Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence that included enhancements for firearm use and gang involvement, resulting in a total sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, and his sentence was reduced to 32 years to life. Years later, the defendant filed several petitions for resentencing, arguing that he was improperly sentenced due to changes in the law and because he was not the actual shooter. The trial court eventually acknowledged that the defendant was serving a longer sentence than he should have, as he was not eligible for the firearm enhancement once the gang enhancement was stricken, but believed it lacked the authority to correct the sentence absent a habeas corpus petition or a request from the district attorney or the Department of Corrections.The Los Angeles County Superior Court repeatedly denied the defendant’s requests for resentencing, finding either that he failed to make a prima facie case under the applicable statutes or that the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Although the trial court recognized a sentencing error, it maintained that procedural limitations prevented it from acting unless prompted by a specific type of petition or an external agency.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that the trial court did have the authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of procedural posture or the form of the defendant’s petition. The appellate court concluded that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the usual statutory restrictions and time limits, and it reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a prompt resentencing hearing and correct the sentence if it is found to be unauthorized. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of felony driving under the influence causing injury, with a prior DUI conviction, after causing a crash that injured another person. As part of her plea agreement, the defendant was ordered to serve jail time, complete probation and an alcohol program, and pay over $78,000 in restitution to the victim. After successfully completing her probation, she petitioned the trial court to expunge her conviction under Penal Code section 1203.4 and to reduce her felony conviction to a misdemeanor under section 17. At the time of her petition, she had paid only a small portion of the restitution, explaining that job and license loss hampered her ability to pay, and that relief would help her restore her employment and ability to pay.The Superior Court of Napa County denied both requests, emphasizing the limited amount of restitution paid as a principal reason for denial, along with the defendant’s prior DUI and delays in completing her alcohol program. The trial court suggested that a more substantial restitution payment might warrant a different result in the future. The People argued that unpaid restitution could be considered among other factors in denying relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the statutory language and legislative history of sections 1203.4 and 17. The court held that under both statutes, an unfulfilled order of restitution or restitution fine cannot be relied upon as any basis for denying expungement or reduction of a conviction, not even as a partial factor. Because the trial court based its denial on unpaid restitution, the appellate court found this to be legal error. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case for reconsideration without reliance on the unpaid restitution. View "P. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, along with his wife, adopted two young girls through the foster care system. Years later, when one of the girls was nearly 17, she disclosed to a friend’s mother that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive father over several years. This disclosure led to a law enforcement investigation, during which the defendant voluntarily went to the sheriff’s department to “turn himself in.” He was subsequently interrogated by two officers in a closed interview room at the station. During the third segment of questioning, after persistent and increasingly accusatory interrogation techniques, the defendant confessed to engaging in sexual acts with one of the victims.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County heard pretrial motions regarding the admissibility of the defendant’s statements to law enforcement. The prosecution sought to admit the statements, while the defense moved to suppress them, arguing they were obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. The trial court ruled the interrogation was not custodial and admitted the statements. At trial, the prosecution presented testimony from the victims and law enforcement, while the defense highlighted inconsistencies and lack of physical evidence. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to over 120 years to life in prison.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed whether the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona. The appellate court held that while the initial questioning was noncustodial, the interrogation became custodial during the third segment, at which point Miranda warnings were required but not given. The court found the admission of the confession was prejudicial and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. NavaAdame" on Justia Law

In 1994, Karl Senser was fatally stabbed during a carjacking, following a series of related crimes. Law enforcement quickly identified Steven Thomas as a prime suspect and later arrested him, but although circumstantial evidence suggested Leon Daniel McInnis was Thomas’s accomplice, authorities did not believe they had enough evidence to charge McInnis with murder at that time. The investigation included interviews, lineups, and early DNA testing, but no physical evidence directly linked McInnis to the murder scene. McInnis ultimately pled guilty to a related carjacking, while Thomas was convicted of Senser’s murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County dismissed the murder charge against McInnis in 2023, after he argued that the 27-year delay in prosecution violated his state due process rights. The court found the delay negligent, reasoning that law enforcement could have tested key evidence, such as a napkin found at the scene, for DNA in 1994. The court also determined that the loss of eyewitnesses due to the passage of time prejudiced McInnis’s ability to defend himself, and that no remedy short of dismissal could cure this prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that, under California Supreme Court precedent, courts may not find negligence by second-guessing prosecutorial decisions about when sufficient evidence exists to file charges, how investigations are conducted, or how resources are allocated. The delay was deemed “investigative,” not negligent, because prosecutors waited until new DNA evidence provided a strong basis for charging McInnis. The appellate court remanded the case for the trial court to properly balance the prejudice to McInnis against the prosecution’s justification for the delay, and to consider alternative remedies. View "P. v. McInnis" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, while driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol content of at least 0.18 percent, crashed into another vehicle, resulting in the deaths of three individuals and causing serious injury to a fourth person, Sarah S. The defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including three counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, two counts of driving under the influence causing injury to Sarah, and two counts of perjury. He pled no contest to the perjury charges and was found guilty by a jury on all remaining counts.Following his conviction in San Mateo County Superior Court, the defendant was originally sentenced to 47 years and two months to life in prison. On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal ordered corrections to the abstract of judgment but otherwise affirmed the conviction. After remittitur and resentencing, the trial court imposed a sentence of 47 years to life. The defendant appealed again, arguing that his convictions for driving under the influence causing injury should be dismissed as lesser included offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and also challenged the trial court’s failure to specify the fines and fees imposed at resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that driving under the influence causing injury is not a lesser included offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated when the offenses involve different victims. The court also found that the trial court erred by not itemizing the fines and fees imposed at resentencing. The appellate court remanded the matter for the trial court to specify the amount and statutory basis for each fine, fee, and assessment, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Demacedo" on Justia Law

Travis Rockhill was charged with the murder of Gary Matthews, who was shot outside a friend’s home and later died from his injuries. The prosecution presented evidence that Rockhill had a dispute with Matthews over a scooter sale and was angry with him prior to the shooting. The defense argued that another individual, Louie (“Primo”), was involved and that Rockhill was not the shooter. During Rockhill’s first trial, he made incriminating statements to the courtroom bailiff, but the prosecution did not introduce this evidence. The jury deadlocked, resulting in a mistrial.In the second trial, presided over by Judge Emily Cole, Rockhill testified in his own defense. After both sides rested, Judge Cole sent ex parte text messages to a former colleague at the District Attorney’s office, questioning why the prosecutor was not calling the bailiff as a rebuttal witness and suggesting someone should speak to the prosecutor about it. The prosecution did not act on this suggestion, and Rockhill was convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm enhancement. After the verdict, the prosecution disclosed Judge Cole’s ex parte communications to the defense. Judge Cole recused herself, acknowledging the impropriety but maintaining she had been impartial. Rockhill moved for a new trial based on judicial bias, but Judge Denise McLaughlin-Bennett of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the motion, finding no intent to intervene in the proceedings and no impact on the verdict.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that Judge Cole’s ex parte communications constituted a due process violation and structural error, as they demonstrated an unconstitutional probability of actual judicial bias. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, directing the lower court to grant Rockhill’s motion for a new trial. View "P. v. Rockhill" on Justia Law

The case concerns Ryan Scott Warner, who was charged with the murder of Kayleigh S., the young daughter of his codefendant, Sara Lynn Krueger. The prosecution alleged that Warner either directly committed the murder or aided and abetted Krueger, with the sole theory presented to the jury being first degree murder by torture. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In 2017, Warner was found guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance finding due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill but affirmed the murder conviction, finding ample evidence of intent to inflict extreme pain for a sadistic purpose.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended California’s murder statutes to eliminate certain forms of accomplice liability and imputed malice, Warner petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Superior Court of Napa County denied his petition at the prima facie stage, concluding Warner had not shown he could not be convicted of murder under the amended statutes. Warner appealed, arguing the trial court improperly engaged in factfinding and that the jury instructions permitted conviction on an impermissible theory of imputed malice.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, independently reviewed the record and affirmed the denial of Warner’s petition. The court held that Warner was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of murder liability—first degree murder by torture—that remains valid after Senate Bill No. 1437. The jury’s findings necessarily established the required mental state for murder under current law, and Warner was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory changes. Therefore, Warner is ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. View "P. v. Warner" on Justia Law

Sara Lynn Krueger was charged with the murder of her young daughter, Kayleigh S., in Napa County, California. The prosecution alleged that the murder was committed by torture, and Krueger was tried on the theory that she either directly committed the crimes or aided and abetted her codefendant. The jury was instructed only on first degree murder by torture and not on felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. In May 2017, the jury found Krueger guilty of first degree murder by torture and assault causing death of a child, but the special circumstance finding of torture was later reversed on direct appeal due to insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill. The conviction for first degree murder was otherwise affirmed, and Krueger was sentenced to 25 years to life.Following legislative changes enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited certain theories of murder liability, Krueger filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing she was eligible for relief because the jury instructions allegedly permitted malice to be imputed based solely on her participation in torture. The Superior Court of Napa County denied her petition at the prima facie stage, finding she was ineligible for relief as a matter of law since she was not convicted under any theory affected by the statutory amendments.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Krueger’s petition. The appellate court held that Krueger was prosecuted and convicted solely under a theory of first degree murder by torture, which remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. The jury’s findings and instructions required proof of a mental state more culpable than malice, and thus, Krueger could still be convicted under current law. The court concluded she was ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6. View "P. v. Krueger" on Justia Law