Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Michael Coleman appealed from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91. That section allowed a current or former servicemember who might be suffering from sexual trauma or substance abuse (among other conditions) as a result of his or her military service to obtain a new sentencing hearing. Defendant contended he pleaded and proved a qualifying condition, and that the trial court erred by ruling otherwise. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the trial court. View "California v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 2013, a jury found defendant-respondent James Ambrosia Williams guilty of child abuse and that he had personally inflicted great bodily injury on the child, who was under the age of five. The trial court found defendant had a prior strike conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, and two prior prison terms. It imposed an aggregate term of 22 years in state prison, including a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal, and judgment was affirmed. At the time defendant was sentenced, Penal Code section 1385 generally authorized judges and magistrates to order an action dismissed in the interests of justice on their own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney but specifically barred them from striking any prior serious felony conviction in connection with imposition of a five- year enhancement. Four years after defendant was sentenced, Senate Bill No. 1393 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018) amended the statute to delete the prohibition. In an unreported minute order dated September 30, 2019, and without the parties present, the sentencing judge recalled defendant’s sentence and struck the five-year punishment for the section 667 serious felony enhancement. The rest of defendant’s sentence remained unchanged. The State appealed. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence: the trial court set forth the authority it relied upon for its decision but did not articulate a factual basis for exercising its discretion to strike the punishment for the prior serious felony enhancement. The matter was remanded for the sentencing court to articulate its basis for exercising discretion to strike the punishment. View "California v. Williams" on Justia Law

In October 2020, the superior court conducted a contested hearing and issued orders granting relief to defendant-respondent, Travis Burhop, on Burhop’s petition to vacate his 2015 second degree murder conviction and to be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. On October 2, 2020, the petition was the subject of a pending appeal with the Court of Appeal in California v. Travis Burhop (Aug. 28, 2020, E073709 [nonpub. opn.]) (Burhop II). In August 2020, the Court of Appeal court issued its opinion in Burhop II and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings on Burhop’s petition. But the remittitur in Burhop II was not issued until October 30, 2020. Thus, in this appeal, the State claimed that the October 2, 2020 orders adjudicating Burhop’s section 1170.95 petition were null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, given that the petition was the subject of the pending appeal in Burhop II and the remittitur in Burhop II had not yet issued. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed the October 2 orders and again remanded the matter for further proceedings on the petition. View "California v. Burhop" on Justia Law

Defendant Omar Kasrawi was apprehended in an affluent neighborhood in possession of property he had stolen from some nearby cars. Although the officer who stopped and ultimately arrested him acted on no more than a hunch after watching Kasrawi innocuously cross the street to his legally parked car, the officer learned that Kasrawi had an outstanding arrest warrant. California Supreme Court precedent compelled the Court of Appeal to conclude that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, the evidence did not need to be suppressed: “This case falls into a narrow exception to the exclusionary rule that applies where a law enforcement officer discovers the defendant’s outstanding warrant after an illegal stop but before a search yields evidence of a crime. Under these limited circumstances, discovery of the warrant can attenuate the taint of the original detention.” On those grounds, the Court affirmed the denial of Kasrawi’s suppression motion. View "California v. Kasrawi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging statewide delays in the transfer of incompetent to stand trial (IST) defendants from county jails to DSH and DDS to begin substantive services. The trial court granted the petition in part, first finding that defendants systematically violate the due process rights of IST defendants in California who are committed to DSH pursuant to Penal Code section 1370 or to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i). The trial court found that due process requires defendants to commence substantive services for these IST defendants within 28 days of the date on which the order transferring responsibility for those defendants to DSH or DDS is served. The trial court denied the petition as to certain IST defendants charged with felony sex offenses who are committed to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii).The Court of Appeal concluded that defendants have systematically violated the due process rights of all IST defendants in California by failing to commence substantive services designed to return those defendants to competency within 28 days of service of the transfer of responsibility document, which is the date of service of the commitment packet for all defendants committed to DSH and the date of service of the order of commitment for all defendants committed to DDS. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment as to the issues raised in defendants' appeal, but reversed as to the issue raised in plaintiffs' cross-appeal. The court remanded to the trial court with directions to modify its order granting in part plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate to reflect a uniform transfer of responsibility date for all IST defendants committed to DDS. View "Stiavetti v. Clendenin" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Sorden appealed his conviction for contempt of court for violating a Criminal Protective Order— Domestic Violence (CPO) issued in a prior action. The Court of Appeal determined Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing reversible error, finding: (1) Appellant could not collaterally attack the CPO in this action; (2) the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of “disturbing the peace” for purposes of the contempt conviction; (3) the trial court did not deny Appellant due process of law when it allowed the jury to consider evidence of cellphone tracking that was not presented at the preliminary hearing; (4) the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the meaning of “act of violence” for purposes of the conduct enhancement; (5) the trial court was not required to give a unanimity instruction for the conduct enhancement; and (6) without individual instances of trial court error, there could be no prejudice from “cumulative error.” The Court further concluded that, as Appellant and the Attorney General agreed, because Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2019, ch. 590, sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2020) applied retroactively, the two one-year sentence enhancements based on prior prison terms should be stricken from the judgment. Accordingly, the Court modified the judgment to strike the two one-year sentence enhancements and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Sorden" on Justia Law

Eloy Gonzalez appealed a trial court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95. Gonzalez claimed the court improperly determined he was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. “Southside” gang members Gonzalez, Matthew Robert Miller, and Eduardo Vargas engaged in a series of armed robberies, one of which ended with Vargas shooting a robbery victim, Jesse Muro. Vargas was tried separately, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to death. The Attorney General (AG) conceded section 1170.95 was constitutional but contended the court’s denial was nevertheless proper. The AG argued a person convicted of murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance before the Supreme Court’s decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015), and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), was barred from pursuing resentencing under section 1170.95 without first having obtained a writ of habeas corpus to set aside the special circumstance for insufficient evidence. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: because the record of conviction did not establish Gonzalez’s ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law, the postjudgment order denying the petition for resentencing was reversed and the matter remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause (OSC) and to proceed in accordance with section 1170.95 (d). View "California v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Jackson sought a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051 as a result of his conviction in 1998 that included two counts of first-degree murder with multiple special circumstances, which counts resulted in a sentence of two consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). Defendant was 19 years old when he committed the homicides. In his October 2019 motion, defendant argued section 3051 violated his equal protection rights because he allegedly “is entitled to the same protections as any other person who violated the law at the same age whether it was murder without special circumstances, robbery, kidnapping or any other crime.” The trial court in November 2019 denied the motion, finding that defendant was statutorily ineligible for relief and that there was a rational basis for carving out from section 3051 offenders such as defendant who were convicted of first-degree special circumstance murder and sentenced to LWOP. On appeal, defendant reiterated his trial court argument that section 3051’s exclusion of persons over 18 years of age with LWOP sentences from its parole hearing provisions violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Upon de novo review, the Court of Appeal concluded the carve out to section 3051 for offenders such as defendant serving a LWOP sentence for special circumstance murder was not an equal protection violation. View "California v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In this case, two gang members were walking together in their gang’s territory where they both lived. Police detained the pair and arrested defendant after retrieving a knife from his pants pocket. A gang expert later opined (given these facts) defendant carried the knife for the benefit of, in association with, and with the intent to promote his gang. A jury found defendant guilty of carrying the concealed knife and found true a two-year gang enhancement. The Court of Appeal concluded there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find the gang enhancement true beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court thus reversed defendant’s gang enhancement and remanded the matter so the trial court could conduct a new sentencing hearing. View "California v. Soriano" on Justia Law

Defendant Malcolm Brewer and codefendants Glen Conway and Shane Williams participated in a string of armed robberies and attempted robberies, mostly of gas stations and convenience stores, in November and December 2017. In many of the robberies and attempted robberies, defendant personally used a firearm by displaying it to or pointing it at the victims. Defendant and his codefendants were charged in a 20-count amended information with numerous counts of robbery and attempted robbery with firearm enhancement allegations as well as one count of felon in possession of a firearm. Williams entered into a plea agreement. Defendant and Conway proceeded to trial together before separate juries. Defendant’s jury found him guilty of 11 counts of second degree robbery, two counts of attempted second degree robbery, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant, who had a strike prior, to an aggregate determinate term of 63 years. On appeal, defendant characterized his sentence as the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole imposed on a developmentally disabled person, and contended it was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of federal and California Constitutions. The Court of Appeal rejected defendant’s contention that such a sentence categorically violated those constitutional provisions in the same way as imposition of the death penalty as to developmentally disabled adults and imposition of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) as to juvenile defendants. Accordingly, his convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "California v. Brewer" on Justia Law