Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Blanca Luna Mendoza was convicted by jury of transporting for sale more than four kilograms of cocaine based on evidence a U.S. Customs and Border Protection agent acquired after a stop on Interstate 15 in California. Mendoza sought to exclude the evidence, arguing the agent did not have reasonable suspicion she was engaged in criminal activity when he stopped her. The agent said he decided to stop Mendoza because she was driving in a known smuggling corridor in a vehicle which had crossed the United States-Mexico border in the prior week; she slowed and changed lanes after he pulled alongside her in an unmarked car, rolled down his window, and stared at her; she drove at approximately 50 miles per hour to stay behind him; and she then refused to look at him when she ultimately passed him a few minutes later. The trial court held, with reservations, that the stop was justified, and a jury later convicted her of transporting narcotics for sale. Mendoza appealed. The Court of Appeal concluded the agent based his decision to stop Mendoza on insufficient evidence she was engaged in criminal activity. "At bottom, the agent acted on a hunch, which is improper, even though - in this case - it proved correct." View "California v. Mendoza" on Justia Law

Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, changed the procedures governing petitions for writs of habeas corpus in capital cases. It ended the practice of capital defendants initiating habeas proceedings in the Supreme Court, in favor of having the “court which imposed the sentence” decide the petitions in the first instance. (Pen. Code 1509(a).) Proposition 66 authorized the Supreme Court to transfer pending petitions to the sentencing court. After the passage of Proposition 66, the Supreme Court transferred Salcido’s pending petition to San Mateo County, where Salcido was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The state sought transfer of the petition to Sonoma County, which is where Salcido was initially charged before the case was transferred due to pretrial publicity. The trial court granted the transfer. The court of appeal granted Salcido mandamus relief; his habeas petition must remain in San Mateo County. The Supreme Court, by transferring Salcido’s petition to San Mateo County pursuant to Proposition 66, has already determined that San Mateo County is the “court which imposed the sentence” and must decide the petition. No lower court may second-guess that decision. There is no statutory basis supporting the position that San Mateo County, as the sentencing court, may transfer the petition to another county. View "Salcido v. Superior Court of San Mateo County" on Justia Law

At issue before the Court of Appeal was whether an otherwise qualified person convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as opposed to murder, could invoke the resentencing provision of Senate Bill 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.). Defendant Fallon Lupe Flores was charged with murder, but pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Years later, she filed a petition to have her conviction vacated and to be resentenced under the resentencing provision of Senate Bill No. 1437. The trial court denied Flores's petition on grounds that the resentencing provision was available only to qualifying persons who were convicted of murder - not persons who were convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court, and therefore affirmed denial of Flores' petition. View "California v. Flores" on Justia Law

After defendant's dog killed plaintiff's cat, the parties settled for $2,000 and a written agreement with a non-disparagement clause. However, defendant then posted a hostile message on a neighborhood blog about plaintiff, who responded by suing defendant and his wife for breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant and his wife filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion and held that there was no public interest in defendant's internet post about plaintiff. In this case, neither party was in the public eye; none of their acts directly affected a large number of people beyond the three households; and there was no issue of public interest when the speaker's words were merely an effort to gather ammunition for another round in the speaker's neighborhood wrangle. View "Jeppson v. Ley" on Justia Law

Adams pleaded no contest to inflicting corporal injury and was placed on formal probation. Defense counsel argued Adams did not have the ability to pay fines or fees; he was homeless and did not have a job. The court did not impose a $330 restitution fund fine or a probation revocation fine but imposed $40 court operations and $30 court facilities funding assessments, a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee, and a $25-per-month probation fee. Later, Adams pleaded no contest in another case for failing to register as a sex offender. Adams again received formal probation. The court imposed a $300 restitution fine plus $30 for administrative costs (Pen. Code 1202.4(b)(1), (l)); imposed but suspended a $300 probation revocation fine (Pen. Code 1202.44); imposed $40 court operations (Pen. Code 1465.8) and $30 court facilities funding assessments (Gov. Code 70373) but did not impose the criminal justice administration fee based on inability to pay.Later, the court revoked probation in both cases and sentenced Adams to prison. The previously-suspended probation revocation fine was ordered to be paid; two $300 parole revocation fines were imposed but suspended. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the trial court violated Adams’s federal due process rights by imposing fines and fees without assessing his ability to pay. The court reasoned that the 2019 decision, People v. Dueñas, was wrongly decided and factually distinguishable. View "People v. Adams" on Justia Law

Kerbs was found not guilty by reason of insanity of assault with a deadly weapon and was committed to the state hospital system for a maximum of four years. Other than two limited periods of conditional release, his commitment was extended over 20 years. The state sought to again extend the commitment. Dr. Mancusi testified as an expert in violence risk assessment, psychodiagnostic assessment, and psychological treatment. She had been Kerbs’s unit psychologist for about four and one-half years. She testified that Kerbs, then 61 years old, suffered from schizophrenia, and that “lacking engagement in treatment and lacking insight into his mental disorder,” Kerbs did “continue to pose a significant risk for violence without sufficient support and supervision.” Kerbs had made statements that concerned her and had expressed an intention to continue his medication. Mancusi believed that his risk in the community without supervision was in the high range. On cross-examination, Mancusi acknowledged that she had never seen Kerbs “place his hands on anyone,” but she had “witnessed him act in an intimidating manner.” The court extended his civil commitment under Penal Code section 1026.51 for two years.The court of appeal reversed. The expert testimony did not show either that Kerbs ever physically harmed another while confined or that he has difficulty controlling “dangerous behavior,” so the court’s finding of dangerousness was not supported by substantial evidence. View "People v. Kerbs" on Justia Law

Emmanuel Cota was convicted by jury of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1)1 and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (count 2). As to both counts, the jury also found defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total term of six years, comprised of three years for assault with a deadly weapon in count 1 and a consecutive three-year term for the great bodily injury enhancement attached to that count. The court imposed a concurrent sentence on count 2 but stayed the term under Penal Code section 654. On appeal, defendant argued his convictions for assault with a deadly weapon in count 1 and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in count 2 were different statements of the same offense and his dual convictions violated Penal Code section 954. He requested the Court of Appeal either vacate his count 2 conviction or remand his case to the trial court with directions to strike one of his duplicative convictions and its attending great bodily injury enhancement. The Attorney General contended defendant’s dual assault convictions should be affirmed because they were legally and factually separate offenses. After review, the Court concluded assault with a deadly weapon and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury were the same offense, stated differently, and based on the record in this case, defendant’s dual assault convictions violated section 954 because both convictions were based on the same conduct. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant’s conviction for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury in count 2 and the great bodily injury enhancement attached to this count. In all other respects, judgment was affirmed. View "California v. Cota" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that a security guard sexually harassed them with his metal detecting wand during the courthouse entry screening process. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against plaintiffs, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's fact finding. The trial court found that plaintiffs failed to prove sexual harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence there had been no sexual harassment. In this case, the screening procedures are public and monitored by video; few witnesses saw the allegedly inappropriate wanding; and the video evidence clearly refutes plaintiffs' claims.The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the trial court committed legal error by failing in the statement of decision to apply and to cite three cases; because substantial evidence supports the finding there was no hostile environment sexual harassment, it was unnecessary for the trial court to make findings about when Ventura Superior Court knew about non-harassing conduct; the trial court in fact did make the findings plaintiffs complained were omitted; claims of error regarding the trial court's decision and conduct as evidence of gender bias were rejected; and challenges to the statement of decision rejected. View "Schmidt v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Sixty-nine year old Pamelia Powell had been prescribed multiple central nervous system depressants, with additive effects. In April 2016 and again in May 2016, she had to be hospitalized for overdoses. In between the two hospital stays, petitioner Marilyn Zemek, who was already Powell’s friend, agreed to become her paid caretaker. She acknowledged at the time that Powell needed “constant companionship,” including help with “properly taking her medication.” Later in May 2016, petitioner took Powell to petitioner’s former attorney. He prepared new estate planning documents for Powell that left everything to petitioner. In June 2016, petitioner left Powell home alone for at least two days and perhaps as much as four days. During that time, Powell died of an overdose of her prescription medications. After Powell’s death, petitioner bought items using Powell’s credit card and emptied Powell’s bank accounts. Based on this evidence, a magistrate held petitioner to answer for crimes including murder, elder abuse, and grand theft. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion to set aside the information. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing there was insufficient evidence: (1) of malice; (2) that she was the legal cause of Powell’s death; and (3) that the money she took did not belong to her. The Court rejected these contentions and affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. View "Zemek v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that vacated defendant Jeffrey Duval's five-year jail sentence for a conviction to which he pled guilty to the possession for sale and transportation of methamphetamine, receiving stolen property, and unlawful possession of a stun gun. Defendant entered a Cruz1 waiver, agreeing that if he failed to appear at his sentencing hearing the trial court would not be bound by the negotiated two-year term and could sentence him up to the maximum term in his absence. Defendant failed to appear for his sentencing. In absentia, the court imposed a prison sentence of nine years, eight months. Defendant’s trial counsel did not object to the sentence, did not ask for a hearing on whether defendant’s violation of the Cruz waiver was willful, and did not present any evidence for why defendant failed to appear. The following court day defendant appeared and was taken into custody. The next day, at the request of defense counsel, the court recalled and vacated defendant’s prison sentence, and instead imposed a five-year county jail term. Defendant then filed a habeas corpus petition contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to argue or present evidence he did not willfully violate his Cruz agreement. The Court of Appeal summarily denied that petition. But then the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its summary dismissal, and remand to the trial court for a hearing on why defendant wasn't entitled to habeas relief. Back in the superior court, a hearing was held on the 83rd day after the appeals court order. In the interim, the State did not file a return—or any other response—to to the appellate court's order to show cause. Notwithstanding the State's objections, the trial court ultimately granted relief by vacating the five-year sentence and reduced it to four. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court had no need to hold an evidentiary hearing when the State failed to file a return to defendant’s writ petition after being ordered to show cause why habeas corpus relief should not have been granted. In addition, the Court of Appeal found the court did not exceed its authority by vacating defendant’s previously imposed sentence and resentencing him in the manner it did. As such, the court did not err and the sentence was therefore affirmed. View "In re Duval" on Justia Law