Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, after appellant Jody Ann Clements solicited her ex-husband and her boyfriend to assault her 16-year-old brother, the two killed the brother by stabbing him and bludgeoning him with a rock and then buried his body in the desert. A jury convicted Clements of second degree murder in 1990 after the trial judge instructed them on both natural and probable consequences and implied malice theories of murder. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of murder to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Legislature also added a new provision to the Penal Code, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment if they could not be sustained under the amended definition of murder. Clements petitioned for relief under SB 1437, arguing she could not be convicted under the current law. After a hearing, at which the parties agreed to limit the evidence to the record of conviction, the trial judge looked to the Court of Appeal's decision in Clements’ original appeal and made two alternative determinations: (1) substantial evidence supported the determination that Clements could have been convicted of second degree murder under an implied malice theory; and (2) Clements in fact committed implied malice second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge therefore denied her petition on each of these independent, adequate grounds. Clements argued the trial court erred (1) by considering the Court of Appeal's opinion in her original appeal; (2) by misconstruing the nature of the eligibility determination it was required to make under the new statute; and (3) by denying her petition in the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of implied malice. The Court held an appellate opinion was part of the record of conviction and could be relied on in deciding a Penal Code section 1170.95 petition on the merits, so the trial judge did not err in doing so in this case. Furthermore, the Court held the trial judge sat as a fact finder at a hearing under section 1170.95 (d), and that substantial evidence supported the trial judge’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Clements committed implied malice second degree murder. The trial judge correctly denied Clements’ petition for resentencing for that reason. View "California v. Clements" on Justia Law

In 2010, Terrence Harris was charged along with three other individuals with one count of premeditated first degree murder in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, and two counts of robbery. Harris pled guilty to the two counts of robbery and one count each of attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter in exchange for dismissal of the murder count. The parties agreed to a stipulated prison term of 16 years four months, which the trial court imposed at sentencing. In 2019, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Harris petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that section 1170.95 provided relief for murder convictions only. He appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "California v. Harris" on Justia Law

A bronze sculpture, “Early Days,” was originally part of a Civic Center monument to California's pioneer period. In 2018, at the request of the San Francisco Arts Commission, the San Francisco Historic Preservation Commission (HPC) granted a Certificate of Appropriateness to take down “Early Days” and place it in storage. Early Days displayed a racist attitude toward Native Americans. Acting upon evidence of “significant adverse public reaction over an extended period of time,” the HPC authorized the removal; the Board of Appeals affirmed. Opponents of the removal asserted “a potpourri of claims,” including a claim under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code 52). They alleged that the Board of Appeals abused its discretion in authorizing the removal and that the manner of the removal, in the pre-dawn hours of the day following the Board's decision, was illegal.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Even if the opponents had adequately alleged the violation of rights amenable to Bane Act enforcement, their complaint does not allege anything that might reasonably be construed as “threats, intimidation or coercion” to violate those rights. There is no support for conclusory allegations that the Board acted in excess of its authority or abused its discretion. View "Schmid v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order denying defendant's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP), Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for defamation and other torts, alleging causes of action arising from an article about him that defendant had written in Vietnamese.The court concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that defendant had failed to satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute, i.e., defendant had not made a threshold showing that plaintiff's action arose from protected activity in connection with an issue of public interest. In this case, the article concerned a matter of public interest because plaintiff was "in the public eye" in the Vietnamese community. Furthermore, plaintiff is collaterally estopped from claiming that the article did not concern an issue of public interest because this issue was decided against him in the prior BBC proceeding. The court also concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that plaintiff had satisfied the statute's second prong, i.e., plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims. The court explained that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing a probability that he can show by clear and convincing evidence that defendant acted with actual malice. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing on his second cause of action for violation of the common law of publicity and his third cause of action for civil conspiracy. View "Kieu Hoang v. Phong Minh Tran" on Justia Law

After the passage of Proposition 218, Sacramento voters approved a requirement that city enterprises providing water, sewer, storm drainage, and solid waste services pay a total tax of 11% of their gross revenues from user fees and charges. Nineteen years later, plaintiff-respondent Russell Wyatt brought a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief against the City challenging its fees and charges for utility services under article XIII D, section 6, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution (added by Prop. 218, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996)). It was undisputed that the City set these fees and charges at rates sufficient to fund the payment of the tax to its general fund. The trial court issued a writ of mandate and judgment in Wyatt’s favor. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its writ of mandate. By approving the tax in 1998, Sacramento voters increased the cost of providing utility services, rendering those costs recoverable as part of their utility rates and the subsequent transfer of funds permissible under article XIII D. View "Wyatt v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a preliminary injunction prohibiting the County of San Diego, its public health officer Wilma Wooten, the California Department of Public Health (CDPH), and Governor Gavin Newsom from enforcing COVID-19-related public health restrictions against any business offering restaurant service in San Diego County, subject to safety protocols. Two San Diego businesses that offer live nude adult filed suit claiming the State and County restrictions on live entertainment violated their First Amendment right to freedom of expression. The State and County eventually loosened their restrictions on live entertainment, but as the COVID-19 pandemic worsened, they imposed new restrictions on restaurants. These new restaurant restrictions severely curtailed the adult entertainment businesses’ operations. But these new restrictions were unrelated to live entertainment or the First Amendment. Despite the narrow scope of the issues presented, the trial court granted expansive relief when it issued the injunction challenged here. "It is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process that, before relief can be granted against a party, the party must have notice of such relief and an opportunity to be heard." The Court of Appeal determined that because restaurant restrictions were never part of the adult entertainment businesses’ claims, the State and County had no notice or opportunity to address them. The trial court therefore erred by enjoining the State and County from enforcing COVID-19-related public health restrictions on restaurants. Because the procedure used by the trial court was improper, the trial court’s actions left the Court of Appeal unable to address the substance of this challenge to restaurant restrictions. View "Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2016, Hill pleaded no contest to felony possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (case CR940896). The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Hill on three years' felony probation. In 2019, a Clearlake police officer noticed Hill outside of a liquor store, approached, obtained Hill’s name, and conducted a records check, which revealed that Hill was on postrelease community supervision. As the officer returned, Hill “produced” a knife and placed it on a pole. Hill said he needed the knife “for protection” and that he had it shoved down his sleeve. Hill pleaded no contest to concealing a dirk or dagger (case CR953084) and admitted a probation violation in case CR940896. The plea was open with a maximum possible sentence of 32t months.The trial court revoked his probation in case CR940896 and sentenced Hill in both cases to an aggregate term of 32 months. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Hill’s argument that his attorney was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on his eligibility for mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. Because Hill’s appeal did not attack the validity of his plea but challenged the court’s sentencing discretion relating to section 1001.36, no certificate of probable cause was required. Hill's counsel was not deficient in failing to request an eligibility hearing nor was Hill prejudiced by counsel’s failure to do so. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting Simplified's special motion to strike the defamation cause of action in the cross-complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The court held that the second amended complaint (SAC) did not render the anti-SLAPP motion moot. The court also held that the email at issue was clearly an act in furtherance of Simplified's constitutional right of petition and is protected activity for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute; the litigation privilege defeats cross-complainants' defamation cause of action; and there is no duty to meet and confer before filing an anti-SLAPP motion. View "Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Isaac Favor agreed to a limited waiver of his right to a preliminary hearing (usually 60 days of arraignment), consenting to a new deadline that was 76 days after arraignment. The preliminary hearing was not held by that date, so Favor moved for mandatory dismissal under Penal Code section 859b. The State argued there could be no limited waiver of the 60-day deadline, so Favor’s waiver was a general one that allowed the preliminary hearing to be set later than he authorized, even without a further waiver. The Court of Appeal rejected that argument and joined Garcia v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.App.5th 631 (2020) in enforcing a limited waiver of the 60-day preliminary hearing deadline. Favor’s writ petition was granted and the trial court was ordered to grant his motion to dismiss. View "Favor v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendant Tony Sims appealed after he pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition. He contended the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress incriminating evidence obtained during a warrantless search of his vehicle. Defendant also argued he was entitled to seek a reduction of his three-year probation term under recently-enacted Assembly Bill No. 1950 (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, sec. 2). Relying on In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965), defendant claimed Assembly Bill No. 1950’s limitation on the maximum duration of felony probation terms constituted an ameliorative change to the criminal law that applied retroactively to cases that were not reduced to final judgment as of the new law’s effective date. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress because the search of defendant’s vehicle was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and, in the alternative, as a search incident to arrest. With respect to his second argument, the Court of Appeal agreed. Judgment was affirmed as to his conviction, but reversed in part as to defendant's sentence. The matter was remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Sims" on Justia Law