Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fisher was stopped for reckless driving and officers found, in his car's trunk, three pipe bombs that could cause serious injury to anyone holding them when lit. Fisher was released on bail. The friend who facilitated his release found chemicals in Fisher's garage and called the police, who found chemical powders and an AR-15 rifle, with no serial number, capable of accepting a magazine. Fisher was convicted of five destructive device felonies. Three offenses were subject to sentences served in county jail (Penal Code section 1170(h)) but Fisher was also convicted of two felony counts of simple possession of a destructive device, a “wobbler” offense that is not county jail eligible under section 1170(h). The court ordered that Fisher’s entire sentence be served in state prison.Fisher argued the disparate punishment of offenders convicted of the simple possession crime violates constitutional equal protection principles by treating similarly situated classes of offenders differently with no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The court of appeal found that persons charged with the various destructive device offenses are similarly situated and that there is no realistically conceivable legislative purpose to require a state prison sentence for those convicted of possession while affording the benefits of county jail incarceration for the 1170(h)-eligible offenses. The court concluded that the proper remedy is to reform section 18710 by making its violation punishable under section 1170(h). View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Schuller shot his long-time friend, W.T., nine times in the head and set the body on fire. Defendant testified, claiming self-defense, but his trial testimony about what happened leading up to and during the shooting suggested he was delusional and hallucinating. Following a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase. He was ultimately found legally sane and sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. He contended substantial evidence demonstrated he had an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief in the need for self- defense that was not entirely delusional. The Court of Appeal agreed, but find the error harmless. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Schuller" on Justia Law

A wardship petition charged Y.C., then 17 years old, with assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Y.C. allegedly shot a suspected rival gang member in the leg. Arrested, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile Assessment Center, where he met with a probation officer and invoked his Miranda rights. Y.C. agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s detention hearings.The court of appeal dismissed Y.C.’s writ petition as moot to the extent that it sought relief relating to his detention During the pendency of the proceeding, Y.C. entered a change of plea and was released from detention. The court otherwise denied the petition, rejecting arguments that the disclosure of the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court, and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as HIPAA and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. View "Y.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Donte Revels appealed his convictions for child abuse resulting in death, and child abuse. He contended the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after a testifying expert doctor rendered assistance to an unconscious juror. The Court of Appeal concluded there was no abuse of discretion, but found an error in the minute order and abstract of judgment that required correction. The Court ordered the error corrected and affirm the judgment. View "California v. Revels" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two American Indian tribes, business entities affiliated with the tribes, and individual tribe members, sued a number of non-tribal cardrooms alleging they were offering banked card games on non-tribal land, in violation of the exclusive right of Indian tribes to offer such games. Based on those allegations, plaintiffs asserted claims for public nuisance, unfair competition, declaratory and injunctive relief, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship and prospective economic advantage. The defendants demurred and, after two rounds of amendments to the complaint, the trial court sustained the third and final demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment of dismissal. The court ruled that, as governmental entities, the Indian tribes and their affiliated business entities were not “persons” with standing to sue under the unfair competition law (UCL), and were not “private person[s]” with standing under the public nuisance statutes. The court further ruled the business entities and the individual tribe members failed to plead sufficient injury to themselves to establish standing to sue under the UCL or the public nuisance statutes. Although plaintiffs broadly framed the issue on appeal as whether they, as American Indians, had standing to redress their grievances in California state courts, the Court of Appeal determined it was much narrower: whether the complaint in this case adequately plead the asserted claims and contained allegations sufficient to establish the threshold issue of whether any of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring those claims. The Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that the complaint did not do so and, therefore, affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Rincon Band of Luiseno Mission Indians etc. v. Flynt" on Justia Law

Defendant Ryan Shropshire was convicted of of manufacturing concentrated cannabis. Defendant Bryan Roberts was convicted on multiple counts, including two counts of receiving stolen property, unlawful possession of methamphetamine, unlawful possession of ammunition, two counts of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, possession of a deadly weapon, and three counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with Shropshire that he was entitled to additional custody credits: Shropshire was serving a two-year sentence in a separate case from Placer County while he awaited trial in this case, and the sentence in the Placer County case was reduced to a misdemeanor before Shropshire was sentenced here. Because he had accrued more custody credits than was necessary to serve the sentence in the Placer County case, defendant was entitled to apply those excess credits to his sentence to the cannabis conviction. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court rejected Roberts’ and Shropshire’s challenges to a search warrant authorizing a search for stolen property. Further, the Court disagreed with Roberts’ remaining contentions except that one of his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654, and rejected Shropshire’s remaining claims except that a one-year prior prison term enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) should have been stricken. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgments as to both defendants and affirmed the judgments as modified. View "California v. Shropshire" on Justia Law

In 2002, a jury convicted Sherwood Jenkins of the second degree murder and kidnapping of Phillip Reeves. In 2019, Jenkins filed a petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, and the trial court denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. Jenkins argued the court erred because it engaged in improper factfinding at the prima facie review stage, and the record of conviction did not refute the allegations of his petition. The State conceded the court erred by failing to issue an order to show cause, and to this, the Court of Appeal agreed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order denying the petition, and the trial court was directed to issue an order to show cause under section 1170.95(c). View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In a companion case, where an employee claimed she was forced to sign an arbitration agreement after litigation had commenced and without the benefit of her counsel, the Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause why relief should not have been granted. Although this case generally did not present the same factual scenario, the Court issued an order to show cause following motions to compel arbitration because this case was ordered related to the other and involves the same defendants. Here, the trial court granted the motions for eight employees, each of whom signed one of two versions of arbitration agreements. Because the first version did not clearly and unmistakably delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, the Court granted the writ petition as to the employees who signed that version. As to two of these employees, the trial court had to decide whether this first version was unconscionable, guided by the Court's analysis in this opinion. As to the other two employees who signed this version, the Court of Appeal found that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for the separate reason of fraud in the execution. Furthermore, the Court found that fraud in the execution voided the agreement for two of the employees who signed the other, second version of the arbitration agreement. The petition was denied as to the remaining two employees who signed the second version. View "Najarro v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In the mid-2000s, Carlos Argenis Figueroa Alatorre was working as a car salesperson when he lost his job. Although he knew his brother-in-law, Luis, was involved in something unsavory, Alatorre began working for him, acting as a lookout and a driver for about two months before the United States Department of Justice closed in on Luis’s drug importation ring, arresting Alatorre along with several others at a border patrol checkpoint. In the wake of the arrest, Alatorre was forthcoming about his involvement. He had already been in jail for a year and a half, awaiting his trial, when he was offered a plea deal that would allow him to be released from custody with credit for time served. So in 2008, at the age of 24, he pleaded guilty to his first and only criminal charge: conspiracy to possess cocaine for sale. Alatorre did not know this conviction would render him immediately deportable. He had come to the United States from Mexico when he was just four years old, and lived here as a permanent resident. In 2011, three years after his plea, he attempted to become a naturalized citizen, which had the unintended consequence of alerting immigration authorities to his criminal conviction. Within a few months, he was deported to Mexico. Alatorre lived in Mexicali after that, taking any available work he could find. Although his children, who are both U.S. citizens, were usually able visit him on the weekends, he was separated from his wife and children, parents, four siblings, and dozens of nieces, nephews, and cousins—all of whom lived in the U.S. In early 2020, Alatorre moved to vacate his conviction, only to have the trial court deny it as untimely based on a finding that he did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to become aware of the existence of the statutory remedy after the law became effective. The question posed by this case was how a petitioner’s “reasonable diligence” should be evaluated when the ripening of an unexpected immigration consequence predates the creation of an avenue of relief. After considering the text, history, and purpose of Penal Code section 1473.7, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s ruling, finding that it applied an incorrect legal standard when it assumed Alatorre was obligated to learn about section 1473.7 starting in January 2017, when the section became effective. As to the merits of his request, the Court found he established prejudicial error within the meaning of section 1473.7, and remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an order granting the motion. View "California v. Alatorre" on Justia Law

In 2013, Crane was studying in a GED class at the High Desert State Prison. Inmate Dolihite approached Crane from behind and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Crane was taken to the prison’s emergency clinic. Crane alleges that after he was released from administrative segregation, he was assaulted by other prisoners and prison guards. He sued the correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Crane contends the assaults were retaliation against him for previously suing the warden and two captains for denying outdoor exercise and staging assaults on inmates.Crane, self-represented, sued Dolihite. The suit was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 583.210(a). Dolihite had been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison; for a time, Crane was unable to identify his location. The superior court advised Crane to use the sheriff’s office to effect service but the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office refused to serve the summons and complaint. The litigation coordinator at Salinas Valley refused to accept service on behalf of Dolihite.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The litigation coordinator’s refusal contradicts Penal Code 4013(a) and Code of Civil Procedure 416.90, which have been interpreted as authorizing state prison litigation coordinators to accept service on behalf of inmates. Crane’s statutory right to initiate and prosecute a civil action was infringed. View "Crane v. Dolihite" on Justia Law