Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jenny-Ashley Colon-Perez sued her former employer, Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (SIS), alleging multiple causes of action related to her employment. After SIS moved to compel arbitration, the parties agreed to arbitrate, and the trial court ordered the claims to arbitration and stayed the court action. SIS paid two arbitration fee invoices but failed to pay the third invoice within the 30-day period required by California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98. Colon-Perez elected to withdraw from arbitration and moved to vacate the arbitration and stay order. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that SIS had materially breached the arbitration agreement and Colon-Perez was entitled to proceed with her claims in court. SIS then moved to vacate the order under section 473(b), which the trial court denied.The trial court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt section 1281.98 and that SIS had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the fees on time. The court also found that section 1281.98 did not violate the contracts clause of the United States and California Constitutions. SIS appealed, arguing that the FAA preempted section 1281.98, that section 1281.98 violated the contracts clause, and that it was entitled to relief under section 473(b).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court's orders. The court held that the FAA did not preempt section 1281.98, as the state law could be applied concurrently with federal law. The court also found that section 1281.98 did not violate the contracts clause because it served a significant and legitimate public purpose and was appropriately tailored to achieve that purpose. Additionally, the court ruled that section 473(b) relief was not available for SIS's failure to timely pay arbitration fees, as the statute's strict 30-day deadline was intended to be inflexible. View "Colon-Perez v. Security Industry Specialists" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ParaFi Digital Opportunities LP, Framework Ventures, L.P., and 1kx LP, invested in Curve, a decentralized cryptocurrency trading platform developed by Mikhail Egorov. They allege that Egorov fraudulently induced them to invest by making false promises about their stake in Curve and then canceled their investment, leading to claims of fraud, conversion, and statutory violations. Egorov, who developed Curve while living in Washington and later moved to Switzerland, formed Swiss Stake GmbH to manage Curve. The investment agreements included Swiss law and forum selection clauses.The San Francisco County Superior Court granted Egorov’s motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that Egorov did not purposefully avail himself of California’s benefits. The court noted that the plaintiffs initiated contact and negotiations, and the agreements specified Swiss jurisdiction. The court also denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, concluding that plaintiffs did not demonstrate that discovery would likely produce evidence establishing jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Egorov’s contacts with California were insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, as the plaintiffs had solicited the investment and Egorov had not directed any activities toward California. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ unilateral actions could not establish jurisdiction and that the agreements’ Swiss law and forum selection clauses further supported the lack of jurisdiction. The court also upheld the denial of jurisdictional discovery, finding no abuse of discretion by the trial court. View "ParaFi Digital Opportunities v. Egorov" on Justia Law

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about property collateral and a quitclaim deed for a residence. Disputes arose over the interpretation of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce it by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement but not in the manner the Govind Parties desired.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially heard the case, where Prashant and Mita sued Govind and his affiliates, claiming a 50% interest in their business ventures. Govind counter-sued for mismanagement. A bench trial began but was paused for settlement discussions, resulting in the contested agreement. When disputes over the settlement terms emerged, both parties filed motions to enforce the agreement. The trial court ruled largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, enforcing the settlement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision, holding that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from seeking to vacate the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The appellate court noted that the Govind Parties' positions were totally inconsistent and that they had been successful in asserting the enforceability of the agreement in their initial motion. The court affirmed the trial court's orders, including the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law

Condominium owners Gregory and Kathleen Haidet filed a lawsuit against their homeowners association (HOA), Del Mar Woods Homeowners Association, alleging that their upstairs neighbors' improperly installed floors constituted a nuisance. The HOA demurred to the Haidets' initial complaint, and the trial court sustained the demurrer, dismissing one cause of action without leave to amend and two with leave to amend. The Haidets chose not to amend their claims against the HOA and instead filed an amended complaint naming only other defendants. Subsequently, the Haidets filed a motion to dismiss the HOA without prejudice, while the HOA filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice. The trial court granted the HOA's request for dismissal with prejudice and awarded the HOA attorney fees.The trial court found that the Haidets' breach of contract claim failed because the governing documents did not require HOA consent for installing hardwood flooring. Additionally, the claims were time-barred as the Haidets had notice of their claims starting in 2016 but did not file until 2022. The court also found that the HOA had no fiduciary duty regarding the structural violation of the governing documents and that the business judgment rule applied to the HOA's decisions. The court dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court was permitted to dismiss the HOA with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), as the Haidets failed to amend their claims against the HOA within the allowed time. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the HOA was the prevailing party for purposes of Civil Code section 5975 and its award of $48,229.08 in attorney fees. The judgment was affirmed. View "Haidet v. Del Mar Woods Homeowners Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Chris Robles and the California Voting Rights Initiative filed a lawsuit against the City of Ontario, alleging violations of the Voting Rights Act and the California Voting Rights Act by conducting at-large elections for city council members, which they claimed diluted the electoral influence of Latino voters. The parties eventually settled, agreeing to transition to district-based elections by 2024 and included a provision for attorney fees incurred up to that point.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County initially sustained the defendants' demurrer with leave to amend, but the parties settled and submitted a stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment included a provision for $300,000 in attorney fees and outlined the process for transitioning to district elections. Plaintiffs later filed a motion to enforce the stipulated judgment, alleging the city violated several statutory requirements related to the districting process. The trial court found the city had not complied with the stipulated judgment but denied plaintiffs' request for additional attorney fees, stating the settlement did not provide for fees beyond those already paid.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to seek additional attorney fees under the plain language of the stipulated judgment, which allowed for fees incurred in enforcing its terms. The court reversed the trial court's order denying attorney fees and remanded the case to determine whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties and, if so, the appropriate amount of attorney fees to be awarded. The appellate court clarified that the trial court's assessment of the prevailing party should focus on whether the plaintiffs achieved their litigation objectives. View "Robles v. City of Ontario" on Justia Law

LCPFV, LLC owned a warehouse with a faulty sewer pipe. After experiencing toilet backups, LCPFV hired Rapid Plumbing to fix the issue for $47,883.40. Rapid's work was unsatisfactory, so LCPFV hired another plumber for $44,077 to redo the job. LCPFV sued Rapid Plumbing, which initially responded but later defaulted. LCPFV sought a default judgment of $1,081,263.80, including attorney fees and punitive damages. The trial court awarded a default judgment of $120,319.22, which included attorney fees and other costs, and also awarded $11,852.90 in sanctions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case. Rapid Plumbing initially participated but ceased involvement after their attorney withdrew. LCPFV then filed numerous motions and requests for sanctions, despite knowing Rapid would not respond. The trial court struck Rapid's answer and granted LCPFV's motion to have its requests for admission deemed admitted, but ultimately awarded a significantly lower judgment than LCPFV sought.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, emphasizing the trial court's role as a gatekeeper in default judgment cases. The appellate court found that the trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting LCPFV's use of requests for admissions to establish fraud and punitive damages. The court also upheld the trial court's reduced award of attorney fees, noting the excessive nature of LCPFV's request given the simplicity of the case and the lack of opposition. Additionally, the appellate court supported the trial court's decision on sanctions and prejudgment interest, affirming that the trial court's awards were appropriate and justified. View "LCPFV v. Somatdary" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts. The Store alleges Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing the Store to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington state. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order to that effect.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in failing to properly allocate the burden of proof to Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store’s unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as it did not demonstrate that Washington law would provide the same or greater rights to a jury trial or that a Washington court would apply California law. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams’s motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

Ofek Rachel, Ltd. and M.M.N. Yad David, USA Ltd. obtained a 2016 judgment from an Israeli court against Suki Ben Zion. They then filed a lawsuit in New York to enforce this judgment, resulting in a 2017 judgment against Zion for $5.5 million. Despite claiming to have no assets, Zion was living lavishly. During post-judgment proceedings, Zion revealed that his friend, Chaim Cohen, was covering his expenses. The judgment creditors served a document subpoena on Cohen, which he initially quashed due to procedural defects. A second subpoena led to a court order compelling Cohen to provide unredacted American Express statements. Cohen's non-compliance with this order led to contempt proceedings.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Cohen guilty of contempt for failing to comply with the discovery order. The court imposed a $3,000 fine and ordered Cohen to pay $185,095.20 in attorney’s fees and $8,964.71 in costs. Cohen appealed, challenging the court's authority to impose attorney’s fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1218, arguing that he was not a party to the original litigation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that section 1218 allows for the imposition of attorney’s fees against a person who violates a court order in post-judgment enforcement proceedings, even if that person was not a party to the original lawsuit. The court reasoned that the statutory language, legislative intent, and the broader context of post-judgment enforcement mechanisms support this interpretation. The court concluded that Cohen, as a party to the post-judgment enforcement proceedings, was subject to the court's order and liable for attorney’s fees for his contempt. View "Ofek Rachel, Ltd. v. Zion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff leased a new 2021 Volkswagen Atlas from Galpin Volkswagen, LLC, and experienced several issues with the vehicle, including problems with the check engine and airbag lights, ignition, and door locks. After multiple repair attempts and delays due to a backordered part, the plaintiff requested Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (VWGA) to repurchase the vehicle. VWGA offered to repurchase the vehicle, including reimbursement for payments made and additional attorney fees, but included a financial confidentiality provision in the offer. Plaintiff did not accept the offer and continued to use the vehicle.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, VWGA and Galpin, on the plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims. The court found that VWGA’s offer to repurchase the vehicle was prompt and compliant with the Song-Beverly Act, including the calculation of the mileage offset and the inclusion of a financial confidentiality provision. The court concluded that the plaintiff could not prove damages for the breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, as VWGA’s offer exceeded the restitution amount required by the Act.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that VWGA’s offer was prompt and compliant with the Act, including the use of the vehicle’s agreed value for the mileage offset calculation. The court also determined that the financial confidentiality provision was permissible under the Act. As a result, the plaintiff could not prove the necessary elements for breach of express or implied warranty claims, and the summary judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carver v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a monetary dispute between a mother (defendant) and her daughter (plaintiff). The daughter sued her mother and obtained a money judgment. During enforcement proceedings, the mother tendered the judgment amount, prejudgment interest, and interest accrued on a bank account in Shanghai. The dispute centers on whether the mother fully satisfied the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother had tendered the full amount owed and granted her motion to require the daughter to acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment. The daughter appealed, arguing there was no competent evidence to substantiate the interest amount accrued on the Shanghai bank account and that the court abused its discretion by not enforcing an order for a judgment debtor’s examination of the mother. She also complained about a comment by the trial court that she claimed offended due process.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court found no merit in the daughter’s contentions. It held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude the interest was fully paid, noting that the trial court was entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the debtor examination and rejected the claim of judicial bias based on the court’s comment. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the mother had satisfied the judgment and awarded her mandatory attorney fees. View "Merrick v. Lau" on Justia Law