Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury found defendant-appellant Larry Jackson to be a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the California Sexually Violent Predator Act. The trial court ordered him committed to the California Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for an indeterminate term. Jackson argued the trial court prejudicially erred by granting the prosecution’s motion to exclude Jackson’s only SVP expert witness from testifying at trial. Based on its review of the record, and applying California Supreme Court authority, the Court of Appeal held that in the context of SVP cases, in determining whether to exclude defense expert witness testimony, the trial court must consider both applicable statutory law, including relevant portions of the SVPA and the Civil Discovery Act of 2004 and the defendant’s constitutional due process right to present such evidence. Here, the trial court’s exclusion of critical defense expert testimony to rebut the testimony of the prosecution’s two expert witnesses deprived Jackson of a fair trial. The Court therefore reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new SVP trial. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

Defendant Danny Hampton was convicted by jury of first degree murder and on two counts of robbery. He was sentenced to an aggregate terms of 33 years to life. The jury could not reach a verdict on the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, and that allegation was dismissed on the State's motion for insufficient evidence. Defendant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, and requested appointment of counsel. In ruling on the section 1170.95 petition, the court considered the murder-robbery jury instructions given and the State's motion to dismiss the special-circumstance allegation for insufficient evidence. The court concluded “that the dismissal of that special circumstance for insufficient evidence is equivalent to a finding that the defendant did not act with reckless indifference. Consequently the People have failed to carry their burden of proving ineligibility.” The court then proceeded to resentencing, vacated the murder conviction, and lifted the stays on the robbery convictions, leaving a sentence of seven years. The State appealed, contending the dismissal of the special-circumstance allegation was not an acquittal. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the petition for resentencing. There was no dispute defendant was not the actual killer and did not act with intent to kill, to now be convicted of murder the prosecution was required to prove defendant “was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” If there was a prior finding by a court or jury that defendant did not act with reckless indifference to human life or was not a major participant in the felony the court was required to vacate the conviction and resentence defendant. Because the original trial court dismissed the case for insufficient evidence, this dismissal acted as the equivalent of an acquittal, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly granted the petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. View "California v. Hampton" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated agreement approved by the trial court, defendant Anthony Scarano was granted five years of supervised probation after he pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon. Among the conditions of probation were a search condition, drug treatment programming, and drug testing. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, and that his term of probation should have been reduced from five years to two in accordance with the recent amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1, enacted while his appeal was pending in Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.). The Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s suppression contention was not preserved because he did not renew his motion in the superior court. As to Assembly Bill 1950, the Court agreed with the parties that it applied retroactively, but disagreed with defendant that the appropriate remedy was to order his supervised probation term be reduced. The Court remanded this matter to allow the trial court and the prosecution the opportunity to withdraw from the original plea agreement. View "California v. Scarano" on Justia Law

Appellants Raymond and Michelle Plata were property owners in the City of San Jose and customers of Muni Water. Muni Water’s annual budget was reflected each year in a document called a source and use of funds statement, which was part of the City’s annual operating budget. In 2013, the Platas filed with the City a claim pursuant to Government Code sections 910 and 910.2, accusing Muni Water of violating Proposition 218 ab initio by collecting money from customers and illegally transferring it to the City’s own general fund. The City rejected the claim, so in early 2014, the Platas brought a class action lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the City under Proposition 218, as well as recovery of the amounts overpaid. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision finding: (1) the late fees charged by Muni Water were not a fee or charge covered by Proposition 218; (2) any claims accruing prior to November 4, 2012 were time-barred because of the statute of limitations provided under Government Code section 911.2, and there was no basis for applying any equitable tolling doctrine; (3) as for tiered water rates, the discussion of high rates in the Platas’ government claims adequate to gave notice to the City that its rate structure was being questioned; and (4) “[a] more significant complication” raised by the City in its class decertification motion. The tiered rate structure would impact different class members differently from month to month, thus making it potentially “impossible” to draw a “line between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ based on monthly water consumption[.]” The court granted the City’s motion to decertify the class, and refused to grant the Platas any relief as to their tiered rate argument. The Platas appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed judgment only as to the trial court’s findings on the tiered rate structure. In all other respects, it was affirmed. View "Plata v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Richard Speck guilty of felony vehicle theft and receiving stolen property with special allegations that the Honda was valued at over $950. Defendant testified; he denied stealing the Honda and knowing it was stolen or had been reported stolen. He claimed he had permission to drive the car and did not think it was stolen because it had an ignition that required particular keys and he had been given those keys; there were no red flags such as a “ripped ignition” or evidence of hot-wiring. Defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 3406 regarding mistake of fact, as to both counts, based on defendant’s testimony that he mistakenly but actually believed he had permission from the owner--Jason, whom defendant thought was the owner--to drive the car, which he mistakenly but actually believed was not stolen. Defendant contended on appeal that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Speck" on Justia Law

Hayden Gerson attacked two police officers attempting to detain him after he refused to comply with their orders. This attack led to a SWAT standoff and gun battle between Gerson and two SWAT officers. After Gerson choked and bit a police K-9, multiple officers were able to subdue and arrest him. A jury found Gerson guilty of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a lesser included offense of attempted murder (charged in counts 1 and 2); two counts of assaulting a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm (counts 3-4); shooting at an inhabited house (count 5); assault on a peace officer with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 6); making a criminal threat (count 7); exhibiting a firearm to a peace officer to resist arrest (count 8); two counts of resisting an executive officer (counts 9-10); and harming or interfering with a police animal (count 11). The jury also found true various enhancements to these offenses. The jury found Gerson to be sane during commission of the offenses. The trial court sentenced Gerson to a total term of 33 years eight months in prison. Gerson appealed. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Gerson did not meet his burden of showing he suffered from bipolar disorder, a mental disorder that qualifies for pretrial diversion. Accordingly, its ruling denying Gerson’s motion for pretrial diversion did not amount to an abuse of discretion. The Court also concluded an individual, such as Gerson, who was out on bail and subject to electronic monitoring on home detention was similarly situated to persons participating in an electronic monitoring program pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.018, and that a rational basis did not exist for treating these categories of individuals differently. Accordingly, Gerson was entitled to preconviction custody credit and preconviction conduct credit under the state and federal equal protection clauses. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Gerson’s remaining arguments. View "California v. Gerson" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on when a lawyer's settlement demand crosses the line and becomes professional misconduct. Falcon Brands, Inc. and Coastal Harvest II, LLC (collectively Falcon) appealed an order granting respondent’s special motion to strike both causes of action in Falcon’s cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP law). The cross-complaint alleges extortion and intentional interference with a contract against attorney Amy Mousavi and her law firm, Mousavi & Lee, LLP (collectively Mousavi). Falcon argued Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, which were the focus of Falcon’s cross-complaint, were not entitled to protection under the anti-SLAPP law because they constituted illegal attempts to force Falcon into settling the underlying matter. The trial court rejected this argument and granted Mousavi’s anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal reversed as to the first cause of action for extortion because it concluded Mousavi’s e-mail settlement demands, when considered in context, were not protected speech in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006). "Mousavi’s escalating series of threats ultimately transformed what had been legitimate demands into something else: extortion." The Court affirmed as to the second cause of action, intentional interference with a contract. That cause of action arose from Mousavi’s actual revelation of damaging information about Falcon to Falcon’s merger partner. Falcon did not contend the revelations were illegal as a matter of law. The revelations were made in furtherance of Mousavi’s contemplated litigation. The Court found the trial court correctly concluded the revelations were protected by the litigation privilege. Consequently, they were also protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Falcon Brands, Inc. v. Mousavi & Lee, LLP" on Justia Law

On the night of March 29, 2018, defendant Ashneel Mani broke into the house where his mother and his brother lived. At the time, defendant’s brother had a restraining order in place against defendant. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree residential burglary and willfully disobeying a court order. The jury found true the allegation that a person, other than an accomplice, was present during the burglary. At a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found that defendant had a previous strike conviction. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 13 years. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evidence Code sections 1109 to prove propensity to commit residential burglary grounded on a theory of intent to steal; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting prior acts evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101(b), and 352; (3) the trial court committed instructional error in instructing the jury with a modified version of the Evidence Code section 1109 instruction, CALCRIM No. 852A, because burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not a crime involving domestic violence; and (4) he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior acts evidence, and the modified CALCRIM No. 852A instruction was not erroneous. The appellate court rejected defendant’s contention that residential burglary based on an intent to steal theory was not an act of domestic violence for which the prior acts of domestic violence were admissible under section 1109, and rejected the related contention that the trial court erred in instructing that the prior acts in this case could be used as evidence of propensity to commit the residential burglary charge grounded on a theft theory. The Court of Appeal concluded that breaking into the victims’ home with the intent to steal was "an act that surely disturbed the peace of the victims. Consequently, given the expanded definition of domestic violence in the Family Code applicable in section 1109, which includes disturbing the peace as a form of abuse, we hold that such a burglary is a crime of domestic violence for purposes of section 1109." Having rejected defendant’s claims of error, the Court necessarily rejected his cumulative error contention. View "California v. Mani" on Justia Law

Orellana was charged with two counts of criminal threats (Pen. Code 422(a)) and one misdemeanor count of exhibiting a deadly weapon (417(a)(1)), with a prior prison term enhancement. The trial court found a doubt as to Orellana’s competency and suspended criminal proceedings. Orellana was treated and regained competence. The parties entered into a plea agreement. Orellana agreed to serve a prison term of two years. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence consistent with that agreement.On appeal, Orellana argued the trial court’s failure at sentencing to award him conduct credit for the period of time in which he was receiving treatment for restoration to competence in the state hospital violated Senate Bill 317, which was enacted while his appeal was pending and provides for such credits. The court of appeal affirmed. While Orellana’s appellate waiver is invalid and did not bar his appeal, Senate Bill 317 does not apply retroactively and the denial of conduct credit for the time Orellana was committed to the state hospital did not violate equal protection principles. The trial court invited Orellana to ask questions or state any concerns but Orellana’s failure to do so does not affirmatively demonstrate a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of his appellate rights. View "People v. Orellana" on Justia Law