Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff (K.D.) was a resident at Muirwoods when she suffered falls, resulting in a fractured hip and deteriorating health. She became bedbound and was allegedly left in unsanitary conditions and infected with scabies. Muirwoods alleged that K.D.’s daughter Tennier, signed an arbitration agreement pursuant to her authority to make health care decisions for K.D. when assisting in her placement at Muirwoods. The arbitration provision included a delegation clause providing that an arbitrator would decide whether a claim or dispute must be arbitrated. The clause specified that the agreement to arbitrate could be withdrawn within 30 days and that “agreeing to arbitration is not a condition of admission to the Community.”The court of appeal affirmed the denial o the motion to compel arbitration. The initial determination of whether Tennier was authorized to agree to arbitration on K.D.’s behalf is one for the court, not the arbitrator. Tennier was not K.D.’s agent for purposes of binding her to arbitration. Because the arbitration provision was optional, with its own signature line, it was essentially a separate agreement, Muirwoods did not establish that Tennier, who did not act pursuant to a durable power of attorney or similar authorization, could bind K.D. to an arbitration agreement as part of authorizing her admission. View "Theresa D. v. MBK Senior Living LLC" on Justia Law

Defendants Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC (Pinnacle) and Jennifer Stewart (Stewart) appealed a trial court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion because it determined the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As to the former, the court noted the agreement was unconscionable because plaintiff Anthony De Leon was required to sign the arbitration agreement as a precondition to his employment. As to the latter, the court found the agreement was substantively unconscionable because of its limits on discovery and because it shortened the statute of limitations to one year on all claims. On appeal, defendants contended the arbitration agreement had low procedural unconscionability and contained only one substantively unconscionable provision: the statute of limitations provision. They alternatively claimed the court erred by failing to sever any unconscionable provisions. After careful consideration of the agreement at issue, the Court of Appeal agreed with the court’s unconscionability findings. Further, the Court held the trial court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever any portion of the arbitration agreement. View "De Leon v. Pinnacle Property Management Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Tax sharing agreements between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister require the city to pay the county a fixed fee (the “Additional Amount”) for each residential unit constructed on land that is annexed into the city from the county. Plaintiff entered into development agreements with the city to build residential units on land subject to the city-county tax sharing agreements, and agreed to satisfy certain obligations from the tax sharing agreements, but sued the city and the county seeking a declaration that payment of the Additional Amount is not among plaintiff’s obligations.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. The plaintiff agreed to pay the city the Additional Amount fees as part of the development agreements. Nothing in the tax sharing agreement suggests that obligations created by it would cease to exist merely because a project annexed during its effective period was not constructed until after the agreement expired. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the Additional Amount is an obligation of the city to the county under the tax sharing agreement, it cannot be a “Developer’s obligation.” The reference to “Developer’s obligations” in the development agreement did not mean only the capital improvement and drainage fees discussed in the tax sharing agreement; the term includes the Additional Amount. View "Award Homes, Inc. v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

A tax-sharing agreement between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister requires the city to pay the county a fixed fee (Additional Amount) per residential unit constructed on land annexed into the city from the county during the period covered by that agreement. Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into an annexation agreement with the city, agreeing to comply with “all applicable provisions” of that tax sharing agreement. When the plaintiff purchased the annexed land and sought to develop it into subdivisions, the city informed the plaintiff that it was liable for the Additional Amount fees. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, then sued, seeking a declaration of its rights and duties under various written instruments.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Plaintiff is contractually liable for the Additional Amount by the terms of the annexation agreement. Any challenge to the calculation of the Additional Amount is beyond the scope of a declaratory relief action and time-barred. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that neither the annexation agreement nor the tax sharing agreement requires the plaintiff to pay the Additional Amount and that the fees violate the Mitigation Fee Act and federal constitutional constraints on development fees as monetary exactions. View "BMC Promise Way, LLC v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

Hodroj, a passenger, was injured in a single-car collision. The driver was insured by CSAA. Hodroj’s attorney wrote to CSAA offering that Hodroj would settle his claim for bodily injuries in exchange for payment of the driver’s insurance policy limits if CSAA provided a sworn declaration confirming the policy limits and delivered a check within 21 days of acceptance. CSAA could condition its acceptance on Hodroj signing a written release of all bodily injury claims. CSAA responded: “We accept ... [and] are tendering ... $100,000[.]” Enclosed were a sworn declaration attesting to the policy limits, and a written release to be signed by Hodroj. A $100,000 check was sent separately, providing that it should not be presented until the release was signed. Hodroj reneged on the settlement because the release included a release of claims for property damage. Hodroj sued the driver. CSAA sued Hodroj for breach of contract.The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of CSAA. An objective observer would conclude that the parties intended to settle Hodroj’s bodily injury claim for the policy limits. That the proposed document contained terms materially different from what had been agreed did not change the binding effect of the agreement. Hodroj was not obliged to sign a release that was inconsistent with what he agreed to but a proposal that does not accurately reflect the agreement does not unwind the entire deal. Hodroj breached the contract by filing suit. View "CSAA Insurance Exchange v. Hodroj" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Roy Kumar appealed a trial court’s order imposing terminating and monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. The trial court found that Kumar’s first amended complaint was factually and legally frivolous because no reasonable attorney could conclude that Kumar’s claims against defendants Kelly Ramsey and Elizabeth Pintar were timely under the applicable four-year limitations period. On appeal, Kumar argued the trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion. Finding ample legal and factual support to conclude that Kumar made a plausible, nonfrivolous argument that the applicable statute of limitations did not bar his suit, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order. View "Kumar v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

When a city delegates the administration of ambulance services to the surrounding county, which then assumes control, the city may not later attempt to resume administration of those services. In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly applied this holding when it denied a motion for a preliminary injunction sought by the City to prohibit the County and Ventura County Emergency Medical Services Agency (VCEMSA) from contracting for ambulance services within City limits.The court concluded that there was no error in the trial court's determination that the City lacks the authority to contract for its own ambulance services under the EMS Act. In this case, the City contends it meets the criteria for Health and Safety Code section 1797.201 grandfathering because it contracted for ambulance services on June 1, 1980, as one of the signatories to the joint powers agreement (JPA). However, on that date the JPA empowered the County, not the City, to contract for and administer ambulance services. Therefore, this fact is fatal to the City's contention. Furthermore, even if the court assumed that the provision of ambulance services is a police power, the exercise of that power is subject to constitutional constraints. The court explained that the City ceased contracting for, providing, and administering ambulance services when it signed the JPA in 1971. Regardless of whether it withdraws from the JPA, it may not now resume providing those services absent the County's consent. View "City of Oxnard v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Elation sued Fenn and Shi for breach of a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) (against Shi only) entered during the course of Shi’s prior employment with Elation and breach of a confidential settlement agreement and mutual release (Settlement Agreement) (against both defendants) entered to resolve a prior action between the parties. The defendants filed a cross-complaint, alleging Elation’s breach of the Settlement Agreement. Elation admitted to liability and stipulated to $10,000 in liquidated damages on the cross-claim for breach of the Settlement Agreement. A jury found that Shi had breached the NDA and harmed Elation, and awarded Elation $10,000 in damages. The court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), denied Elation’s motion for injunctive relief, and awarded defendants $700,000 in attorney fees.The court of appeal reversed in part. The trial court should have awarded Elation nominal damages on its NDA claim, as defendants’ JNOV motion did not challenge the jury’s finding that Shi breached the NDA. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s finding in Elation’s favor on its Settlement Agreement claim. The court affirmed the order granting JNOV as to Elation’s Settlement Agreement claim and vacated the award of attorney fees. View "Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented centered on the aftermath of an Indian tribal casino’s unsuccessful suit in tribal court against appellant James Acres following a contract dispute. After dismissal of the tribal case, Acres filed his own suit in state court against two officials of the casino, the casino’s attorneys, a tribal court judge, the clerk of the tribal court, and various other individuals and entities. He alleged, among other things, that the parties he sued (collectively, respondents) wrongfully conspired to file the lawsuit against him in tribal court. He then sought monetary relief from respondents as redress for this alleged conduct. The trial court, however, found Acres’s claims against all respondents barred by sovereign immunity and, as to the tribal judge and several others, also barred by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed in part. Because Acres’s suit, if successful, would bind only the individual respondents, and not the tribe or its casino, the Court found those respondents were not entitled to sovereign immunity. But, as to those respondents who asserted personal immunity from suit (e.g., judicial immunity), the Court agreed those respondents, with one exception, were immune from suit. View "Acres v. Marston" on Justia Law

This appeal presented an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeals: does a commercial property insurance policy provide coverage for a business’s lost income due to the COVID-19 pandemic? After review of the specific insurance policy that California Mutual Insurance Company (California Mutual) issued to The Inns by the Sea (Inns) for its five lodging facilities, the Court determined Inns could not recover from California Mutual for its lost business income resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, Inns did not identify any manner in which it could amend its complaint to state a claim for coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining California Mutual’s demurrer without leave to amend. View "The Inns by the Sea v. Cal. Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law