Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Before Peter and Debra Last were married in June 2002, they entered into a premarital agreement which included a provision by which Debra purported to waive any right to receive spousal support in the event the marriage ended in dissolution. When the marriage did end in dissolution, Debra sought, and the trial court awarded her, temporary spousal support. The court did not adjudicate the issue whether the premarital agreement was enforceable but granted Peter’s request to bifurcate that issue. Peter argued the trial court erred by awarding Debra temporary spousal support because the premarital agreement was presumed to be valid and, absent a determination the agreement was unenforceable, it barred an award of temporary spousal support. While the Court of Appeal agreed that premarital agreements were no longer disfavored and are not per se unenforceable, the Court found Peter was incorrect in asserting the premarital agreement was presumed valid simply because it facially appeared to satisfy the requirements of Family Code section 1615(c)(1) and (2). "To the contrary, a premarital agreement is presumed to have not been executed voluntarily, and is therefore unenforceable, unless the trial court finds in writing or on the record that the agreement satisfies the requirements of section 1615(c)(1) and (2)." When the court ordered temporary spousal support, the premarital agreement was deemed not to have been voluntarily executed, and, therefore, the spousal support waiver did not prevent the court from awarding Debra temporary spousal support. The appeals court also concluded the trial court had the ability to modify the support order retroactively to the first support payment if it ultimately determined the premarital agreement was enforceable. Although the appeals court believed this reservation of jurisdiction did not make the temporary spousal support order nonappealable, it resolved any doubts about appellate jurisdiction by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, which was thus denied. View "Last v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant Wanu Water Inc. on June 16, 2020, and on December 7, 2020, Defendant filed a motion to set aside its default and vacate the default judgment under the mandatory attorney-fault provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) (section 473(b)). The trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling.   The Second Appellate District vacated the default judgment. The court explained that the mandatory provision requires the court to vacate the default judgment if the application is filed “no more than six months after entry of judgment,” is “in proper form,” and is accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault unless the court finds the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect. Here, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion and gave no reason for its ruling. The record shows the filing was timely and was accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit of fault. Thus, the only bases for denying the motion to vacate the default judgment were that the application was not “in proper form” or that the default “was not in fact caused by” the attorney’s neglect. View "Dollase v. Wanu Water Inc." on Justia Law

A healthcare provider contended it was underpaid for substance abuse treatment that it rendered to 29 patients. Seeking to recover the difference directly from the insurance company, the provider filed suit alleging the insurer entered into binding payment agreements during verification of benefits and authorization calls with the provider and otherwise misrepresented or concealed the amounts it would pay for treatment. The trial court entered summary judgment against the provider. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the court did not err in determining one or more elements of the provider’s causes of action could not be established. View "Aton Center v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Esplanade Productions, Inc. sued The Walt Disney Company and affiliated entities (collectively Disney) for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, breach of confidence and unfair competition, alleging Disney had used the creative ideas of Esplanade’s principal, Gary Goldman, in Disney’s animated motion picture Zootopia without compensating Esplanade. The trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Disney regarding the individual elements of the works and the works as a whole, finding they were not substantially similar as a matter of law. The court overruled Disney’s demurrer as to the title “Zootopia.” The court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Disney, ruling there was no evidence the creators of Disney’s Zootopia had access to Goldman’s work and, even if there was evidence of access, any inference of copying was rebutted by the undisputed evidence a Disney employee had independently created the title “Zootopia.” On appeal from the judgment entered in favor of Disney, Esplanade challenged the trial court’s demurrer ruling and the grant of summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that there is simply no evidence that Disney producers would have had reason to discuss an animation project, nor is there evidence that they would have occasion to share that information with those working on Zootopia. Esplanade’s access argument relies solely on speculation and conjecture arising from the fact that some of the individuals involved occasionally provided feedback on one another’s work. That is insufficient as a matter of law to establish access. View "Esplanade Productions v. The Walt Disney Co." on Justia Law

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Company (Ford) appealed from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of warranty, violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, Section 1790 et seq.; the Song-Beverly Act) and for fraudulent omission arising from alleged defects in a sports utility vehicle Plaintiffs’ purchased from the dealership, AutoNation Ford Valencia (AutoNation). The central question on appeal is whether Ford as the manufacturer of the vehicle, can enforce an arbitration provision in the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation to which Ford was not a party under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded Ford cannot enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract because Plaintiffs’ claims against Ford are founded on Ford’s express warranty for the vehicle, not any obligation imposed on Ford by the sales contract, and thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not inextricably intertwined with any obligations under the sales contract. Nor was the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation intended to benefit Ford. View "Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Bennett, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, purchased three disability income insurance policies from National in 1984, 1991, and 1995. Under the policies, monthly benefits were payable for life if he was totally disabled due to injury; if due to sickness, benefits would only be paid until the age of 65. National initially approved Bennett’s 2014 claim that he was totally disabled due to an injury sustained when thrown from his horse. In June 2015, National notified him of its determination that his disability was due to sickness, not an injury. National continued to pay disability benefits until September 2018, the policy year Bennett turned 65 years old.Bennett sued. The trial court granted National summary judgment, concluding his claims were barred by the statutes of limitation — four years for breach of contract and two years for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing–both of which accrued when National issued an unconditional denial of liability in June 2015. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with Bennett that his causes of action did not accrue until all elements — including actual damages — were complete. Bennett suffered no harm as of June 2015, because National continued to pay disability benefits. Only in September 2018 — when National began withholding benefits, and Bennett thereby incurred damages — did his causes of action accrue. View "Bennett v. Ohio National Life Assurance Corp." on Justia Law

The trial court entered judgment for Respondent in this breach of contract claim. The Second Appellate District affirmed and also imposed sanctions against Appellant's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.The Second Appellate District explained "An appeal is frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive – to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment – or when it indisputably has no merit – when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." The court held that here, the appeal was frivolous because it "indisputably has no merit." The matter was entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the fact that Appellant's counsel consulted with two other attorneys who believed the claim had merit did not change the court's opinion. View "Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery" on Justia Law