Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal held that Code of Civil Procedure section 351 impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, and thus the dormant Commerce Clause, when it is used to toll the statute of limitations against a judgment debtor who moved away from California to engage in commerce after the judgment was entered.The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to debtor on the ground that creditor's lawsuit is time-barred. In this case, creditor filed suit in 2018 to enforce a 1997 judgment against a judgment debtor who departed California in 1998 to start a new business in Nevada. In light of the general law governing the dormant Commerce Clause, and the specific application of that law to tolling statutes aimed at out-of-state defendants in Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 486 U.S. 888, the court explained that analyzing whether section 351 violates that clause is a three-step process: first, the court determined that debtor engaged in interstate commerce; second, section 351 does not discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or practical effect; and third, section 351 places burdens on interstate commerce that are clearly excessive in relation to its putative local benefits. The court rejected creditor's arguments to the contrary. View "Arrow Highway Steel, Inc. v. Dubin" on Justia Law

Defendant Reffiglia Lorraine Pack-Ramirez pled no contest to a felony count of identifying information theft with a prior. The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of 3 years in county jail. The court also ordered her to pay a $600 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4(b); a $619.86 victim restitution payment under section 1202.4(f); a $40 court operations assessment under section 1465.8; a $30 court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373; and a $109.50 fee for the cost of preparing the probation report under section 1203.1b. On appeal, defendant contended the Court of Appeal should conditionally reverse the judgment and remand for a hearing on her eligibility for primary caregiver diversion under newly enacted Penal Code section 1001.83. She also alleged the court violated her right to due process by imposing the above-mentioned amounts without first determining her ability to pay them. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment, but directed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment and sentencing minute order to reflect a $600 restitution fine under section 1202.4(b). View "California v. Pack-Ramirez" on Justia Law

In a previous appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed defendant Shaun Shaw’s convictions for burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and making a criminal threat, but remanded to allow the trial court to exercise its new authority pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013) to consider striking Shaw’s five-year enhancement for his serious prior felony conviction. At resentencing, the trial court again imposed the enhancement. Shaw challenged that decision and further arged that he was again entitled to resentencing, this time in light of Senate Bill No. 136 (Senate Bill 136) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590). After review, the Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the decision not to strike the five-year enhancement imposed under section 667(a)(1). Nevertheless, resentencing was necessary to permit the trial court to strike the prison priors pursuant to recently enacted Senate Bill 136. View "California v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Henry Jones appealed the denial of his petition to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95, the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) In 2000, Jones was convicted of attempted murder and first degree felony murder, and the jury also found true the robbery-murder special circumstance, which authorized a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for “a major participant” in a felony murder who acted with “reckless indifference to human life.” The trial court summarily denied Jones’s section 1170.95 petition on groundd that his special circumstance finding rendered him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. On appeal, Jones argued the trial court erred by denying his petition without the benefit of briefing from his counsel. He argued he could demonstrate a prima facie case for relief because his special circumstance finding no longer supported a felony-murder conviction after the California Supreme Court’s decisions in California v. Banks, 61 Cal.4th 788 (2015) and California v. Clark, 63 Cal.4th 522 (2016), which clarified the meaning of “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life.” California appellate courts have split over whether such a pre-Banks/Clark special circumstance finding rendered a petitioner ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the line of decisions in California v. Gomez, 52 Cal.App.5th 1 (2020) and California v. Galvan, 52 Cal.App.5th 1134 (2020), which held that a petitioner with a pre-Banks/Clark finding was ineligible for relief under section 1170.95 as a matter of law. The Court therefore affirmed. View "California v. Jones" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Barton was convicted by jury on five counts of forcible oral copulation, and one count of forcible sodomy. The jury reached its verdict only after the trial court discharged a holdout juror (Juror No. 12), after it found she was refusing to deliberate. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Barton to a prison term of 48 years. Barton appealed, contending, inter alia, the trial court abused its discretion by discharging Juror No. 12 on the basis that she was refusing to deliberate. Barton contended the other jurors’ testimony demonstrated only that Juror No. 12 disagreed with the other jurors, who found her to be unfriendly and unable to offer persuasive explanations for her opinion, not that she was unable or unwilling to deliberate. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: under the heightened standard of review that applies to a trial court’s decision to discharge a holdout juror for refusing to deliberate, the Court concluded the trial court’s decision to discharge Juror No. 12 was not manifestly supported by evidence. Accordingly, the Court did not address Barton’s other contentions on appeal, other than his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and reversed the judgment. View "California v. Barton" on Justia Law

Jeremy Tellez was charged with DUI offenses and sought pretrial mental health diversion. The issue presented for the Court of Appeal's review was which of the two statutes prevailed: Vehicle Code section 23640 or Penal Code section 1001.36. Like the trial court, the Court concluded that Vehicle Code section 23640 prevailed and barred pretrial mental health diversion for defendants charged with DUI offenses. the Court therefore denied Tellez’s petition for a writ of mandate. View "Tellez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Luke Wilson was convicted by jury on one count of oral copulation of a child 10 years or younger and and three counts of committing a lewd act upon a child. The court sentenced Wilson to an indeterminate prison term of 45 years to life. Wilson appealed, contending: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions under Penal Code section 288(a); (3) he was denied his due process right to notice of the nature of the charges against him; (4) the prosecution knowingly introduced false evidence at trial; (5) the prosecution failed to produce exculpatory evidence before trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (6) the trial court’s jury instructions and answers to jury questions were incomplete, misstated the law, and were unduly prejudicial; (7) prosecutorial misconduct and the court’s failure to address the misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial; (8) the mandatory sentence was cruel and/or unusual as applied to Wilson; and (9) cumulative error. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "California v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Von Staich is incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, based on 1986 second-degree murder and attempted murder convictions. In May 2020, he sought habeas corpus relief, citing the COVID-19 pandemic. Shortly thereafter, San Quentin suffered a COVID-19 outbreak that infected approximately 75 percent of the inmate population and dozens of prison staff in just weeks. Von Staich is 64 years old and suffers respiratory problems resulting from bullet fragments lodged in his lung; he claimed that he and a 65-year-old cellmate, both of whom had tested positive for COVID-19 (Van Staich was asymptomatic), were in an extremely small open cell and that there is no opportunity for social distancing.The court directed the Warden to transfer Von Staich to a suitable quarantine location, finding that the Warden and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) have acted with deliberate indifference. There is ongoing federal litigation concerning inadequate medical care due to severe overcrowding in the California correctional system and San Quentin has particular risk factors, caused by the age and architecture of the facility. The court acknowledged that the existing Eighth Amendment violation will continue until the population at San Quentin can be reduced to the 50 percent level. Unless CDCR’s existing expedited release programs are sufficient to promptly achieve this population reduction—which, the sheer numbers indicate they cannot be—CDCR will have to find additional means of releasing or transferring prisoners out of San Quentin. View "In re Von Staich" on Justia Law

Mario Marquez appealed a postjudgment order striking his petition for resentencing made pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). The trial court struck Marquez’s petition on the ground that Senate Bill No. 1437 violated article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution by amending Proposition 7 (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)) and Proposition 115 (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)). In 2007, a jury found Marquez guilty of first degree murder, second degree robbery, carjacking, willful evasion of a police officer with reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court sentenced Marquez to a term of 70 years 8 months to life in prison. A panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment (modified to strike the one-year sentence enhancement under Penal Code 667.5(b). Marquez argued that retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 1437 by means of the petitioning process of section 1170.95 conflicted with the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 (Marsy’s Law) and violated the separation of powers doctrine. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to consider the petition on the merits, and partially published its opinion because the issues of whether Senate Bill No. 1437 conflicted with Marsy’s Law and whether Senate Bill No. 1437 violated the separation of powers doctrine have not been addressed in a published opinion of this division. On those issues, the Court concluded Senate Bill No. 1437 neither conflicted with Marsy’s Law nor violated the separation of powers doctrine. In the nonpublished part of the opinion, the Court concluded Senate Bill No. 1437 did not unconstitutionally amend Proposition 7 or Proposition 115. View "California v. Marquez" on Justia Law

Defendant Troy Son was charged with murder with an enhancement for the personal use of a deadly weapon. A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, unanimously finding that the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated and committed by lying in wait. The jury found the weapon use allegation to be true. Defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of 26 years to life, comprised of 25 years to life for the murder, plus a consecutive one year for the enhancement. Defendant raises three issues on appeal. The first was that the trial court erred by permitting a detective to describe the events of a surveillance video that was subsequently watched by the jury. Defendant’s second and third arguments went to each of the first-degree murder theories. The jury made separate findings on two theories of first-degree murder: premeditation, and lying in wait. Defendant contended both were infected with error. To prevail on appeal, he had to prevail on both arguments: if either the premeditation or lying-in-wait finding was upheld, then any error in the other is necessarily harmless. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, in admitting the detective’s narration - it was admissible lay testimony based on her extensive review of the video. The Court found no misconduct as to how the prosecutor explained the concept of premeditation to the jury: "the example was harmless: the multiple-shots example is not entirely wrong, the prosecutor mentioned it only briefly, this was not a gun case, the issue of premeditation hinged on defendant’s mental health, and the court properly instructed the jury. Because we uphold the first-degree murder conviction on a theory of premeditation, we need not address lying in wait." Conviction was affirmed. View "California v. Son" on Justia Law