Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether a pause in a criminal jury trial due to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic violated an accused’s due process right to a fair trial. Here, the prosecution nearly completed its case-in-chief against Defendant-appellant John Breceda when the trial court paused proceedings on March 16, 2020, because three of the 14 jurors were ill. Breceda refused to waive time and refused to proceed with 11 jurors. The trial court denied his motion for a mistrial and continued the case. Beginning that day, and for months after, the COVID-19 pandemic caused California officials to issue a series of orders to continue to provide essential government services, safeguard constitutional rights, and protect people from a "mysterious, contagious, and deadly virus." The effect of some of those orders was jury trials could not proceed. Seventy-two days after the trial court paused proceedings, the court denied Breceda’s second motion for a mistrial. Trial resumed the following day. The prosecution completed its case-in-chief, and Breceda testified. The jury acquitted Breceda of first degree murder but convicted him of second degree murder and arson of another’s property. Breceda argued on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his mistrial motions because the pause in his jury trial due to the COVID-19 pandemic violated his due process right to a fair trial. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Although the pause in the trial was lengthy, 10 weeks, Breceda’s constitutional rights were not set aside and forgotten. ... the record demonstrates the court remained appropriately focused on Breceda’s constitutional rights during the onset of an unprecedented global health crisis." Judgment was thus affirmed. View "California v. Breceda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Taylor Pixley appealed the denial of his petition seeking resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91, which allowed a person convicted of a felony who may have certain kinds of trauma as a result of his or her military service to petition for resentencing. The trial court ruled that section 1170.91 did not apply to a person who pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement that provided for a stipulated sentence. Petitioner argued the language of section 1170.91(b), which allowed “[a] person currently serving a sentence for a felony conviction, whether by trial or plea” to petition meant that the existence of a plea agreement could never bar resentencing. He also argued that, if the petition were granted, the trial court could withdraw its approval of the plea agreement. The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points, and affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Pixley" on Justia Law

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, On March 16, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-in-place order. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency statewide order suspending jury trials and continuing them for 60 days, extending by 60 days the speedy trial time period provided for in Penal Code section 1382 for holding a criminal trial. The order was later extended an additional 30 days. In December, in response to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order. After trials resumed, there were backlogs and trials were continued beyond the statutory deadlines. Defendants alleged violations of their speedy trial rightsThe court of appeal declined to order dismissal of their cases. The continuances were supported by good cause. In making a determination of good cause based on reasons of court congestion or backlog, the critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances. The District Attorney adequately showed exceptional circumstances connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, not chronic conditions in the court. View "Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

After a police officer found him asleep in his car with a bag of methamphetamine and a loaded gun at his feet, a jury convicted defendant-appellant Daniel Gonzalez of possession of a controlled substance while armed, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a felon in possession of ammunition. On appeal, Gonzalez challenged the constitutionality of Health and Safety Code section 11370.1, arguing the provision violated the Second Amendment by restricting a nonviolent offender’s right to possess firearms. The Court of Appeal concluded the argument lacked merit and affirmed. View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

This case arose from the violent sexual assault and killing of an 84-year-old woman inside her home and during a burglary. After the first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, a second jury found defendant Alvin Larry Davis guilty of first degree murder, and forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object, a cane. The jury also found true the enhancement allegations, and a special circumstance allegation. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant had two prior convictions that qualified as strikes under the three strikes law. The court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal, defendant contended the judgment had to be reversed due to prejudicial evidentiary errors and prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. Defendant primarily argued the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony based upon the application of the STRmix(TM) methodology (a method of DNA analysis): this evidence should have been excluded under the test for the admission of new scientific evidence established by the California Supreme Court in California v. Kelly 17 Cal.3d 24 (1976), abrogated by statute on another point in California v. Wilkinson, 33 Cal.4th 821 (2004). Defendant made additional claims of error that he conceded may have been forfeited; thus he argued in the alternative that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and cumulative error. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in determining that the STRmix method of DNA analysis was generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community, such that expert testimony relying on the method satisfied the first requirement of the Kelly test. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected or declined to consider the remaining claims of error and affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Davis" on Justia Law

Vanndrya Srouy graduated from Crawford High School (Crawford) in the San Diego Unified School District (the District). While a student at Crawford, he was a member of its varsity football team. After Srouy graduated, he found himself named as a co-defendant in a lawsuit filed by a football referee, John Herlich, who claimed to have been injured when Srouy blocked an opponent, who fell into Herlich, during a school football game. The District (as co-defendant) rejected Srouy’s tender of his defense in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy then filed underlying lawsuit against the District, claiming the District violated a mandatory duty to defend him in the Herlich lawsuit. Srouy alleged this duty arose under the free school guarantee and the equal protection clause of the California Constitution; title 5, section 350 of the California Code of Regulations; and/or Education Code section 44808. The trial court granted the District’s demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed Srouy’s operative complaint. "Although Srouy’s plight evokes our sympathy," the Court of Appeals found its ability to respond was "constrained by the law, and the allegations of this case do not afford a judicial solution. We leave it to the Legislature to determine whether the needs of student athletes in Srouy’s position are sufficiently addressed by current law, and if not, to craft an appropriate solution." Judgment was affirmed. View "Srouy v. San Diego Unified School District" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Elijah Hall was convicted by jury of six counts of robbery committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang and one count of active gang participation (all committed when he was 15 years old), and he received a sentence of 65 years to life in state prison. Hall appealed, and while his appeal was pending, Proposition 57 raised the minimum age a minor could be tried as an adult in criminal court from 14 to 16. Following the procedure approved in California v. Superior Court (Lara) 4 Cal.5th 299 (2018), the trial judge recalled Hall’s sentence and transferred his case to juvenile court, where the judge “treat[ed the] convictions as juvenile adjudications” and held a hearing to impose an appropriate disposition. After Hall was transferred to the Department of Juvenile Justice, he informed the Court of Appeal he wished to proceed with his appeal, which was reinstated as an appeal of a judgment in a juvenile criminal proceeding. Hall raised two challenges to the criminal trial on which his juvenile adjudications were based: (1) the trial judge violated his due process rights by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 315, which covered eyewitness identification evidence and tells the jury to consider, among other factors, the witness’s level of certainty when making the identification; and (2) Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) required reversal of the true findings on the substantive gang offense and enhancements because the new law increased the proof requirements under the gang statute (Pen. Code 186.22). The Court of Appeal rejected Defendant's first argument under California v. Lemcke, 11 Cal.5th 644 (2021), in which the Supreme Court held that CALCRIM No. 315’s certainty factor did not violate due process. The Court agreed with Defendant's second argument, and remanded the case to give the State an opportunity to retry the substantive charge and enhancement allegations under Assembly Bill 333’s new requirements in a juvenile criminal proceeding, and impose a new disposition in Hall’s case - either at the conclusion of retrial or upon the State's election not to retry him. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Hall" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Jody Ann Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the California Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements filed a petition arguing she was convicted of second degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory and could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeals' decision in Clements’ original appeal and other portions of the record of conviction and made two alternative determinations that: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition. Clements argued the trial judge erred by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal, by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute, and by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court of Appeal held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. The Court also held the trial judge sits as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95(d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The Court again affirmed the trial court's order denying Clements' petition. View "California v. Clements" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law