Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, a trial court summarily denied defendant Alberto Flores' postjudgment petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95. Appointed counsel found no arguable issues to raise on appeal, filing a "Wende brief" asserting the Court of Appeal had to independently review the record. Defendant did not file a brief on his own behalf. The Court determined this case was not not defendant’s first appeal as a matter of right; therefore, the Court was not required to independently review the record. However, the Court found no legal authority that prohibited it from conducting such an independent review in the interests of justice. Reviewing the entire record on appeal, the Court found no arguable issues. Thus, it affirmed the order denying defendant’s section 1170.95 petition. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

Herman regularly attends Los Angeles and Pasadena city meetings and has been removed more than 100 times. Herman At a public hearing on April 17, 2019, Herman said, “Fuck" Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney Fauble and gave Fauble’s address. At an April 29 meeting, Herman, in a threatening manner, again disclosed Fauble’s Pasadena address. Herman also submitted speaker cards; one had a swastika drawn on it, another had a drawing of a Ku Klux Klan hood with figures that were either an “SS” or lightning bolts above Fauble’s name. On May 1, Herman attended another meeting and stated, “I’m going back to Pasadena and fuck with you.”The city sought a workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure 527.8, precluding Herman from harassing, threatening, contacting, or stalking Fauble or disclosing his address, and requiring Herman to stay at least 10 yards away from Fauble while attending meetings. At a hearing, Herman explained that he made the statements because he was upset about a change in the council rules and with his own homelessness. He denied intending to threaten Fauble. The court of appeal affirmed the entry of a restraining order, rejecting a First Amendment challenge. There was substantial evidence that Herman’s threatening conduct was reasonably likely to recur and that Herman’s statements would have placed a reasonable person in fear for his safety, regardless of Herman’s subjective intent. The credible threats of violence were not constitutionally protected. View "City of Los Angeles v. Herman" on Justia Law

Mark Hartland was convicted by jury of one count each of kidnapping, assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and domestic violence resulting in a traumatic condition. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found a prior conviction allegation true as both a prior strike, ad a prior serious felony. Hartland received a 21 year sentence in state prison. Relying on California v. Oliver, 55 Cal.2d 761 (1961) and In re Michele D.,29 Cal.4th 600 (2002), Hartland argued the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury that if the kidnapping victim was so intoxicated as to lack the capacity to consent, then Hartland could not be found guilty of kidnapping unless he acted with illegal purpose or illegal intent. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal rejected Hartland’s argument because the Court declined to extend the doctrine of Oliver and Michele D. to the kidnapping of an intoxicated, resisting, adult victim. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court addressed issues concerning sentencing and custody credits. The matter was remanded for the trial court to exercise its newly gained discretion to dismiss or strike the prior serious felony conviction. Furthermore, the Court ordered the correction of clerical errors in the abstract of judgment and the sentencing minute order. Otherwise, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Hartland" on Justia Law

Defendant Stephen Belche admitted violating probation in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of three years on the original conviction. The trial court approved the admission agreement, formally revoked defendant’s probation, and ordered that probation would not be reinstated. While defendant was awaiting sentencing on the original conviction, he exposed himself to a jail nurse. The probation department filed a new petition to revoke probation based on the indecent exposure. The trial court found the new allegation true, again revoked defendant’s probation, and sentenced him to six years in state prison. On appeal of that sentence, defendant argued: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find he violated probation based on his indecent exposure after the trial court formally revoked his probation and ordered that it not be reinstated; and (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him to six years in state prison because he only agreed to a sentence of three years when he admitted the probation violation. After review, the Court of Appeal determined: (1) the trial court did not have jurisdiction to find defendant violated probation based on his indecent exposure because defendant’s probation had been formally revoked and not reinstated, terminating probation; and (2) the Court had to vacate the six-year prison term and remand for the trial court either to impose a three-year term or allow defendant to withdraw his admission made under the agreement. View "California v. Belche" on Justia Law

Cornejo died of a methamphetamine overdose at Highland Hospital after being arrested by California Highway Patrol officers during a traffic stop and observed to put in his mouth and swallow something that he insisted was gum, not drugs. Cornejo declined repeated offers of medical attention and no symptoms of drug intoxication were observed until after he was transferred to the custody of deputies at the jail.A jury ruled in favor of Cornejo’s parents in a suit for wrongful death predicated on the negligence of the officers who took Cornejo to jail rather than to the hospital, under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 52.1). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the defendants’ arguments that the officers had no duty to obtain a medical examination for Cornejo under the circumstances; that they fulfilled the scope of any duty they may have had by taking him to jail with on-site medical staff; that their failure to take him to the hospital was not a proximate cause of his death; and that the trial court erred in ruling the jury could not consider Cornejo’s intentional act of swallowing the methamphetamine in allocating comparative fault and in denying defendants’ motion to exclude evidence that the officers attempted to coerce an admission to possession of a controlled substance by conditioning medical treatment on Cornejo’s admitting he swallowed a controlled substance. View "Frausto v. Department of the California Highway Patrol" on Justia Law

After the Department discharged plaintiff based on her failure to report another deputy's use of force against an inmate and her failure to seek medical assistance for the inmate, the Commission affirmed the discharge. However, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate and directed the Commission to set aside plaintiff's discharge, award her back pay, and reconsider a lesser penalty.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in upholding plaintiff's discharge. In this case, plaintiff committed a more egregious violation of Department policy that went beyond a failure to report the use of force or to seek medical attention by perpetuating a code of silence among deputies in the jail, which encouraged other deputies to ignore their responsibilities and brought embarrassment to the Department. Therefore, plaintiff's conduct also violated the general behavior policy, which requires a deputy "not act or behave privately or officially in such a manner as to bring discredit upon himself or the Department." Given the Department's reasoned explanation that discharge was necessary in light of plaintiff's furtherance of the code of silence and the resulting embarrassment and loss of trust in the Department, the court held that this is not the exceptional case where reasonable minds cannot differ on the appropriate penalty. View "Pasos v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Tyrone McGee appealed after entering a no contest plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of the car he was driving and a female passenger’s purse. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal concluded the presence of an unsealed bag of marijuana plainly visible on the passenger’s person constituted probable cause to search the passenger’s purse. Since the purse contained a gun which defendant pled to possessing, the Court affirmed. View "California v. McGee" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Andras Peter Schaffer was convicted and sentenced to three years in state prison in 2015 for failing to register as a sex offender. He was released on parole in 2016 on the condition he wear a GPS monitoring device and charge it, at least twice daily. He appealed a July 2019 superior court order, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated his parole by failing to keep his GPS monitoring device charged and ordering him to serve 180 days in county jail. Relying on the plurality opinion in United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019), defendant claimed he had a Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether he violated his parole based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the court violated that right by denying his request to allow a jury to determine whether he violated his parole. The Court of Appeal determined defendant did not have a right to have a jury determine whether he violated his parole, and the reasoning of the Haymond plurality did not apply to defendant’s case. View "California v. Schaffer" on Justia Law

According to the complaint, “Plaintiff/Petitioner the People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement . . . is an association of residents of Orange County that includes at least one member who pays property taxes to Orange County.” People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors and Law Enforcement was a watchdog group seeking to ensure Orange County law enforcement agencies complied with their constitutional and statutory duties. The other plaintiffs were three individuals who were Orange County residents, and who had various interests in ensuring the integrity of the criminal justice system. The defendants were Todd Spitzer and Don Barnes who were the elected District Attorney and Sheriff, respectively. The gist of the complaint was that defendants operated an illegal and clandestine confidential informant (CI) program. The basic structure of the alleged CI program was that the Sheriff recruited confidential informants from among the prison population, moved those informants near a criminal defendant to facilitate a surreptitious interrogation, notwithstanding that the defendant was represented by counsel, which rendered the interrogations illegal under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The Sheriff allegedly kept extensive logs of these interactions, but kept those logs secret, even from the courts. The District Attorney used information from these interrogations, despite knowing their illegality, and did not disclose information about the CI program to defendants, in violation of their discovery duties. This appeal stemmed from a dismissal following a sustained demurrer in plaintiffs’ taxpayer suit against the Orange County officials. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue taxpayer claims for waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, nor a petition for a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the point of taxpayer standing, as well as the related doctrine of public interest standing in mandamus proceedings, was to confer standing on the public at large to hold the government accountable to fulfill its obligations to the public. "The fundamental rights at stake fit comfortably within the doctrines of taxpayer and public interest standing." View "People for the Ethical Operation of Prosecutors etc. v. Spitzer" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant, David Lippert, filed a petition under Penal Code section 1170.95 to vacate his 2003 murder conviction. The parties stipulated that defendant made a prima facie showing that he “fall[s] within the parameters for resentencing” under the statute. Plaintiff-respondent, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office (the State), however, moved to strike the petition on the ground that Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional because it: (1) impermissibly amended Proposition 7; (2) impermissibly amended Proposition 115; (3) violated separation of powers principles; and (4) violated Victims’ Bill of Rights of 2008 (Marsy’s Law). The trial court agreed Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutionally amended Propositions 7 and 115, and struck defendant’s petition without addressing the State's remaining arguments. The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in concluding Senate Bill No. 1437 was unconstitutional, and reversed. View "California v. Lippert" on Justia Law