Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department of Industrial Relations determined that plaintiff Vector Resources, Inc. failed to pay the appropriate prevailing wages to its workers on a public works project for the San Diego Unified School District. The Department's director's decision was based on regulatory language in a document entitled "Important Notice To Awarding Bodies And Other Interested Parties Regarding Shift Differential Pay In The Director's General Prevailing Wage Determinations," which was posted on the Department's Web site. The Important Notice addresses shift differential pay for various crafts used on public works projects, and was augmented by additional regulatory language in a "Note" that the Department placed on the cover page of prevailing wage shift provisions ("the Stamp"). Vector filed a declaratory relief action against the Department, seeking a declaration that the Important Notice and Stamp were invalid and unenforceable as "underground regulations" because they were not promulgated in compliance with the notice and hearing requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Vector and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the Department's motion on the ground that under Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g), the Important Notice and the Stamp were exempt from the notice and hearing requirements of the APA because they were part of an overall prevailing wage determination process that constituted "rate setting." Vector argued on appeal that the grant of summary judgment to the Department was made in error because: (1) the Department admitted that the shift premium rule is a regulation; (2) the Department admitted that that regulation was not adopted in compliance with the APA; (3) the Department failed to prove that the shift premium regulation establishes or fixes rates within the meaning of Government Code section 11340.9, subdivision (g); (4) the court erred in failing to specifically cite the evidence it relied on to grant summary judgment; (5) the court's written order ignored the law and the admissible evidence; and (6) the Department's motion relied upon inadmissible evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Vector Resources, Inc. v. Baker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was an insurance coverage dispute arising from underlying construction defect litigation in which Corona homeowners sued the developer, plaintiff-appellant Centex Homes for work performed by Centex’s subcontractors. One of the subcontractors, Oak Leaf Landscape, Inc., was insured by defendants-respondents, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company (Travelers). Centex was named as an additional insured on the Travelers’s policy. Centex appealed an order and judgment sustaining without leave to amend defendants’ demurrer to the seventh and eighth causes of action of the original complaint filed by Centex. The seventh and eight causes of action for declaratory relief centered on coverage and Centex’s right to independent counsel pursuant to Civil Code section 2860. Upon review of the dispute, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the claims were neither “ripe” nor “actual”, and affirmed the judgment. View "Centex Homes v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Pacific appealed the Board's suspension of its license as the sanction for failing to notify the Board that a judgment had been entered against Pacific. Jerry McDaniel and his wife Delma own two corporations, Pacific and Gold Coast Drilling, Inc. The trial court found that Pacific did not substantially comply with the requirement that the contractor be licensed while performing work. Pacific argued that the judgment was not “substantially related” to its “construction activities” within the meaning of Bus. & Prof. Code 7071.17, and so Pacific’s license should not have been suspended. The court concluded that Gold Coast was obligated to notify the Board of the unsatisfied stipulated judgment where the stipulated judgment falls within the ambit of section 7071.17 and the stipulated judgment was unsatisfied; the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Gold Coast did not “act[] reasonably and in good faith” to maintain its license; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Pacific Caisson & Shoring v. Bernards Bros." on Justia Law

Shortly before the collapse of the housing market, the Gavras, Agam, and Cohen formed a partnership to purchase, subdivide, and build two or three houses for resale in Los Altos Hills. They purchased and subdivided the property into three lots, but financial issues and personality conflicts derailed their plans. Between 2009 and 2011, they sold the vacant lots, losing close to $1.3 million on the project. In 2009, Agam and Cohen sued the Gavras for breach of the Partnership Agreement and breach of their fiduciary duties to the partnership. The Gavras filed a cross-complaint alleging breach of contract. Cohen reached a settlement with the Gavras and the cross-actions between Agam and the Gavras proceeded to trial. The court rejected the Gavras’ breach of contract claim and concluded they had breached both the Partnership Agreement and their fiduciary duties. The court awarded Agam more than $700,000 in reliance damages on the breach of contract claim, no damages on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and about $245,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the Gavras’ argument the trial court misallocated the burden of proof on Agam’s breach of contract claim and challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "Agam v. Gavra" on Justia Law

After Rio School District’s new school was completed, the District and its general contractor (FTR) engaged in a decade-long legal battle, resulting in a judgment for FTR exceeding $9 million. Public Contract Code section 7107 allows a public entity to withhold funds due a contractor when there are liens on the property or a good faith dispute concerning whether the work was properly performed. The trial court assessed penalties against District because it did not timely release the retained funds. The court of appeal affirmed in part. A dispute over the contract price does not entitle a public entity to withhold funds due a contractor; the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply to section 7107; the trial court properly rejected the District's action under the False Claims Act, Government Code section 12650 and properly assessed prejudgment interest, subject to adjustment for any extra work claims found untimely on remand. The trial court erred in its interpretation of a contract provision imposing time limitations to submit the contractor's claims for extra work as requiring a showing of prejudice and erred in awarding fees for work not solely related to FTR's section 7107 cause of action. View "East West Bank v. Rio School Dist." on Justia Law

In 2004, Berkeley issued a use permit for construction of a building with 51 residential rental units and ground floor commercial space. Permit condition 10 provides: “Before submission for building permit, the applicant shall submit floor plans and schedules … showing the location of each inclusionary unit and the sales or rental prices…. and that the unit rent or sales price complies with Chapter 23C.12” (Inclusionary Housing Ordinance). The Ordinance was designed to comply with Government Code section 65580, requiring a general plan to contain a housing element stating how the local agency will accommodate its share of regional need for affordable housing. The ordinance requires that 20 percent of all newly constructed residential units be reserved for households with below-median incomes and rented at below-market prices. The development took more than seven years. The city sought a declaration that the condition was valid, conceding that the ordinance has been preempted by the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, 1954.50), but arguing that it may enforce the condition, the validity of which was not previously challenged. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of the city. View "City of Berkeley v. 1080 Delaware, LLC" on Justia Law

Lydig Construction was the general contractor on a large public works project. Martinez Steel was the original steel supply subcontractor on the project. Lydig sued Martinez for additional costs Lydig incurred because Martinez failed to timely supply steel for the project; Lydig, with the public agency's approval, had been required to replace Martinez as the steel supplier. Lydig moved for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment and presented the trial court with its business records and declarations from its employees. Martinez opposed Lydig's motion and presented declarations from one of its employees that set forth its contention Lydig owed it for, among other items, steel Martinez had delivered to the project. Martinez filed a cross-complaint in which it alleged claims that, if successful, would entirely offset Lydig's claims against it. The trial court granted Lydig's motion and issued writs of attachment in the amount of $203,315. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Martinez's contentions that its cross-complaint, as a matter of law, prevented the trial court from issuing a writ of attachment against it and that Lydig's application for a writ of attachment was not supported by substantial evidence. View "Lydig Constr., Inc. v. Martinez Steel Corp." on Justia Law

Belasco bought a new Manhattan Beach residence in 2004 from the builder (Wells). In 2006, Belasco filed a complaint with the Contractors State License Board, alleging construction defects. Belasco and Wells settled the dispute in 2006, with Wells paying $25,000 and Belasco executing a release and a Civil Code 15241 waiver of all known or unknown claims. In 2012, Belasco sued, based on an alleged roof defect discovered in 2011. The trial court entered summary judgment, finding the action barred by the settlement. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that: the 2006 general release and waiver for patent construction defects is not a “reasonable release” of a subsequent claim for latent defects under section 929 and the Right to Repair Act (section 895); a reasonable release can only apply to a “particular violation” and not to a latent defect under section 945.5(f), and the 2006 settlement was too vague to be a valid; section 932 authorizes an action on “[s]ubsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;” public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and a genuine issue of fact existed concerning fraud and negligence claims that would void the settlement under section 1668. View "Belasco v. Wells" on Justia Law

FTR has constructed buildings for public entities for 15 years. In 1999, FTR submitted the winning bid of $7.345 million to construct a District school. During construction, FTR submitted approximately 150 proposed change orders (PCO). FTR claimed some were necessary because the District’s plans were inadequate or misleading. The District denied most of the PCOs on the grounds that the work was covered under the basic contract, the amounts claimed were excessive, or that a PCO was not timely under the contract. Construction was completed in 2001. Public Contract Code 7107 allows a public entity to withhold funds due a contractor when there are liens on the property or a good faith dispute concerning whether the work was properly performed. The court of appeal held that the trial court properly assessed penalties against District because it did not timely release retained funds; properly rejected the District's action under the False Claims Act, Government Code 12650; and properly assessed prejudgment interest. The court erred in its interpretation of a contract provision imposing time limitations to submit claims for extra work as requiring a showing of prejudice and erred in awarding fees for work not solely related to FTR's section 7107 cause of action. View "FTR Int'l, Inc. v. Rio Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased a home from Laux. Almost two years later, she sued the homebuilder, Shapell for strict liability, negligence, and fraudulent concealment, claiming Shapell built the home on unstable and uncompacted “fill” soil and with an inadequate foundation, causing “substantial differential movement” and numerous defects such as cracked floors, walls, and ceilings. The court granted Shappel summary judgment as to fraudulent concealment and later and entered judgment for Shapell on the other claims, concluding plaintiff lacked standing because her claims accrued when Laux owned the home and he did not assign the claims to plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed. Construing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether Shapell fraudulently concealed information about the property’s soil conditions. Plaintiff was entitled to have a jury determine the disputed factual issues of when and to whom the causes of action accrued. View "Stofer v. Shapell Indus., Inc." on Justia Law