which resulted in the murder of the store’s manager. Although he was 16 years old at the time of the robbery, the trial court sentenced petitioner to state prison for life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on direct appeal in 2004 but, more than a decade later, the trial court resentenced petitioner to 25 years to life after a federal district court issued a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner sought habeas relief again from the resulting sentence from the federal court's grant of relief, arguing the jury’s special circumstance finding was no longer viable after the California Supreme Court's decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016),because the evidence did not establish he was a major participant in the robbery and that he acted with reckless disregard for human life. After review, the Court of Appeal denied the petition, finding the evidence in the record of conviction showed petitioner was a major participant in the robbery, and he acted with reckless indifference to human life, "so the jury’s special circumstance finding must stand." View "In re Harper" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

In 2001, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Yolanda Harden of murdering 85-year-old Alfred P. during a residential burglary and robbery. The Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction of first degree murder with special circumstances in a partially published opinion. Among other things, the previous case rejected a claim of instructional error because there was no evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Harden was an aider and abettor. "Harden I" concluded, “a rational jury could not reasonably infer that . . . any person other than Harden[] was Alfred’s actual killer.” Twenty years later, Harden claims she did not kill anyone, but merely “crept in and stole” property, Harden filed a petition to vacate her conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court, which did not have the benefit of the California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in California v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021), denied the petition on the grounds that her claim was “completely inconsistent” with the facts recited in Harden I. The Court of Appeal affirmed, but on slightly different reasoning. In reviewing the record of conviction at the prima facie stage, a trial court was not permitted to engage in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” The relevant inquiry at this stage was not whether factual findings recited in the prior appellate opinion were inconsistent with the petitioner’s claims. "Rather, the key question is whether legal determinations in the prior opinion refute those claims as a matter of law." The Court found Harden I conclusively established as law of the case that Harden’s first degree murder conviction was based on a theory that she was the actual killer. Because, as the actual killer, she would still be convicted of first degree murder even under recent amendments to the murder statutes that narrowed liability for the crime, the trial court correctly denied her 1170.95 petition without issuing an order to show cause. View "California v. Harden" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant Hector Pacheco and other gang members "jumped" two people: one victim died, the other survived. A jury found Pacheco guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor, attempted murder, and gang participation. The jury also found true a gang special circumstance sentencing enhancement. In 2019, Pacheco filed a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition seeking to vacate his murder conviction. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. On appeal, the Attorney General argued the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance instruction made Pacheco ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed. The Court found the trial court instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences theory, which was no longer a valid theory of murder liability. "While the gang special circumstance instruction told the jurors they needed to find Pacheco had the requisite intent to kill (the mens rea), the instruction did not require the jurors to find that Pacheco directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder (the actus reus). Therefore, without weighing the evidence, the jury’s true finding on the gang special circumstance does not conclusively establish Pacheco could be found guilty of murder under current law (that he had the intent to kill, and he directly aided and abetted the target crime of murder)." The Court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Pacheco’s section 1170.95 petition. On remand, the court was directed to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the murder charge. View "California v. Pacheco" on Justia Law