Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Thirteen-year-old Jessica F.-H. was brutally murdered in a Sacramento County park. Her murder went unsolved until defendant Ryan Roberts' DNA was linked to her belt buckle and cigarette butts found at the scene. Defendant’s DNA had been collected after an unrelated felony arrest more than a year after Jessica’s murder. Although that arrest was supported by probable cause, he was not formally charged in that matter. Based primarily on the DNA evidence, a jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury also found true an enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 26 years to life. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether using a DNA sample taken from a defendant who was validly arrested for a felony on probable cause but never formally charged, violated the defendant’s federal or state constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure or his state constitutional right to privacy. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded defendant’s federal right protecting him against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated. Further, the Court held defendant’s state constitutional rights were not violated, but even if they were, the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 prohibited suppression of the DNA evidence in a criminal trial. In addition to defendant’s search and seizure and privacy claims concerning the DNA evidence, defendant also asserted: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in restricting the scope of his gang expert’s testimony; (2 the trial court prejudicially erred in precluding the defense from presenting certain demonstrative evidence; (3 the trial court denied defendant due process by refusing to give his proposed pinpoint jury instruction on third party culpability; (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors warrants reversal; (5) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial premised on newly discovered evidence; and (6) the trial court erred in concluding a juror did not commit prejudicial misconduct related to statements made on Twitter during the trial. As to the last claim, defendant requested that the Court perform an independent in camera review of the juror’s Twitter account records. After review, the Court found no reversible error and affirmed judgment. View "California v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Ahmed Mumin was convicted by jury of first degree murder, burglary, and robbery. The jury also convicted Mumin on two counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer, two counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm, two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and one count each of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person. The jury found true various firearm enhancements. The trial court sentenced Mumin to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, plus an additional consecutive indeterminate term of 55 years to life imprisonment and a consecutive determinate term of 41 years four months. Mumin appealed, contending: (1) the evidence did not support a jury instruction on the kill zone theory of attempted murder liability; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial misconduct by questioning Mumin’s counsel about her closing argument in the presence of the jury; and (3) his convictions for assault with a semiautomatic firearm should be vacated because they were lesser included offenses of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic firearm. The Attorney General conceded the two assault convictions should have been vacated or reversed, and the Court of Appeal accepted this concession. The Court held Mumin’s two remaining contentions were without merit. Therefore, judgment was modified to vacate the two assault convictions (and the stayed sentences thereon) and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Mumin" on Justia Law

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (MCWE) appealed an order denying its special motion to strike, made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), which was directed to three affirmative defenses for setoff pleaded by Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC (NHOM) in its answer to MCWE’s cross-complaint. The appeal presented two issues: (1) could a special motion to strike under section 425.16 (b) be directed to an affirmative defense pleaded in an answer; and (2) did an affirmative defense for setoff constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike.The Court of Appeal answered the questions presented: (1) no - an anti-SLAPP motion could not be directed to an affirmative defense; and (2) also no - an affirmative defense for setoff cannot constitute a cause of action or claim for relief subject to an anti-SLAPP motion. Only a “cause of action” asserted by a plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner could be the subject of an anti-SLAPP motion. "A cause of action seeks relief. An affirmative defense cannot seek relief and is not asserted by a plaintiff, a cross-complainant, or a petitioner." Further, the Court held setoff, as an affirmative defense, could not give rise to affirmative relief. "California Supreme Court authority holds that the affirmative defense of setoff may only be used defensively and does not permit recovery of the damages sought to be set off against the opposing party’s recovery." View "Morris Cerullo World Evangelism v. Newport Harbor Offices etc." on Justia Law

A jury found defendant Gregory Wilson guilty of second degree murder. He was sentenced to 17 years to life. On appeal he contended the trial court erred in failing to: (1) instruct the jury sua sponte on defenses arising from the use of deadly force to protect against common law felonies; (2) instruct sua sponte on the Home Protection Bill of Rights presumption; and (3) provide the jury with verdict forms for voluntary manslaughter. He also contended: (4) the errors cumulatively required reversal; (5) his prior prison term enhancement should have been struck in light of Senate Bill No. 136; and (6) the imposition of certain fines and fees were unlawful in light of California v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019). The Court of Appeal concurred defendant was entitled to the ameliorative benefit of Senate Bill 136 and struck the one-year prior prison term; the Court affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Petitioner Karen Sims, a former attorney with long standing history of mental illness, was convicted of murdering her husband Henry Sims in 2006 and was sentenced to prison for a term of 50 years to life. After her conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in 2008, she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court in 2011, on the ground her conviction was invalid because she was incompetent to stand trial. An order to show cause (OSC) was issued by the Supreme Court, returnable to the Riverside County Superior Court, but was denied. In 2016, petitioner again sought habeas relief, petitioning the Supreme Court, but with additional information about her postconviction mental health problems as they related to timeliness. The California Supreme Court again issued an OSC, this time returnable to the Court of Appeal. The appellate granted the petition and remanded the matter again to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing, where it specified that counsel should present the testimony of Michael DeFrank, as well as any expert witnesses or mental health professionals who were aware of defendant’s mental health condition during the period between August and December 2006, or such other evidence as may constitute substantial evidence of defendant’s incompetence to stand trial. On remand, the court heard the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel, which it found lacking in credibility, and that of petitioner, and denied the petition once again. This petition followed. The State argued that the court properly found the testimony of petitioner’s trial counsel lacked credibility and argued the Court of Appeal's previous remand order did not require the superior court to readdress petitioner’s claim that she was incompetent to stand trial. The Court of Appeal granted the petition and reversed the judgment of conviction. Defendant could be retried on the charges for which she was convicted if she was competent to stand trial. View "In re Sims" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathan Henderson pleaded no contest to possession of a nunchaku, and admitted a prior prison term. In August 2018, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four years, consisting of: three years for the nunchaku possession plus a consecutive year for the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5 (b). The trial court suspended execution of the final 1,096 days of the sentence and ordered them to be served as a period of mandatory supervision with various terms and conditions. Defendant subsequently admitted violating his mandatory supervision on four occasions. In May 2020, the trial court terminated defendant’s mandatory supervision, reaffirmed his sentence, but declined to strike the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136), effective January 1, 2020, concluding that defendant’s sentence had become a final judgment 60 days after his sentence was pronounced on August 8, 2018, and thus defendant was not entitled to retroactive relief. On appeal, Defendant contended the trial court erred in declining to strike the prior prison term enhancement. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed. However, in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Stamps, 9 Cal.5th 685 (2020), the Court asked for supplemental briefing on whether striking the prior prison term enhancement while maintaining the remainder of the plea agreement would deprive the State of the benefit of their bargain, such that the State should be afforded an opportunity to withdraw from the plea agreement. Defendant argued the Court could strike the enhancement and keep the plea deal intact, whereas the State argued the Court had to must remand to permit it to withdraw from the plea agreement. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court concluded Stamps was not on point because in this case the parties entered into an open plea agreement rather than agreeing to a stipulated sentence. The Court thus modified the judgment to strike defendant’s prior prison term enhancement and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "California v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of Labor Code claims pursued by former employees, who contend that their lawsuit is limited to recovering civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).The Court of Appeal again interpreted the California Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, to mean "that PAGA representative claims for civil penalties are not subject to arbitration" under a predispute arbitration agreement. In this case, the PAGA claims alleged in the former employees' complaint are owned by the state and are being pursued by the former employees as the state's agent or proxy. The court explained that the arbitration agreements at issue are not enforceable as to the PAGA claims because the state was not a party to, and did not ratify, any of those agreements. Furthermore, after the former employees became representatives of the state, they did not agree to arbitrate the PAGA claims. Consequently, under the rule of California law recognized in Esparza v KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1234, and many other decisions of the Court of Appeal, the court concluded that the PAGA claims cannot be forced into arbitration based on agreements made by the former employees before they became authorized representatives of the state. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied this rule of law.The court also concluded that defendant's argument that arbitration is compelled by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal preemption fails for similar reasons. The court concluded that the FAA does not reach the PAGA claims alleged in this case and, therefore, federal law does not preempt the rule of California law stating PAGA claims are subject to arbitration only if the state, or the state’s authorized representative, consents to arbitration. View "Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, David Shawver, Brooke Paz, Ryan Hoskins, and Amanda McGuire brought two petitions for writ of mandate challenging the constitutionality of legislative amendments made to the procedures governing the recall of state officers. Petitioners began a recall proceeding in April 2017 with the aim of obtaining certification in August 2017 for the November 2017 election. The Legislature changed the law in June 2017 by passing Senate Bill No. 96 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085176, challenging the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 96 on single-subject grounds. The Court of Appeal issued an order temporarily staying the enforcement of the amendments to the Elections Code effected by Senate Bill No. 96. On August 24, 2017, the Legislature enacted similar revisions to the recall procedures by adopting Senate Bill No. 117 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), a bill providing for appropriations related to the budget bill. Petitioners filed a writ petition in case No. C085381, challenging the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 117’s Elections Code amendments, arguing the amendments impaired their right to a speedy recall, denied them due process, and were not a valid budget-related bill that could be passed by a majority vote and take effect immediately. The Court of Appeal consolidated both cases and issued an order directing the parties to address the following question: “Does the Legislature of the State of California have the authority to (1) amend the budget bill by a majority vote, and (2) adopt ‘other bills providing for appropriations related to the budget bill’ to become effective immediately by a majority vote.” The parties complied. After review, the Court of Appeal found no grounds upon which it could grant relief, and denied both petitions. View "Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Weber" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus to petitioner who was convicted of murdering her three young children by setting a house fire that killed them. Petitioner argues that the current scientific understanding of burn patterns and how fire behaves under certain conditions fatally undermines expert testimony offered by the prosecution at trial regarding the cause and origin of the fire at petitioner's home, as well as the fire scene investigation on which the experts based those opinions.The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b). Although petitioner has identified real advances in fire investigation science, the court explained that section 1473, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) condition the availability of habeas relief on the effect such advancements likely would have had on the particular expert testimony at issue in the particular proceedings at issue. In this case, given the extent to which the same criticisms of the prosecution's expert testimony were litigated at the original trial, the continuing expert debate on these topics reflected at the evidentiary hearing, the lack of any authority rejecting some aspect of the original investigation as improper or incorrect by current standards, and the other evidence of guilt offered against petitioner at trial, petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief.The court also concluded, for largely the same reasons, that petitioner failed to establish that the state of fire investigation science at the time of trial rendered her trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process. The court stated that, although additional scientific support for the defense's expert testimony at trial would have been helpful to the defense in rebutting the prosecution expert's opinions, the absence of such additional support did not necessarily prevent a fair trial. View "In re Parks" on Justia Law

California has two statutory mechanisms for detaining, evaluating, and treating persons who have been declared incompetent to stand trial for a felony that entailed a threat of bodily harm, and who continue to pose a danger to others. When the reason is a "developmental disability," the applicable mechanism is civil commitment under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500; when the reason is a "mental disease, defect, or disorder," the applicable mechanism is a so-called Murphy conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act) (section 5000 et seq.), section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(B). Under section 6500, the one-year recommitment period ends on the anniversary of the date of the recommitment order; for a Murphy conservatorship, the one-year period ends on the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order. Because, as is common, recommitment orders under section 6500 are not fully litigated (and hence not issued) until after the anniversary of the date of the initial commitment order, the end dates for section 6500 recommitments typically get pushed out further and further with each recommitment.The Court of Appeal held that this "creep" of the end date under section 6500 does not violate equal protection in regard to Murphy conservatorships. The court explained that individuals civilly committed under section 6500 and Murphy conservatorships are not similarly situated for purposes of fixing the end date for a recommitment. Even assuming that persons civilly committed under section 6500 and in a Murphy conservatorship are similarly situated for purposes of the timetable for terminating a one-year period for a recommitment, the court concluded that there is a sufficient justification for that differential treatment that withstands rational basis scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed the end date for the section 6500 recommitment in this case. View "People v. Nolasco" on Justia Law