Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When executing a search warrant at defendant Donald Rorabaugh’s home, police learned that one of his cars was a short distance away, at a ranch. Police went to the ranch and towed the car away to be stored until they could obtain a warrant to search it. Later, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence found in the car. In closing argument to the jury, the prosecution argued DNA evidence found in the car corroborated its theory of defendant’s culpability for murder. After the jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trial court imposed a term of 25 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erroneously denied: (1) his suppression motion; and (2) his motion for acquittal. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first claim, but disagreed with his second. The Court found police violated the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless seizure of defendant’s unattended car on private property. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained after a search of the car was prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Rorabaugh" on Justia Law

Israel Gutierrez Zamora was convicted on multiple charges, including attempted kidnapping and assault with a semiautomatic weapon. He petitioned for disclosure of juror identifying information pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237. After denying the disclosure petition as untimely, the trial court sentenced Zamora to a total term of 98 years to life. Zamora then filed an appeal challenging the denial of his petition for disclosure; he also argued there were errors in his sentence and the abstract of judgment. As a result of that first appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition, as well as the challenged aspects of the sentence and abstract, and remanded the case with directions. On remand, the court denied Zamora’s disclosure petition on the merits, and corrected the sentence and abstract as directed. Zamora appealed that second order which denied his disclosure petition, arguing that the court was statutorily required to release the identifying information for jurors who did not object to disclosure. Zamora also challenged additional aspects of his sentence that were imposed when the court resentenced him following remand, arguing he was entitled to the benefit of recent changes in the law that rendered certain sentence enhancements. The Court of Appeal found that section 237 obligated the trial court to release the information only if none of the jurors protested the disclosure. "If any juror does object, the court must sustain the objection if it concludes the motion fails to show good cause for the release. That is what occurred in this case. Six of the twelve jurors objected to disclosure, which triggered the court’s obligation to determine whether there was good cause for disclosure. After concluding there was not, the court properly denied the petition." The Attorney General agreed that the challenged enhancements had to be stricken, rather than stayed. To this, the Court of Appeal concurred and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to strike those sentence enhancements. View "California v. Zamora" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a confrontation between petitioner’s gang and a rival gang in which an innocent bystander was shot. Petitioner, the driver of the vehicle from which his fellow gang members fired several shots, was convicted of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, criminal street gang participation with gang and firearm enhancements, for which he was sentenced to 32 years to life. The prosecution's primary theory was that petitioner aided and abetted these offenses, which were the natural and probable consequence of disturbing the peace or simple assault. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal, finding in the published part of its opinion that a person convicted as an aider and abettor was a “principal” for the purposes of Penal Code section 12022.53(e). In 2014, petitioner petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to the superior court, which was denied. In 2015, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal, which also was denied. The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the matter in light of California v. Canizales, 7 Cal.5th 591 (2019). On remand, the appellate court vacated the superior court's denial, and remanded to that court for additional proceedings. The superior court again denied relief in March 2020. Petitioner again petitioned for habeas relief to the Court of Appeal in January 2021, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to give a kill zone instruction, a prejudicial error requiring reversal of his attempted murder conviction; (2) allowing him to be liable for the section 12022.53 enhancement as a principal violated his due process right to adequate notice; (3) the failure to instruct the jury on attempted involuntary manslaughter violated his due process rights; (4) cumulative error warrants reversal; and (5) appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise issues raised in the habeas petition. The Court of Appeal determined the kill zone instruction given in petitioner's case differed from that in Canizales. "The instruction in this case, when combined with the prosecutor’s arguments concerning it, presented the same problem that led to reversing the conviction in Canizales. The instruction allowed the jury to use circumstantial evidence to infer an intent to kill the victim when that same circumstantial evidence can support a reasonable inference of no intent to kill." Finding the error was prejudicial, the Court vacated petitioner's murder conviction, reversed the sentence, and remanded for additional proceedings. View "In re Lisea" on Justia Law

The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over minor A.V. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removed her from the custody of her mother, S.V. (mother). Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction as well as the resulting disposition order. She argued in the alternative that the court denied her due process right to be heard at the jurisdictional hearing when it made the challenged findings in her absence. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother’s latter contention and reversed without reaching her sufficiency of the evidence challenge. View "In re A.V." on Justia Law

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a defamation case against defendant, alleging that defendant falsely told independent insurance agents that plaintiff is dishonest and unethical in her business practices and falsifies insurance documents. Defendant and Auchel World filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure 426.16, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect defendant's statements because they squarely fall within the commercial speech exemption set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c). Courts are admonished to examine section 425.17 as a threshold issue before proceeding to an analysis under section 425.16. Section 425.17 expressly provides that speech or conduct satisfying its criteria is entirely exempt from anti-SLAPP protection even if "the conduct or statement concerns an important public issue." In this case, the trial court also erred in finding that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). The court explained that defendant's alleged slander of a competitor in a private setting to solicit business is neither speech in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition nor the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue. View "Xu v. Huang" on Justia Law

Before 2018, a person who aided and abetted only an intended assault could be found guilty of second degree murder if a resulting death was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. The aider and abettor did not have to intend to aid the perpetrator in committing the life endangering act, nor be subjectively aware of the risk to human life. Murder charges that might have been brought before 2018 using the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine had to be pursued, if at all, on a direct aiding and abetting theory. And that required, among other things, the aider and abettor acted with malice aforethought. The question this case posed for the Court of Appeal's review was what evidence sufficed, for purposes of a preliminary hearing, to bind over a defendant on a direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder. What started as a fist fight ended in a senseless killing: real party in interest, Daniel Valenzuela, did not stab the victim. But he instigated the fight, was armed with a screwdriver, and he brought Cesar Diaz Vasquez (Diaz), a known gang member armed with a knife, to fight on his side. Diaz stabbed 19-year-old Orlando M. a few inches above the heart. Valenzuela was charged with murder, but the magistrate dismissed that charge at the preliminary hearing. Exercising independent review, the Court of Appeal concluded there was sufficient evidence to bind over Valenzuela on an implied malice murder theory. View "California v. Super. Ct. (Valenzuela)" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Brown order granting Defendant Brown's motion in part. The court held that statements in an annual 10-K report filed with the SEC constitute statements "made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by [an] official proceeding" under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). View "Sugarman v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that statements Banc made in its Forms 8-K and 10-Q filed with the SEC, as well as related investor presentations and conversations, are protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as matters under review and consideration by the SEC. Furthermore, statements related to financial projections were also protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), as matters of public interest. View "Sugarman v. Benett" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Clark appealed his conviction for second degree murder and true findings on the associated firearm enhancements. He argued the trial court erred by inquiring into the identity of a holdout juror and subsequently dismissing that juror, as well as by failing to grant his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. He also argued the trial court was biased against him, thus violating his right to due process and a fair trial. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed defendant's conviction. View "California v. Clark" on Justia Law