Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Kevin Gray, a sexually violent predator (SVP), was found suitable for conditional release. The State Department of State Hospitals identified a proposed placement for Gray, but the Stanislaus County District Attorney opposed it due to its proximity to a home where a child engaged in a public charter school’s independent study program. The court ruled that the home constituted a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f), making the location ineligible for Gray’s placement.The trial court initially determined Gray was suitable for conditional release and ordered a housing search. After an extensive search, a proposed site was identified. The People opposed the site, arguing it was too close to a home-based school. The court agreed, ruling the home was a “school” under the statute, and barred the placement.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a home where a child engages in a public school independent study program does not constitute a “school” under section 6608.5, subdivision (f). The court distinguished this case from People v. Superior Court (Cheek), which involved a private home school. The court noted that independent study is a program, not a type of school, and the legislative intent behind the placement restriction was to protect children in traditional school settings. The court declined to consider alternative arguments regarding the proximity of children fitting Gray’s victim profile, as these were not addressed by the trial court.The court granted the petition for writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order barring Gray’s placement at the proposed site. View "Gray v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

Brooklyn Broadway pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter and hit-and-run causing death, while Ana Villanueva was convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon, willful cruelty to an elder, and robbery. Both defendants were referred to the San Diego County Behavioral Health Court (BHC) for admission screening over the objections of the People. The People filed peremptory challenges against the assigned BHC judge, Judge Cynthia Davis, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, which Judge Davis denied, concluding that BHC proceedings do not involve contested issues of fact or law.The People sought writs of mandate from the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, to direct the trial court to grant their peremptory challenges. The appellate court issued orders to show cause and consolidated the petitions for review.The Court of Appeal held that BHC proceedings do involve contested issues of fact or law, as the BHC judge makes the final decision on whether to admit a defendant into the program, which can be contested by the parties involved. The court concluded that the BHC judge's role in screening and acceptance decisions, as well as in probation violation hearings, constitutes hearings involving contested issues of fact or law. Therefore, the People’s peremptory challenges were timely and appropriate.The Court of Appeal issued writs of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders denying the People’s peremptory challenges and to enter new orders granting the challenges. View "P. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Armani Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, Miller filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019. Miller contended that subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life should apply to his case.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Miller's petition, finding that he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the changes to the felony-murder rule, and thus, he could not benefit from the amendments. The court also noted that Miller's argument based on subsequent case law was not sufficient to meet the statutory requirements for relief.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 because the amended information filed against him in January 2020 did not allow the prosecution to proceed under the old, now-invalid theory of felony murder. The court emphasized that the charging document required Miller to be a major participant in the kidnapping and to act with reckless indifference to human life, aligning with the amended felony-murder rule. Therefore, Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief as he was not charged under a theory that imputed malice solely based on his participation in the crime. The court affirmed the denial of Miller's petition for resentencing. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

Daniel Bray pleaded no contest to possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to two years of formal probation with several conditions, including restrictions on Internet use, dating or socializing with individuals who have custody of minors, and prohibitions on possessing or frequenting places with pornography. Bray challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.The Santa Clara County Superior Court imposed these conditions, and Bray objected to the conditions regarding Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography. The trial court overruled his objections, finding the conditions reasonable and related to the offense. Bray then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the Internet use restriction was overbroad, as it unduly burdened Bray's ability to perform daily tasks and maintain employment. The court also found the condition on dating and socializing overbroad, as it infringed on Bray's right to freedom of association without being closely tailored to the goal of protecting minors. Additionally, the court agreed with the Attorney General's concession that the conditions regarding pornography were unconstitutionally vague and needed modification.The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to strike or modify the conditions on Internet use, dating and socializing, and pornography to ensure they are narrowly tailored and specific. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Bray" on Justia Law

Armani Miller appealed the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. In August 2020, Miller pled no contest to voluntary manslaughter with a firearm use enhancement and was sentenced to 16 years in state prison. In May 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder based on changes to the felony-murder rule effective January 1, 2019, and subsequent cases recognizing youth as a factor in determining reckless indifference to human life.The Alameda County Superior Court denied Miller's petition, finding he failed to make a prima facie case for relief. The court reasoned that Miller's plea and conviction occurred after the felony-murder rule was amended, and he could not show he could not be convicted of murder due to changes effective January 1, 2019.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Miller could not establish a prima facie case for relief because the amended information against him was filed after the felony-murder rule was amended by Senate Bill 1437. Therefore, the prosecution was precluded from proceeding under the old, invalid theory of felony murder. The court concluded that Miller was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), as the charging document did not allow the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder that imputed malice based solely on his participation in the crime. The order denying Miller's petition for resentencing was affirmed. View "People v. Miller" on Justia Law

The People initiated a criminal prosecution against Diana Maria Teran, alleging she misused information obtained during her employment with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) while working for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. Teran was charged with violations of Penal Code section 502, subdivision (c)(2), which criminalizes unauthorized access and use of data from a computer system. The charges were based on Teran’s alleged use of data related to disciplinary proceedings of sheriff’s deputies, which she accessed during her tenure at LASD and later shared with a colleague at the District Attorney’s Office.The Los Angeles County Superior Court held Teran to answer on six counts after a preliminary hearing, finding sufficient evidence that she accessed the deputies' personnel records through LASD’s Performance Recording and Monitoring System (PRMS) and used this data without permission. The court rejected Teran’s argument that she was exempt from prosecution under the statute for acting within the scope of lawful employment and denied her motion to dismiss the charges under section 995. Teran then filed a petition for writ of prohibition.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and granted Teran’s petition. The court held that section 502(c)(2) does not apply to the use of purely public court records, even if those records were accessed from a computer system without permission. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the statute was to prevent hacking and tampering with computer systems, not to criminalize the sharing of public information. Consequently, the court ordered the dismissal of the charges against Teran and unsealed certain exhibits related to the case. View "Teran v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

In 1999, a jury convicted Patrick Allen Trent of first-degree murder and street terrorism but found not true the enhancements that he had personally used a knife and that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life plus eight months. This court affirmed the judgment in 2001. Trent’s first-degree murder conviction was later reduced to second-degree murder, reducing his aggregate term to 15 years to life plus eight months. In July 2020, Trent filed a petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, which the trial court granted in February 2022. The trial court redesignated the murder conviction as assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury with a great bodily injury enhancement and resentenced Trent to six years eight months.The trial court denied Trent’s request to vacate the gang conviction, finding that section 1172.6 concerned the murder conviction. Trent timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to retroactively apply Assembly Bill No. 333 to his gang conviction and in imposing a great bodily injury enhancement to the redesignated offense. The People opposed Trent’s arguments but agreed that the abstract of judgment required correction to reflect that Trent’s convictions were by jury, not by plea.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, agreed with Trent that he was entitled to the retroactive application of Assembly Bill No. 333, requiring the reversal of his section 186.22 conviction and remand for further proceedings. The court also vacated Trent’s great bodily injury enhancement, finding that the trial court erred in imposing an uncharged enhancement. The court directed the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting these changes and that Trent’s convictions were by jury. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "P. v. Trent" on Justia Law

James Dixon was convicted in 2008 of first-degree murder and two counts of rape. The jury found true special-circumstance allegations that the murder was committed during a robbery and kidnapping, and Dixon was sentenced to death. Additionally, the court imposed and stayed execution of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the rape convictions, a one-year firearm enhancement, and four one-year prior prison term enhancements under Penal Code section 667.5, former subdivision (b).The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation informed the Superior Court of Los Angeles County in 2023 that Dixon was eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The superior court, without holding a hearing, permanently stayed execution of the prior prison term enhancements but ruled Dixon was not eligible for resentencing because the trial court had stayed execution of his enhancements. Dixon appealed, arguing he was entitled to a full resentencing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the superior court had jurisdiction to resentence Dixon on the noncapital portions of his sentence, despite his pending automatic appeal in the Supreme Court. The court held that section 1172.75 applies to all enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former subdivision (b), whether executed or stayed. Therefore, the superior court should have stricken the prior prison term enhancements and conducted a resentencing hearing on the non-death portions of Dixon’s sentence.The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's order and directed it to vacate its previous order, strike Dixon’s prior prison term enhancements, and resentence him on the rape convictions and the firearm enhancement in accordance with section 1172.75. The superior court was also instructed to prepare a new abstract of judgment and send it to the Department. View "P. v. Dixon" on Justia Law

In 1985, the petitioner was sentenced by the Los Angeles County Superior Court (LASC) to 15 years to life plus seven years for murder. While serving this sentence, he was found with methamphetamine in 1997 and subsequently sentenced by the Kern County Superior Court (KSC) in 1998 to an additional eight years, to be served consecutively. In July 2024, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified both courts that the petitioner qualified for compassionate release under Penal Code section 1172.2. The KSC denied the petition, while the LASC granted it and ordered the CDCR to release the petitioner. However, the CDCR refused to release him, citing the unserved eight-year sentence from the KSC.The petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, which ordered the CDCR to show cause why the writ should not be granted, questioning the compatibility of sections 1172.2 and 1170.1(c). The case was transferred to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The appellate court reviewed the case and concluded that section 1172.2, which mandates a single court to resolve compassionate release petitions, is reconcilable with section 1170.1(c), which governs consecutive sentences for in-prison offenses.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that section 1172.2 requires a single court to handle compassionate release petitions and that the KSC, as the last court to impose a sentence, was the appropriate court to rule on the petition. The court found that the statutes were not irreconcilable and denied the petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. The order to show cause was discharged, and the petitioner’s request for release was denied. View "In re Brissette" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child and sentenced to 12 years in prison. The trial court also ordered the defendant to undergo an HIV test and to stay away from his ex-wife and three of his children. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court erred by allowing speculative testimony, ordering the HIV test, and issuing a no-contact order with his ex-wife and two of his children.The Tuolumne County Superior Court initially charged the defendant with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child and three counts of lewd conduct against a child. The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts but hung on the substantial sexual conduct enhancements. The prosecution did not retry the enhancements. The trial court reversed the convictions on the lewd conduct counts and sentenced the defendant to 12 years for the continuous sexual abuse count. The court also ordered the defendant to undergo HIV testing and issued a protective order against his ex-wife and two of his children.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the defendant’s conviction but found that the trial court erred in ordering the HIV test and including the defendant’s ex-wife and two of his children in the protective order. The appellate court vacated the HIV test order and the protective order as it pertained to the ex-wife and two children. The court directed the trial court to amend the protective order to reflect that it was issued under the correct statutory basis and that only the victim, T.W., was to be protected. The case was remanded to the Tuolumne County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s opinion. View "P. v. Walts" on Justia Law