Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sequeira did not work on January 1, 2010, because it was a paid holiday. He was hospitalized the next day with a sudden illness and died on January 6 without returning to work. Sequeira’s widow sought benefits under a supplemental life insurance policy that was issued to Sequeira’s employer on January 1, 2010. The trial court ruled that she was not entitled to benefits because the policy required her husband to be “on the job, at his employer’s place of employment, performing his customary duties” between January 1 and his death. The court of appeal reversed. The policy is ambiguous regarding whether Sequeira needed to perform his work responsibilities on New Year’s Day or anytime after that in order for his wife to receive benefits. The court should, therefore, interpret the policy in favor of Sequeira’s reasonable expectations, which are that he should not have to work on New Year’s Day or when he is sick in order to receive coverage that he has paid for. View "Sequeira v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

West Bay Builders, Inc. and Safeco Insurance Company of America (Safeco) appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for attorney fees under Business and Professions Code section 7108.5 and Public Contract Code sections 7107 and 10262.5 (prompt payment statutes). West Bay and Safeco were sued by James L. Harris Painting & Decorating, Inc. for breach of contract and violation of the prompt payment statutes. In turn, West Bay filed a cross-complaint against Harris for breach of contract arising out of the same construction project. After years of litigation, the jury found both West Bay and Harris had failed to perform and thus did not award damages to either side. Safeco also did not recover because it was sued only in its capacity as issuer of a bond to West Bay for the construction project. Although West Bay and Safeco did not recover any damages, they moved for attorney fees under the fee shifting provisions of the prompt payment statutes. The trial court denied their motion, finding there was no prevailing party in this case. On appeal, West Bay and Safeco argued the trial court lacked discretion to refuse an award of mandatory attorney fees under the prompt payment statutes because they prevailed at trial. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that under the prompt payment statutes, the trial court has discretion to determine there is no prevailing party in an action. And in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding there was no prevailing party. View "James L Harris Painting v. West Bay" on Justia Law

The Judicial Council of California, (JCC) entered into a contract with Jacobs Facilities, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jacobs. Performance of the contract required a license under the Contractors’ State License Law. Facilities was properly licensed when it commenced work. Later, Jacobs, as part of a corporate reorganization, transferred the employees responsible for the JCC contract to another subsidiary and caused the new subsidiary to obtain a contractor’s license, while permitting the Facilities license to expire. Facilities remained the signatory on the JCC contract until a year later, when the parties entered into an assignment to the new, licensed subsidiary. JCC sued under Bus. & Prof. Code 7031(b), which requires an unlicensed contractor to disgorge its compensation. Defendants contended that Facilities had “internally” assigned the contract to the new subsidiary prior to expiration of its license; JCC ratified the internal assignment when it consented to the assignment to the new subsidiary; and Facilities had “substantially complied” with the law. After the jury found for defendants on the other defenses, the substantial compliance issue was not decidedd. The court of appeal reversed, concluding Facilities violated the statute when it continued to act as the contracting party after its license expired, and remanded for a hearing on substantial compliance. View "Judicial Council of Cal. v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc." on Justia Law

Darbun filed suit against Mission for breach of a lease agreement, seeking damages and specific performance. In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that, in cases involving mixed issues of equity and law, a trial court may not act as a factfinder on issues it specifically reserves for jury determination. Here, in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), the trial court improperly transformed its equitable finding of unenforceability as to specific performance into a finding of unenforceability as to the legal issue of damages. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Darbun Enter., Inc. v. San Fernando Comm. Hosp." on Justia Law

The Wongs bought a hillside home in San Carlos for $2.35 million from the Stolers. Several months after they moved in, the Wongs discovered that they and 12 of their neighbors were connected to a private sewer system and were not directly serviced by the city’s public system. Believing they had been deceived, they sued the Stolers and the real estate agents who brokered the sale alleging various claims, including rescission. After the Wongs settled their dispute with the real estate agents for $200,000, a trial was held on the rescission claim only. Although the court found that the Stolers, with reckless disregard, made negligent misrepresentations to the Wongs, it declined to effectuate a rescission , but ordered the Stolers to be, for a limited time, indemnifiers to the Wongs for sewer maintenance and repair costs exceeding the $200,000 they obtained in their settlement with the agents. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the trial court declined to effectuate a rescission of the contract based on incorrect justifications and that its alternative remedy failed to provide the Wongs with the complete relief to which they were entitled. View "Wong v. Stoler" on Justia Law

OEpic and ALi agreed to cooperate in developing a power amplifier for use in wireless networking devices and entered into a nondisclosure agreement. Wong signed the agreement on Ali’s behalf. Later, Wong formed Richwave. OEpic continued to transfer intellectual property to Wong’s team based upon assurances that Ali’s rights and obligations under the agreement had been or would be assumed by Richwave. Richwave subsequently disclaimed any need for OEpic’s services; ALi disclaimed any further obligation to OEpic. Epic was formed, became successor to all of OEpic’s interest, and sued ALi, Richwave, and Wong, alleging that ALi had transferred certain of Epic’s intellectual property to Wong and Richwave in violation of the agreements between OEpic and ALi.. The trial court granted Wong and Richwave summary judgment on the ground that a settlement agreement with ALi barred remaining causes of action. The court of appeal reversed, noting that several other provisions of the settlement agreement containing the disputed release clause are not easily reconciled its seemingly broad language. The subsequent conduct of the contracting parties also appears inconsistent with intent to extend the release to unaffiliated third parties. View "Epic Commc'ns, Inc. v. Richwave Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

A homeowner sued a general contractor for allegedly shoddy and incomplete work in connection with a major home remodeling contract. The homeowner’s complaint also contained a cause of action against the general contractor’s license bond company, seeking to recover for the contractor’s having “grossly deviated” from the plans and specifications for the job. To support his action, the homeowner explicitly alleged in the complaint that the contractor was licensed at all times. The contractor cross-complained against the homeowner for unpaid work. The cross-complaint included a copy of their written contract which showed the contractor’s license number. To that, the homeowner simply filed a general denial of all allegations. When the case came to trial, the homeowner (contrary to the applicable local rule requiring plaintiffs to identify all controverted issues) did not identify licensure as a controverted issue. The contractor’s attorney did not obtain a verified certificate from the Contractors’ State License Board showing the contractor was licensed at all times during his performance. But when the contractor was about to rest his case on the cross-complaint, the homeowner’s attorney made a motion for nonsuit based on the absence of such a verified certificate as required under Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (d). The trial judge deferred immediate ruling on the homeowner’s nonsuit motion. "As the contractor learned to his chagrin, it [...] takes at least six days to obtain a verified certificate from the License Board even if one drives overnight to Sacramento to pick it up in person." While the contractor was eventually able to obtain a verified certificate of licensure from the License Board, he could not do so until after the close of the trial, in which he prevailed on his claim for unpaid work from the homeowner. Because no certificate of licensure could be produced, the trial judge reluctantly granted the homeowner’s nonsuit motion, by judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). This appeal followed. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed that judgment in favor of the homeowner, with instructions to the trial judge to grant judgment in favor of the general contractor as against the homeowner. "We conclude this is one of those relatively rare cases where a party can be bound by a judicial admission made in an unverified complaint. Here, the judicial admission that the general contractor was licensed, compounded by the homeowner’s failure to comply with the local rule requiring identification of all controverted issues, rendered the question of licensure assuredly uncontroverted for purposes of section 7031. Because of the judicial admission, the rule of 'Advantec Group, Inc. v. Edwin’s Plumbing Co., Inc.' (153 Cal.App.4th 621 (2007)) does not apply." View "Womack v. Lovell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (24 Hour) stating causes of action for premises liability, general negligence, and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs Etelvina and Pedro Jimenez appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of 24 Hour. Etelvina sustained a catastrophic injury while using a treadmill at a 24 Hour facility in Sacramento. Etelvina’s expert opined that she fell backwards off of a moving treadmill and sustained severe head injuries when she hit her head on the exposed steel foot of a leg exercise machine that 24 Hour placed approximately three feet ten inches behind the treadmill. 24 Hour filed an answer to the complaint generally denying the allegations and claiming several affirmative defenses, including the defense that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by a liability release. Plaintiffs asserted that 24 Hour was grossly negligent in setting up the treadmill in a manner that violated the manufacturer’s safety instructions. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in 24 Hour’s favor because: (1) the liability release was not enforceable against plaintiffs’ claim of gross negligence; (2) the release was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation; and (3) the release only encompasses reasonably foreseeable risks and Etelvina’s injury was not reasonably foreseeable at the time she signed the release. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiff's first two contentions. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jimenez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Rachel Verdugo appealed an order granting a motion to stay based on a forum selection clause in her employment agreement with defendant-respondent Alliantgroup, L.P. The clause designated Harris County, Texas, as the exclusive forum for any dispute arising out of Verdugo’s employment, and also included a provision designating Texas law as governing all disputes. Verdugo contended the trial court erred because enforcing the forum selection clause and related choice-of-law clause violated California’s public policy on employee compensation. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the trial court’s order. View "Verdugo v. Alliantgroup" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit in this case, "Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc. v. Leonard," was filed by real party in interest Retailers’ Credit Association of Grass Valley, Inc., and alleged petitioner Kathleen Leonard breached a contract by failing to pay $2,340.41 for medical services provided by additional real party in interest, Dignity Health, which was doing business as Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Retailers’ Credit Association was the local collection agency providing collection services for Sierra Nevada Memorial Hospital. Leonard filed a pro. per. cross-complaint against Retailers’ Credit Association, alleging a violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 by negligent disclosure of private medical information (i.e. “date of medical visits, medical record number, [and] account numbers”). On the front page of her cross-complaint, Leonard checked the box on the form that stated, “ACTION IS A LIMITED CIVIL CASE ($25,000 or less).” In the complaint itself, Leonard checked the box requesting “compensatory damages” for “limited civil cases.” She also requested injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring Retailers’ Credit Association to remove the allegedly private information from its complaint. Leonard later filed a pro. per. motion to amend her cross-complaint. In the caption of the motion, she stated the amendment was to “NAME SIERRA NEVADA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AS A CROSS-DEFENDANT and TO REMOVE THIS CASE TO A COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION.” The memorandum of points and authorities alleged that the documents attached to the complaint contained her medical record number and were not necessary for the prosecution of the collection claim and at the very least could have been redacted to protect her privacy. When she reviewed the complaint, she “noticed the attachment to the complaint contained [her] medical records and medical record number” and that the complaint with the attachment had been filed publically at the courthouse. The trial court denied Leonard’s motion to amend the cross-complaint and “[t]ransfer to [u]nlimited [j]urisdiction” without prejudice. Leonard “failed to attach the proposed [a]mended [c]ross-[c]omplaint to the motion” and as a result, the court was “unable to determine what the proposed changes include.” The court was “unable to determine if an additional [c]ross-[d]efendant [wa]s sought to be named or if damages sought exceed $25,000. Thus, th[e] Court [w]as unable to determine if [Leonard] [wa]s entitled to the relief sought.” This case involves how a limited civil case (here a cross-complaint) gets reclassified as an unlimited civil case. After review, the Court of Appeal held that where Leonard filed, through counsel, an amended cross-complaint that added a cross-defendant and added causes of action that increased the amount in controversy to over $25,000 and tried twice to pay the court clerk the reclassification fee, the trial court was required to reclassify the case. Here, the trial court refused to reclassify the case and went on to deny Leonard’s later-filed motion for reclassification, a motion that was unnecessary because the trial court should have already reclassified the case (and in any event, the motion was the inappropriate vehicle by which to change the classification here). The Court therefore granted Leonard’s petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to reclassify the case upon Leonard paying the reclassification fee. View "Leonard v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law