Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the defendant, along with two codefendants, was involved in a series of crimes in 1983 that included kidnapping, robbery, sexual assault, and murder. The three men armed themselves and kidnapped two victims from a park, holding one victim in the trunk and sexually assaulting the other. Both victims were eventually shot in the head—one survived, the other was killed. The defendant admitted to participating in the crimes, including the use of a firearm, and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, oral copulation in concert, and rape in concert as part of a plea agreement. In exchange, special circumstance allegations were dropped, and other counts were dismissed.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County originally sentenced the defendant to 27 years to life. Decades later, following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which limited felony-murder liability, the defendant petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he was not a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Superior Court denied his petition, finding him ineligible for relief because he was a major participant and acted with reckless indifference. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, as required by recent case law.After an evidentiary hearing, which included testimony from a retired detective and the defendant’s own statements at a parole hearing, the Superior Court again denied the resentencing petition. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the record under the substantial evidence standard and affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was a major participant in the underlying felonies and acted with reckless indifference to human life, making him ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The order denying resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Grandberry" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances, two counts of burglary, and one count of robbery, stemming from a 1986 home invasion burglary in which two victims were killed. The jury imposed the death penalty for each murder, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to death as well as a consecutive determinate term of seven years, which included a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in 1995, and subsequent federal habeas corpus petitions were denied.Years later, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified the defendant as potentially eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, because the one-year enhancement for a prior prison term was no longer valid under current law. The defendant requested a full resentencing, including the possibility of striking the special circumstance findings and modifying the death sentence. The People objected, arguing that section 1172.75 did not authorize resentencing of a death sentence, which could only be challenged by a writ of habeas corpus under section 1509. Despite the objection, the Ventura County Superior Court recalled the entire sentence, including the death penalty.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the matter. The court held that while Penal Code section 1172.75 authorized recall and resentencing for invalid prior prison term enhancements, it did not empower a trial court to recall or resentence a final, affirmed death sentence. The court found that such action would amount to a collateral attack on the judgment of death, which section 1509—enacted by voter initiative—explicitly reserves for habeas corpus proceedings. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order recalling the death sentence, affirmed the order as to the noncapital portions, and remanded for resentencing on those noncapital portions only. View "People v. Cain" on Justia Law

In 2008, the petitioner was convicted by a jury of multiple counts, including attempted first degree murder, attempted murder of police officers, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, and attempted arson. The trial court sentenced him to lengthy prison terms and imposed an $8,000 restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, in addition to direct victim restitution and a court security fee. Over a decade later, the California Legislature enacted a statute making restitution fines imposed under section 1202.4 unenforceable and uncollectible after 10 years, and stating that the portion of the judgment imposing such fines is vacated.After the new law took effect, the petitioner sought relief in the Superior Court by filing a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the statutory vacatur of the restitution fine required a full resentencing. When this was denied, he filed a further petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two.The California Court of Appeal held that the statute’s vacatur of the restitution fine after 10 years does not entitle the petitioner to a full resentencing. The court reasoned that this change only affects the fine and does not alter the interdependent components of the aggregate prison term. Instead, the court concluded that the proper procedure for reflecting the vacated fine is to file a postjudgment motion in the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment, so it conforms to the judgment as modified by statute. The appellate court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, explaining that habeas relief was unavailable because an adequate legal remedy exists—a motion to correct the abstract of judgment in the trial court. View "In re Mattison" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Travis Scott Frederickson of two counts of first-degree murder, found that he personally used a firearm, and found true a special circumstance of multiple murder. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Following changes in California law that gave courts discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements, Frederickson petitioned for resentencing. In 2024, Frederickson asked the Superior Court of Orange County to recall his sentence and resentence him under the amended law. The prosecution agreed that the court could resentence as to the firearm enhancement, but argued that the court could not take any action that would effectively strike or dismiss the special circumstance finding.The Superior Court, however, reduced Frederickson’s convictions from first-degree to second-degree murder and imposed sentences on those lesser charges, including firearm enhancements. The trial court explicitly stated it was not striking or dismissing the special circumstance findings, but rather vacating the first-degree murder convictions; since the special circumstance only attaches to first-degree murder, it no longer applied once those convictions were vacated. The court entered new judgments for second-degree murder and imposed sentences accordingly.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 1385.1—which prohibits judges from striking or dismissing special circumstance findings—by vacating the first-degree murder convictions and resentencing on the lesser offenses under section 1172.1. The appellate court reasoned that when a conviction is validly vacated, the attached special circumstance falls away by operation of law, not by judicial action proscribed by section 1385.1. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "People v. Frederickson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with multiple counts, including murder and attempted murder, arising from an alleged retaliatory shooting involving the “Mongolian Boys Society” gang. He was originally arraigned on a felony complaint in February 2020 and entered a general time waiver for his preliminary hearing. In May 2021, the prosecution amended the complaint to change the nature of certain firearm enhancements; petitioner was arraigned on the amended complaint the same day and agreed to a limited time waiver for the preliminary hearing until August 16, 2021, plus ten court days. The preliminary hearing was ultimately delayed several times due to requests for continuances, discovery issues, and pandemic-related quarantine measures, despite petitioner’s repeated objections to further continuances.The Superior Court of Fresno County held the preliminary hearing in November 2021, outside the period covered by petitioner’s limited waiver on the amended complaint, and subsequently held petitioner to answer on all charges. After the information was filed and the prosecution indicated intent to seek the death penalty, petitioner moved to set aside the information, initially without raising the timeliness issue. Later, he supplemented his motion to argue that the delay violated his right to a speedy preliminary hearing under Penal Code section 859b. The superior court denied the motion. Petitioner then sought writ relief, which was initially denied by the California Court of Appeal, but the California Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider whether petitioner’s speedy preliminary hearing rights were violated.Upon review, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that while general time waivers for preliminary hearings under section 859b are irrevocable, a new 60-day period commences upon arraignment on an amended complaint unless expressly waived. Because petitioner did not enter a general time waiver at the second arraignment, and the preliminary hearing was held beyond the statutory time limit, the court granted relief and ordered the information set aside and the complaint dismissed as to petitioner. View "Lee v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Anthony Seigler and his girlfriend, Katrina Fowles, were involved in two incidents in Lake County in early 2023. In the first, they called 911 reporting armed threats to their son and shots fired into their home; responders found Seigler had fired two shots through a bathroom wall while his son was present, but there was no evidence of an actual attack. Both appeared under the influence of drugs. In the second incident, Fowles’s mother reported a burglary at her home by Seigler and Fowles, and Seigler was found with stolen property. Seigler was charged in two separate cases: one for negligent discharge of a firearm, and another for burglary.The Lake County Superior Court repeatedly continued trial dates over several months for reasons including the need for witness availability, discovery issues, and defense counsel’s request for a mental health evaluation of Seigler due to concerns about his mental state and substance abuse. Despite counsel’s continued difficulty communicating with Seigler and attempts to secure a mental health evaluation, such evaluation was never performed. On the day of trial, defense counsel moved for a continuance and filed an application for mental health diversion. The trial court denied both, finding them untimely and inadequately noticed, and proceeded toward trial. Seigler then entered no contest pleas to both charges and was placed on probation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance, particularly given indications that Seigler’s mental health and substance abuse were significant factors and the statutory right to seek diversion before trial or plea. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded, directing that Seigler be given a reasonable opportunity to apply for mental health diversion and, if granted and completed, for dismissal of charges; if not, the judgment would be reinstated. View "People v. Seigler" on Justia Law

One evening, a group of friends gathered at an apartment, where alcohol and marijuana were consumed. Among them was A.S., who became highly intoxicated and passed out on a couch. Later, Ruben Paramo Gallardo, who was also present, was observed by another friend, D.L., on top of A.S., appearing to penetrate her while she was unconscious. D.L. intervened and called the police. A.S. later underwent a medical exam that documented various injuries and found Gallardo’s DNA on her body. At trial, Gallardo testified that the sexual contact was consensual and that A.S. was awake, but this was contradicted by other evidence.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, a jury found Gallardo guilty of two offenses: rape of an unconscious person under Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(4), and assault with intent to commit rape under section 220, subdivision (a)(1). The court sentenced him to four years for the assault count and stayed a concurrent three-year term for the rape count pursuant to section 654. Gallardo appealed, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person, and therefore his conviction for assault should be reversed.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. Applying the statutory elements test, the court determined that assault with intent to commit rape requires proof of intent to use force, which is not an element of rape of an unconscious person. Therefore, assault with intent to commit rape is not a lesser included offense of rape of an unconscious person. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that Gallardo could properly be convicted of both offenses. View "People v. Gallardo" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally convicted in 2011 of felony possession of child pornography, which required him to register as a sex offender. In 2015, he was convicted of failing to register a change of address, an offense classified as a felony because his registration requirement was based on his prior felony conviction. Years later, after his child pornography conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, he sought to have his 2015 failure to register conviction likewise reduced to a misdemeanor and dismissed, citing his rehabilitation, lack of subsequent offenses, and support from family and associates.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court had previously granted the defendant’s motion to reduce his 2011 conviction to a misdemeanor and dismissed that case. However, when the defendant petitioned to reduce and dismiss his 2015 felony registration offense, the court denied the motion, finding that the offense was a straight felony, not a wobbler, and that it was not appropriate to dismiss the case. The defendant appealed, arguing that the later reduction of his underlying offense should retroactively affect the status of his 2015 conviction, or that the court should have exercised discretion to reduce or dismiss it in the interest of justice.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that the 2015 failure to register conviction was a straight felony under Penal Code section 290.018(b), and not subject to reduction under Penal Code section 17(b), which only applies to wobblers. The reduction of the underlying 2011 offense did not retroactively convert the 2015 conviction to a misdemeanor. The court also found no substantive due process violation, as the legislative scheme had a rational basis. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4. View "People v. Woodward" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Geovanni Quijadas Silva, and North River Insurance Company posted a $100,000 bail bond for his release. Silva failed to appear at a required court hearing, leading the Superior Court of Santa Clara County to declare the bond forfeited and begin the statutory appearance period during which the bail company could either produce Silva or demonstrate why forfeiture should be set aside. North River requested and was granted two extensions of this period. On the final day, North River moved to vacate the forfeiture, claiming Silva was located and detained in Mexico, and requested either exoneration of the bond or a tolling/continuance to allow time for extradition. The prosecution did not timely decide whether to pursue extradition and opposed the motion, arguing that no obligation existed for it to decide within the appearance period.The Superior Court denied North River’s motion to vacate or continue, finding that the prosecution was not required to decide on extradition by the end of the appearance period and that the motion was untimely. Judgment was entered against North River, which appealed. The California Court of Appeal initially affirmed, but later reversed and remanded, concluding that the lower court should have either required a prosecution decision on extradition or granted a continuance.The Supreme Court of California subsequently held that Penal Code section 1305 does not authorize trial courts to compel prosecutors to make extradition decisions or require a continuance solely for that purpose. However, the Supreme Court did not address whether courts may, for good cause, extend time for extradition decisions by continuing the hearing on the motion to vacate. On remand, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, adopted the concurring analysis that trial courts have discretion to grant limited continuances for good cause to allow extradition decisions. The case was remanded for the trial court to exercise this discretion in accordance with that interpretation. View "People v. The North River Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2001 of attempted second degree murder and received a sentence that included enhancements for firearm use and gang involvement, resulting in a total sentence of 42 years to life. On direct appeal in 2003, the gang enhancement was stricken, and his sentence was reduced to 32 years to life. Years later, the defendant filed several petitions for resentencing, arguing that he was improperly sentenced due to changes in the law and because he was not the actual shooter. The trial court eventually acknowledged that the defendant was serving a longer sentence than he should have, as he was not eligible for the firearm enhancement once the gang enhancement was stricken, but believed it lacked the authority to correct the sentence absent a habeas corpus petition or a request from the district attorney or the Department of Corrections.The Los Angeles County Superior Court repeatedly denied the defendant’s requests for resentencing, finding either that he failed to make a prima facie case under the applicable statutes or that the court lacked jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Although the trial court recognized a sentencing error, it maintained that procedural limitations prevented it from acting unless prompted by a specific type of petition or an external agency.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, held that the trial court did have the authority to correct an unauthorized sentence at any time, regardless of procedural posture or the form of the defendant’s petition. The appellate court concluded that the unauthorized sentence doctrine is an exception to the usual statutory restrictions and time limits, and it reversed and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to hold a prompt resentencing hearing and correct the sentence if it is found to be unauthorized. View "P. v. Cervantes" on Justia Law