Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Jorge Sarmiento-Zuniga was found guilty by a jury of oral copulation of a person he knew or should have known was intoxicated. In March 2023, the San Francisco Superior Court sentenced him to the middle term of six years in prison for this count. The court reviewed various documents, including the probation officer’s report and the victim’s impact statement, before announcing a tentative sentence. The court cited Sarmiento’s prior convictions and the victim’s repeated refusals captured on video as reasons for the middle term sentence. Despite the defense’s argument for a lesser sentence based on time already served, the court finalized the middle term sentence.The San Francisco Superior Court’s decision was appealed by Sarmiento, who argued that the court erred in considering his prior convictions without certified records and that the lower term should have been imposed due to the victim’s voluntary intoxication. The People contended that the appeal was forfeited because Sarmiento did not object to the sentence during the trial. They also argued that certified records were unnecessary for the middle term sentence and that none of the statutory circumstances mandating the lower term applied.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that Sarmiento forfeited his appeal by not objecting to the sentence in the trial court. However, the court exercised its discretion to review the merits and affirmed the sentence. The court found that Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(1) does not impose additional evidentiary requirements for a middle term sentence and that the trial court properly stated its reasons for the sentence on the record. The judgment was affirmed. View "People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga" on Justia Law

In September 2022, Antoine Leon Richardson had an altercation with Mckyla Middleton at a liquor store in Lancaster, California. Richardson accused Middleton of cutting him off, threatened her, and flashed a gun at her from a satchel. In November 2022, police searched Richardson’s home and found ammunition but no firearms. Richardson admitted to brandishing the gun during the altercation and owning the ammunition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court charged Richardson with being a felon in possession of a firearm, being a felon in possession of ammunition, and misdemeanor exhibiting a concealable firearm in public. The jury found Richardson guilty on all counts and confirmed his prior felony convictions. The court sentenced him to three years and eight months in prison for the firearm and ammunition charges, with a concurrent 364-day term for the misdemeanor.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. Richardson argued that his convictions for firearm and ammunition possession violated the Second Amendment, citing New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen. The court disagreed, stating that the Second Amendment protects law-abiding citizens, not felons. The court also found that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Richardson had separate objectives for possessing and exhibiting the firearm, thus allowing multiple sentences under Penal Code section 654.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment, upholding Richardson’s convictions and sentences. View "People v. Richardson" on Justia Law

In 1985, Terry D. Bemore was arrested and later convicted for the murder of a liquor store clerk. He was sentenced to death in 1989. Bemore's trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance, and evidence of racial bias by his lead counsel was presented. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bemore's death sentence, and he was resentenced to life without parole in 2016. In 2020, the California Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act (RJA), allowing defendants to challenge convictions based on racial discrimination. Bemore sought to use this new law to challenge his conviction.The trial court appointed the San Diego Office of the Primary Public Defender to represent Bemore in his RJA claim, despite his request to have his previous habeas counsel, Sayasane and Cotterill, appointed. Bemore filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the trial court should have appointed his preferred counsel due to their extensive prior representation and familiarity with his case.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 987.2 of the Penal Code governs the selection and assignment of counsel in noncapital postconviction habeas proceedings, including those under the RJA. The court found that the trial court erred in placing the burden on Bemore to demonstrate the Public Defender's unavailability and in failing to recognize the good cause shown for appointing Sayasane and Cotterill. Additionally, the court determined that the Public Defender had created a conflict of interest by opposing Bemore's petition, thus disqualifying itself from representing him.The Court of Appeal granted Bemore's petition, vacated the trial court's order appointing the Public Defender, and directed the trial court to appoint one or both of Bemore's requested attorneys. View "Bemore v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Michael Lovelace was charged with multiple felonies, including rape and aggravated kidnapping, along with special sentencing enhancements and aggravating factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c). Lovelace challenged the constitutionality of the rule 4.421(c) residual clause, which allows for consideration of any other factors that reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed. He argued that this clause violated the separation of powers and due process principles.The trial court denied Lovelace's motion to set aside the information, leading him to seek interlocutory review by petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, issued an order to show cause and held oral arguments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in People v. Lynch, which provided guidance on the interpretation and application of Senate Bill 567 amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the court took supplemental briefing.The Court of Appeal granted writ relief, holding that the rule 4.421(c) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague and exceeds the Judicial Council’s delegated authority to adopt rules promoting uniformity in sentencing. The court found that the clause grants prosecutors and juries open-ended power to define sentencing criteria on an ad hoc basis, violating the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order denying Lovelace's section 995 motion and to enter a new order sustaining the motion to the extent it seeks to invalidate the residual clause. The court prohibited the trial court from allowing a jury to consider any findings based on the rule 4.421(c) residual clause. View "Lovelace v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kristopher Bunker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the superior court's denial of his request for an automatic bail review hearing under Penal Code section 1270.2. At his arraignment, the superior court held a preliminary bail review hearing and ultimately decided to hold Bunker without bail, citing a substantial likelihood of great bodily injury if he were released. Bunker then requested a bail review hearing within five days, which the court denied, stating it was pending a change in circumstances.Bunker subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, arguing that he was entitled to a bail review hearing within five days as a matter of right, without needing to demonstrate a change in circumstances. The Court of Appeal construed the petition as one seeking a writ of mandate and requested opposition, but no response was filed.The Court of Appeal held that under Penal Code section 1270.2, Bunker was entitled to an automatic bail review hearing within five days of the original bail order without needing to show a change in circumstances. The court found that the superior court erred in denying Bunker's request for such a hearing. Consequently, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its pretrial detention order and conduct a new bail hearing in accordance with section 1270.2. The decision was made final immediately. View "Bunker v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2002, Juan Lara was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and sentenced to 29 years and 4 months in prison. In 2023, under section 1172.6, the trial court vacated these convictions and redesignated them as one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling and three counts of assault with a firearm. Lara appealed the three counts of assault with a firearm.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially found sufficient evidence to support the redesignation of Lara’s attempted murder convictions. The court vacated the attempted murder convictions and redesignated one as shooting at an inhabited dwelling and added three counts of assault with a firearm. Lara argued that the evidence supporting the additional assault convictions was inadmissible hearsay and insufficient.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the redesignation of one count of assault with a firearm, finding it supported by substantial evidence. However, it reversed the additional two counts of assault with a firearm, concluding that the trial court lacked the authority to impose these new convictions. The appellate court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (e) does not permit the imposition of uncharged or unlitigated offenses when redesignating a vacated conviction. The court remanded the case for resentencing on the affirmed counts. View "P. v. Lara" on Justia Law

The defendant, Aquil Qadir Lawson, was convicted of murder after shooting Madison Rose Weiss while she was in her car. Lawson, who is Black, argued that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were influenced by implicit racial bias, violating the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He claimed that the court's decisions emphasized his criminality while minimizing the victim's, who was white. Specifically, Lawson contended that the exclusion of evidence regarding Weiss's illegal activities and the inclusion of his Instagram posts and fraud activities demonstrated racial bias.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, the jury found Lawson guilty of second-degree murder and the firearm allegation true. The court excluded evidence of Weiss's involvement in sex work, vaccination card fraud, and other illegal activities, deeming them irrelevant to the case. The court also excluded evidence of a gun found near the crime scene, as it was not connected to the shooting. Conversely, the court admitted Lawson's Instagram posts, which contained statements related to the shooting, and evidence of his involvement in fraud, which was used to impeach his credibility.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court's evidentiary rulings were based on relevance and did not demonstrate implicit racial bias under the Racial Justice Act's preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The appellate court found that the trial court's decisions were ordinary evidentiary rulings and that Lawson failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rulings were motivated by racial bias or animus. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "P. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

In the late hours of December 5, 2000, Tramell Vernon Taylor, Darryl McCoy, and Dewayne Richardson planned to rob several men at a nearby motel, including Kendall M., a drug dealer. In the early morning of December 6, 2000, a gun battle ensued at the motel, resulting in Kendall being shot and McCoy being fatally shot. Taylor and Richardson were believed to be members or associates of a gang, while Kendall was affiliated with a rival gang. Extensive ballistics evidence was collected, indicating multiple firearms were involved in the shooting.Taylor and Richardson were convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and the first-degree murder of McCoy. The jury found true a gang enhancement and a special circumstance that the murder was committed during a robbery. Taylor was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the murder, with a concurrent 12-year sentence for the conspiracy. On appeal, the court affirmed the convictions with minor corrections to the abstract of judgment.Taylor filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which the trial court initially denied without a statement of reasons. On appeal, the denial was reversed, and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that Taylor could still be convicted of murder under the provocative act doctrine, as he was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had misconstrued the elements of the applicable offense. The appellate court held that the trial court's findings did not support a valid theory of murder under current law. The order denying the petition was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "People v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Mariano Albert Valdez was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a murder he committed at age 17. In 2018, Valdez petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which allows juvenile offenders sentenced to LWOP to seek resentencing after 15 years of incarceration. The trial court granted the petition and resentenced Valdez to 50 years to life. In 2024, Valdez filed another petition for resentencing, arguing that his 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP, citing People v. Heard, which held that denying resentencing relief to juvenile offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates equal protection.The trial court construed Valdez's filing as a petition under section 1170(d)(10), which allows for resentencing after 20 years of imprisonment if the defendant was resentenced to LWOP or its functional equivalent. The trial court granted the petition, reasoning that Valdez's 50-year-to-life sentence was the functional equivalent of LWOP and that excluding him from resentencing relief would violate equal protection.The People petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to deny Valdez's resentencing relief. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the reasoning in Heard does not apply to section 1170(d)(10) if the defendant was eligible for youth offender parole under the sentence imposed at resentencing under section 1170(d)(1). Since Valdez was eligible for youth offender parole under his 50-year-to-life sentence, it was not the functional equivalent of LWOP. Therefore, Valdez was not entitled to relief under section 1170(d)(10).The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting Valdez resentencing relief and to enter a new order denying the petition for resentencing. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Richard Martinez, a licensed plumber, contracted with Gayle Jelley to construct a pool in her backyard for $26,900. Jelley made several payments totaling $9,000, but Martinez abandoned the project after partially completing the excavation and rebar installation. It was later discovered that Martinez's contractor's license had expired before the project began. The Department of Consumer Affairs, Contractors State Licensing Board (CSLB) confirmed that Martinez had never held a valid contractor's license and had previously received three administrative citations for unlicensed contracting.The People charged Martinez with grand theft, acting as a contractor without a license, requiring an excessive downpayment, and unlawfully receiving payments exceeding the work performed. Martinez was arraigned on December 9, 2021, and later filed a motion to dismiss based on a violation of his speedy trial rights, citing a four-and-a-half-year delay in prosecution. He argued that the delay resulted in the loss of key witnesses and evidence, causing actual prejudice to his defense.The Superior Court of Riverside County granted Martinez's motion to dismiss, citing the prosecution's lack of effort to arrest Martinez after the complaint was filed. The People appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by not requiring Martinez to demonstrate actual prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Martinez failed to affirmatively demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay, as required under state constitutional law. The court also noted that the trial court did not conduct the necessary analysis of the four factors required to determine a federal speedy trial violation for the misdemeanor charges. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part and remanded the case with directions to conduct the proper analysis for the federal speedy trial claim on the misdemeanor charges and to deny the motion to dismiss on the felony charge. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law