Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were “acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery. The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed. In a consolidated appeal, two of the minors, Edgerrin J. and Jamar D. challenged the denial of their motions to suppress, arguing the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual, and claimed the citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed on both points. However, the Court found conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, judgment was reversed and remanded for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance. View "In re Edgerrin J." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Gerard Gallo was charged by information with elder abuse under Penal Code section 368(b)(1) (count 1) and murder under section 187(a) (count 2). He was convicted by jury as charged, for which the trial court sentenced him to a total indeterminate term of 15 years to life on count 2. The court also imposed a determinate term of three years on count 1, but stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654. After defendant appealed, in an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Almost seven years later, defendant petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95 in pro. per. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing defendant was the actual killer, thus, not entitle do relief. The State stated that defendant punched his father in the face and his father died. When the trial court asked if this was a “single-defendant murder case,” the prosecutor responded, “Yes.” Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. Defendant was appointed counsel for appealing that denial. Counsel filed a "Wende" brief; defendant did not file a supplemental brief. The Court of Appeal determined "Wende's constitutional underpinnings do not apply to appeals from the denial of postconviction relief," and it had no independent duty to review the record for reasonably arguable issues, but could undertake review "in the interests of justice." Because defendant was the sole killer, and a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder under section 187 (a), section 1170.95 did not apply to defendant. Thus, the Court independently reviewed the record for potential error, and was satisfied appointed counsel fully complied with their responsibilities as counsel, and no arguable issue was presented. View "California v. Gallo" on Justia Law

In June 2015, defendant William Roseberry began serving a five-year term in state prison for willfully inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. While serving that time, defendant brought a controlled substance into prison. In December 2015, for defendant’s in-prison offense and pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.1(c), a trial court imposed a three-year prison term consecutive to the five-year term defendant was already serving for the corporal injury offense. Appealing that second sentence, defendant contended the trial court: (1) contravened Penal Code section 1170.1 (c) because only one-third of the base term should have been imposed; and (2) erred by failing to pronounce a single determinate term of imprisonment, “treat[ing] this case as a stand-alone case, which it was not.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's sentence. View "California v. Roseberry" on Justia Law

The court of appeal upheld the dismissal of a claim against a school district under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code 51), A school district is not a business establishment and cannot be sued under the Unruh Act even where, as in this case, the alleged discriminatory conduct is actionable under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. 12101).The California Supreme Court has not considered whether a government entity, specifically an agent of the state performing a state constitutional obligation is a business establishment within the meaning of the Act. The court of appeal examined the historical genesis of the Act and the Act’s limited legislative history. Public school districts are, nonetheless, subject to stringent anti-discrimination laws set forth in the Education Code and the comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions set forth in the Government Code and applicable to all government entities, as well as federal constitutional mandates (actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983), and statutes such as Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681), Title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12131), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. 794). View "Brennon B. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant Kenneth Grant admittedly stole merchandise from a Wilsons Leather outlet store. Everything there was sold at a discount (as evidenced by a “comparable value” the store displays on tags attached to each product). At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence showing that the cumulative comparable values of the stolen merchandise exceeded the $950 felony theft threshold. However, the prosecution introduced: (1) no evidence establishing that the comparable values represented the merchandise’s actual fair market values; and (2) evidence of actual sales prices for only a few of the stolen products (totaling about $265). Presumably relying on the comparable values, the jury found the value of the stolen merchandise exceeded $950, and convicted Grant of grand theft and burglary. The trial court sentenced him to three years in local custody. On appeal, Grant contended his grand theft conviction must be reduced to petty theft, and his burglary conviction had be reversed, because: (1) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the definition of fair market value; (2) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the distinction between burglary and misdemeanor shoplifting; and (3) substantial evidence did not support the finding that the value of the stolen merchandise exceeded $950. Even if the jury had been properly instructed, the Court of Appeal concluded its finding regarding the fair market value of the stolen merchandise was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reduced Grant’s grand theft conviction to petty theft, reversed his burglary conviction, and remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Grant" on Justia Law

Police responding to a report of O’Hearn acting erratically had previously dealt with him. They suspected O’Hearn had “mental health issues” but, after he threatened to kill his neighbors, they arrested O’Hearn for making criminal threats and violating conditions of probation. O’Hearn had four prior felony convictions. During the ensuing months, O’Hearn was represented by three attorneys and pled guilty.Then-counsel Selby failed to sign O’Hearn's Cruz/Vargas Waiver. The PSR noted that O’Hearn had bi-polar disorder and was not taking his medication at the time of the offense. Another attorney filed a motion to vacate the plea, arguing that it was the consequence of ineffective assistance. Counsel “barely met" with O'Hearn, failed to attend the sentencing hearing, lost the case file, never explained potential defenses, did not inquire about O'Hearn's extensive mental health history, and did not advise him of the consequences or alternatives. O’Hearn’s 800-page medical record showed hospitalizations for mental health problems and a history of schizophrenia. Selby had been repeatedly found to have failed to provide competent legal services. The victims, one of whom had a criminal history, had interacted with O’Hearn for many years. Conviction of making criminal threats requires specific intent, which can be negated by a mental disorder.The court of appeal reversed the denial of O’Hearn’s motion to vacate his plea. Selby never asserted any strategic reason for failing to learn whether his client’s mental state provided the basis for a possible mental defense and the deficient representation was prejudicial. View "People v. O'Hearn" on Justia Law

Defendant Patty Ann Lamoureux was convicted by jury for felony murder. The trial court vacated the conviction and resentenced her under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.). Lamoureux was released from custody for time served and, although she had excess custody credits, the trial court exercised its discretion to place her on parole supervision for the statutory maximum of three years. On appeal, Lamoureux contended the trial court erred in declining to apply her excess custody credits to offset her three-year parole supervision period. Additionally, she claimed: the court failed to articulate a rational method of computation when it imposed a $560 restitution fine; erred by not applying her excess custody credits to offset her restitution fine; and miscalculated her presentence custody credits. With respect to the offset, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in declining to reduce Lamoureux's parole supervision period by her excess custody credits. As to Lamoureux's remaining arguments, the Court of Appeal concluded she forfeited the challenge to restitution by failing to object at trial court. The issue of her entitlement to additional presentence custody credits was moot, but those excess custody credits had to be applied to offset the restitution fine in its entirety. View "California v. Lamoureux" on Justia Law

Defendant Todd Winkler killed his third wife (the victim) by stabbing her in the neck, severing her jugular vein. She had been having an extramarital affair and was planning to divorce defendant. Defendant did not deny killing her, but claimed he did so in self-defense. A jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree and found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 26 years to life. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the 1999 death of defendant’s second wife under Evidence Code section 1101(b). The Georgia authorities where the incident took place determined the death was accidental. Before allowing the jury to hear this evidence, the trial court had a gatekeeping duty under Evidence Code section 403 (a) to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish a homicidal act by a preponderance of the evidence. In doing so, the trial court relied on evidence related to the charged offense as proof of the earlier homicidal act. Furthermore, the Court concluded that any probative value the uncharged act evidence had was substantially outweighed by the Evidence Code section 352 concerns of undue consumption of time and undue prejudice. However, given the strength of the admissible evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded the error was harmless. As to his asserted error regarding evidence related to the victim’s fear of him, the Court concluded defendant forfeited several of these contentions. And contrary to defendant’s assertion, he was not denied the constitutionally effective assistance of counsel for his attorney’s failure to object to the evidence. The Court also rejected defendant’s cumulative error argument. And there was substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his conviction of murder in the first degree. The abstract of judgment had to be corrected to reflect that the indeterminate sentence imposed was 25 years to life, and delete reference to the term of life without the possibility of parole. View "California v. Winkler" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Court of Appeal's review related to the model jury instructions for driving under the influence (DUI) causing injury (Veh. Code, sec. 23153 (a)), and its lesser included offense of DUI (sec. 23152 (a)). Defendant-appellant Christopher Stockman contended the model instructions differed in a manner that affected his jury verdict. The instruction on the lesser offense of DUI, CALCRIM No. 2110, directed the jury that the “manner in which a person drives is not enough by itself to establish” that the person was “under the influence,” though it may be considered along with other factors. The instruction for DUI causing injury, CALCRIM No. 2100, contained no such direction. Stockman unsuccessfully sought a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2100 that would harmonize the two instructions. The Court of Appeal agreed with Stockman that there was no basis to provide differing instructions for determining whether a person was “under the influence” as to these two offenses. The Court published its opinion to encourage trial courts not to provide differing instructions for the two offenses, and it likewise encouraged the Judicial Council of California to consider reconciling the two instructions by amending either CALCRIM No. 2100 or CALCRIM No. 2110 to eliminate this disparity. To this case, however, the Court concluded that the “manner of driving” instruction implicated principles of law that had no bearing on this case. Thus, any error was harmless. Judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Stockman" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Cody Kruse of: making a criminal threat (count 1); attempting to deter or prevent an executive officer from lawful performance of his duties by means of violence or threat of violence (count 2); and possession of a controlled substance (count 3). The trial court sentenced Kruse to three years and eight months in state prison. Kruse contended on appeal the trial court prejudicially erred by: (1) allowing the prosecutor to question him on cross-examination about being investigated for killing his former girlfriend’s baby; and (2) refusing to instruct the jury on Penal Code section 148(a)(1) (willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing a public officer) as a lesser included offense of Penal Code section 69 (attempting to deter an executive officer from performing any duty by means of threat or violence). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed Kruse's convictions and sentence. View "California v. Kruse" on Justia Law