Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, appellant Geraldo Bascomb and another man committed a home invasion robbery during which the second man shot and killed one of the residents. In 2005, a jury found Bascomb guilty of first degree felony murder and assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to a prison term of 27 years to life. In 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which, among other things, amended the definition of felony murder so that an accomplice to an underlying felony who was not the actual killer couldn't be convicted of felony murder unless they aided in the murder with the intent to kill or were “a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] section 190.2.” SB 1437 also added Penal Code section 1170.95, which established a procedure for vacating murder convictions predating the amendment that could not be sustained under the new definition of felony murder. Bascomb challenged the trial judge’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition to vacate his murder conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence he acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge’s finding was "amply supported" by the record and therefore affirmed the order denying his petition. View "California v. Bascomb" on Justia Law

While driving with his girlfriend "Jane Doe" and their infant child, Dagoberto Shoreque Villa, who was heavily intoxicated, began punching Doe and pulling out her hair in a fit of jealousy. When a police officer pulled them over after seeing him run a red light, he found Doe injured and bleeding and asked Villa to exit the vehicle. Villa identified himself using a false driver’s license and resisted taking a blood alcohol test. Later, Doe accused Villa of having previously beat her with a belt buckle and threatening to have her deported if she disclosed the abuse. Villa denied these last charges but said he didn’t remember the events on the night of the drunken driving. A jury convicted Villa of inflicting corporal injury, child endangerment, driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or more, falsely identifying himself to a police officer, giving false information to a police officer, and intimidating a victim. On appeal, he argued the trial judge abused her discretion by excluding evidence Doe had applied for a visa available only to victims of domestic violence who cooperate in prosecuting their abusers. Though the evidence was relevant, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial judge didn’t abuse her discretion by excluding it: "Doe gave a statement to police and testified against Villa at the preliminary hearing, when she didn’t know about the visa program, and her trial testimony was the same except for some unimportant details. That fact makes the probative value of the evidence minimal, easily outweighed by the potential for wasted time and jury confusion. Moreover, the physical evidence of the abuse was overwhelming, so any error was harmless." View "California v. Villa" on Justia Law

McDowell and Hutchison planned and executed a burglary and an attempted armed robbery of a drug dealer. Hutchison shot and killed the drug dealer. McDowell was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and found true robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. McDowell filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging the special circumstance findings. The California Supreme Court returned the case to the court of appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of its 2020 Scoggins opinion.The court of appeal again concluded that the special circumstance findings are adequately supported. Under the first-degree felony-murder rule, a defendant who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves special circumstances: either the defendant intended to kill or aided and abetted the commission of a specified felony “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant.” McDowell helped plan the robbery, knocked on the door, and entered first, brandishing a knife to facilitate Hutchison’s entrance. McDowell’s decision to arm himself should be viewed in combination with the particularly risky crime that he planned —a home invasion robbery of a methamphetamine dealer. The potential for violence was obvious. McDowell had an opportunity to restrain Hutchison, or otherwise intervene, either when he entered the house and realized they would be outnumbered or after Hutchison fired a warning shot. View "In re McDowell" on Justia Law

Alexander Valliant was charged with second degree robbery; criminal threats; carrying a dirk or dagger; carrying a loaded firearm in public; and driving on a suspended license, all arising out of a single incident in September 2014. He ultimately pled guilty to second degree robbery and admitted he personally used a firearm during the commission of that robbery. In exchange, the District Attorney agreed to dismiss the four remaining charges. He was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to a prison term of 12 years. Valliant petitioned to recall his sentence and be resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.91 (b), which authorized such relief for military veterans who suffered from military-related trauma and substance abuse, and who did not have those factors considered as mitigating factors when they were originally sentenced. The court denied his petition on the basis that section 1170.91 (b)(1)(B) authorized resentencing relief only for persons who were sentenced before January 1, 2015. On its face, this provision did not apply to Valliant who was sentenced in March 2015. Valliant, along with amicus curiae from the Orange County Public Defender’s Office (amicus), argued the trial court erred in its interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), contending that when properly understood, the subdivision extended resentencing relief to all veterans whose military-related trauma was not considered at their initial sentencing, without regard to when that sentencing took place. Valliant suggested this broad construction was the only reasonable interpretation of subdivision (b)(1)(B), while amicus claims the language was “poorly drafted” and ambiguous, and urged the Court of Appeal to resolve the purported ambiguity by examining the statute’s purpose and legislative history. The Court declined such requests and affirmed the trial court: "There is no ambiguity. In the face of such an unequivocal statutory limitation, we have no authority to rewrite the statute even if we sympathize with the contention." View "California v. Valliant" on Justia Law

Defendant David Zorich appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18. He was originally convicted (as relevant here) for grand theft of an automobile, and unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle. Defendant argued the trial court lacked substantial evidence to deny his petition because he submitted admissible evidence about the value of the vehicle in question and the prosecution submitted nothing other than an assertion that the vehicle was worth more than $1000. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, finding substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Zorich" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Michael Barber of reckless driving. The jury also found true that Barber personally inflicted great bodily injury and proximately caused a loss of consciousness of another. The court placed Barber on formal probation for three years. Barber appealed, contending: (1) the trial court prejudicially erred when it refused to give a special jury instruction he proposed; (2) the great bodily injury enhancement finding had to be stricken because it was an element of reckless driving; and, in the alternative, (3) the matter should have been remanded with instructions to the trial court to determine whether to strike the great bodily injury finding in furtherance of justice. Additionally, while this matter was pending, the Court of Appeal granted Barber’s motion to file a supplemental opening brief. In that brief, he argued CALCRIM No. 2200 incorrectly defined one of the elements of reckless driving. Finding no merit to any of Barber's claims, the Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and probation. View "California v. Barber" on Justia Law

Stewart was convicted of forcible rape, digital penetration and misdemeanor battery on his cousin, Doe 1, when she was 15 and he was 19 years old. He was sentenced to 13 years in state prison. Stewart argued the prosecution violated its “Brady” obligations by withholding a police report containing impeachment evidence concerning a key prosecution witness, Doe 2. After his trial ended, he received the impeachment evidence, a Child Protective Services report documenting Doe 2’s allegation of sexual abuse by a party other than Stewart, rather than the police report, from the juvenile court in response to filing a Welfare and Institutions Code section 827 petition.The court of appeal reversed the conviction. While the prosecutor was not required to turn over the police report nor was the trial court required to review the report (or other juvenile records) in camera, the prosecutor’s disclosure of notes reflecting the existence of a police report did not satisfy its Brady obligation simply because Stewart could have sought the report from the juvenile court. The prosecutor could have satisfied its obligation by informing the defense that the police report contained Brady material but its disclosure did not indicate that was the case. View "People v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 1993, Butler was convicted of raping two women and assault with intent to commit rape of a juvenile and sentenced to 18 years in prison. In 2006, before his release, the District Attorney filed a petition to commit Butler under the Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600. Despite Butler's numerous demands for a trial and explicit direction to the Public Defender’s office that it was not authorized to waive time, no trial was held. Butler was confined to a state hospital for 13 years awaiting trial on his SVP petition; more than 50 continuances were granted without objection or a finding of good cause.In 2019, Butler’s appointed private counsel filed a habeas corpus petition. The court found that Butler’s due process right to a timely trial had been violated and that the public defender, district attorney, and trial court all bore some responsibility for this “extraordinary” delay. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the district attorney’s argument that she had no affirmative obligation to bring a person to trial on an SVP petition. Because involuntary civil confinement involves a substantial deprivation of liberty, an alleged SVP defendant is entitled to a trial at a meaningful time. The ultimate responsibility for bringing an accused SVP detainee to trial rests with the state. Here, the blame for the delay is shared between the district attorney’s office, the public defender’s office, and the court. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

The city council for respondent City of Sacramento adopted a resolution in 2007 approving the destruction of records as allowed under Government Code section 34090, and authorizing its city clerk to adopt a new records retention policy. Acting pursuant to this resolution, Sacramento’s city clerk adopted in 2010 a new records retention schedule allowing the destruction of all correspondence, including e-mails, older than two years old, subject to certain exceptions. But because Sacramento lacked the technological ability to automatically delete older e-mails at the time, it delayed implementing this policy for several years. In 2014, Sacramento finally attained the technological ability to automatically delete older e-mails under its 2010 policy. Before moving forward to delete these e-mails, the City informed various media and citizen groups around December of 2014 that it would begin automatically deleting e-mails under its 2010 policy on July 1, 2015. In late June of 2015, less than a week before Sacramento planned to begin deleting its older e-mails, appellants each submitted requests to the City for records set for destruction pursuant to the Public Records Act ("PRA"). At the time, Sacramento was retaining about 81 million e-mail records; appellant Stevenson’s request targeted about 53 million of these records, and appellant Grimes’s request concerned about 64 million. Sacramento staff estimated it would take well over 20,000 hours to comply with appellants’ requests. Though appellants agreed to narrow the scope of their requests, they still sued Sacramento for “refus[ing] to provide Petitioner’s [sic] access to the records they request” in violation of the PRA and the California Constitution. A trial court enjoined the City from destroying 15 million potentially responsive e-mails. Over appellants’ objection, the court conditioned the grant of the injunction on appellants posting an undertaking per Code of Civil Procedure section 529, initially set at $80,000, later lowered to $2,349.50, following supplemental briefing in which Sacramento said it in fact anticipated expending as little as $2,349.50 to comply with the injunction. Appellants contended the section 529 undertaking requirement conflicted with the PRA's requirements, and requiring a party to post an undertaking before obtaining an injunction was an unlawful prior restraint under the First Amendment. Finding neither contention availing, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's condition of an undertaking. View "Stevenson v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (department) filed a petition seeking to remove an 18-month old girl based on mother’s substance abuse and mental health issues and noncustodial father’s failure to provide for her. However, after the child was detained, father came forward and said he had been trying to reunify with her since mother took the child when she was about four months old. He also said he had established his paternity through a genetic test and had been paying child support to mother throughout their separation. Father said he couldn’t yet take custody of the child because his housing, transportation, and employment weren’t stable, but he indicated he had obtained work and was attempting to find suitable housing. He also indicated he would return to Chicago, his home city, and live with relatives who were willing to help him raise her once he obtained custody. The department amended the petition to remove the allegations against father before the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, nonetheless maintained the child should be removed from both parents, and asked the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that placing the child with her parents would pose a substantial danger to her health, safety or well-being. Rights to the child were ultimately terminated, but the father appealed, averring his situation had changed: he obtained full-time employment with benefits and a permanent place to live. The court denied his motion, concluding he had shown his circumstances were changing, but had not changed. Before the Court of Appeal, father argued the entire procedure violated his due process rights and there wasn’t adequate support for the trial court’s finding that giving him custody would be detrimental to the child. The Court held a juvenile court could not terminate parental rights based on problems arising from the parent’s poverty, "a problem made worse, from a due process standpoint, when the department didn’t formally allege those problems as a basis for removal." Absent those impermissible grounds for removal the Court found there wasn’t clear and convincing evidence that returning the child to father would be detrimental to her. Termination of father’s rights was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law