Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against BevMo seeking civil penalties for violation of Civil Code section 1747.08 of the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1747 et seq. Plaintiff purchased alcohol online through BevMo's website and elected to pick up his order at a BevMo store. The court concluded that plaintiff was bound by the allegation in his initial complaint that the transaction was completed online when he paid for the merchandise with his credit card. Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, the court concluded that section 1747.08, subdivision (a) does not apply to plaintiff's online purchase of merchandise that he subsequently retrieved at the retail store. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of BevMo. View "Ambers v. Beverages & More, Inc." on Justia Law

Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), sued Beech-Nut and other food manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, seeking enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, commonly referred to as Proposition 65 (Health & Saf. Code, 25249.5). ELF alleged certain of defendants’ products contain toxic amounts of lead sufficient to trigger the duty to provide warnings to consumers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, concluding they had no duty to warn because they satisfactorily demonstrated that the average consumer’s reasonably anticipated rate of exposure to lead from their products falls below relevant regulatory thresholds. The court of appeal affirmed, analyzing regulations promulgated by the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. View "Environmental Law Found. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition" on Justia Law

Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2695.183 was promulgated in 2010 following complaints by homeowners who lost their residences in wildfires that they did not have enough insurance to cover the full cost of repairing or rebuilding their homes because, when they bought their insurance, the estimates of replacement value were too low. The Regulation prohibits a “licensee” from “communicat[ing] an estimate of replacement cost to an applicant or insured in connection with an application for renewal of a homeowners’ insurance policy that provides coverage on a replacement cost basis” that does not satisfy specific content and format provisions. Noncompliance “constitutes making a statement with respect to the business of insurance which is misleading and which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known to be misleading, pursuant to Insurance Code section 790.03.” Insurance Associations argued that the Insurance Commissioner lacked authority to define new unfair business practices; questioned whether the record established a high volume of complaints and whether the problem was caused by lack of knowledge; and complained that the expense of compliance would discourage carriers from providing insurance. They obtained a declaration that the Regulation was invalid. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that the Commissioner lacked authority under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act. View "Ass'n of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained loans to purchase their home in 2005, each secured by a deed of trust. Wells Fargo had the senior lien, and Chase had the junior lien. Wells Fargo foreclosed on the property, but the proceeds were not enough to pay off Chase’s loan. About a year later, Chase sent plaintiffs a letter, stating that plaintiffs still “owe[d]” $67,002.04 and offering to accept $16,750.56 “as settlement for [their] loan balance.” The letter purported to offer a short window of opportunity to resolve the] delinquency before the debt was accelerated. In its final sentence, the letter disavowed any “attempt to collect a debt or to impose personal liability” that “was discharged.” Chase sent a similar second letter. Chase and PRS also made collection calls to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Chase and PRS on behalf of a potential class, claiming that Chase’s right to enforce its loan against them personally had been extinguished and that defendants’ letters and calls were misleading for implying that the debt was still owed. Plaintiffs cited California’s Rosenthal Act, Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal held that a borrower may sue the debt collector under the FDCPA and may sue the junior lienholder or its debt collector under the Rosenthal Act and UCL, but may not sue for violations of CLRA. View "Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dione Aguirre appealed an order denying class certification. Plaintiff sued defendants Amscan Holdings, Inc., and PA Acquisition, doing business as Party America (collectively, Party America) on behalf of herself and similarly situated individuals, alleging Party America violated Civil Code the Song-Beverly Credit Card Act of 1971 (Civil Code section 1747 et seq.) by routinely requesting and recording personal identification information, namely ZIP Codes, from customers using credit cards in its retail stores in California. The trial court found that plaintiff's proposed class of "[a]ll persons in California from whom Defendant requested and recorded a ZIP code in conjunction with a credit card purchase transaction from June 2, 2007 through October 13, 2010" was not an ascertainable class due to "plaintiff's inability to clearly identify, locate and notify class members through a reasonable expenditure of time and money [. . .] bars her from litigating this case as a class action." Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in determining the class was not ascertainable based upon the finding that each individual class member was not specifically identifiable from Party America's records (and thus, notice to the class could not be directly provided to class members.) The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard in determining the proposed class was not ascertainable and erred in its conclusion. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Aguirre v. Amscan Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Shaun Trabert purchased a used vehicle from an automobile dealer. Trabert signed a preprinted industry-drafted installment sales contract. The dealer then assigned the contract to Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. Portfolio later repossessed Trabert's vehicle, and Trabert filed a class action complaint alleging Portfolio's repossession/default notices were defective under consumer statutes. This appeal was the second time the issue of an automobile purchaser who brought consumer claims against the creditor-assignee of the parties' sales contract came before the Court of Appeal. The first appeal involved the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the contract. In "Trabert I," the Court held the arbitration agreement contained certain unconscionable provisions, and remanded for the court to determine whether these provisions could be severed from the remaining agreement. On remand, the trial court declined to sever the provisions and denied the creditor-assignee's motion to compel arbitration. Portfolio challenged the trial court's last order in this second appeal. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in denying Portfolio's motion. "The unconscionable provisions concern only exceptions to the finality of the arbitration award, and can be deleted without affecting the core purpose and intent of the arbitration agreement. The deletion of these exceptions creates a binding arbitration award and promotes the fundamental attributes of arbitration, including speed, efficiency, and lower costs." The Court reversed and remanded with directions for the court to sever the unconscionable provisions from the arbitration agreement and granted Portfolio's motion to compel arbitration. View "Trabert v. Consumer Portfolio Services" on Justia Law

After experiencing problems with his Mercedes-Benz that required multiple repair attempts, MacQuiddy filed suit under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, 1790) and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. 2301), seeking a refund for the car and a civil penalty for the alleged willful violation of the Act. Mercedes-Benz admitted it had not been able to conform the car to the applicable warranties within the time frames set forth in the Act and that it had not yet replaced the car or made restitution, but asserted it would offer to reimburse MacQuiddy as required under the Act. MacQuiddy subsequently rejected a statutory offer to compromise in which Mercedes-Benz offered to repurchase the car for an amount consistent with the Act, and to pay MacQuiddy’s attorney fees and costs incurred up to that point. A jury found Mercedes-Benz did not willfully fail to comply with the Act. The court of appeal affirmed in part, but reversed an order denying MacQuiddy costs and awarding costs to Mercedes-Benz. On remand, the court is to permit MacQuiddy to file a new Memorandum of Costs, and to recalculate such costs without regard to Mercedes-Benz’s section 998 offer. An order denying attorney fees was affirmed. View "MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Lewis filed a putative class action complaint for damages for violation of the Credit Card Act, Civ. Code, 1747, alleging that he purchased an alcoholic beverage, using a credit card for the purchase. The clerk requested personal identification information in the form of Lewis’s birth date. Lewis believed he was required to provide that information. The clerk entered Lewis’s birth date into the computerized cash register. Although the store was required by Business and Professions Code section 25660 to verify that a purchaser of alcohol is not under the age of 21, there is no legal requirement that the information be recorded. Most retailers selling alcoholic beverages do not record date of birth information. The store was not contractually obligated to provide personal identifying information in order to complete a credit card transaction. The trial court dismissed and the court of appeal affirmed, acknowledging that the Act prohibits requesting or requiring a purchaser to write any personal identifying information on the credit card transaction form “or otherwise,” and requesting or requiring a purchaser to provide personal identifying information which is recorded upon the credit card transaction form “or otherwise.” The prohibitions do not apply to purchases of alcoholic beverages. View "Lewis v. Jinon Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Sharon McGill sued defendant-appellant Citibank, N.A. for unfair competition and false advertising in offering a credit insurance plan she purchased to protect her Citibank credit card account. She brought claims under California’s unfair competition law (UCL), false advertising law (FAL), and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), seeking monetary damages, restitution, and injunctive relief to prevent Citibank from engaging in its allegedly unlawful and deceptive business practices. Citibank petitioned to compel McGill to arbitrate her claims based on an arbitration provision in her account agreement. The trial court granted the petition on McGill’s claims for monetary damages and restitution, but denied the petition on the injunctive relief claims. Citibank appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the case for the trial court to order all of McGill’s claims to arbitration. View "McGill v. Citibank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joyce Flannery sued defendant-respondent VW Credit, Inc. (VW), alleging VW failed to comply with provisions of California's Vehicle Leasing Act (VLA), California's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and California's Unfair Competition Law. VW filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the trial court sustained without leave to amend. On appeal, Flannery argued the court erred by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to consumer protection laws. VW has moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismiss and reversed the dismissal. Following the trial court's ruling on its demurrer, VW sought and received entry of an order dismissing the complaint again, and provided Flannery with notice of entry of the order. However, before the time in which to appeal from the dismissal expired, VW asked the trial court to vacate the dismissal and enter a new dismissal that included VW's costs. The trial court granted VW's request and entered an order vacating the first dismissal and ordering entry of a second dismissal, which included VW's costs. VW then served Flannery with notice of entry of the second dismissal. Thereafter, Flannery filed a notice of appeal from the second dismissal. VW argued that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within 60 days after service of notice of entry of the first dismissal; VW contends that, notwithstanding the literal meaning of the trial court's order vacating the first dismissal, the Court of Appeal should interpret the order as simply amending the first judgment to add VW's costs and thereby render Flannery's notice of appeal untimely. The Court interpreted the trial court's order literall: the first dismissal was vacated by the terms of the trial court's order, and a second dismissal was entered from which Flannery filed a timely notice of appeal. With respect to the merits, the Court reversed: "[a]lthough the doctrine of substantial compliance has been employed when doing so avoids injustice and is consistent with the purposes of a particular statute, those considerations are not present here, where VW failed to provide consumers with notice of their right to an appraisal upon early termination of their automobile leases in the language prescribed by Civil Code section 2987." The Court did not reach the question of whether VW's alleged violation of the VLA would support any relief under provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Act and the Unfair Competition Law. View "Flannery v. VW Credit" on Justia Law