Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Tyrone Douglas was convicted of two nonviolent felonies and a violent felony. The trial court chose one of the nonviolent felonies as the primary offense, imposed sentence for that offense, imposed but stayed sentence on the other nonviolent felony offense, and imposed a consecutive term for the violent felony. After Douglas’s sentencing, California voters passed Proposition 57, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, which added section 32 to article I of the California Constitution. Douglas petitioned or habeas relief, challenging a regulation adopted by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) that limited the parole-consideration benefit of section 32(a)(1) to inmates who were convicted only of nonviolent felonies, thus excluding from early parole consideration anyone convicted of one or more violent felonies plus one or more nonviolent felonies (“mixed- offense inmates”). In support of his challenge to the CDCR regulation, Douglas cited In re Mohammad, 42 Cal.App.5th 719, review granted February 19, 2020, S259999 (2019), which held that because the unambiguous text of section 32(a)(1) provided for early parole consideration for inmates convicted of nonviolent felony offenses, regardless of whether they were also convicted of a violent offense, a mixed-offense inmate is eligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). Although the Court of Appeal found the language of section 32(a)(1) supported an interpretation that mixed-offense inmates were entitled to early parole consideration, such an interpretation would lead to absurd results the voters did not intend. Accordingly, the Court concluded that a person convicted of a violent felony offense and sentenced to state prison was ineligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). The petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied. View "In re Douglas" on Justia Law

In two separate trials involving two different victims, juries found Defendant-appellant Michael Brugman guilty of three counts of corporal injury to someone with whom he had a dating relationship; three counts of violating a protective order; one count of assault with a deadly weapon; one count of making a criminal threat; one count of rape of an unconscious person; and one count of false imprisonment. The trial court found that the corporal injury counts were committed within seven years of a previous conviction for aggravated assault, some of the counts were committed while Brugman was out on bail, and that Brugman incurred a serious felony prior and a prison prior. The trial court sentenced Brugman to a prison term of 25 years, 8 months. On appeal, Brugman contended: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred in denying his request for a pinpoint instruction with respect to the count of assault with a deadly weapon; (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and making a criminal threat; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by not striking Brugman’s prior strike, or the five-year enhancement for Brugman’s serious felony prior. Concluding that Brugman’s arguments lacked merit, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Brugman" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Pettigrew challenged his conviction for the first degree murder of Mimie Cowen, contending substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding that the murder was premeditated, and the trial court erred prejudicially by instructing the jury with a standard “flight” instruction that it could consider defendant’s postarrest suicide attempts as evidence of a consciousness of guilt. In addition, defendant argued there was no evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that he had the ability to pay a $514.58 “booking fee,” and the court erred when calculating presentence credits to be applied to his state prison sentence of 25 years to life. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s conviction for first degree murder was supported by substantial evidence of premeditation. In addition, because there was no evidence defendant fled to avoid arrest or tried to escape from custody, the Court agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight. However, the Court concluded the error was harmless. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court concluded the trial court’s order imposing a “booking fee” without finding defendant had the ability to pay, if error, was harmless. And the Court accepted the State’s concession that defendant was entitled to an additional 21 days of presentence credit. Because the Court found no reversible error, judgment was affirmed as modified to accurately reflect defendant’s presentence custody credits. View "California v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant David Curry was convicted by jury of robbery. Before the trial court sentenced him to state prison for 40 years to life and imposed various costs, defendant sought to file a motion for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court ruled the motion was untimely and did not consider it. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the trial court erred by denying as untimely his request for mental health diversion; (2) if the diversion request was untimely, trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; and (3) the trial court violated due process principles by imposing costs without determining defendant’s ability to pay. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant’s first contention and conditionally reversed the judgment with instructions for the trial court in considering defendant’s eligibility for mental health diversion. The Court's holding mooted defendant’s second contention. The Court disagreed with defendant’s due process challenge to costs imposed. View "California v. Curry" on Justia Law

After a political action committee and two political candidates successfully campaigned for a ballot measure in a Redondo Beach municipal election, two citizens filed suit against the committee and the candidates, claiming the candidates had controlled the committee, which had used an improper title for itself. The trial court ruled in favor of the committee and candidates, awarding them attorney fees.In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal concluded that the nonparties have standing to appeal the judgment; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Rescue was a general purpose committee and that neither candidate controlled it; and the trial court acted beyond its authority by issuing a judgment against nonparties to the action. The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants, who were unquestionably the prevailing party. Finally, the court denied the request for sanctions because the appeal of the attorney fees was not frivolous. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

Defendant Jason Andahl appealed a July 2019 judgment revoking his probation and executing a prison sentence of seven years eight months imposed in 2018 when he was first placed on probation. The sentence included two prior prison term enhancements of one year under Penal Code section 667.5 (b). Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended section 667.5 (b) to limit qualifying prior prison terms to those served for sexually violent offenses, which defendant’s prior offenses were not. The parties did not contest that Senate Bill 136 was retroactive under In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965). On appeal, defendant claimed he was entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 136 under the California Supreme Court’s decision in California v. McKenzie, 9 Cal.5th 40 (2020). The Attorney General responded that McKenzie did not govern because the 2018 order at issue here suspended the sentence’s execution, as opposed to its imposition, and was therefore a final judgment for retroactivity purposes. The Court of Appeal concluded that by virtue of the retroactive change in the law, defendant’s one-year enhancements were unauthorized and must be stricken. View "California v. Andahl" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Michael Miranda was convicted on 13 counts charging sex crimes against two minor girls, including oral copulation of an unconscious person, rape of an unconscious person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person. He was sentenced under the One Strike law. On appeal, he contended in part that the jury should have been instructed on lesser included offenses, and that his ineligibility for youth offender parole hearings violated equal protection. The Court of Appeal agreed that battery was a lesser included offense of oral copulation of an unconscious person, rape of an unconscious person, and sexual penetration of an unconscious person. Given that battery required only an offensive touching, it was impossible to commit any of these crimes without also committing battery against that person. Because of the evidence presented, the Court concluded the trial court was required to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense as to one of Miranda’s crimes, oral copulation of an unconscious person. Therefore, that conviction was reversed and the sentence vacated, as there was a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the jury would have convicted him of only battery if instructed as to that option. As to Miranda’s other two crimes, the Court found the notion that Miranda committed battery but not the greater crimes lacked a grounding in the evidence, so the trial court had no duty to instruct on battery as a lesser included offense. In addition, the Court rejected Miranda’s other challenges to his convictions, including his equal protection challenge. View "California v. Miranda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that prison officials retaliated against him because he disclosed information to the Office of Internal Affairs of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) about prison officials covering up a murder and he filed administrative grievances addressing misconduct by officials at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of replevin directing prison officials to return his personal property or pay its value. The trial court dismissed the action based on failure to exhaust.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On a question of properly pleading the excuse of unavailability, the court concluded that plaintiff must allege specific facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the machinations, misrepresentations or intimidations were accomplished. In this case, the papers plaintiff filed in the trial court and in this appeal demonstrate he could amend his petition to allege specific facts showing the administrative process is unavailable to him because prison officials have thwarted his use of the inmate grievance procedure through misrepresentations and machinations. View "Foster v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Gonzalo Paredes was found guilty by jury of 35 counts of offering or delivering compensation for workers’ compensation patient referrals and 16 counts of concealing an event affecting an insurance claim. The trial court sentenced Paredes to an aggregate term of five years in prison. On appeal, Paredes claimed the prosecutor committed misconduct during his examination of one of the witnesses and during closing argument by suggesting the existence of facts not in evidence. He also contended the trial court erred in excluding as hearsay, an unavailable witness' testimony from a prior federal trial. Further, Paredes contended the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's verdicts. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Paredes' convictions and sentences. View "California v. Paredes" on Justia Law