Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In the appeal case presented, the defendants, Brian Terrell Hill and Clifford Jenkins, sought resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 for their convictions of first-degree murder and attempted murder. The defendants were initially convicted based on their involvement in the 1990 kidnapping and subsequent murder of Randy Burge and attempted murder of Kevin Thomas.The defendants contended that their petitions for resentencing were denied based on a felony murder theory related to kidnapping, which they argued violated ex post facto principles. They stated that at the time of the offense, kidnapping was not an enumerated felony under section 189, subdivision (a) to which felony-murder liability could be attached. However, the court rejected this argument, stating that section 1172.6 does not apply new law retroactively to make formerly innocent conduct criminal, but looks to whether a defendant could be convicted under current law.The court found substantial evidence supporting the lower court's determination that Hill intended to kill Thomas and was therefore guilty of attempted murder. Similarly, the court found substantial evidence supporting the lower courts' findings that both Hill and Jenkins were guilty of felony murder as major participants in the kidnapping who acted with reckless indifference to human life.Given these findings, the court affirmed the denial of Hill's and Jenkins' petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. View "People v. Hill" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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This case involves an appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, with the defendant, Richard Curtis Morris, Jr., appealing from the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Morris was previously convicted on charges of first-degree murder with associated special circumstances of rape, robbery, and murder for financial gain. He argues that for a nonkiller to be convicted of first-degree murder under the amended felony-murder statute when the nonkiller acts with intent to kill, the prosecution must prove the nonkiller assisted the actual killer in the killing itself. According to him, the jury found that he aided an actor in committing the underlying felonies, which he claims is insufficient basis for denying a resentencing evidentiary hearing.The appeals court disagreed with Morris, holding that a person who, with an intent to kill, directly commits or aids and abets an enumerated felony in which a death occurs commits the actus reus necessary for felony murder under the amended felony-murder statute by acting in furtherance of the common design of the felony. The jury instructions and verdicts in this case establish the jury necessarily concluded Morris possessed an intent to kill during the commission of the underlying felonies and aided and abetted the actual killer in committing those felonies. By this ruling, the court affirmed that the record of conviction establishes, as a matter of law, that Morris is not eligible for resentencing. Therefore, the trial court was correct in its summary denial of the petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "P. v. Morris" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The case involves an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County, California, denying Francisco Carrillo's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The motion was based on the claim that Carrillo did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence.Carrillo, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was convicted of assault with a firearm following a trial. He was sentenced to serve 301 days in jail and granted formal probation for five years. However, when Carrillo later admitted to a probation violation and received an additional 90 days in jail, his total term of imprisonment exceeded one year, thereby qualifying his conviction as an "aggravated felony" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), leading to mandatory deportation.Arguing that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence, Carrillo filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence under section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Carrillo failed to demonstrate that he suffered prejudicial error due to his lack of understanding, as he did not show a reasonable probability that he would have acted differently had he been aware of the immigration consequences.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's order but modified it to be without prejudice. This means that Carrillo could file another motion asserting grounds not raised in his initial motion. The appellate court agreed that Carrillo did not understand the potential immigration consequences of his conviction and sentence. However, it found that Carrillo failed to prove that this misunderstanding prejudiced his decisions at trial or during his sentencing hearing. View "People v. Carrillo" on Justia Law

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In this case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioner, Eddie Gomez, Jr., sought to challenge a Superior Court judge's denial of his request to disqualify another judge, Judge Kimberly Menninger, who was set to consider his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.Gomez had previously appeared before Judge Menninger for his arraignment, where he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted murder and two enhancements. Following the plea agreement, Judge Menninger dismissed the remaining counts and enhancements, sentencing Gomez to 11 years in prison. Later, Gomez filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and subsequently filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify Judge Menninger from ruling on this resentencing petition.However, Judge Jonathan S. Fish denied the peremptory challenge, stating it was untimely and that Judge Menninger, as the sentencing judge, was required to handle the resentencing under section 1172.6. Gomez then sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal, but his petition was denied.Upon review of the case, the Court of Appeal held that Gomez's peremptory challenge was indeed untimely. The court reasoned that the resentencing proceeding was a continuation of the earlier criminal action, and therefore Gomez was not entitled to file a peremptory challenge at the resentencing stage. The court affirmed that when the judge assigned to examine and rule on the resentencing petition is the same judge who presided at the petitioner's earlier criminal action, the petitioner is not entitled to peremptorily challenge that judge. As a result, the court denied Gomez's petition for a writ of mandate. View "Gomez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2018, Steven Laurent Montgomery Jr. was sentenced to 18 years in prison, including two one-year enhancements for prior prison sentences, after pleading no contest to several violent felonies. Later, under Senate Bill No. 483, which invalidated most prison priors imposed before January 1, 2020, Montgomery became eligible for resentencing. Although the court struck the prison priors, it did not hold a resentencing hearing.This matter before the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three was to correct this oversight. The court agreed with the Attorney General's concession of error, reversed the trial court's order striking the prison priors, and remanded the case for a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75.The court also addressed a disagreement between the parties about the power of the prosecutor to withdraw from the plea bargain if the resentencing resulted in further sentence reductions. The court sided with Montgomery, concluding that the legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's ability to withdraw from the plea bargain due to sentence reductions at the resentencing hearing. The court's interpretation was based on the text and legislative history of Senate Bill No. 483, which indicated an intent to reduce or preserve sentences while limiting the prosecutor's ability to rescind plea agreements. View "People v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

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In this case, Albert Jackson was alone in a parked car when two officers approached him. The officers boxed him in, shined flashlights on him, and questioned him, while observing that he was wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night and seemed nervous. The officers did not have any reason to suspect criminal activity, but they stopped and detained Jackson due to his behavior. The officers found a gun in Jackson's possession, leading to his arrest. Jackson challenged his arrest, arguing that his detention violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court disagreed and denied his motion to suppress the evidence.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight held that the officers' actions amounted to an unjustified detention. The court found that a reasonable person in Jackson's position would not feel free to leave due to the officers' display of authority. The court noted that the officers did not have any specific and articulable facts suggesting that criminal activity was afoot. Wearing a bulky jacket on a hot night, appearing surprised and nervous, and sitting awkwardly in a car do not amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court also rejected the prosecution's argument that the area was a high-crime area, stating that the officer's words did not suggest this.The court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction, and remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its order denying Jackson’s motion to suppress the evidence and to enter a new order granting that motion. The court concluded that Jackson's detention was invalid and violated the Fourth Amendment. View "People v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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This case revolves around the appeal of Timothy Marvin Santos, who was originally sentenced in 2007 under California's Three Strikes law and other enhancement provisions. The appeal concerns a resentencing order issued in 2022, where the trial court struck Santos' prior prison term and drug conviction enhancements but maintained his sentence of 25 years to life under the original Three Strikes law.Santos argued that the court did not apply the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 to reduce his sentence and that the resentencing was held without his presence, violating his federal and state constitutional rights. The People initially supported the trial court's decision but later changed their stance, suggesting that the court should have resentenced Santos under the current penalty provisions specified by the Reform Act.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, disagreed with this assertion. The court held that the Reform Act's revised penalty provisions could not be retroactively applied to Santos' sentence outside of the specific mechanism provided for in the Act itself. The court further concluded that if the resentencing statute was interpreted to authorize retroactive application of the revised penalty provisions without adhering to the criteria in the Reform Act, it would unconstitutionally amend the initiative statute.Concerning Santos' absence during resentencing, the court concluded that any error in accepting his counsel's waiver of his presence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Santos could not have offered any help since he was not eligible for a reduction of his term under the Three Strikes law based on the resentencing statute. Consequently, his absence could not have influenced the proceeding's outcome. The court affirmed the judgment. View "P. v. Santos" on Justia Law

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In the 1992 murder case of Laurie Houts, John Kevin Woodward was charged but not convicted. The case went to trial twice, resulting in deadlocked juries and subsequent mistrials both times. After the second mistrial in 1996, the trial court dismissed the case, citing "insufficiency of the evidence."In 2022, new DNA evidence led to the refiling of the murder charge against Woodward. However, Woodward moved to dismiss the complaint on double jeopardy grounds, asserting that the 1996 dismissal operated as an acquittal. The trial court agreed and dismissed the refiled complaint.The district attorney disputed this interpretation and petitioned the appellate court to vacate the dismissal order and deny Woodward's motion to dismiss. The district attorney contended that the 1996 dismissal did not bar refiling because the earlier dismissal was not due to legal insufficiency of the evidence, but was instead a decision made in the furtherance of justice.The appellate court agreed with the district attorney, finding that the trial court's 1996 dismissal did not clearly indicate an intent to dismiss for legally insufficient evidence and thus preclude retrial. As such, the appellate court ruled that double jeopardy principles do not bar the refiling of the murder charge against Woodward, and directed the lower court to vacate its dismissal order. View "P. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The defendant, Jason Felix, was arrested in Utah for a traffic violation where a consensual search of his car led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, and over five kilograms of methamphetamine. While in Utah, Felix became a suspect in two murders that took place in Southern California. Upon his return to California, Felix invoked his right to counsel when questioned about one of the murders. He was then put in a cell with an undercover detective, during which he made incriminating statements about both murders. Felix was eventually found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder.On appeal, Felix argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his car and his statements to the undercover agent. He contended that the traffic stop extended beyond a reasonable duration, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, he argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated as he had invoked his right to counsel before making the incriminating statements to the undercover agent.However, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision, ruling that the duration of the traffic stop was lawful and that Felix's consent to the car search was valid. The court also held that Felix's statements to the undercover detective were correctly admitted as they were made voluntarily and without coercion. Felix's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated as the incriminating statements were not the product of coercive interrogation.Lastly, both Felix and the prosecution agreed that Felix was entitled to an additional day of presentence custody credits, which the court confirmed. The case was remanded to the trial court to correct the presentence custody credits. View "People v. Felix" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, considered a habeas corpus request by Ropati Afatia Seumanu, a capital case convict. Seumanu sought a certificate of appealability (COA) after his habeas corpus petition was dismissed, as he sought to challenge the superior court's decision on nine points. The court agreed to issue a COA on one claim but declined to do so for the remaining claims. The court also addressed three unprecedented issues: whether the 10-day time limit for granting or denying COA requests was mandatory or directory; how strong a showing a COA applicant must make to meet the “substantial claim for relief” test; and whether an as-applied attack on the constitutionality of section 1509, subdivision (d) was appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court found that the 10-day time limit was not mandatory, a “substantial claim to relief” required a strong enough showing for reasonable jurists to debate whether the trial court erred, and as-applied attacks on the constitutionality of section 1509(d) were appealable under section 1509.1(c). The court also discussed the need for a COA applicant to provide an adequate record for review. View "In re Seumanu" on Justia Law