Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Geringer Capital, Inc., Roger Geringer and Tricycle Entertainment, LLC (collectively Geringer parties) moved to preclude Jeffrey Konvitz, Blue Rider Finance, Inc.’s counsel of record, from testifying at trial in support of Blue Rider’s claim that the Geringer parties fraudulently induced Blue Rider to enter into a settlement agreement that did not accurately reflect the terms negotiated by the parties. The Geringer parties subsequently clarified that their motion should be considered, in the alternative, a motion to disqualify Konvitz. The court granted the motion and disqualified Konvitz, finding the integrity of the judicial process would be impaired if Konvitz served in dual roles. On appeal, Blue Rider contends the court should have denied the motion due to the Geringer parties’ excessive delay in raising the issue.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court explained that the general rule is that an attorney may serve as both advocate and witness, testifying at trial concerning disputed issues, if the client has provided its informed written consent. Disqualification of counsel, when consent has been given, must be based on a convincing showing of prejudice to the opposing party or the potential for palpable injury to the judicial process. Here, the court wrote that the record is devoid of the evidence necessary to support the disqualification of Blue Rider’s chosen counsel. Further, the court explained that disqualification is not justified absent a convincing demonstration by the moving party of a potential for injury to the integrity of the judicial process. The showing must be based on an adequate factual record, not overarching statements of policy or conclusory allegations by the party seeking disqualification. Accordingly, the court found that it was an error for the trial court not to resolve the Geringer parties’ motion in favor of allowing Blue Rider to be represented by Konvitz, its counsel of choice. View "Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance" on Justia Law

Allstate Insurance Company and several of its affiliates (collectively, Allstate) brought qui tam actions on behalf of the State of California alleging insurance fraud under the California Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA) (and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) against three medical corporations, a medical management company and its parent company, four physicians, and Sattar Mir, an individual. The trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred.   The Second Appellate District reversed the orders sustaining the demurrers and judgments of dismissal. The court explained that the trial court found the complaints failed to state causes of action under the IFPA and the UCL because they were not pled with requisite specificity, the business models alleged were lawful, and one of the actions was time-barred. The court concluded that the operative complaints adequately plead causes of action under both statutes. View "P. ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology etc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Infinity Select Insurance Company and Infinity Property and Casualty Corporation (collectively, Infinity) are named Defendants in a pending action (the instant lawsuit). The instant lawsuit stems from an earlier 2013 case (the prior action) in which plaintiffs sued Infinity’s insured for negligence and wrongful death in connection with a three-vehicle collision (the collision). In August 2022, the court issued its ruling. The primary effect of the ruling was to reform the Infinity policy to provide greater bodily injury policy limits of $750,000. Per its terms, the ruling “establishes the policy limits for the jury’s consideration in the upcoming jury trial on the remaining causes of action” including plaintiffs’ cause of action against Infinity for bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing due to Infinity’s rejection of plaintiffs’ Code of Civil Procedure section 998 demand of $750,000. Infinity filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the subject ruling.   The Fifth Appellate District concluded that the trial court erred in reforming the Infinity policy. The court held that the motor carrier of property—not the insurer—bears ultimate responsibility for meeting the requirements necessary to obtain a motor carrier permit. Moreover, even where an insurer intends to issue and certify a policy under section 34631.5, it is not obligated to issue the policy in the full amount of $750,000. Additionally, the court wrote evidence of insurance is not the only means of complying with the MCPPA financial responsibility requirements and infinity was under no duty to determine whether the insured had otherwise complied with MCPPA requirements. View "Infinity Select Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a thoracic surgeon. After the stock market crash now known as the “Great Recession” of 2008, Plaintiff’s sister recommended Gregory Acosta and Diamond Bar Executive Benefit Programs & Insurance Services, Inc. (the Acosta entities) as a potential financial planning service. In 2008, the Acosta entities and Securities America had contracts with Pacific Life Insurance Company (Pacific Life) that authorized them to act as a broker (or “producer”) for Pacific Life. Plaintiff later sued Acosta, the Acosta entities, Kestra, Securities America, and Pacific Life. Plaintiff asserted claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, financial elder abuse, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). He alleged his damages were $495,254.78. Plaintiff argued that the trial court inappropriately entered summary judgment for Pacific Life on his negligence and UCL claims because Pacific Life remains liable to Plaintiff.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment for Pacific Life. The court explained that the law and the undisputed evidence, in this case, indicate that it is the broker who typically conducts this suitability analysis. Variable life insurance policies are a “variable product,” and a different Insurance Commissioner regulation requires “brokers and agents selling variable products [to] comply with suitability standards.” The court further explained that section 2534.2(c) does not obligate an insurance company to conduct its own independent suitability analysis, regardless of whether the broker has also conducted one. Moreover, Pacific Life’s conduct—whether labeled “direct” or “vicarious” in the eyes of the law—falls completely within the terms of the release. View "Fischl v. Pacific Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Esplanade Productions, Inc. sued The Walt Disney Company and affiliated entities (collectively Disney) for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence and unfair competition, alleging Disney had used the creative ideas of Esplanade’s principal, Gary Goldman, in Disney’s animated motion picture Zootopia without compensating Esplanade. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Disney regarding the individual elements of the works and the works as a whole, finding they were not substantially similar as a matter of law. The court overruled Disney’s demurrer as to the title “Zootopia.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Disney, ruling there was no evidence the creators of Disney’s Zootopia had access to Goldman’s work and, even if there was evidence of access, any inference of copying was rebutted by the undisputed evidence a Disney employee had independently created the title “Zootopia.” On appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Disney, Esplanade challenged the trial court’s demurrer ruling and the grant of summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is simply no evidence that Disney producers would have had reason to discuss an animation project, nor is there evidence that they would have occasion to share that information with those working on Zootopia. Esplanade’s access argument relies solely on speculation and conjecture arising from the fact that some of the individuals involved occasionally provided feedback on one another’s work. That is insufficient as a matter of law to establish access. View "Esplanade Productions v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law