Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A longtime deputy sheriff was convicted by a federal jury of mail and wire fraud after she submitted an insurance claim for items stolen during a burglary at her home, some of which she falsely claimed as her own but actually belonged to her employer, the sheriff’s office. She also used her employer’s fax machine and cover sheet in communicating with the insurance company and misrepresented her supervisor’s identity. The criminal conduct arose after a romantic relationship with a former inmate ended badly, leading to the burglary, but the fraud conviction was based on her false insurance claim, not on the relationship or the burglary itself.Following her conviction, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) determined that her crimes constituted conduct “arising out of or in the performance of her official duties” under Government Code section 7522.72, part of the Public Employees Pension Reform Act, and partially forfeited her pension. The administrative law judge and the San Francisco Superior Court both upheld CalPERS’s decision, reasoning that her actions were sufficiently connected to her employment, particularly in her misuse of employer property and resources and in the context of her relationship with the former inmate.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the statute requires a specific causal nexus between the criminal conduct and the employee’s official duties, not merely any job-related connection. The court found that the deputy’s fraudulent insurance claim, although it referenced employer property and resources, did not arise out of or in the performance of her official duties as required by the statute. Accordingly, the pension forfeiture determination was set aside. View "Myres v. Bd. of Admin. for CalPERS" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of misdemeanor embezzlement in November 2016 and placed on three years’ probation. Eleven months into probation, she was accused of committing new fraud, and by December 2017, the probation department reported a violation to the trial court. Thirteen months after her probation began, the court summarily revoked her probation and set a hearing on the violation. That hearing was continued several times, sometimes at her request, and ultimately was never held. Meanwhile, in 2021, a new law—Assembly Bill 1950—shortened most misdemeanor probation terms to one year and applied retroactively.After the new law took effect, the woman moved to terminate her probation, arguing her term should be considered expired by operation of law under the revised statute. The People opposed, citing prior case law and statutory provisions that allow courts to retain jurisdiction over violations that occurred during the original term. The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied her motion, and the Appellate Division of the Superior Court denied her petition for a writ of mandate without explanation. She then sought relief in the California Court of Appeal, which initially denied her petition as well.Following reconsideration ordered by the Supreme Court of California in light of its decision in People v. Faial, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, concluded that the new law applied retroactively and that the woman’s probation expired by operation of law one year after it began. Because the trial court did not revoke probation within that new, shorter period, it no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate the alleged violation. The Court of Appeal granted her petition, ordering termination of her probation and directing the lower courts to issue the necessary orders. View "Kuhnel v. Appellate Division" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant was charged with assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury and a related enhancement. After being arraigned in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, the defendant was remanded into custody with bail set. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for nine days after arraignment, in line with the ten-court-day deadline under California Penal Code section 859b for in-custody defendants. Due to a cyberattack, all Los Angeles County courthouses were closed on the originally scheduled hearing date, and the preliminary hearing was continued to the tenth court day. On that day, the defendant was not brought to court, and the court continued the hearing further, ordering the defendant released on his own recognizance. However, the defendant was not actually released until almost three days after the order.The trial court denied defense motions to dismiss the complaint under section 859b, reasoning that dismissal was unnecessary because the defendant had been ordered released on the tenth court day. The defendant then sought a writ of mandate from the superior court, which was denied on similar grounds. The defendant petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of prohibition, which was denied by a divided panel. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, held that section 859b requires dismissal of the criminal complaint when a defendant remains in custody for more than ten court days solely on that complaint and the preliminary hearing is continued beyond the statutory period, unless the defendant waives the deadline or good cause is found. The court concluded that the relevant measure is the defendant’s actual time in custody, not the date of a release order. Because the defendant was not released until after the ten-court-day period and neither waiver nor good cause was established, dismissal was mandatory. The court granted the petition for writ of prohibition and directed dismissal of the complaint. View "Benavides v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant charged with several offenses, including possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of ammunition by a prohibited person, possession of a controlled substance with a firearm, and related drug offenses, following a 2023 arrest in Orange County. The defendant, who was on probation in three other counties, filed a motion for pretrial mental health diversion under California Penal Code section 1001.36, submitting evidence of multiple diagnosed mental disorders that were significant factors in the commission of the offenses. Expert reports and treatment records supported the defendant’s eligibility and suitability for diversion, noting his willingness to participate in treatment and the absence of any indication that he posed an unreasonable risk to public safety if treated in the community.The Superior Court of Orange County held a hearing and found that the defendant met all statutory eligibility and suitability criteria for mental health diversion. Nevertheless, the court denied the motion, exercising what it described as “residual discretion,” citing concerns about public safety, the defendant’s criminal history, substance use, a recent DUI arrest, and an alleged lack of effective court monitoring during diversion. The defendant subsequently pled guilty to most charges and was sentenced to probation and jail time, but appealed the denial of diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that while trial courts retain discretion to deny mental health diversion even when statutory criteria are met, that discretion must be exercised consistent with the statute’s principles and purposes—favoring broad application of diversion for eligible defendants. The appellate court found the lower court’s denial was based on findings unsupported by substantial evidence, speculative reasoning, and a misunderstanding of the statute’s monitoring provisions. The judgment was reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to grant diversion absent changed circumstances. View "P. v. Cabalar" on Justia Law

A man used a social media application to communicate with what he believed to be a minor. In reality, he was interacting with a law enforcement officer posing as a 14-year-old girl. Their exchange included plans to meet for sexual contact, and when he arrived at the agreed location, law enforcement apprehended him. Physical evidence found in his vehicle supported the allegation that he intended to engage in sexual activity. At trial, the defendant asserted that he did not know he was interacting with a minor and claimed he had deleted the relevant message thread, losing access to the initial messages where age was mentioned.The Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, conducted the trial, where a jury found him guilty of meeting a minor for lewd purposes, contacting a minor for a sexual offense, and attempted lewd act upon a child. The trial judge sentenced him to probation. The defense argued that the jury instructions regarding mistake of fact were erroneous, specifically that they required any mistaken belief about the minor’s age to be reasonable. The prosecution conceded the instructional error but asserted it was harmless.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that a mistake of fact as to the minor’s age must be reasonable, when the charged offenses require only an actual belief due to their specific intent elements. The appellate court found the error was prejudicial, emphasizing that the jury might have credited the defendant’s testimony but was prevented from considering an unreasonable yet genuinely held belief. Consequently, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment. View "P. v. Ismaiel" on Justia Law

After entering a no contest plea to charges including willful infliction of corporal injury and dissuading a witness, the petitioner was sentenced to four years’ probation and 60 days in county jail. She was referred to a work release program in lieu of serving her jail time. While participating, she discovered she was pregnant and could not complete her work assignment due to morning sickness. After providing proof of her pregnancy, the sheriff advised her not to return to the worksite because no light duty was available, and her case was sent back to the trial court for further action.The Contra Costa County Superior Court later considered her situation. At a hearing, the court found that she had not willfully violated the terms of the work release program but concluded that the alternative sentence was no longer feasible. The court ordered her to serve the remainder of her jail term in custody, denying her requests for re-referral to the program or a delayed surrender. The petitioner subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, asserting that her due process rights had been violated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that individuals enrolled in work release programs in lieu of jail time possess a conditional liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process. The court found that the trial court’s decision to remand the petitioner into custody was based on a factual finding—her unfitness for the program—that was unsupported by the evidence. As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter with instructions to re-refer the petitioner to the work release program to complete any remaining days owed. View "In re Riley" on Justia Law

A man was apprehended after leading police on a high-speed chase in a stolen vehicle. When the vehicle was stopped, law enforcement found an AR-style firearm with an overall length of less than 30 inches on the passenger-side floorboard. The man was charged with several offenses, including driving or taking a vehicle without consent, fleeing a police officer while driving recklessly, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of an assault weapon. The information also alleged several aggravating factors related to his criminal history and conduct.In Contra Costa County Superior Court, a jury found the defendant guilty of all charges except receiving a stolen vehicle. The court, after a hearing, found true several aggravating factors and sentenced him to three years and four months, including concurrent terms for some offenses. The sentence for possession of an assault weapon was stayed under Penal Code section 654.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed three issues raised by the defendant: whether California’s ban on assault weapon possession violated the Second Amendment; whether sentences for taking a vehicle without consent and fleeing an officer should have been stayed as based on the same act; and whether the abstract of judgment accurately reflected custody credits. The court held that Penal Code section 30605 does not violate the Second Amendment because there was no evidence in the record that assault weapons covered by the statute are in common use by law-abiding citizens, as required by relevant Supreme Court precedent. The court also held that the two vehicle-related offenses involved separate criminal objectives and thus did not require a stay under section 654. However, the court agreed that the custody credits were miscalculated and directed the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment accordingly. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Crenshaw" on Justia Law

In 1995, a military veteran was convicted of assaulting and causing the death of his four-month-old daughter, resulting in a 15-years-to-life sentence for a violation of California Penal Code section 273ab. This was his first and only felony conviction, although he had a prior record of mostly DUI offenses. Nearly three decades later, in 2024, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.91, arguing that military service-related conditions—specifically traumatic brain injury and substance abuse—were not considered as mitigating factors at his original sentencing.The Superior Court of Solano County initially denied his habeas corpus petition, noting that relief was available through section 1170.91 and instructing him to file a separate resentencing petition. When he subsequently filed a formal resentencing petition under section 1170.91, the trial court summarily denied it without a hearing, stating he had failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The defendant appealed, asserting he was entitled to a public hearing on his petition and that his military-related conditions should have been considered.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that, even assuming the petition was sufficient to require a public hearing, any procedural error was harmless because the defendant was statutorily ineligible for resentencing. The court concluded that under section 1170.91, subdivision (c), individuals convicted of offenses listed as “super strikes” under section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)—which includes the defendant’s conviction—are categorically excluded from resentencing relief. The court affirmed the denial of the petition, holding that the statutory exclusion applies regardless of whether the conviction was a first offense or resulted from the Three Strikes law. View "P. v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The defendant was residing at a hotel managed by the Department of Mental Health when the hotel’s general manager entered his room to deliver a meal. After discovering the entry, the defendant accused the manager of theft. This confrontation escalated when the defendant returned to the manager’s office and threatened him with a knife. As a result, charges were filed for assault with a deadly weapon and making criminal threats, with allegations of prior serious or violent felony convictions and aggravating sentencing factors.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss one of his previous strike convictions but later granted the prosecution’s request to dismiss one strike as inapplicable. The court bifurcated the trial on the prior conviction and aggravating factors. After the prosecution rested its case, the defendant stipulated to having a prior strike conviction and to the existence of aggravating factors, without being advised of his right to a jury trial on these issues or the penal consequences of his admission. The jury convicted the defendant of making criminal threats but could not reach a verdict on the assault charge. The court sentenced the defendant to the upper term, doubled under the three strikes law, based on his stipulation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court erred by failing to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights—including the right to a jury trial—before accepting his stipulation to the prior conviction and aggravating factors. The appellate court found these errors prejudicial under the totality of the circumstances. While the conviction was affirmed, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. The People were allowed the option to retry the prior conviction and aggravating circumstances. View "P. v. Kinnear" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged in October 2022 with possession of child pornography, including an enhancement for possessing a large number of images involving very young minors. In February 2023, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation, jail time under work release, and required to register as a sex offender. The defendant is a registered nurse, and after his conviction, the state Board of Registered Nursing began disciplinary proceedings to remove his license. He lost his job but later received support from his former employer and sought therapy and treatment.In September 2023, the defendant petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County under Penal Code section 236.15 to vacate his conviction. He argued that his offense was a direct result of sexual violence he suffered as both a child and an adult, including repeated abuse and rapes. The petition was supported by a clinical director who opined that the defendant’s behavior was a “direct result” of trauma repetition linked to his history of sexual violence. After an evidentiary hearing in January 2024, the Superior Court granted the petition and vacated the conviction, leading to the dismissal of disciplinary proceedings against him.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court clarified the requirements for relief under section 236.15 and held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to appellate review. It found that, although the defendant suffered significant sexual violence, his later possession of child pornography was not a “direct result” of that victimization as required by the statute. The court emphasized that multiple contributing factors and the passage of time attenuated the causal connection. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting the petition and directed the lower court to deny the petition. View "P. v. S.H." on Justia Law