Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In California, a defendant, Gary Marcus Hall, convicted of two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years, challenged his sentence on several grounds. He argued that the court (and the parties) mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation, that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded, and that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the defendant's 10-year prison sentence, rejecting all his arguments. The court found that the defendant had waived his objections by failing to raise them at trial. It also held that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial was not violated by the trial court's reliance on a properly established aggravating factor—namely, the defendant's prior convictions. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw from a person involved in a car accident, where unconsciousness or unresponsiveness occurred in a hospital about 90 minutes after the incident. The defendant, Francisco Andres Alvarez, was involved in a fatal car accident and was transported to the hospital. He appeared unresponsive approximately 90 minutes after the accident. An officer, suspecting Alvarez was under the influence of alcohol, requested a blood draw without obtaining a warrant. The blood test revealed a 0.05 percent blood alcohol level with the presence of cocaine and THC.Alvarez moved to suppress the blood testing results, arguing that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and that no exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw. The trial court initially granted the motion, but later, following a U.S. Supreme Court decision (Mitchell v. Wisconsin), the court reconsidered and denied the motion, ruling that exigent circumstances permitted a blood test without a warrant.On appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District of the State of California reversed the judgment and remanded the case. The court concluded that no exigent circumstances, as defined in Mitchell v. Wisconsin or Schmerber v. California, allowed a warrantless blood draw in this case. The court found that the officer had ample time to obtain a warrant and no emergency medical interventions were required that would have justified the warrantless blood draw. Furthermore, the court found that the officer did not reasonably and in good faith rely on California's implied consent statute, which allows for a blood draw without a warrant if the driver is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusal. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Alvarez's motion to suppress the blood test results and allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. View "P. v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

In the case being reviewed, Alfredo Ramirez was found guilty of multiple counts of sexual offenses against minors and was sentenced to 107 years in prison. Ramirez appealed, arguing that the evidence obtained from his phone, which was unlocked using his fingerprint, was obtained unlawfully and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also argued that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning child sexual abuse victims’ responses, incorrectly instructed the jury, and imposed fines without determining his ability to pay.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, disagreed with Ramirez and affirmed the judgment. The court held that using Ramirez's fingerprint to unlock his phone did not constitute an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment or violate his Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination. The court also found no violation of Ramirez's due process rights. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury or in admitting the expert testimony. Finally, the court found that Ramirez had forfeited his right to challenge the imposed fines and fees due to his failure to object at sentencing. View "P. v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

In a criminal case in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, the defendant, Terrell Trammel, was convicted of multiple charges arising from his violent relationship with his former girlfriend, M.T. Trammel first appealed his aggregate 12-year prison term sentence, arguing that the trial court erroneously failed to stay the punishment for two convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The appellate court agreed and remanded the case for a full resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected its errors and resentenced Trammel to a total prison term of 12 years, four months.Trammel then filed a second appeal arguing that his new sentence violated the prohibition against double jeopardy in the California Constitution. The appellate court agreed with Trammel, finding that the addition of four months to his sentence upon resentencing violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the errors in his original sentence were not the result of "unauthorized leniency" that might have warranted a harsher sentence under the exception outlined in People v. Serrato. The court also found that the amended abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect Trammel's total custody credits at the time of resentencing.The court remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to modify the sentence and impose a total aggregate sentence of 11 years, four months, and to determine Trammel's actual total custody credits as of the time of his resentencing. The court also instructed the trial court to order the clerk of the superior court to prepare a second amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes. View "P. v. Trammel" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by Alexander Alberto Frias, who was convicted of stalking. Frias argued that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his four requests to substitute the Castaneda Law firm as his counsel. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Frias's first three requests as the firm's attorneys were not ready for trial and the case had been pending for three years, during which time four different attorneys had represented Frias at his request. However, the court ruled that the trial court's denial of Frias's fourth request was an abuse of discretion. At the time of the fourth request, an attorney from the Castaneda firm announced he was ready for trial, subject to a few witness scheduling issues. The appellate court noted that while the trial court was concerned the Castaneda firm’s attorneys would seek a further continuance or that Frias would yet again seek to substitute in new counsel, nothing in the record showed that the Castaneda firm was not prepared for trial. Therefore, the court’s concerns were not sufficient grounds on which to deny Frias’s request to have retained counsel of his choice. The court held that the denial of Frias’s constitutional right to counsel of his choice was structural error, and thus reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Frias" on Justia Law

The case concerns Gary Marcus Hall, who was convicted on two counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14 years. Hall was a registered sex offender and lived with the victims' grandfather. The trial court sentenced him to 10 years in prison, which included the upper term on one of the two counts. Hall challenged his sentence on three grounds. Firstly, he claimed the court mistakenly assumed he was presumptively ineligible for probation. Secondly, he argued that the aggravating factors found by the court were not pleaded. Lastly, he contended that the court erred in finding aggravating factors in the absence of his personal waiver in open court of his right to a jury trial on the facts supporting such factors. The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District held that Hall's sentence was not constitutionally or statutorily infirm due to failure to allege sentencing factors in aggravation. The court also ruled that Hall knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to jury trial, including as to aggravating facts, and his aggravated sentence is constitutionally permissible for that reason. The court further concluded that even if Hall did not sufficiently waive his constitutional jury trial right, the trial court found at least one aggravating factor—recidivism—on a basis consistent with the Sixth Amendment and therefore his aggravated sentence is not constitutionally infirm. Thus, the court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Hall" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Velasco, who was serving a sentence for attempted home invasion robbery, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon, was identified as eligible for resentencing pursuant to California Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess., codified at Penal Code section 1172.75). At a September 2022 resentencing hearing, Velasco’s attorney made an oral motion to strike Velasco’s one year prison prior enhancement, which had been imposed pursuant to section 667.5(b) and did not involve a sexually violent offense. Velasco was not present at the hearing and, although the minute order reflected his presence was waived, the record did not contain a written waiver. The trial court granted the request, struck the enhancement, and resentenced Velasco to a total term of 26 years and four months. Neither counsel nor the court addressed whether other new sentencing laws might impact Velasco’s sentence or whether postconviction factors should influence the new sentence. Velasco argued on appeal the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting a full resentencing hearing as was required by section 1172.75. He further contended the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by holding a resentencing hearing in his absence without a valid waiver. The State argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this resentencing hearing at all because Velasco’s case was already on appeal before the Court of Appeal in case No. D080603. However, should the appeals court determine that the trial court had jurisdiction, the State conceded remand was warranted because Velasco did not waive his presence at the resentencing hearing. The Court concluded the trial court had jurisdiction to resentence Velasco pursuant to section 1172.75 but reversed and remanded for a new hearing on the grounds that Velasco was not present at the sentencing hearing and did not validly waive his presence. View "California v. Velasco" on Justia Law

The trial court appointed the same attorney (counsel) to represent defendant Mark Foley and Raymond Gladden, who had been a codefendant in the underlying criminal trial, at a consolidated evidentiary hearing after both had filed separate petitions for resentencing. Both men were not the actual killer, but both had been convicted of murder on a felony-murder theory. At the hearing, to save the murder convictions, the prosecution was required to prove that defendant’s and Gladden’s individual participation in the underlying felony of kidnapping made them major participants in the kidnapping and that they acted with reckless indifference to human life. The prosecution argued those elements were satisfied for defendant and Gladden. Counsel then argued factors she considered favorable to defendant and also argued factors favorable to Gladden. But the same factors did not favor both, and counsel stated Gladden “certainly [had] the stronger petition.” The court granted Gladden’s petition only. The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of defendant’s petition because the court violated defendant’s constitutional right to conflict-free representation. The case was remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "California v. Foley" on Justia Law

The trial court here dismissed a violent felony charge filed against defendant-respondent Brian Turner for the third time, finding that the two prior dismissals did not result from any excusable neglect. The Riverside County District Attorney appealed. If a charge for a violent felony has been dismissed twice, Penal Code section 1387.1 authorized prosecutors to refile the charge for a third time so long as one of the dismissals was “due solely to excusable neglect . . . on the part of the court, prosecution, law enforcement agency, or witnesses,” and the prosecution did not act in bad faith. Because the first dismissal was due to the trial court’s excusable neglect, the Court of Appeal reversed. View "California v. Turner" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial in 2004 of first-degree murder and robbery arising from a shooting death and attempted murder and a second count of robbery based on two separate incidents on June 30, 2022. In January 2020, the superior court granted Defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 expressly finding Defendant had been a major participant in the robbery but not the actual shooter and impliedly finding he did not act with reckless indifference to human life during the robbery. The court vacated the murder conviction, resentenced Defendant on the remaining three convictions and ordered him released from custody based on time served. Defendant petitioned pursuant to section 851.8 for a finding of actual innocence, arguing as evidence of his innocence that the victim’s companion, the only eyewitness to the robbery-murder, had not identified Defendant as a participant in the crime and that the prosecutor had withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. The superior court denied the petition. On appeal, Defendant argued the order vacating his murder conviction under section 1172.6 necessarily entitled him to a finding of factual innocence.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s successful section 1172.6 petition did not entitle him to a finding of factual innocence. The court explained that an order granting Defendant’s petition for resentencing does not mean, without more, Defendant is factually innocent of the crime of murder. The court noted that the record must exonerate, not merely raise a substantial question as to guilt. View "P. v. Hollie" on Justia Law