Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

RNT appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on its claim for breach of insurance contract against RNT, arguing that the trial court erroneously determined that the claim failed in light of the terms of RNT's policy. The court concluded that summary judgment on RNT's claim for breach of insurance contract was properly granted on the basis of the undisputed facts; condition 10(b) of the policy, which terminates an insurer's liability when the loan is paid off or the related mortgage is released; and exclusion 3(a) of the policy, which precludes coverage for defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to by RNT. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "RNT Holdings v. United Gen. Title Ins." on Justia Law

This case arose when defendant entered into a settlement agreement to sell her property to Blueberry and then refused to consummate the sale. The trial court entered judgment pursuant to the terms of the agreement and ordered defendant to complete the sale. On appeal, defendant challenged the trial court's post-judgment order appointing the clerk of the court as an elisor to execute the escrow agreement on behalf of defendant. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that the trial court's order was proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(4), which empowers the court to compel obedience to its judgments.View "Blueberry Properties v. Chow" on Justia Law

This case was one of a number of cases which have, in the aftermath of the "Great Recession" that hit Riverside and San Bernadino counties particarly hard. This appeal stemmed from the construction of a Kohl’s department store in Beaumont. The developer of the store was Inland-LCG Beaumont, LLC, and the general contractor was 361 Group Construction Services, Inc. Somewhere in the process of construction, the money dried up and 361 refused to pay its subcontractors for work they had done. Those subcontractors included Cass Construction, TNT Grading Inc., Palomar Grading & Paving and R3 Contractors. These four subcontractors recorded mechanic’s liens and sued to foreclose those liens. With one exception they obtained judgments of foreclosure. The one exception was TNT, who, by the time of the trial to foreclose its mechanic’s lien, was a suspended corporation and thus unable to prosecute an action. The two owners of the property, Kohl’s and Wells Fargo, appealed the judgments obtained by the three successful subcontractors, Cass, R3 and Palomar Grading. The Court of Appeal took a "soup-to-nuts" approach in reviewing the multiple issues presented on appeal, and affirmed in all respects except to the degree that liens of Palomar Grading and Cass should include prejudgment interest. To that degree the Court reversed the judgment and remanded it with instructions to the trial court to recalculate the prejudgment interest at 7 percent. On balance, Cass and R3 were still the prevailing parties in this appeal: Of 10 issues raised, they prevailed, either singly or together, in 9. They recovered their costs on appeal from Kohl’s and Wells Fargo. For Palomar Grading, the only issue on which it has appeared in this appeal was the issue of the proper rate of prejudgment interest, and on that issue it lost. "However, it would be unfair to allow Kohl’s and Wells Fargo to recover all their appellate costs from Palomar Grading because they won on the lone prejudgment interest rate issue. Most of this appeal has concerned their unsuccessful challenges to the foreclosure judgments obtained by Cass and R3."View "Palomar Grading v. Wells Fargo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Ron Willemsen, a purchaser of vacant land, sued various parties involved in the sale of the land, including defendant-respondent AppraisalPacific, Inc., the appraisal company hired by Willemsen’s lender. AppraisalPacific, Inc. and its individual appraisers, moved for summary judgment, in which they asserted that Willemsen’s negligent misrepresentation cause of action against them failed as a matter of law. The court granted the motion and Willemsen appealed. After its review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: Willemsen failed to raise a triable issue of material fact to show the AppraisalPacific Defendants intended to supply information to him to influence his decision whether to buy the property. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Willemsen’s request for leave to file an amended complaint to assert a cause of action for breach of third party beneficiary contract.View "Willemsen v. Mitrosilis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (CBRE), pursuant to a 2004 listing agreement, sought a commission after the 2005 sale of 38 acres of land in Murrieta. Arbitration proceedings between CBRE and the seller, Jefferson 38, LLC resulted in a confirmed arbitral award in CBRE’s favor, but no monetary satisfaction for CBRE because Jefferson had no assets by the time of the arbitral award and judgment. The issue this case presented to the Court of Appeal centered on CBRE’s attempt to recover damages from Jefferson’s individual members. A jury trial resulted in a $354,000 judgment in favor of CBRE. Both defendants and CBRE appealed the judgment, citing alleged errors pertaining to jury instructions, the admissibility of evidence, juror misconduct, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. Upon review, the Court of Appeal rejected the parties’ contentions, except with regard to CBRE’s entitlement to attorney fees.View "CB Richard Ellis v. Terra Nostra Consultants" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed as a massage therapist with HMWC when he was accused in an underlying action for sexually assaulting a client during a massage. In this case, plaintiff filed suit against Continental, HMWC's comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurer, alleging that Continental had a duty to defend and indemnify him in the underlying action. The court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that defendant was not entitled to a defense under the Continental policy where the intentional sexual assault alleged in the underlying action cannot not properly be characterized as within the scope of plaintiff's employment or having occurred while performing duties related to the conduct of HMWC's business. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.View "Baek v. Continental Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Scottsdale for breach of its insurance contract and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. At issue was whether plaintiffs can pursue a claim for preforeclosure damage to the property at issue deliberately caused by the purchaser under an insurance policy issued by Scottsdale containing a mortgage coverage provision. The court concluded that plaintiffs' full faith and credit bid at the foreclosure sale under the second deed of trust precluded them from making a claim on the insurance proceeds. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a defense offer to compromise under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.View "Najah v. Scottsdale Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Attorneys Siegel and Weills represented Hernandez in a successful employment discrimination lawsuit in which attorney fees and costs were awarded, pursuant to Government Code section 12965. The total amount of the fee award, plus accrued interest, was paid directly to Siegel’s law firm by the defendant in the litigation. When the interest was not disbursed to her, Hernandez sued Siegel, Weills, and their law firm, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and intentional torts. The trial court concluded that the attorneys, rather than Hernandez, were entitled to both. Hernandez appeals. The appeals court affirmed, noting language in the fee agreement: you authorize and agree that our outstanding bill for fees and costs must and will be paid from the settlement or judgment in your case, whether or not we are your counsel at the time the matter is finally resolved.View "Hernandez v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Mercury Casualty Company filed an action seeking declaratory relief regarding its obligation to students Hung Chu and his roommate Tu Pham. Mercury issued an automobile policy to Chu insuring his 1995 Honda Accord. Chu was driving, and Pham was a passenger, when Chu collided with a vehicle driven by Krystal Nguyen Hoang. Pham filed a personal injury action against Chu and Hoang and obtained a $333,300 judgment against Chu. Mercury sought a judicial determination confirming Mercury’s decision Chu’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s judgment under a “resident exclusion.” Mercury also sought an order requiring Chu to reimburse Mercury the fees and costs it incurred in defending him against Pham’s lawsuit. Chu cross-complained against Mercury for breach of contract, bad faith, and general negligence. Mercury prevailed on the issue of whether the policy provided coverage for Pham’s judgment. The court determined Mercury had no duty to indemnify Chu with respect to the judgment. It granted Mercury’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (JOP) on Chu’s cross-complaint but determined Mercury could not seek reimbursement of its attorney fees and costs in defending Chu because such damages were not sought in the JOP. Both parties appealed. Chu and Pham appealed the determination that Mercury’s policy excluded coverage for Pham’s personal injury lawsuit against Chu. Mercury appealed the court’s ruling Chu was not required to reimburse Mercury for the defense fees and costs. After its review of the record, the Court of Appeal reversed, concluding the policy provision excluding Pham from coverage was an overbroad expansion of the statutorily permitted exclusion and was also contrary to public policy. Based on this ruling, the Court did not address the issue raised in Mercury’s cross-appeal regarding its entitlement to defense costs and fees.View "Mercury Casualty v. Chu" on Justia Law

The Fleets applied to have their Bank of America (BofA) home loan modified in 2009 under the Making Homes Affordable Act. The result of multiple telephone calls and letters to various BofA-related personnel, the Fleets were either (a) assured the Fleets that everything was proceeding smoothly or (b) told BofA had no knowledge of any loan modification application. Finally, in November 2011, BofA informed the Fleets they had been approved for a trial period plan under a Fannie Mae modification program. All they had to do, was to make three monthly payments starting on December 1, 2011. If they made the payments, then they would move to the next step (verification of financial hardship); if they passed that test, their loan would be permanently modified. The Fleets made the first two payments, for December 2011 and January 2012, which BofA acknowledged receiving, and therefore foreclosure proceedings had been suspended. Toward the end of January 2012, their house was sold at a trustee’s sale. Two days after the sale, a representative of the buyer showed up at the house with a notice to quit. The Fleets informed him that the house had significant structural problems, and he said he was going to rescind the sale. The Fleets continued to try to communicate with BofA regarding the property. A BofA representative left voice mail messages to the effect that BofA wanted to discuss a solution to the dispute, but otherwise it appeared that productive conversation between the Fleets and BofA and between the Fleets and the buyer had ceased. In light of this silence (which they interpreted to mean the buyer was trying to rescind the sale), the Fleets spent $15,000 to repair a broken sewer main, which was leaking sewage onto the front lawn. They were evicted in August 2012. In June 2012, the Fleets sued BofA, the trustee under their deed of trust, BofA officers and some of the employees who had been involved in handling their loan modification, and the buyer of the property and its representative. BofA’s demurrer to the first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action promissory estoppel, breach of contract, fraud, and accounting. All of the BofA defendants were dismissed. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Although the Fleets’ amended complaint spreads the fraud allegations over three causes of action and contains a great deal of extraneous information, it also alleges the requisite elements of promissory fraud. [. . .] This cause of action may or may not be provable; what it definitely is not is demurrable." The Court sustained the demurrer to the Fleets' action for promissory estoppel, and affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fleet v. Bank of America" on Justia Law