Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Washington was convicted of five sexually violent offenses that occurred in 1984. Before Washington’s 2014 release, the state sought to commit Washington as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, The trial court declared Washington to be an SVP and committed him to the California Department of State Hospitals for an indeterminate term.The court of appeal remanded, first rejecting Washington’s argument that the trial court violated the Act by failing to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. The Act provides that trial will be “before the court without a jury” if the defendant or attorney “does not demand a jury trial.” The statute does not provide for advisement of the alleged SVP’s right to a jury trial. Washington also argued that failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial violated his right to due process, and the Act’s failure to provide protections for his jury trial right, unlike statutes governing other types of civil commitments, violated his equal protection rights. The court questioned whether the dangerousness of SVP’s is a constitutionally valid justification for differential treatment with respect to procedural protections of their jury trial right but remanded for evaluation of that challenge. View "People v. Washington" on Justia Law

Since he was 19 years old, defendant John Vasquez had been continuously been on probation, parole, or incarcerated. At age 26, Vasquez pleaded guilty to two armed robberies and went to prison for 13 years. At age 42, while still on parole, Vasquez committed two recent armed robberies. In the last robbery, Vasquez hit a gas station attendant in the face with his handgun, causing fractures to the victim’s right orbital area. Vasquez also shot the victim in the leg. The prosecution charged Vasquez with attempted murder, two armed robberies, related crimes, and sentencing enhancements. The prosecution calculated Vasquez’s potential exposure at 90 years to life. However, the trial court struck one of Vasquez’s two prior strike convictions and imposed a 28-year determinate prison term after Vazquez pleaded to the sheet. The prosecution objected and appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded that given Vasquez’s background, character, and prospects, he fell squarely within the letter and the spirit of the “Three Strikes” law, and there were no extraordinary circumstances that justified a departure from that law. Therefore, the Court found the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing one of Vasquez’s strike priors. View "California v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Rodney Lewis appealed after a jury convicted him of rape by intoxication and kidnapping to commit rape. Lewis argued the trial court erred in instructing the jury on kidnapping to commit rape and insufficient evidence supported his convictions. After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal agreed there was prejudicial instructional error and reversed his kidnapping to commit rape conviction. Because there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction, Lewis could not be retried. His insufficiency of the evidence claim as to his rape by intoxication conviction was meritless. In all other respects, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1991, petitioner Nokkuwa Ervin and other perpetrators committed an armed robbery of a store. During the robbery, one of the perpetrators shot and killed an innocent victim. A jury found Ervin guilty of burglary, robbery, and murder. The jury found true two sentencing allegations that Ervin personally used a firearm as to the burglary and the robbery counts. The jury found not true a sentencing allegation that Ervin personally used a firearm as to the murder count. The jury also found true two felony-murder special-circumstance allegations. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. In 2019, the California Legislature limited the scope of the felony-murder rule: if a victim is killed during a designated felony, a defendant cannot be found guilty of murder unless he was: (1) the actual killer; (2) aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to kill; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Ervin petitioned for resentencing, arguing he could no longer be convicted of murder. The trial court initially found Ervin established a prima facie basis for relief, issued an order to show cause (OSC), and set an evidentiary hearing. But the court later revoked the OSC and summarily denied the petition. The court ruled the felony-murder special-circumstance findings precluded Ervin from obtaining relief under Penal Code section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The trial court’s ruling was made prior to the California Supreme Court’s ruling in California v. Lewis, 11 Cal.5th 952 (2021), which clarified the guidelines for section 1170.95 petitions. In its de novo review, the Court of Appeal found Ervin’s section 1170.95 petition reliably met the “very low” prima facie threshold for relief. Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s summary denial of Ervin’s section 1170.95 petition. On remand, the Court ordered the trial court to issue an OSC and to conduct an evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Ervin" on Justia Law

While serving as an inmate at West Valley Detention Center, defendant Chelsea Giddens threw a milk carton filled with urine at a deputy, hitting her in the face. The incident was recorded by one of the jail’s security cameras. Based on the video, the prosecution charged Giddens with one count of “gassing” a peace officer, an aggravated form of battery that occurs when an inmate intentionally causes “any mixture containing human excrement or other bodily fluids” to make contact with the officer’s “skin or membranes.” At trial, the prosecution played the security footage for the jury, and the deputy testified she was certain the “salty, warm” liquid that splashed into her eyes and mouth was urine. Giddens testified in her own defense and denied throwing anything at the deputy, but her attorney presented a different theory during closing statements, arguing the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the liquid was urine as it was just as likely Giddens had made a concoction of warm water and rotting food from her cell. The jury found Giddens guilty as charged. On appeal, she argued: (1) the jail violated Penal Code section 243.9’s mandatory duty to collect a sample of the suspected gassing substance and test it to determine whether it in fact contained a bodily fluid; (2) the failure to test the contents of the liquid also violated her due process rights to the disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence; and (3) the trial judge erroneously denied her motion to dismiss the gassing charge for insufficient evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Giddens' conviction. View "California v. Giddens" on Justia Law

Appellants John Tos et al. (Tos parties) appealed a trial court's a judgment that section 2704.78 of the Safe, Reliable High-Speed Train Bond Act for the 21st Century (Bond Act) (Sts. & Hy. Code, section 2704 et seq.) did not violate the state debt provision of the California Constitution set forth in article XVI, section 1. Subdivision (d) of section 2704.08 of the Bond Act, approved by the voters in 2008 as Proposition 1A, required an independent financial report indicating, among other things, that each corridor or segment of a corridor of the high-speed train system, if completed according to a “detailed funding plan,” would be “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation.” The Tos parties contended the meaning of “suitable and ready for high-speed train operation” set forth in section 2704.78 (a), constituted an implied partial repeal of the Bond Act in violation of section 1 of article XVI of the California Constitution. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: "The 'single object or work' of the Bond Act was (1) the initial planning and construction of a high-speed train system under (2) a 'mandatory multistep process to ensure the financial viability of the project,' which we described in California High- Speed Rail Authority v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 676 (Rail Authority). ... The multistep planning and review process in section 2704.08, subdivision (d), remained intact." The judgment was thus, affirmed. View "Tos, et al. v. California" on Justia Law

Jesus Valderas, facing several felony charges, did not appear at a status conference/trial call on October 20, 2020. It was the second consecutive court appearance that Valderas missed. The trial court issued a bench warrant for Valderas but ordered the warrant to be held until December 8, 2020, the date on which the court had set a readiness conference. The court sent notice to Valderas by mail to his last known address. When Valderas did not appear at the December 8 hearing, the court lifted its hold on the bench warrant. Valderas sought a writ of mandamus to recall the December 8 bench warrant., arguing there was no evidence before the court, at the time it lifted its hold on the bench warrant, that Valderas had actual notice that he was required to appear. Put differently, Valderas argues that a court may only issue a bench warrant if it can show that the subject defendant had actual notice of the hearing date he or she missed. The wrinkle here was that the COVID-19 pandemic caused the San Diego Superior Court to close for all criminal proceedings and continue all hearing and trial dates, thus requiring new dates be set for Valderas’s upcoming hearings and trial. Valderas did not dispute that the notices were mailed. His counsel represented to the court that Valderas was “couch surfing” with no set living address and infrequent access to a cell phone. Based on these representations, Valderas insisted there was no evidence that he had actual notice of the hearings, and, without actual notice, the court could not issue a bench warrant. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument: "Here, we believe the burden appropriately falls on Valderas. ... Even if Valderas were changing residences or having difficulty obtaining the use of a cell phone, it is not too burdensome to require him to check in with the court or his attorney in the eight months that followed the continuation of his trial date. He did not do so. ... We decline to require a court in this situation to track down Valderas’s actual whereabouts, provide him with notice of a hearing, and, only then, if he does not appear, issue a bench warrant. ... "The court correctly exercised its discretion in issuing the bench warrant for Valderas. View "Valderas v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Harris is charged with a violent rape that occurred in 1989. DNA from the crime scene and a vaginal swab matched Harris’s. A “pretrial services court report” indicated that Harris appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. Harris asked for release on his own recognizance with nonfinancial conditions, e.g., a no-contact order, limitation of his use of dating websites, and GPS tracking. Harris argued that he is indigent, there is no indication he is a flight or safety risk, the alleged crimes occurred 32 years ago, he has not tried to contact the victim, he had a limited criminal history in the interim years, and he had community ties. The prosecution offered testimony by the victim that she feared for her safety, the doctor who treated the victim, and several women who reported that Harris liked to tie women up during sex and enact rape fantasies.Ultimately, the trial court denied Harris bail. finding that the charged felony offenses involved acts of violence on another person and that there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that Harris’s release would result in great bodily harm to others. The court of appeal remanded. The court erred in failing to set out reasons on the record why less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The district attorney charged Appellant Joseph Codinha with four offenses which occurred on two different dates. The counts alleged, respectively: (1) felony indecent exposure; (2) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics; (3) felony possession of a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine; and (4) misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for narcotics. In addition, the amended information alleged: a prison prior for violating Penal Code section 667.5(b); five probation denial priors; the commission of one count while out on bail; and the requirement for registration as a sex offender. Appellant raised a number of issues as a result of rulings in four separate proceedings in the trial court: (1) the denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence of drugs and drug paraphernalia; (3) the determination, based on Appellant’s Pitchess motion that the San Diego Police Department had no records responsive to Appellant’s discovery request; and (4) the sentence, which included a stay of a one-year enhancement on one of the counts. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred in staying Appellant's section 667.5(b) one-year enhancement: due to a change in the law after Appellant’s guilty plea and before Appellant’s sentencing, at the time of sentencing Appellant was no longer subject to the one-year sentence enhancement based on a prior prison term. Accordingly, the Court struck the enhancement and affirmed the judgment in all other respects. View "California v. Codinha" on Justia Law

Appellant Javier Murillo was convicted by jury of forcibly resisting an executive officer in the performance of his duties, as well as delaying a peace officer in the performance of his duties and possessing drug paraphernalia. After he served his prison sentence, Murillo moved to vacate his resisting conviction based on newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.6. Based on its own assessment of the underlying facts of the case and the credibility of the prosecution’s key witness, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion for failure to establish a prima facie case for relief. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that such factfinding at the initial stage of the motion process was improper. Therefore, the trial court’s denial order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Murillo" on Justia Law