Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John was a student at the University of California, Davis when fellow student Jane reported that he engaged in nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her in violation of University policy. John agreed they had sex but said Jane consented. Following an investigation, UC Davis found that on the night the two had sex, Jane was incapacitated due to alcohol such that she was unable to consent and that, given her condition, a reasonable person should have known she was unable to consent. John was suspended from all UC campuses for two years.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the suspension. The court rejected John’s claim that he was denied a fair process in UC Davis’s investigation and adjudication because he was denied a live hearing and an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses before a fact-finder who was not also the investigator. In university disciplinary proceedings involving allegations of sexual misconduct, when the sanction is severe and credibility is central to the adjudication, the university must provide cross-examination at a live hearing before a neutral adjudicator who was not also the investigator. In this case, however, credibility was not central. John’s own account provided substantial evidence of the policy violation. The investigation was thorough, there is no evidence of investigator bias, and John was provided many opportunities to state his version of events and to review and respond to the evidence. View "Doe v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In 1990, defendant-appellant Marty Dominguez was convicted by jury of second degree murder, and an allegation was found true he was armed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Dominguez was sentenced to prison for 21 years to life. He appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In January 2019, Dominguez filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which permitted a defendant convicted of murder under a felony-murder theory or the natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition for the conviction to be vacated and resentenced. The superior court found that Dominguez did not make a prima facie showing that he was entitled to relief and denied the petition. Dominguez appealed, contending the court erred in determining his petition did not establish a prima facie case for relief. The Court of Appeal concluded the superior court properly considered the record of conviction to determine as a matter of law that Dominguez was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. View "California v. Dominguez" on Justia Law

During the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found Linde Smith guilty of second-degree murder, and found true a deadly weapon enhancement allegation. Smith’s mother, Anne Smith (Anne), was the victim. During the sanity phase of the trial, the jury found that Smith was legally sane at the time she committed the offense. The trial court sentenced Smith to a term of 16 years to life in prison, consisting of a 15 years to life term for the murder and a one-year consecutive term for the deadly weapon enhancement. On appeal, with respect to the guilt phase, Smith claimed the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence pertaining to the severity of her depression at the time of the incident giving rise to the charged offense. In addition, Smith contended the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as an uncharged lesser included offense to murder. With respect to the sanity phase, Smith claimed the trial court violated her constitutional right to due process under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) and its progeny by admitting evidence that she claims amounted to a comment on her exercise of her right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She also contended the trial court erred in refusing to preclude an expert retained by the prosecution from testifying due to the State’s alleged failure to timely provide the defense with the expert’s report and related data. Finally, Smith argued cumulative error required reversal of the sanity verdict. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not commit Doyle error. The Court rejected the remainder of Smith’s claims in unpublished portions of its opinion. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Tevita Kaihea was convicted by jury of first degree murder and other offenses involving a crime spree preceding the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregated prison term of 111 years and court months to life. On appeal defendant challenged: (1) the admission of certain gang evidence as cumulative and highly prejudicial; (2) the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of mistake of fact and transferred intent; and (3) the court’s instruction that the jury could consider gang evidence in deciding whether defendant acted in self-defense and heat of passion. Defendant contended those errors were cumulatively prejudicial. He also (4) challenged the imposition of a gang enhancement sentence to his murder conviction; (5) contended the trial court improperly calculated custody credits; and (6) contended the court improperly deducted actual days served credit for his jail behavior. Both defendant and the State separately noted (7) the trial court erroneously awarded conduct credit. In the published portion of its opinion,the Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s third contention and concluded the standard instruction, CALCRIM No. 1403, was legally correct as it related to the use of gang evidence for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant actually believed in the need to defend himself or acted in the heat of passion. Furthermore, the Court concluded defendant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel grounded on the failure to request the modification because the failure did not prejudice defendant. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court conclude d that some of defendant’s other contentions had merit. The Court struck the 10-year gang enhancement, directed the trial court to award an additional 213 days of credit, and struck the award of conduct credits. The Court also directed the trial court to correct several errors in the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Kaihea" on Justia Law

Ordinances banning “land uses in support of” new oil and gas wells and “land uses in support of” wastewater injection in unincorporated areas of Monterey County were enacted as part of Measure Z, an initiative sponsored by PMC and passed by Monterey County voters.The trial court upheld, in part, a challenge to Measure Z by oil companies and other mineral rights holders. The court of appeal affirmed. Components of Measure Z are preempted by state laws. Public Resources Code section 3106 explicitly provides that the State of California’s oil and gas supervisor has the authority to decide whether to permit an oil and gas drilling operation to drill a new well or to utilize wastewater injection in its operations. Those operational aspects of oil drilling operations are committed by section 3106 to the state’s discretion and local regulation of these aspects would conflict with section 3106. View "Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Tyrus Jenkins was convicted by jury of first-degree burglary of a residence with a person present, second degree burglary of a car, attempted unlawful taking of the car, and misdemeanor possession of burglary tools. The court sentenced him to a total of 13 years. Jenkins appealed, contending his conviction for attempted unlawful taking of a vehicle should have been reversed because the court permitted, over his objection, a police detective to testify to the car’s estimated value obtained from the Kelley Blue Book’s Web site. Jenkins claimed this was hearsay evidence that should have been excluded, and absent this testimony, there was no evidence establishing the car was worth more than $950, an element of the felony offense. Jenkins also contended his conviction for vehicular burglary also had to be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to prove the car was locked at the time of his entry. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly admitted the Blue Book evidence under Evidence Code section 1340, the published compilation exception to the hearsay rule. And the Court found substantial circumstantial evidence established the car was locked. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Flores was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, among other crimes, after the jury initially declared it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Defendant moved for a new trial based on evidence the jury considered defendant’s sentence in determining the verdict. The jurors’ declarations in support of the new trial motion showed the jury was at an impasse between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter and shortly after discussing the possibility defendant would “walk” if it were to hang, the jury found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court denied defendant’s new trial motion, finding inadmissible any evidence of the jury’s deliberations regarding punishment and that discussing punishment during deliberations was not misconduct. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding: (1) the trial court erred in finding inadmissible the entire contents of the jurors’ declarations submitted in support of the new trial motion; (2) consideration of the admissible portions of the jurors’ declarations establish misconduct occurred, raising a rebuttable presumption of prejudice; and (3) the State failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

In 2003, defendant-appellant Louis Montes was convicted of, among other things, the special circumstance murder of April Peake (the victim) which he committed when he was 17 years old. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). After the United States Supreme Court ruled in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), the California Supreme Court decided that juveniles sentenced to LWOP were entitled to a hearing in order to have an opportunity to present information as to juvenile characteristics and circumstances at the time the offense was committed. Defendant petitioned to recall his sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 1170(d)(2). The superior court granted the petition, recalled defendant’s sentence, and resentenced him to LWOP. In this appeal, defendant contended the superior court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard during resentencing. He further contended the court should have sua sponte transferred this matter to the juvenile court for a transfer/fitness hearing pursuant to Proposition 57 (as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)). The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s first contention but found merit in the second: in supplemental briefing, the parties agreed, and the Court concurred, the minute order of the resentencing hearing had to be corrected, and a new abstract of judgment should issue. Accordingly, the Court conditionally reversed defendant’s sentence and remanded for defendant to receive a transfer/fitness hearing in the juvenile court. View "California v. Montes" on Justia Law

In 1997, with the help of an interpreter, defendant Estaban Bravo pleaded guilty to, and was convicted on, a plea bargain agreement of: a felony violation of domestic violence (count 1); and felony violation of child cruelty (count 2). The trial court sentenced defendant to two years’ incarceration, suspended, and placed him on formal probation for 36 months on terms and conditions including 25 days’ custody, for which he was granted time served. In 2018, defendant moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1016.5 and 1473.7. In 2019, the trial court denied the motion. In late 2020, following defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeal affirmed. In March 2021, the California Supreme Court granted review, and in May issued California v. Vivar, 11 Cal.5th 510 (2021), disapproving of the appellate court’s opinion in Bravo. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal in Bravo back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the decision and reconsider the matter in light of Vivar. Defendant stated that the immediate advantage of his plea was that he would be released from custody that same day so that he could return to his construction job without being fired and could therefore support his spouse and their child. Defendant stated he was informed by counsel and the prosecution that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would conduct a sweep of the county jail where he was being held by the next morning; being released that afternoon allowed him to avoid the ICE sweep and likely deportation as a result of that encounter. Before the Court of Appeal, defendant contended that at the time he executed the plea agreement, he was unaware of future immigration consequences of his plea, and had he known, he would not have executed the agreement. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal found that notwithstanding its sufficiency to meet the statutory language of section 1016.5, the advisement on defendant’s 1997 plea agreement was inadequate to advise him of the mandatory immigration consequences of his plea. "In such cases, '[d]efendants must be advised that they will be deported, excluded, and denied naturalization as a mandatory consequence of the conviction." However, "a defendant's self-serving statement - after trial, conviction and sentence... must be corroborated independently by objective evidence." Here, notably, defendant offered no statement or declaration by his trial counsel or any other contemporaneous evidence other than the statements in his declaration to support that claim. Accordingly, there was no supportable reason for defendant to believe the court would accept an immigration-neutral alternative charge. The Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's section 1473.7 application; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "California v. Bravo" on Justia Law