Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant Alfredo Martinez and two codefendants were charged in connection with a “drug rip.” A jury found defendant guilty of robbery in the second degree, active participation in a criminal street gang, criminal conspiracy, being an active participant in a criminal street gang having a concealed firearm, and recruiting a minor into a criminal street gang. The jury found true several firearm enhancements and an on-bail enhancement, and the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 16 years eight months in prison. On appeal, defendant contended: (1) the Penal Code section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement on count two must be stricken because it is impermissibly inconsistent with the jury’s failure to reach a finding on the section 186.22(b)(1), gang enhancement allegation attached to count two; (2) the sentence imposed and stayed on the section 12022(a), enhancement attached to count two had to be stricken because the jury did not make a true finding as to that enhancement allegation; (3) the verdict on count eight, recruiting a minor for participation in a criminal street gang, was not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) following the passage of Senate Bill No. 620, the matter should have been remanded to afford the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement. The Attorney General conceded the trial court improperly imposed and stayed sentence on the section 12022(a) enhancement attached to count two. The Attorney General also agreed that the matter should have been remanded to afford the trial court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to strike the section 12022.53(e) firearm enhancement attached to count two. The Court of Appeal agreed with these concessions, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "California v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant James Oliver challenged his convictions for human trafficking Jane Doe (count 1) and D.A. (count 4), and his sentence. On appeal, he contended: (1) his conviction on count 4 for human trafficking an adult in violation of Penal Code section 236.1 (b) should have been reversed there was no substantial evidence D.A. did not consent; (2) his conviction on count 4 had to be reversed because the trial court erred by not instructing the jury sua sponte on the element that D.A. did not consent to her restraint or confinement; (3) his conviction on count 1 for human trafficking a minor in violation of section 236.1 (c) had to be reversed because the trial court erred by permitting the State to admit hearsay evidence of Jane Doe’s age at the time of the alleged offense; and (4) during sentencing, the trial court erred by not considering his present ability to pay various fines and fees, as mandated by California v. Duenas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (2019), so those fines and fees should have been stricken and the matter remanded for a hearing on his ability to pay. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the lack of the victim’s consent was not an element or an affirmative defense of the offense of human trafficking an adult in violation of section 236.1(b); the record contained substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant trafficked D.A.; and defendant forfeited his claim of Duenas error with respect to the maximum restitution fine imposed at sentencing, and his claims of reversible error about other fines and fees lacked merit. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court accurately instructed the jury on human trafficking as alleged in count 4; defendant forfeited his claim of evidentiary error on count 1 by not timely and specifically interposing a hearsay objection below; and his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to so object. View "California v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Defendant Yor Xiong shot the victim multiple times and then led police on a high-speed car chase on surface streets from south to north Stockton ending across the street from his house. A jury found defendant guilty of: first degree murder (count 1); possession of a firearm by a felon (count 2); and evading an officer with wanton disregard (felony evading) (count 3). The jury also found true an enhancement allegation in connection with count 1 that defendant personally discharged a firearm causing the victim’s death. The jury deadlocked on gang enhancement allegations on counts 1 and 2, and thereafter, the trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to strike those allegations. Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life plus two years eight months. Defendant raised a host of alleged errors at trial. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in precluding defendant’s testimony regarding his understanding about what happened to people who denied allegations made by police in the Thai refugee camps where he was born and stayed as a boy. "His cultural experience was relevant to his state of mind in interacting with the detectives who interrogated him and tended to prove why he would have given a false confession." However, given the other evidence defendant was allowed to introduce concerning his confession, the Court concluded defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to present a defense by the preclusion of this testimony. Furthermore, the Court determined the erroneous preclusion of this testimony was harmless. In addition, the Court concluded the trial court erred in instructing the jury: the trial court included a sentence from CALCRIM No. 358. Defendant did not want the instruction, even though evidence of oral unrecorded inculpatory statements was admitted. "The trial court had no sua sponte obligation to give the instruction. It is up to a defendant to request the instruction and a defendant is entitled to reject it. However, under the circumstances here, we conclude the error was harmless." In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court modified judgment by striking the two one-year prior prison term enhancements imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b). The matter was remanded for resentencing. As for defendant's other contentions raised on appeal, the Court concluded they were forfeited, meritless and/or nonprejudicial. Judgment was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Xiong" on Justia Law

In 2016, Proposition 57 amended the California Constitution to allow early parole consideration for persons “convicted of a nonviolent felony.” The regulations the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) adopted pursuant to Proposition's authority excluded from early parole consideration any person convicted of an offense requiring the person to register as a sex offender. Ural King was serving 25 years to life for 2000 conviction of possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. The CDCR denied King early parole consideration under Proposition 57 on the ground that he was required to register as a sex offender because of prior offenses. King petitioned for habeas relief, claiming that the CDCR’s regulation improperly excluded from the benefits of Proposition 57 inmates like him who were serving sentences for nonviolent offenses but were required to register as sex offenders because of prior offenses. The Court of Appeal concluded the plain language of section Cal. Const., art. I, section 32(a)(1) required early parole consideration to be based solely on the present offense of conviction. The Court therefore concluded the CDCR regulation excluding from early parole consideration prisoners who were required to register as sex offenders because of prior convictions was invalid. Consequently, King’s petition for writ of habeas corpus was granted. View "In re King" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss a petition to have him civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), because he was deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial.Applying the four factors in the Barker analysis, the court held that neither the length of the delay, the assertion of the right, the reasons for the delay, or prejudice is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, the court held that they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In this case, the trial court engaged in that balancing process and concluded that the state had failed defendant. Whether the court reviewed this determination under the abuse of discretion standard or, as the People assert, under a de novo standard, the court found no error based on the analysis. The court also held that, under the Mathews analysis, defendant's right to be free from government restraint without due process of law has been violated. The court rejected the People's cursory contention that the case should be ordered to trial and held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. View "People v. DeCasas" on Justia Law

In October 2019, Christopher Frezier was found not guilty by reason of insanity of a felony offense. The trial court committed him to a state hospital pursuant to Penal Code section 1026. At the time of the commitment, the trial court calculated Frezier’s maximum term of commitment as three years with credits for 829 days, consisting of credits for both the actual time served in custody prior to his commitment and conduct credits pursuant to section 4019 for the time spent in county jail. Despite his commitment to a state hospital to receive treatment, Frezier was never transported to a hospital and instead, was left in the county jail for unknown reasons. After spending almost one year in jail after his commitment, Frezier filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was entitled to immediate release because he had served his maximum term of commitment, after accounting for his precommitment custody and conduct credits combined with the additional time served in the county jail postcommitment. The trial court agreed and granted relief, ordering that Frezier be released. The District Attorney sought extraordinary relief and an immediate stay to prevent Frezier’s release by petitioning for a writ of mandate. The District Attorney argued Frezier was not entitled to section 4019 conduct credits under the relevant statutes. The Court of Appeal concluded that under the plain language of the relevant statutes, Frezier served more than his maximum term of commitment and the District Attorney failed to demonstrate any error warranting extraordinary relief. The Court, therefore, denied the District Attorney’s writ petition. View "California v. Superior Court (Frezier)" on Justia Law

In 1996, a jury found defendant Vincent Lombardo guilty of second degree murder. In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under newly enacted Penal Code section 1170.95, which was enacted as part of Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015). The superior court denied the petition because, in its view, Senate Bill 1437 impermissibly amended Proposition 7 (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978) text of Prop. 7) and Proposition 115 (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) text of Prop. 115). The Court of Appeal disagreed with the superior court and agreed with the unanimous conclusion of other appellate courts that have addressed the issue: Senate Bill 1437 was not an invalid amendment of either Propositions 7 or 115. Though the superior court did not clearly rule on the issue, the parties also asked the Court of Appeal to determine whether Senate Bill 1437 violated Marsy’s Law (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of Prop. 9). To this, the Court concluded it did not, thereby agreeing with the unanimous conclusion of other appellate courts on this issue too. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Lombardo" on Justia Law

The underlying Government Code section 12974 civil action was initiated by DFEH in December 2017 by a petition seeking provisional relief to temporarily enjoin Tastries from refusing to sell wedding cakes to same-sex couples. The trial court denied DFEH's requests for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.The Court of Appeal granted DFEH's petition for writ of mandate, holding that the trial court's interpretation of a section 12974 civil action as the equivalent of a section 12965 action was incorrect, and its order on the preliminary injunction requested under section 12974 was not a merits-based determination of the merits of the DFEH's Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA) claim to be presented in a civil action under section 12965. Furthermore, regardless of the procedural context of the preliminary injunction request, the court held that the trial court's decision on it could not constitute a merits-based adjudication of the UCRA claim: the trial court's order related to an issue of law that was decided with reference to extrinsic factual evidence that had not been fully investigated at the administrative level or fully pleaded in a claim for permanent relief. The court finally held that the trial court's incorrect construction of its preliminary injunction order as a final, merits-based determination of the DFEH's UCRA claim in its order on the motion to enforce the judgment led the trial court to circumscribe DFEH's statutory duties in a manner that violated the separation of powers doctrine. View "Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court of Kern County" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea bargain, minor K.W. admitted one count of robbery; counts alleging kidnapping, brandishing, and vandalism were dismissed. After he completed probation, he moved to seal the record under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786. He was not eligible for sealing, because robbery was one of the crimes listed in section 707(b). The trial court reduced the adjudication to the lesser included offense of grand theft, which was not a section 707(b) offense. The court then granted the motion to seal. The State appealed, contending: (1) the juvenile court lacked the authority to reduce the adjudication; and (2) reducing the adjudication violated the plea bargain. The Court of Appeal determined the statutes the juvenile court cited did not give it authority to reduce the conviction. Further, the Court held Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, which would allow the juvenile court to “set aside the findings and dismiss the petition” in the interest of justice, did not authorize the juvenile court to reduce an adjudication, at least when doing so would violate a plea bargain, as it would have here. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "In re K.W." on Justia Law

Defendant Hashmatullah Zaheer was tried twice for sexual battery by restraint. He denied any wrongdoing. The case hinged entirely on the credibility of the victim, Martha M. In the first trial, Zaheer was nearly acquitted of the two felonies with which he was charged, with the jury voting 11‒1 in his favor on both counts. In the second trial, however, he was convicted of both felonies. A key aspect of the defense attack on Martha’s credibility involved the condition of the electronic door lock system in Zaheer’s car. In both trials, Martha testified in some detail about how Zaheer locked her inside the car by pressing a button on the driver’s side door. The defense countered that with evidence that the electronic locking mechanism in Zaheer’s car had not worked in years. In the second trial, however, defense counsel simply failed to establish the necessary predicate fact that Martha was in Zaheer’s Honda on the night in question. And despite having knowledge to the contrary, the prosecutor seized on this oversight to suggest for the first time during her closing argument that Zaheer might have been driving a company car. In a case that hinged entirely on whether the jury believed Martha, and with a jury in the first trial that largely did not, the Court of Appeal felt compelled to conclude that defense counsel’s error, compounded by the prosecutor’s comment, was prejudicial. Judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "California v. Zaheer" on Justia Law