Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lauron had two Chase credit cards, one ending in 5285 and one ending in 5274. The Cardmember Agreement for 5274 stated that: “THE TERMS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THIS AGREEMENT AND YOUR ACCOUNT SHALL BE GOVERNED AND INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL LAW AND, TO THE EXTENT STATE LAW APPLIES, THE LAW OF DELAWARE, WITHOUT REGARD TO CONFLICT-OF-LAW PRINCIPLES. THE LAW OF DELAWARE, WHERE WE AND YOUR ACCOUNT ARE LOCATED, WILL APPLY NO MATTER WHERE YOU LIVE OR USE THE ACCOUNT.” Chase sold both accounts to PCC for collection. PCC filed suit. Lauron cross-complained, alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15 U.S.C. 1692) and California’s Rosenthal Act by attempting to collect a time-barred debt. The court granted Lauron summary judgment, determining that Delaware’s three-year state of limitations applied and that the limitations period had expired before PCC filed suit, so that PCC was attempting to collect a time-barred debt in violation of the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act. The court of appeal reversed because, with respect to 5285 Lauron had not established when PCC’s claims accrued nor that the Cardmember Agreement applied. With respect to 5274, the court correctly applied Delaware law, but did not establish when the claims accrued. View "Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron" on Justia Law

Shalizi purchased an apartment building and wanted to move into unit four. Geraghty had been renting unit four for 22 years and was paying $938 a month. Shalizi’s attorney sent a letter informing Geragthy that Shalizi intended to commence an owner move-in eviction (Ellis Act “no fault” eviction), but suggested a voluntary buyout agreement. Shalizi and Geragthy entered into an agreement that promised Geraghty $25,000 and gave him several months to depart. Geraghty released Shalizi from “any and all claims which have or may have arisen from Tenant’s occupancy of the Premises at any time or any and all claims related to the Premises, including, but not limited to, claims for wrongful eviction, non-compliance with or violations of the provisions of the San Francisco Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance [SFRRSAO] and Rules and Regulations, . . . [or the] right to reoccupy the Premises.” Geraghty vacated and Shalizi paid. Shalizi began $70,000 in renovations and occupied the unit. Months later, Shalizi lost his job. Months later, Shalizi found new work, but had to relocate. He rented unit four to a new tenant for $3,700 a month. After discovering Shalizi was again renting out unit four, Geraghty sued for violation of the San Francisco rent ordinance, negligence, fraud, and rescission. The trial court granted Shalizi summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed, finding Geraghty’s waiver valid and enforceable. View "Geraghty v. Shalizi" on Justia Law

Leighton sued Forster for breach of an attorney fee contract and an account stated, seeking damages in excess of $114,000. In granting Forster summary judgment, the trial court found that an engagement letter Leighton emailed to Forster’s husband Bob was not a valid contract because it was never signed (Bus. & Prof. Code, section 6148) and any claim for payment of the reasonable value of Leighton’s services was barred by the two-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc, section 339(1)). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there were triable issues of material fact regarding Rochelle’s liability for the unpaid attorney fees because she produced evidence that, before Bob died, Leighton and Bob negotiated a fee arrangement that either satisfied the requirements of section 6148 or was exempt from those requirements. The absence of a written fee agreement conclusively establishes that Rochelle was entitled to summary judgment. View "Leighton v. Forster" on Justia Law

Jacobs, a licensed California real estate broker, had the “exclusive and irrevocable right” to sell a Marin County parcel for one year. The listing price was $2,200,000; if Jacobs procured a buyer during the listing period, Jacobs would receive a commission of $200,000. The agreement specified that if one named party bought the property, Jacobs would receive no commission. Locatelli signed the agreement as trustee of the Locatelli Trust, but there were blank signature lines for five additional parties. Jacobs claimed that Locatelli stated that he was authorized to act on behalf of the other owners and that she can obtain a written “agency agreement” through discovery. When Jacobs noted interest in the property by TPL, Locatelli was angry and asserted that he had been speaking with TPL for three years and that he wanted to change the agreement. Jacobs claimed that she investigated and that her TPL contact told her that he did not know Locatelli and had not been aware the property was for sale until he was contacted by Jacobs. Later, the owners and TPL entered into a sales contract. The sale was never consummated, apparently because issues arose between the parties. Jacobs sued the owners and TPL. The trial court dismissed without explanation. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the claims were not barred by the statute of frauds or the parol evidence rule. View "Jacobs v. Locatelli" on Justia Law

Western filed suit against La Cumbre for breach of an indemnity agreement where Mark J. Melchiori signed the agreement on La Cumbre's behalf as a managing member. In actuality, he was the managing member of La Cumbre's manager, MIC. MIC did not have actual authority to execute the indemnity agreement on La Cumbre's behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment for Western. The court concluded that Melchiori's signature binds La Cumbre pursuant to former Corporations Code section 17157, subdivision (d) (now section 17703.01, subdivision (d)), provided that the other party to the agreement does not have actual knowledge of the person's lack of authority to execute the agreement on behalf of La Cumbre. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Western Surety Co. v. La Cumbre Office Partners" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs borrowed $110 million in 2007 from Bear Stearns to finance the purchase of Rincon Towers, a San Francisco apartment complex. In 2010, after plaintiffs failed to repay the loan and after changes in the ownership of the loan, CP III purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued CP III and other entities who were involved in administering the loan, unsuccessful workout negotiations, and the eventual foreclosure sale. The trial court rejected all of their claims. The court of appeal remanded plaintiffs’ legal claims (breach of contract, fraud, slander of title, trade secret misappropriation), finding that the trial court erred in striking their demand for a jury trial, but affirmed as to the equitable claims (unfair competition, to set aside the foreclosure sale, and for an accounting). View "Rincon EV Realty, LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that the company violated the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. Plaintiff's claim also included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Lab. Code, § 2699. On appeal, Wet Seal challenges the denial of its motion to compel arbitration, and the grant of plaintiff's motion to compel discovery responses. The court concluded that Wet Seal's motion to compel arbitration was properly denied where the trial court declared the entire arbitration agreement was void and unenforceable based on its determination that the PAGA waiver was invalid, and applied the arbitration agreement's nonseverability provision. Wet Seal also asserts that the trial court should not have reached the merits of the discovery motion while its motion to compel arbitration was undetermined. The court concluded that there is no requirement for a trial court to issue a tentative ruling, or to announce its final ruling before taking a matter under submission. Because there is no basis to treat the appeal from the nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, the court dismissed this portion of the appeal. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

M.C., a gestational carrier, challenges the trial court's declaration that Father is the sole legal parent of triplet children and finding that M.C. has no parental rights. M.C. entered into the surrogacy arrangement with Father, pursuant to a written “In Vitro Fertilization Surrogacy Agreement.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that M.C. is not estopped from challenging the legal effect or validity of the Agreement. On the merits, the court concluded that Father complied with the requirements for establishing a parent-child relationship and for terminating M.C.’s claimed parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 7962. The court also concluded that the trial court's application of section 7962 is consistent with the constitutional rights of M.C. and the children. In this case, M.C.'s various substantive and procedural challenges are foreclosed by specific legislative provisions and by a prior decision by the California Supreme Court. Because the court found no error in the trial court's ruling, the court affirmed the judgment. View "C.M. v. M.C." on Justia Law

Dr. Hoang, a dentist, died in 2010. Dr. Khan agreed to buy Hoang’s practice. The contract allows the prevailing party to be awarded fees if “any litigation . . . is commenced . . . concerning its terms, interpretation or enforcement or the rights and duties of any party.” Two years later, Khan filed suit for breach of contract, fraud, concealment, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission. Khan alleged failure to comply with warranties, including that none of the practice records contained any untrue statement or material omission; that the practice was in compliance with laws and regulations; that patients and insurance companies had been properly billed; that the practice had not billed for services for which the practice was not entitled to compensation; that the practice had not, as a usual practice, waived co-payments or deductibles; and the practice had not increased any employee’s salary after April 2010. The estate counter claimed that Khan had failed to remit accounts receivable and to provide proper accounting. Before trial, Khan voluntarily dismissed her entire complaint without prejudice. The court found for Khan on all causes of action in the counter-complaint. The estate obtained an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(a)(4). The court of appeal remanded. Section 1717(b)(2), generally bars the award of fees after a pretrial voluntary dismissal for defense of contract claims, but the agreement's fee provision was broad enough to cover fees for defense against tort actions. View "Khan v. Shim" on Justia Law

VitaVet hired IDS to develop a software program that would increase the speed and efficiency of its online services. IDS delivered an unfinished version of the software and withheld the source code and technical specifications needed to finish it. The parties filed suit against each other and the trial court issued a preliminary injunction that ordered the software consultant to deliver the source code and technical specifications to the company. The court concluded that a preliminary injunction that alters the status quo does not constitute an impermissible final adjudication of the merits of the lawsuit. The court explained that such injunctions are reserved for “extreme cases” where the right to relief is “clearly established.” The court affirmed the issuance of the injunction because the trial court did not abuse it discretion in concluding that this is one of those “extreme cases” where VitaVet had a “clearly established” right to preliminary injunctive relief. In this case, VitaVet established that the contract gave all ownership of IDS's work product to VitaVet, going so far as to empower VitaVet to obtain copies of that product whenever it wanted. IDS's refusal to hand over the source code breached these contractual provisions and damaged VitaVet's business operations. View "Integrated Dynamic Solutions v. Vitavet Labs" on Justia Law