Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against John Travolta, Atlo, and others (collectively, "Atlo"), seeking a declaration as to whether a three-page agreement or a four-page agreement was the enforceable termination agreement between the parties, and whether a confidentiality provision, if one exists, is enforceable. Atlo filed an anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike the first amended complaint under Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that a declaratory relief action filed in response to an attorney's letters threatening litigation over the contract dispute does not come within the provisions of an anti-SLAPP lawsuit where the lawsuit sought a declaration regarding the terms of plaintiff's termination agreement, not whether Atlo may send demand letters or threaten litigation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike the complaint and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Gotterba v. Travolta" on Justia Law

Defendant provides residential real estate brokerage services in Seattle, Washington. Plaintiff lives in California. In 2009 the parties executed a form contract drafted by defendant. Defendant engaged plaintiff as a Contract Field Agent (CFA) as “an independent contractor.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, alleging defendant improperly classified CFAs as independent contractors when they were actually employees under California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Laws and claimed unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest periods, inaccurate and untimely wage statements, waiting time penalties, and unreimbursed business expenses. Defendant sought arbitration under the Agreement, which provides that it is to be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); that the arbitration clause did not apply to plaintiff’s statutory claims because those claims were based on statutes, not the contract; and noted “unrebutted evidence of substantial procedural unconscionability.” The court of appeal reversed, Under California law, there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and, even under California law, plaintiff’s unconscionability claim lacks merit. View "Galen v. Redfin Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Nancy Lee hired Attorney William Hanley to represent her in a civil suit. After the litigation settled, Lee sought a refund of unearned attorney fees and unused expert witness fees she had advanced to Hanley. Not having received a refund, Lee hired Attorney Walter Wilson and terminated Hanley. Attorney Hanley thereafter refunded certain expert witness fees, but no attorney fees. More than a year after hiring Wilson, Lee filed a lawsuit against Hanley seeking the return of the unearned fees. Hanley filed a demurrer to Lee’s second amended complaint, based on the one-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action with prejudice. Lee appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that to the extent a claim is construed as a wrongful act not arising in the performance of legal services, "such as garden variety theft or conversion, section 340.6 is inapplicable. . . . Here, the facts alleged in Lee’s second amended complaint could be construed as giving rise to a cause of action for the theft or conversion of an identifiable sum of money belonging to her. This being the case, we cannot say that Lee’s second amended complaint demonstrates clearly and affirmatively on its face that her action is necessarily barred by the section 340.6 statute of limitations." Because this action had not reached a point where the court could determine whether the wrongful act in question arose in the performance of legal services, and thus, whether or not section 340.6 applied, the demurrer should not have been sustained. View "Lee v. Hanley" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as iWorld, filed suit against Westfield, a shopping center, alleging that Westfield violated a lease agreement. The trial court stated that Westfield's service of a notice of termination was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that each count was based in part on Westfield's service of the notice. The trial court concluded that the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b), "arguably" was a complete defense to the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not arise from protected activity and was not subject to a special motion to strike. Therefore, plaintiff need not establish a probability of prevailing on her claims and the court need not decide whether she did so. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the special motion to strike and the order awarding attorney fees to Westfield. View "Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC" on Justia Law