Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former professor at the University of California, Berkeley, sued the Regents of the University of California, alleging violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and the Information Practices Act (IPA). The professor claimed that the university failed to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations for his bipolar II disorder, and that it invaded his privacy by leaking information about student complaints and his disability accommodations to the media.The Alameda County Superior Court granted summary adjudication in favor of the Regents on the claims of failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and invasion of privacy. The court also denied the professor’s motion to compel responses to certain discovery requests and his request for a retrial on the cause of action for which the jury left the verdict form blank. The jury found in favor of the Regents on all other claims except for the personnel file cause of action, which the jury did not address due to the instructions on the verdict form.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the claims of failure to engage in the interactive process and failure to provide reasonable accommodations, finding no prejudicial error. The court also upheld the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel discovery, agreeing that the requests were overly broad and protected by the reporter’s privilege. However, the appellate court reversed the summary adjudication of the invasion of privacy cause of action, finding that there were triable issues of fact regarding whether the Regents violated the IPA by leaking information to the media. The court also reversed the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees and costs, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Wentworth v. UC Regents" on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased a new 2020 Ford Super Duty F-250 from Fairway Ford in San Bernardino, financing the purchase through the dealer and signing a sale contract that included an arbitration provision. The truck developed mechanical issues during the warranty period, and after unsuccessful repair attempts by Ford of Ventura, the petitioners filed a lawsuit under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act against Ford Motor Company (FMC) and Ford of Ventura. FMC moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the sale contract between the petitioners and the non-party dealer.The trial court granted FMC's motion to compel arbitration, finding that FMC could enforce the arbitration provision as a third-party beneficiary of the sale contract and that the petitioners were estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claims. The petitioners moved for reconsideration twice, citing appellate decisions that disapproved of the precedent relied upon by the trial court. Both motions for reconsideration were denied, with the trial court maintaining its original order compelling arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that FMC and Ford of Ventura are neither intended third-party beneficiaries of the sale contract nor entitled to enforce the arbitration provision under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The court found that the sale contract did not express an intent to benefit FMC and that the petitioners' claims against FMC and Ford of Ventura were based on warranty obligations independent of the sale contract. The appellate court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders compelling arbitration and denying reconsideration, and to enter a new order denying FMC's motion to compel arbitration. View "Rivera v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new 2014 Kia Optima and soon experienced issues with the vehicle's transmission. Despite multiple visits to the dealership, the problem persisted. The plaintiff requested a buyback from Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia), but Kia initially declined, citing an inability to replicate the issue. Eventually, Kia offered to repurchase the vehicle, but the plaintiff found the terms unacceptable and continued to use the car while pursuing legal action.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding restitution and a civil penalty for Kia's willful violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. The jury awarded $42,568.90 in restitution and $85,317.80 in civil penalties, totaling $127,976.70. Kia filed post-trial motions to reduce the restitution amount and to strike the civil penalty, arguing that certain costs should not be included and that there was insufficient evidence of willfulness. The trial court partially granted Kia's motions, striking the civil penalty but upholding the restitution amount.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the restitution award should exclude the cost of the manufacturer’s rebate, the optional theft deterrent device, the optional service contract, and certain insurance premiums. The court found that these costs were not recoverable under the Act. However, the court found substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Kia knowingly violated the Act or did not act with a good faith and reasonable belief that it was complying. The court affirmed the trial court's order for a new trial on the issue of the civil penalty, directing that the new trial be consistent with its opinion and limited to the 21-month period between Kia's violation and the plaintiff's lawsuit. View "Valdovinos v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff purchased a new 2014 Kia Optima and soon experienced issues with the vehicle's reverse gear. Despite multiple visits to the dealership, the problem persisted. The plaintiff requested a buyback from Kia Motors America, Inc. (Kia), but Kia's investigations, including installing a flight recorder, did not confirm the defect. Kia eventually offered to repurchase the vehicle, but the plaintiff rejected the offer and continued to use the car until filing a lawsuit under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding restitution and a civil penalty for Kia's willful violation of the Act. Kia filed posttrial motions challenging the restitution amount and the civil penalty. The court partially granted Kia's motions, striking the civil penalty for insufficient evidence but denying the motion to reduce the restitution amount.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the restitution award should not include the cost of the optional service contract, certain insurance premiums, and other specific amounts. The court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial on the civil penalty, finding substantial evidence that Kia may have had a good faith and reasonable belief that the vehicle was not defective.The appellate court directed the trial court to amend the judgment to exclude the non-recoverable amounts from the restitution award and to conduct a new trial on the civil penalty, limited to the period before the lawsuit was filed. The court clarified that a violation of the Act is willful only if it is deliberate, knowing, or not based on a good faith and reasonable belief of compliance. View "Valdovinos v. Kia Motors America, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the enforceability of a noncompetition provision in an operating agreement following the partial sale of a business interest. Robert and Stephen Samuelian co-founded Life Generations Healthcare, LLC, and later sold a portion of their interest in the company. The new operating agreement included a noncompetition clause that the Samuelians later challenged in arbitration. The arbitrator found the provision invalid per se under California Business and Professions Code section 16600, which generally voids contracts restraining lawful professions, trades, or businesses.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the arbitrator's decision de novo and confirmed the award, agreeing that the noncompetition provision was invalid per se. The court also found that the Samuelians did not owe fiduciary duties to the company as minority members in a manager-managed LLC. The company and individual defendants appealed, arguing that the arbitrator applied the wrong legal standard and that the reasonableness standard should apply instead.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the arbitrator had indeed applied the wrong standard. The court held that noncompetition agreements arising from the partial sale of a business interest should be evaluated under the reasonableness standard, not the per se standard. The court reasoned that partial sales differ significantly from the sale of an entire business interest, as the seller remains an owner and may still have some control over the company. Therefore, such noncompetition provisions must be scrutinized for their procompetitive benefits.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitration award and directed the trial court to enter an order denying the Samuelians' petition to confirm the award and granting the company's motion to vacate the entire award, including the portion awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Samuelian v. Life Generations Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Jose Medina purchased a used car from St. George Auto Sales in December 2014, with financing from Alaska Federal Credit Union. Medina later discovered that the car had extensive engine repairs that were not disclosed to him at the time of purchase. He experienced multiple issues with the car, including the check engine light activating several times shortly after the purchase. Despite repeated repairs, the problems persisted. In December 2015, Medina learned from a different dealership that the car had significant pre-existing engine issues, which led him to believe that St. George had concealed this information.Medina filed a lawsuit in August 2018 against St. George and Alaska Federal, claiming a violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). The defendants argued that the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. They contended that Medina should have been aware of the issues by March 2015 due to the repeated activation of the check engine light. The Superior Court of San Bernardino County overruled the defendants' demurrer and denied their motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual questions about when Medina should have suspected the harm. The jury ultimately found in favor of Medina, concluding that he did not have sufficient notice of the claim until later.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the discovery rule applies to the CLRA’s statute of limitations, meaning the limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the basis for the claim. The court found no error in the trial court’s rulings on the demurrer, summary judgment, or nonsuit motions, as there were factual questions about when Medina should have known about the engine issues and the defendants' potential wrongdoing. The judgment in favor of Medina was affirmed. View "Medina v. St. George Auto Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

J.M., an 11-year-old student, filed a class action lawsuit through his guardian ad litem against Illuminate Education, Inc., an education consulting business. J.M. alleged that Illuminate obtained his personal and medical information from his school to assist in evaluating his educational progress. Illuminate promised to keep this information confidential but negligently maintained its database, leading to a data breach where a hacker accessed the information. Illuminate delayed notifying J.M. and other victims about the breach for five months, during which J.M. began receiving unsolicited mail and phone calls.The trial court sustained Illuminate's demurrer, concluding that Illuminate did not fall within the scope of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) or the Customer Records Act (CRA) and that J.M. failed to state a cause of action. J.M. filed a proposed second amended complaint with additional facts and a motion for reconsideration. The trial court reviewed the amended pleadings but maintained that J.M. had not stated a cause of action and could not amend to do so, thus sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and entering judgment for Illuminate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that Illuminate falls within the scope of the CMIA and CRA. The court found that J.M. stated sufficient facts to support causes of action under both statutes. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court, allowing J.M. to file an amended complaint with additional facts. View "J.M. v. Illuminate Education, Inc." on Justia Law

Farzam Salami received emergency services at Los Robles Regional Medical Center on three occasions in 2020. He signed a conditions of admission contract agreeing to pay for services rendered, as listed in the hospital's chargemaster. Los Robles billed him for these services, including a significant emergency services fee (EMS fee). Salami paid part of the discounted bill but disputed the EMS fee, claiming it covered general operating costs rather than services actually rendered. He argued that had he known about the EMS fee, he would have sought treatment elsewhere.Salami sued Los Robles in December 2021 for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The trial court sustained Los Robles's demurrer to the first amended complaint (FAC), finding that Salami did not allege he performed his duties under the contract or that Los Robles failed to perform its duties. The court also found that the breach of contract claim could not be cured by amendment. Salami was granted leave to amend to assert claims under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA). In his third amended complaint (TAC), Salami alleged that Los Robles failed to disclose the EMS fee adequately.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Los Robles had no duty to disclose the EMS fee beyond including it in the chargemaster. The court referenced recent cases, including Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc., which held that hospitals are not required to provide additional signage or warnings about EMS fees. The court concluded that Los Robles complied with its statutory and regulatory obligations, and Salami's claims under the UCL and CLRA failed as a result. The judgment in favor of Los Robles was affirmed. View "Salami v. Los Robles Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mark Coziahr filed a class action against Otay Water District, alleging that Otay's tiered water rates for single-family residential customers violated Section 6(b)(3) of Proposition 218, which mandates that property-related fees not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel. The trial court certified the class and found that Otay failed to meet its burden of demonstrating compliance with Section 6(b)(3). In the remedy phase, the court awarded an estimated refund of approximately $18 million, with monthly increases until Otay imposed compliant rates. Otay appealed the liability decision and damages, while Coziahr appealed only as to damages.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that Otay's tiered rates were based on non-cost objectives like conservation and did not correlate with the actual cost of providing water service. The court determined that Otay's reliance on peaking factors and adherence to industry standards were insufficient to justify the tiered rates. The court also found that Otay discriminated against single-family residential customers by charging them more for water than other customer classes without a cogent reason. The court rejected Otay's peaking factor analysis and Mumm's independent analysis as flawed and unsupported by the record.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's liability determination, holding that Otay did not establish its tiered rates complied with Section 6(b)(3). The court found that Otay's evidence did not withstand independent review and that the trial court properly applied the principles from Capistrano and Palmdale. However, the appellate court reversed the refund amount, finding the trial court's calculations unreasonable due to reliance on projected data and a proxy from another case. The matter was remanded for a new trial on the refund amount, including monthly increases and prejudgment interest. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "Coziahr v. Otay Wat. Dist." on Justia Law

The case involves Leah Lorch, who filed a lawsuit against Kia Motors America, Inc. The case was initially assigned to Judge Robert C. Longstreth for all purposes. However, due to Judge Longstreth's unavailability, the case was reassigned to Judge Timothy B. Taylor. Upon learning of this reassignment, Lorch's counsel filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Taylor under section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting that Judge Taylor was prejudiced against Lorch. However, Judge Taylor denied the challenge, ruling it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The trial proceeded, resulting in a defense verdict in favor of Kia Motors.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Lorch's peremptory challenge, ruling it was untimely under the master calendar rule. The court also refused to stay the trial, and Judge Taylor immediately began a two-day jury trial, which resulted in a defense verdict and judgment in favor of Kia Motors. Lorch then filed a petition within the statutory 10-day period, contending that her peremptory challenge was timely because it was filed before the trial started. She sought to vacate Judge Taylor’s orders denying her section 170.6 challenge and contended that all of Judge Taylor’s subsequent orders, as well as the judgment, were void for lack of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, held that Lorch’s section 170.6 challenge was timely filed before the commencement of the trial and rejected Kia’s laches argument. The court also concluded that the Superior Court of San Diego County's local rule, which purports to provide any superior court judge with the power to act as a master calendar department for purposes of assigning cases for trial, is inconsistent with section 170.6 and case law interpreting the statute. The court granted the petition with directions to vacate the void orders and judgment entered by Judge Taylor after denying the peremptory challenge. View "Lorch v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law