Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After plaintiffs filed a malicious prosecution action against defendant, who was the attorney for the opposing party in a prior litigation, defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeal held that the evidence did not demonstrate a reasonable probability plaintiffs would prevail on the merits of their claim, because plaintiffs' action was time-barred. In this case, the four-year provision of the statute of limitations expired prior to the filing of the complaint, and a later discovery could not extend that period. Finally, the court noted that plaintiffs' plea for justice did not fall on deaf ears, but that the court was constrained to follow the law and to enforce the statute of limitations. View "Garcia v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Todd Schuster petitioned the superior court for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking early parole consideration under Proposition 57. At the time, an emergency regulation of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) rendered those who had a conviction for a sex offense requiring registration under Penal Code section 2901 ineligible for such consideration. The petition pointed out that under Proposition 57, all “nonviolent” offenders were eligible for early parole consideration. The only statutory definition of nonviolent was the definition of violent felonies in section 667.5, which did not include section 290 registrants. The trial court appointed counsel for Schuster; counsel then narrowed his argument to the claim that Schuster could not be declared ineligible for parole based only on his prior conviction for a sex offense. Whether a current conviction would render him ineligible for parole was not discussed. The trial court granted the petition and invalidated the regulation. In doing so, the court found that “nonviolent” felonies under Proposition 57 included only those felonies not listed as violent in section 667.5. The Department sought a stay and reconsideration, arguing the matter was moot because Schuster had been released from prison and the regulations had been revised. The court found the petition was not moot because it affected important issues of continuing public interest that may evade review and denied the stay. The court modified its order sua sponte to declare invalid two revised regulations that denied early parole consideration to those convicted of an offense requiring registration under section 290 or serving life terms for a violent offense. Ralph Diaz, Secretary of the Department, appealed that judgment. The Court of Appeal concluded the matter was not moot because it posed an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur. Further, the Court concluded the trial court erred when it invalidated the unchallenged revised regulations. The judgment was modified to invalidate only the challenged regulation and then only to the extent it was applied to inmates like Schuster who were section 290 registrants solely due to a prior conviction. View "In re Schuster" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mason Fish was involved in a fatal motor vehicle collision and thereafter charged with (among other offenses) three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Based on Fish's statements to law enforcement officers after the collision that he was under the care of a psychotherapist who had prescribed him certain antidepressant and antipsychotic medications, the prosecution subpoenaed the psychotherapist's (and his medical group's) treatment records. Fish moved to quash the subpoenas on the basis they sought information protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The prosecution countered that Fish had, through his disclosures to law enforcement officers, waived this privilege. Respondent superior court (the trial court) agreed with the prosecution and denied Fish's motion, indicating it would review the psychotherapist's treatment records in camera to determine if Fish and his therapist discussed whether the medications might affect Fish's driving. Contending the trial court erred in finding he waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege, Fish petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to prevent the trial court from reviewing his psychotherapy treatment records, and to require the trial court to grant his motion to quash the subpoenas. The Court of Appeal determined the California Supreme Court has held that when no exception to the privilege has been established and there has been no waiver, the state's claimed compelling need for the information to aid criminal prosecution did not justify invasion of the privilege. "Because Fish's disclosures were legally insufficient under our court's precedent to waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege, the trial court erred in concluding otherwise." View "Fish v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

David Gaynor was convicted by jury of: using the personal identification information of another (counts 1, 4 and 7); forgery, possessing a completed check with the intent to defraud (count 2); burglary (count 3); possession of a forged driver's license (counts 5 and 6); and failure to appear while on bail (count 8). In addition, the jury found true the allegation that Gaynor had a prior strike conviction, and the trial court found true an allegation that Gaynor was on bail from another case at the time of the commission of count 8 (failing to appear). At sentencing, the trial court struck the prior strike in the interest of justice and sentenced Gaynor to a total term of five years and eight months in prison. The court sentenced Gaynor to the upper term of three years on count 1, a consecutive eight-month term on count 8, and a two-year consecutive term for the on-bail enhancement. The court also imposed concurrent two-year terms on counts 2, 4, and 7 and stayed execution of the sentences on counts 3, 5, and 6 pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The trial court imposed a restitution fine of $4,500 and a corresponding parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount. On appeal, Gaynor argued the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of the sentences on three of the counts (counts 2, 4 and 7) pursuant to section 654 and also requested the Court of Appeal remand the matter to permit the trial court to reconsider the amount of the restitution fine and the corresponding parole revocation restitution fine, arguing that the court erred in imposing a restitution fine based on a count for which the execution of sentence was stayed pursuant to section 654. The State conceded the trial court erred in failing to stay execution of the sentences on 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654, but contended the trial court properly declined to apply section 654 with respect to count 2. With respect to the restitution fine, the State contended no remand was required because Gaynor did not demonstrate any prejudice. The Court of Appeal accepted the State's concession, and concluded substantial evidence supported the trial court's implicit finding that section 654 did not apply with respect to count 2. In addition, the Court concluded there was a reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a different restitution fine and corresponding parole revocation restitution fine if the court had properly stayed execution of the sentences on counts 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to stay execution of the sentences imposed on counts 4 and 7 pursuant to section 654, and for reconsideration of the restitution and parole revocation restitution fines. View "California v. Gaynor" on Justia Law

The San Diego County (County) Board of Supervisors approved an amendment to the County's general land use plan, which would have allowed for the development of over 2,100 homes in a previously designated rural area of the County. Residents opposed to the change in land use circulated a referendum petition and gathered enough signatures to have the matter placed on an election ballot. To prevent an election, the land developer filed a petition for writ of mandate, contending the referendum petition was illegal and void as a matter of law. The court denied the writ petition. The issues this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review were: (1) whether the referendum petition complied with the full text requirement under Elections Code section 91471; and (2) the referendum petition's legality in challenging a single legislative act even though the Board of Supervisors executed several concurrent, associated legislative acts. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Molloy v. Vu" on Justia Law

Brian Jennings was convicted by jury on four counts of burglary and one count of attempted burglary. Jennings challenged only his count 3 burglary conviction, which offense involved his alleged entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment was open during regular business hours. Proposition 47, enacted in 2014, created a new misdemeanor offense of "shoplifting," set forth in Penal Code section 459.5(a). On appeal, Jennings contended that because the new section 459.5 shoplifting offense was "carved out" of the general section 459 burglary offense, the prosecution was required, in the circumstances of this case, to prove he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950. Furthermore, he argued there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950, therefore his count 3 burglary conviction had to be reversed. Alternatively, he contended the trial court prejudicially erred by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the prosecution's duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of burglary, including proof that he intended to take property with a value exceeding $950. After review, the Court of Appeal concurred with Jennings, concluding there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Jennings intended to take property with a value exceeding $950 when he entered the commercial establishment in count 3. The Court also concluded the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing sua sponte on the $950 property value requirement for the count 3 burglary charge. In addition, the Court agreed Senate Bill No. 136 applied retroactively to Jennings's case pursuant to In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965), and therefore reversed the court's imposition and execution of a consecutive one-year section 667.5(b) prior-prison-term enhancement. Accordingly, Jennings' count 3 burglary conviction and one-year section 667.5(b) prior prison term enhancement were reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "California v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Defendant Sara Salcido was in the business of providing immigration services — typically, obtaining visas for her clients that would allow them to stay in the United States legally. Defendant failed to comply with the consumer protection requirements outlined in the Immigration Consultant Act, and was ultimately convicted on one count of misdemeanor unlawfully engaging in the business of an immigration consultant. The State argued, however, that each time defendant took money from a client in exchange for providing immigration services, she was committing theft by false pretenses, because she was not a legally qualified immigration consultant under state law. The trial court agreed; thus, it also convicted her on six counts of grand theft, and two counts of petty theft. It dismissed two additional counts of grand theft as time-barred. Defendant was placed on probation for five years. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held federal law did not preempt the application of the Act to defendant. In the unpublished portion, the Court held one of defendant’s probation conditions had to be stricken. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed as modified. View "California v. Salcido" on Justia Law

This appeal involved an effort to "foist" the pension and retiree healthcare costs for city employees who performed redevelopment-related work onto the successor agency to the now-abolished Anaheim Redevelopment Agency (Anaheim RDA). Plaintiff City of Anaheim, in its own right and as the successor agency to the Anaheim RDA, and John Woodhead, who worked for both entities, brought this 2017 petition for a writ of mandate. The petition sought to overturn the determination that an agreement between the City of Anaheim and the Anaheim RDA to reimburse the City of Anaheim for the retirement costs of its employees who worked for the Anaheim RDA was not an enforceable obligation of the Anaheim RDA, and thus payments to the City of Anaheim for this purpose from the successor agency were not permissible. As defendants, the petition identified the director of the Department of Finance, Keely Bosler, in her official capacity; the Department of Finance (a redundant defendant); the auditor-controller for Orange County (a neutral stakeholder); and the oversight board that supervised the operations of the successor agency. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department, "after issuing a lengthy and cogent ruling." On appeal, petitioners reiterated their claims, which focused on their interpretation of what was a “legally enforceable” required payment from the Anaheim RDA, the purported unconstitutional impairment of contractual rights, and estoppel. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "City of Anaheim v. Bosler" on Justia Law

Jones is serving a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a 1994 murder he committed when he was 19 years old. In 2018, Jones filed a petition to recall his sentence, citing Penal Code 1170(d)(2), which applies to a defendant who is serving an LWOP sentence for an offense committed when the defendant was “under 18 years of age” and who has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.The court of appeal upheld the denial of relief, rejecting an argument that section 1170(d)(2) violates equal protection because it denies LWOP offenders ages 18-25 the same opportunity to petition for resentencing that is afforded to similarly-situated juvenile offenders without any rational basis for doing so. LWOP offenders who were 18-25 years old when they committed their offenses are adult offenders, not similarly situated to juvenile offenders. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” To determine the age at which the diminished culpability of a youthful offender should no longer result in a categorically different sentence, a line must be drawn. The Legislature could reasonably decide that for LWOP offenders, the line should be drawn at age 18, rather than at some later date when the brain is fully developed. Drawing a bright line at age 18 establishes an objective and easily implemented measure, which has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court. View "In re Jones" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's partial denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff filed suit after defendant posted comments in Facebook that she alleged were, among other things, defamatory.The court held that plaintiff's complaint arose from protected activity, because the comments upon which plaintiff based her claims implicated an issue of public interest. In this case, defendant's comments described a widespread pattern of identity theft and multi-level marketing scams. The court also held that plaintiff met her burden of showing a probability of prevailing on her defamation claim, because her claim had at least minimal merit. The court explained that the statements complained of – that she had been indicted, that she was a convicted criminal, and that she had stolen the identities of thousands of people – were plainly defamatory in character and would tend to expose their subject to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy.The court commented on civility, sexism, and persuasive brief writing, stating that the opening paragraph in defense counsel's reply brief, which commented on the trial judge's personal characteristics and appearance, reflected gender bias and disrespect for the judicial system. View "Briganti v. Chow" on Justia Law